Poll: Is epiphenomenalism true?

Philosophy Forums Philosophy
1

Is Epiphenomenalism true?

  • All thoughts are effects of the body, thoughts have no causal powers. Epiphenomenalism.
  • Some thoughts are effects of the body, thoughts have some causal powers. Non-epiphenomenalism.
0 voters

Epiphenomenalism is the belief that our thoughts do not cause our behavior. The standard metaphor is to think of a train blowing off smoke. The train moves (which is the body) and blows off smoke (which is the mind/thoughts). The smoke does not control the movement of the train. The thoughts are completely passive.

2

That’s just silly. I’m playing a game of chess… I have to evaluate the consequence of each possible move and decide on which to play. Then my body moves a piece.

3

I Think useing the Word ‘thoughts’ is making epiphenomenalism sound sillier than it actually is. I disagree with EPI P, but the Word ‘thoughts’ allows an equivocation to take Place. What we call thoughts, to the epiphenomenalogist is actually just an experience of a set of physical processes in the brain, processes that do indeed cause behaviors and are also caused by behaviors. But the experience, the subjective side of ‘thoughts’ or mental phenomena are, to the Epis, not causal. So in Phyllo’s example, certainly brain processing in reaction to the position on the chess board leads to certain behaviors and not others. But this is all physically determined. The noticing of these thoughts, the consciousness of these thoughts, the subjective side/observer side is not causal, according to the Epis. But the neuron based ‘calculations’ absolutely lead to effects according to them. The rest is mere qualia.

4

If it’s physically determined, then what identifies the pieces on the chess board?

What is doing the calculation?

5

I just wanted to give a further explanation of Epiphenomanalism (or my understanding of it) for those uninitiated in the conversation:

The basic idea is that consciousness is not an active part in the activities of your body - consciousness can be described as ‘the inner listener’. The body has ‘thoughts’, so to speak, and even neurologically creates auditory patterns to ‘think’ about those ‘thoughts’, but there’s no subjective experience necessarily in the body - that’s where consciousness comes in. Consciousness is that which hears those thoughts. It doesn’t do anything. It doesn’t create thoughts, cause movements, or anything like that. It’s merely a subjective observer.

And if you removed the observer, the body would go on behaving as it did before.

The common thought experiment is the parallel zombie universe. Basically, you have this universe, in which the bodies are occupied by listeners, and you have the zombie universe in which they aren’t. In both universes, according to the epiphenomenalist, exactly the same stuff happens. Humans behave exactly the same way. There is a zombie me making this post right now, but he’s not conscious. He has no ‘listener’, no subjective awareness of what he’s writing.

The clue to why epiphenomenalism is intuitively unacceptable is in the above paragraphs. 20 points to the first person that finds it.

6

Things like cancer cells and normal healthy cells both are bodily activities and forms which don’t respond to thoughts and will.
That is a little example of how we don’t have total control over our body. We also don’t have total control over our thoughts.
Therefor I believe in something like small will vs free will.

7

Like most polls, they tend to ask 'when did you stop beating your wife."
Forcing you down into a narrow choice that is not justifiable.
Your choices are not mutually exclusive, there are other possibilities not covered by your question.

As all effects are caused, not by single factors, but also enabled by the current state of reality, which enables the following moment in time to happen. You cannot simply discount any single factor as a possible cause, reducing it to an effect only. That would be an hopelessly naive and linear view of causality that plays into the hands of those that would want to reject a determinism, replacing it with a Laissez-fairre wilful universe, with effects bereft of causes.

8

I think you’re talking about something else, Hobbes. There’s no ‘effect without a cause’ in epiphenomenalism. Only things without effects.

9

You are correct about epiphenomenalism.

10

i’m not an epiphenomonalist…
that said…
The eyes pick up patterns these are translated into other patterns in the neuronal activity,and the brain like some very complicated calculator chooses a move in response.

The calculator of the brain. Just like calculators do calculations. Or other devices we do notconsider to be conscious, b ut which respond to stimuli with calculation and then action. Robots, computers, burglar alarms,w hatever.

The Es believe that consciousness is a kind of impotent witness
and that there is a ‘choosing’ quale.

But the physical brain does calculate and react, in a completely determined fashion.

11

What would be the use of having an ‘impotent witness’?

The brain can regulate bodily functions without conscious thought. If it could make decisions in an automatic ‘thoughtless’ way, then why would it not do so? Why would any thoughts arise at all, unless it was necessary or useful in some way?

12

It’s the same thing.
But then you are forcing a distinction between states of affairs that can and cannot effect. You are drawing a special case for some states of existence without warrant.
To have thing hood is to be causal, you can’t have your cake and eat it.
A thought must be constituted, that constitution is in some way effective/affective.

Choice two is just ridiculous. Some this and some that - how and why?

13

Raising the question in validates it’s own premise. Thought , falls into two modes of regression :astonished:nto logically contradictory, in the sense that the question of identifying what.it is, leads to Russell’s infinite regress. On the other hand, justifying all patterns of though as epiphenomenal, regresses the idea as Ayer pointed out.

 The identification is the key problem of what thought is, on one hand, and what causes the determination: a signal, a cue, ?  Are these signals internal, external?

 The duality is sustained, and the question is simply incapable of validation one way, or another.


  Wittgenstein would probably  say that it is propositionally invalid to raise the question.
14

It’s not the same thing, not remotely. I don’t know what the rest of your post is on about, but nothing in epiphenomenalism talks about effects spontaneously arising without cause. I’m not defending epiphenomenalism – I think I made it clear that I’m not an epiphenomenalist. I’d even go as far as to say that it’s one of those ideas that shouldn’t be believed by anybody - not because it’s false, but because of how obviously false it is. Like Solipsism: almost no philosophers believe in Solipsism, talking about Solipsism is more like an exercise. You intuitively know why you can’t accept it, the exercise is to explain why. For me, epiphenomenalism should hold the same place: it can’t be true, if you’re thinking clearly you know it can’t be true. The exercise is in explaining why.

But just because I don’t believe epiphenomenalism is a remotely reasonable position doesn’t mean I’m not going to correct you when you say things about effects without causes. That’s incorrect. Epiphenomenalism is about matter having an effect on consciousness, while consciousness is not having an effect on matter. Neither of those previous two statements involves effects without causes. You have a misunderstanding somewhere.

15

I read a movie script about Epiphenomenalism recently:

16

Haha, that was great. Very witty. Did you write it?

17

I wish.

18

Okay let’s deal with the “rest of my post”, first. It relates to choice 2) ;"Some thoughts are effects of the body, thoughts have some causal powers. Non-epiphenomenalism..
This is inherently preposterous. I said some this some that. If only some thoughts are causal, then how can that be the case? Some are causal some are not - I just have no idea where you are going with this. So one thought gives rise to an arm movement? But others lead to nothing. It seems to me that a thought that can implies that it has an energy content, thus a thought that appears to lead to nothing will have to lead to at least waste heat, or contribute to another thought, or changed brain state; there are no effect less circumstances. Nothing is without effect; a thing must effect its self, unless it disappears spontaneously.
I am miffed here because you have once again gone on the defensive and have started to flirt with ad homimen, in absence of actually dealing with my point (i.e. “if you are thinking clearly” oh um).
As for you being an epiphenomenalist or not, that is completely irrelevant. The real point I’m making is that your choices are not mutually exclusive. You say you may choose one, but I can’ bring myself to choose either given the way they are articulated.
What I also object to is you resorting to “intuition” to reject EP, without giving adequate reasons, leaving me with choice 2, which is utterly absurd.

19

But gees whizz you just can’t say why?

FYI, I am not saying that he is not correct.

However since yo mention it, FJ is in fact misrepresenting EP.
In fact EP is a species of determinism which posits consciousness are a supervening quality of indirect causality; designed to account for advances in scanning technology which now suggests that we are conscious of our thoughts after we have them.
The degree to which thoughts are part of an ongoing chain of causality is moot.

20

Oh, you’re an epiphenomenalist. I didn’t realize that, I genuinely thought you weren’t. You hadn’t made your position very clear. I honestly wasn’t trying to insult you, because I honestly didn’t think you believed that.

It’s too late to take it back now, though… :evilfun: