Postgrad essay question: Commonwealth property law

D3R7 · December 30, 2015, 10:45am

Impressed upon a landholder by his neighbour were a number of demands in relation to his property tenureship…

D3R7 · December 30, 2015, 10:49am

The demands themselves were cultural in nature and were communicated with an apparent guarantee of Crown complicity…

D3R7 · December 30, 2015, 10:54am

The landholder would like to know if his neighbour’s demands carry with them a responsibility in law.

500 words or less

The_Golden_Turd · December 30, 2015, 12:33pm

Yes. Its a ancient right, rooted the Clameur de Haro.

en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clameur_de_haro

It hasn’t been fully repealed anywhere, including the US, and us still in force in some parts of the Commonwealth in near original form. Its morphed considerably from it’s original source, and must go through the court systems (usually), which are fully autonomous of the royalty now.

I need to point out Mozambique unlikely follows our pattern of law, but given the antiquity of this, likely has it in effect form it’s own equivalent from it’s colonial core of laws.

Like… this forum… it’s owned by a moderator, yet is public space under US law, circuit courts have ruled Carleas isn’t nearly as entitled to do what he wants with our posts as he thinks he can, per rulings against Linden Labs/Second Life. You still have ownership over yourself, and your right to speech isn’t negated just because someone owns the ground you stand on, if it’s publicslly accessible, and merely slapping up a involuntary contract stating that by reading by his, you agree with this, isn’t a enforceable contract in the US for this sort if behavior… what has been calked “antics” has actually been well in accord with my responsibility to confirm my property rights to my own copyrighted protected speech continues dispute Carleas, Magsj, and whoever claims otherwise. I could Sue Carleas, at the very least get the site’s server temporarily seized by my rights. These are ancient rights, that evolved out of this law, regarding property.

Nowadays, you would have to pilfer through something like Casner’s Cases and Text on Property, still a requirement in many law schools. You can’t fit that in under 500 words or less.
amazon.com/Cases-Text-Proper … 0735539804

The Commonwealth is going to be all over the place on this, because no treaty can be expected to tie all the common law aspects of this built in under one set of treaty clauses, nor is any law firm on the planet aware of every tangent this impulse over the last 1000 years has taken, it’s imbedded all over the place… it’s hidden inside the law making capacity of Parliaments and Congress to pass laws on the use of land… which are Democratic Republican in it’s nature (not the King in Parliament, I’m talking about actual Parliament, including Cromwell’s). In America, Congress can declare usage of land (so can municipalities, declaring your property as agricultural land only) limited, or outright force you to relinquish it. If you don’t own all the rights to your land, such as mineral rights, oil companies can Sue to have rights to access. Even when you own your land fully, rights to access can also be sued for, as it denies others their necessary rights to cross over it… it happens from time to time.

People can try to force properties on national historical registries… your usually aren’t allowed to change the property style, even if you own it (may I suggest some arson good sir?), if some stupid fucking eagle decides to nest, your fucked if your a logger… even applies to the military, some stupid bird called by troops in Georgia “The Red Headed Cock Sucker” apparently only nests in shooting ranges… it’s near extinction for it’s unwise choice of nesting, and insists on swooping down on targets whenever they pop up downrange, daring the soldier to shoot. Sure the he’ll wasn’t the military that came up with the idea to stop shooting, someone sued.

The law is smothered everywhere, fragmented all over the place.

D3R7 · December 30, 2015, 10:34pm

Turd Ferguson:

Yes. Its a ancient right, rooted the Clameur de Haro.

[…]

The Commonwealth is going to be all over the place on this, because no treaty can be expected to tie all the common law aspects of this built in under one set of treaty clauses, nor is any law firm on the planet aware of every tangent this impulse over the last 1000 years has taken, it’s imbedded all over the place… it’s hidden inside the law making capacity of Parliaments and Congress to pass laws on the use of land… which are Democratic Republican in it’s nature (not the King in Parliament, I’m talking about actual Parliament, including Cromwell’s). In America, Congress can declare usage of land (so can municipalities, declaring your property as agricultural land only) limited, or outright force you to relinquish it. If you don’t own all the rights to your land, such as mineral rights, oil companies can Sue to have rights to access. Even when you own your land fully, rights to access can also be sued for, as it denies others their necessary rights to cross over it… it happens from time to time.

Good response, but the relationship to Torrens title could have been explored more thoroughly.

Can we talk of ‘proximate appeasement’ in relation to burgeoning freehold? What’s really fair in the eyes of reasonable men? Most importantly, when does Crown complicity give way to forfeiture when the evidence is nowhere to be found?

The_Golden_Turd · December 31, 2015, 4:18am

That sounds like a question for Maia… or Carleas, who claims with little supporting evidence to be a lawyer.

I’m a philosopher and historian with a interest in minor interest in Commonwealth law, and you just tapped my wealth of knowledge on Commonwealth Property Law outside of Hong Kong.

I’ll Google the answers I suppose, but not sure it’s going to be overly accurate from this point on. Fair heads up.

And like… don’t cross examine me like I’m in a Master’s course getting a review… of course I can do better, that was a what I knew on the fly, I didn’t exactly set out to become a British Lawyer… not a fan of the mops they wear on their heads (though its being phased out now finally for Judges), and dont want to feel like I’m going to fail some course I never was in to begin with.

The_Golden_Turd · December 31, 2015, 4:41am

Next to nothing found initially, but found a British heavy blog discussing a Peruvian case regarding climate change, one of the comments look good, made two weeks ago:

Janice Moore on December 14, 2015 at 10:37 am
Q: How can a company plausibly reject a lawsuit for business activity related damage to the environment, when their PR department embraces claims that such damage is occurring?

A. Setting aside the jurisdiction issue (i.e., assuming jurisdiction in that venue),

for there to be liability there must be inter alia: 1) a legally recognized injury (a cause of action under the law, e.g., negligence); 2) to the plaintiff (= “standing”); and 3) the defendant’s actions must have proximately caused that injury.

I don’t know enough of the facts of the case or the legal theory being asserted by the plaintiff here to conclude, however, the reason the German attorneys did not respond is likely because there is NO cause of action under the law which imposes a duty of care on that defendant to protect that plaintiff from that injury.

The plaintiff has the burden to prove “nexus” or “causation.” If CO2 is the alleged agent of damage, the plaintiff, for the foreseeable future, can NEVER prove that.

People sue non-liable deep pockets all the time, hoping they will weigh the cost-benefit of defending and settle. I hope the defendants fight this to ultimate victory over the Green Opportunists. And, yes, if they run into enough politically corrupt judges, they will have a long, uphill, battle — but, the fight is worth it.

And it’s true, you can Sue anyone, but the cases get publicity once taken to trial, and just looks bad usually (philosophers being sued would just get the case thrown out, reap the notoriety and write a counter essay, doesn’t work so well if your a brick factory).

Carbon Emissions are being treated as both an effect as well as property to be traded and speculated on… which gets complicated considering all the banking apparatuses built up over the last few major stock market crashes… I’m going to look more in depth using this as a springboard.

wattsupwiththat.com/2015/12/14/s … -eldorado/

Inter Alia & Inter Alios
legaldictionary.net/inter-alia/

Preponderance of Evidence
legaldictionary.net/preponderanc … e/Evidence

Now begins the task of seeing how it works in England, how the terms morphed, and how the Brits ducked up the concepts.

Once that is done, we can leap over to parallels in Commonwealth Law… I usually see on wikipedia listings on how laws evolved between various Anglo legal systems, including the US… Aussies are usually the first to go renegade into questionable territory.

The_Golden_Turd · December 31, 2015, 8:03am

en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Freehold_(law

Indeterminate fixation… okay, so the 1925 law amended English law further away from modern French Law (children automatically inherit land upon death of biological parent, even if spouse still lives there, she can be booted out into the street to die, likewise, you can’t write in a French will who will inherit, children must. Its why if you ever hear a philosopher note the French don’t respect the wishes of the deceased, they speak of this… primogeniture likely has some logic, positively or negatively, on thus 1925 law, I’m willing to bet the English revert to this whenever the principles of the 1925 law can’t be established…

Alrighty, now I’m seeing familiar territory again… the crown seizure of free holdings in the West Country in the early medieval era…

See, the middle ages resulted in a slow increase of population… surplus population, resulted into pushes by disenfranchised sons to settle in former abandoned Welsh areas, big forests.

These holdings we’re developed, but didn’t contribute to the level of taxation and levies the king desired, and he had his own population pressures of people asking him to open up new communities, so he would evict them, forcing them further west, and new, more loyal families sent to occupy.

This continued until the collapse of the British Empire… they never stopped sending colonies, we’ve always had laws against squatters and vagrants, and it never was quite unified, because a vagrant could be urban and not squatting… or a squatter like Robinhood could be not a vagrant. The people would be pressganged, jailed, killed, encouraged to immigrate, sent to penal colonies.

I’m going to keep a eye out for this reasoning in the case studies, once I find them, it’s of interest, the logic gets frozen in common law systems and comes out occasional to fuck the poor and dispossessed hard at times. They neither pay for the courts, no historically provided judges… so the judiciary never had cause to look after them, even though they we’re often bona fide as legitimately British as any, just descended from a dispossessed second or third son, instead the first, given a trade and told to go fuck off. I’m guessing the 1925 law adjusted this to a degree.

Irish Free State started it’s slow succession prior to this law, do it’s a variable to look at, not now part of the Commonwealth, it likely has some concepts fossilized, being a relatively small country.

en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Irish_Free_State

The_Golden_Turd · December 31, 2015, 8:25am

en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Law_of_ … y_Act_1925

The Act followed on from a series of land law and policy reforms that had been begun by the Liberal government starting in 1906. This is how one American legal scholar, Morris Raphael Cohen, described it.

That which was hidden from Maitland, Joshua Williams, and the other great ones, was revealed to a Welsh solicitor who in the budget of 1910 proposed to tax the land so as to force it on the market. The radically revolutionary character of this proposal was at once recognized in England. It was bitterly fought by all those who treasured what had remained of the old English aristocratic rule. When this budget finally passed, the basis of the old real property law and the effective power of the House of Lords was gone.[3] The legislation of 1925-26 was thus a final completion in the realm of private law of the revolution that was fought in 1910 in the forum of public law, i.e., in the field of taxation and the power of the House of Lords.[4]

In the UK, this has received adjustments, so I’m guessing it isn’t the same across the Commonwealth (especially in revolutionary Africa)

Parts 7-10:
Part VII - Perpetuities and Accumulations
Part VIII - Married Women and Lunatics
Part IX - Voidable Dispositions
Part X - Wills & Probate

I’m already imagining Ex-Patriot forums for each Commonwealth country already discusses this stuff in great detail… someone marries, moves… spouse dies, suddenly family members hate the surviving Anglo and want them dispossessed… I guarantee you some horror stories abound on those forums, I see them occasionally online.

The_Golden_Turd · December 31, 2015, 8:52am

This covers American considerations for Proximate Cause, haven’t found UK references yet.

en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proximate_cause

They mostly resolve around tests to prove various forms of causation, and culpability, but the tests vary state to state… so the goal is to see what tests are used in British Commonwealth states. Fairness is going to be hard to discern in Non-Jury trials, so in regards to India, I don’t know how you can figure this out. In Jury trials, the survival of a test over time, gaining favorability, or likewise insurrections and Communist movements aimed at toppling injustices reaped from such laws can be seen as factors of how people view fairness… you want the tests that are most agreed upon, that results in the least civil agitation and violence.

From the American terminology, it looks basically like thus in regards to land use…

You have a spring on your property, on top of a hill, and I own land lower. I depend on the water, you decide to change the water’s path of irrigation, so my property dries up. It hurts me financially. I go to court… Sue either for damages or get the judge to slap you silly and return the water.

Interstate laws managing water from the Colorado River and Lake Meade run under this, and Mexico, a sovereign country, has it’s agreed upon allotments too.

Yet, in South America, Guyana is Communist… how do they differ?

The_Golden_Turd · December 31, 2015, 9:11am

en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Causati … nglish_law

Causation in English law

Causation in English law concerns the legal tests of remoteness, causation and foreseeability in the tort of negligence. It is also relevant for English criminal law and English contract law.

In the English law of negligence, causation proves a direct link between the defendant’s negligence and the claimant’s loss and damage. For these purposes, liability in negligence is established when there is a breach of the duty of care owed by the defendant to the claimant that causes loss and damage, and it is reasonable that the defendant should compensate the claimant for that loss and damage.

Public policy Edit

Policy at this level is less than ordre public, but nevertheless significant. The policy is to give bound to the scope of people who can claim damages, how much they can claim, and within what timeframe.

The claimant must prove that the breach of the duty of care caused actionable damage. The test for these purposes is a balance between proximity and remoteness:

that there was a factual link between what the defendant did or failed to do, and the loss and damage sustained by the claimant, and
that it was reasonably foreseeable at the relevant time that this behaviour would cause loss and damage of that type.
To clarify the nature of the judicial process, in Lamb v Camden LBC (1981) QB 625, Lord Denning said:

“The truth is that all these three – duty, remoteness and causation – are all devices by which the courts limit the range of liability for negligence . . . All these devices are useful in their way. But ultimately it is a question of policy for the judges to decide.”
In other words, the court’s main task is to do justice as between these parties in their present situation. For this purpose, a weighing evaluative process is required, rather than a clear-cut rule of law. For example, in Meah v McCreamer and others (No. 2) (1986) 1 AER 943, the claimant suffered head injuries and brain damage as a result of the defendant’s negligent driving, which led to a personality disorder. Four years later, he sexually assaulted and raped three women. The illegal nature of his conduct was not raised at the civil trial, and the claimant was held entitled to damages to compensate him for being imprisoned following his conviction. In separate proceedings, the three women assaulted obtained a judgment for compensation, so he sought indemnification from the negligent driver and his insurers for the amounts he had been ordered to pay. This was not a claim for his own personal injuries nor direct financial loss, but indirect loss. The three women could not have sued the driver directly because they were not foreseeable and so no duty of care was owed to them. The question was whether a person convicted of a crime was entitled to be indemnified against the consequences of that crime. Woolf J. held that the action would be dismissed on two grounds. First, the damages were too remote to be recoverable and, if such actions were to be allowed, it would leave insurers open to indefinite liability for an indefinite duration. Secondly, as a matter of policy, defendants should not have a right to be indemnified against the consequences of their crimes. In Clunis v Camden and Islington Health Authority (1998) QB 978 the claimant had been discharged from hospital where he had been detained under s3 Mental Health Act 1983. He was to receive aftercare services in the community under s117 Act 1983, but his mental condition deteriorated and, two months later, he fatally stabbed a stranger at a London Underground station. He pleaded guilty to manslaughter on the ground of diminished responsibility and was ordered to be detained in a secure hospital. Subsequently, he brought an action against his local health authority for negligence. The health authority applied to strike out the claim as disclosing no cause of action on two grounds. First, that the claim arose out of the health authority’s statutory obligations under s117 Act 1983 and those obligations did not give rise to a common law duty of care. Secondly, that the claim was based on the plaintiff’s own criminal act. In the Court of Appeal, the health authority’s appeal was allowed on both grounds.

The factual test of causation Edit

The basic test for establishing causation is the “but-for” test in which the defendant will be liable only if the claimant’s damage would not have occurred “but for” his negligence. Alternatively, the defendant will not be liable if the damage would, or could on the balance of probabilities, have occurred anyway, regardless of his or her negligence. To understand this, a distinction has to be made between cause and a precondition for the events. Lord Hoffmann in South Australia Asset Management Corp v York Montague Ltd[1] gave a classic example.

“A mountaineer about to undertake a difficult climb is concerned about the fitness of his knee. He goes to a doctor who negligently makes a superficial examination and pronounces the knee fit. The climber goes on the expedition, which he would not have undertaken if the doctor had told him the true state of his knee. He suffers an injury which is an entirely foreseeable consequence of mountaineering but has nothing to do with his knee.”

The doctor’s negligence does result in the mountaineer running a risk which he otherwise would not have done, but this is insufficient to incur liability. The purpose of the doctor’s duty to take care is to protect the mountaineer against injuries caused by the failure of the knee, not rock falls. Even though the injury might be reasonably foreseeable, the doctor is not liable. In The Empire Jamaica (1955) 1 AER 452, the owners sent their ship to sea without properly licensed officers. The pilot fell asleep, and a collision occurred. Though the pilot was negligent at the time, he was generally competent. Thus the question for the courts was: were the owners liable for the collision because they sent their ship to sea without properly licensed officers? Or was the factual precondition superseded by the question as to the competence of the pilot? There is no question that sending the ship to sea is “a cause” of the collision. The legal question is whether it is “the cause”. This is a question that the courts treat as objective, addressed by evidence and argument. Hart and Honoré (1985) describe the process for establishing legal causation as constructing a parallel series of events (counterfactual situation), and comment: “the parallel series is constructed by asking what the course of events would have been had the defendant acted lawfully.” Thus, the owners were not liable. Although they sent the ship to sea without licensed officers (what actually transpired) rather than with licensed officers (the lawful course), the cause of collision was failing to navigate a safe passage. As to the pilot, his lack of licence did not bear on his general competence. The significant factor was the pilot’s negligence at the time, and the pilot’s lack of license made no difference there. Had the pilot been licensed, he would have been no less likely to sleep. The license would not have awoken him. The owners were, therefore, exonerated on grounds that whether or not the pilot held a license made no difference to the real cause, which was not the pilot’s general level of competence, but rather his negligence at the time.

Similarly, in Christopher Andrews v Barnett Waddingham LLP and RAJ Waddingham (2006) EWCA Civ 93, the claimant transferred from a “safe” employer’s pension scheme to a commercial scheme on the advice of a firm of financial advisers. The breach of duty alleged was confined to advice about the protection afforded by the Policyholders Protection Act 1975 to “with-profits” annuities, and this duty was found to be breached by the first instance judge. The claimant would not have chosen the Equitable Life with-profits annuity if he had been given correct advice, but that did not entitle him to recover the loss he had sustained as a result of his acquiring the annuity. The 1975 Act would have applied if Equitable Life had become insolvent. That was not the case. The real cause of the loss was that the terminal bonuses were not guaranteed and were adversely affected by the downturn in Equitable Life’s fortunes. So the negligence as pleaded and as found by the judge did not relate to the fact that the terminal bonuses were not guaranteed.

In Pickford v Imperial Chemical Industries (1998) 1 WLR 1189 the Lords were asked to determine the cause of repetitive strain injury in a typist. Lord Steyn posed the question, “That immediately raises the point that there must be an explanation for the fact that she contracted PDA4. What was the cause of her PDA4? There really was no alternative on the evidence to concluding that this condition was caused by Miss Pickford’s typing work.” But alternative explanations are that typing might aggravate an inherent condition or generally be an unsuitable occupation for someone with a predisposition to that condition, and neither proves the legal cause. In all cases, the burden of proof is on the claimant to prove the cause as pleaded. There is no burden on the defendant to prove an alternative explanation of the cause of any loss or damage, but a failure to do so may be a factor in deciding whether the claimant’s explanation of the cause should be accepted. This test works well in straightforward situations, but it proves less successful in establishing causation in more complex situations where a number of actual or potential causes operate either consecutively or concurrently. For example, in Robinson v Post Office (1974) 1 WLR 1176 following an accident at work, the claimant had an anti-tetanus injection. Nine days later, there was an adverse reaction to the serum and brain damage resulted. No matter what tests the doctor might have performed, there would have been no sign of an adverse reaction within a reasonable time (see the Bolam Test). The doctor’s reasonable decision to provide the standard treatment was therefore not the relevant cause of the brain damage because the claimant would not have been injected “but for” the defendant’s negligence. Thus, in deciding between sequential contributions to the final result, the court must decide which is the more substantial contribution.

Breaking the chain of causation Edit

Main article: Breaking the chain
Acts of a third party Edit
Whether the acts of a third party break the chain of causation depends on whether the intervention was foreseeable. The general rule is that the original defendant will be held responsible for harm caused by a third party as a direct result of his or her negligence, provided it was a highly likely consequence. So, for example, where the defendant has control over the third party, or where the third party is faced with a dilemma created by the defendant, the chain of causation is unlikely to be broken and the defendant will normally be liable to the claimant for the damage caused: Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co Ltd. [1970] AC 1004. The continuity of liability is not imposed merely because the original negligence makes damage by the third party foreseeable, but where the defendant’s negligence makes it very likely that the third party will cause damage to the claimant: Lamb v. Camden LBC [1981] QB 625. In practice, however, the requirement that the third party intervention will usually break the chain and, at the very least, the liability to pay compensation representing the totality of the loss or damage will be apportioned between the two or more tortfeasors. So, for example, if A injures V, it is foreseeable that an ambulance will be called, that paramedics will lift and carry V, and that there will be a journey back to the hospital. This cycle of intervention is continued in the hospital. None of this activity affecting V would arise “but for” the original negligence so A will remain liable unless and until either an unforeseeable B intervenes (e.g. negligently drives his car and collides with the ambulance), or a paramedic or member of the hospital staff is so seriously negligent that it becomes a new cause of action.

Acts of the claimant Edit
Main article: Acts of the claimant
Remoteness Edit

Main article: Remoteness
Loss of a chance Edit

Main article: Loss of chance in English law
In loss of chance cases, the court is invited to assess hypothetical outcomes, either affecting the claimant or a third party where the defendant’s negligence deprived the claimant of the opportunity to obtain a benefit or avoid a loss. Although it has been relatively unsuccessful in cases of medical negligence, it does provide a remedy in professional negligence generally.

Loss of a right Edit

Main article: Loss of right in English law
Recent medical negligence cases suggest tacit recognition of a more rights-based approach to damage.

Causation: law and science compared Edit

Science and law have different functions but share striking similarities. Both purport to provide rational, reasoned, independent, unbiased processes concerned with the objective assessment of evidence. There are also striking differences. Scientific assertions compared with determinations of legal causation have the following characteristics:

they are population-based, not individual; general not particular;
they are probabilistic, not deterministic;
they are generally expressed as the refutation of the hypothesis and not a finding of fact or proof of an allegation;
the evidence is not exhaustive, whereas an adjudication is determined according to the evidence available.
The major distinction between legal determinations and scientific assertions lies in the concept of certainty. The legal concept of causation is deterministic: it is an expression of the fiction of certainty, an absolute concept. The scientific concept of causation is probabilistic: it is an expression of the uncertainty of truth, an asymptotic concept.

Look at those tests, in the quote above, and find which tests are used in land cases in the UK, and at least two other Commonwealth states.

Its 500 words or less, so you merely gotta show you can

Identify how to research the problem (I practically handed the answer to you, 90% of the effort)
Show differation of concepts between states.

If they can see you understand each Commonwealth country is independent, with their own Parliaments, and laws will drift, they won’t write you off as a hard. Mention it’s all descended from Clameur de Haro, and UK Law seeks to do justice to each claimant, a continuation of that ancient policy. If the tests don’t fit, you have no claim to injury, right, or hardship, your fucked. I don’t have much grounds to declare myself the King of Scotland, so will have a difficult time suing for my supposed land rights.

In the case of "The Principality of Sealand, courts refused to deal with it because they decided it was out of their territorial waters… how likely would this be the case is a North Sea oil tanker rammed into that pier? Would the UK recognize itself as liable, even though it claims it has no control over it, just because it built it, or would the idiot who claimed himself king be liable?

I suspect the UK would lose it’s own claim because it was negligent in tearing the shit down, or putting a light house or radio warnings on it… generally in peace treatises, the various sides agree to limit damages to fixed sums, claimants can lay claim to parts of it… but I don’t know the law on floating sea mines stuck in ice breaking lose, or being dredged up… if they go bang, even harder to prove who made them. I’m guessing most cases just say you should of had insurance, be more careful.

Sweden does a lot if work dredging up old mines and bombs from the Baltic. Its a proactive approach. I think it would have a lot of moral authority to demand NATO help, given they have the capacity to tackle the unexplored ordinance, and they we’re all involved in WW2. But that Principality of Sealand? Just the British, and it’s been continuously lived in by British subjects, a and his sovereign independence us questionable under international law… think England would revert to ownership upon the first sea accident of the site, but would then be refused any extension of oil and fudhing rights in it’s surroundings by a international tribunal… you owe costs for negligence, but can’t reap the rewards.

The UK recognizes Iceland’s expanded Fisheries, after Iceland defeated the British Empire in the Cod Wars back in the 70s:

Id like to point out, a lot of stuff I dragged up regarding the language for proximate appeasement regarding the English was WW2… related to Neville Chamberlain… it appears they we’re using the concept as foreign policy for Hitler’s land grabs.

You could try to loop Noam Chomsky and Nietzsche in through this, as it challenges his theory that states behave differently to it’s people and foreign countries, but this appears to be a case where the British didn’t abide by either observation… we treated the Nazi Empire on the same basis as a individual… the persona of Hitler as the state… likewise with Uncle George Stalin during WW2. It appears the WW2 generation didn’t read Nietzsche, and obviously not Noam Chomsky, and played on a more universal set of axioms, differentiating little between internal and external political principles.

I think I’ll stop here.