Isn’t a total an idea verging on an absolute mystery? at least with a so-called subjective whole we have a vision of what is under consideration. It seems the other way round - for example, herd, environment, mind, heap, bouquet, etc., are wholes and seem much less definite than the sum (total) of their individual parts.
But how do we know when we have reached the total? How do we know when to say “that’s all there is” or “I’ve counted all of them”?
And that’s my challenge here. Wittgenstein (and Kant in a round-about way) are the only philosophers who posed some severe problems associated with assessing totals.
Based on what I have written here, could they be right?
Yes, and that might mean that totals are not amenable to explanation. At least, I’m still waiting for one. I suspect there isn’t one immediately to hand.
I don’t think that they will deal with this in a mathematics course. The question is “how do we know when we have finished counting?”
(Interestingly, STOP and START was always problematic (and buried), to computing. Typically, Turing and others erroneously took the whole as a step (= STOP/START) in a computer programme and so confused STOP and START because of it… might post later on that one…)
Yes. I have to decide.
I can decide to count “all of them”, say.
Now, how do I know when to stop? When there are no more left?
But how do I know when there are no more left?
There’s a problem here it seems to me. It looks as though a totality cannot be assessed internally, among the elements themselves, that is. In other words, the description we call “totality” requires something more than just a description of the elements.
Another interesting addendum, as an example: Wittgenstein said that the world is the totality of facts. But is this a fact also? The elements - the facts- strive to overcome the whole or world. Wittgenstein’s solution was to say that the world is transcendental (a whole, or manifesting condition). To me this seems to be saying that a totality of elements is manifested through a whole, and the whole is not one of the elements. I think Witt used this as a solution to Russell’s barber paradox, and I think it served as solution to Frege’s set paradox. Is this simply Type theory? I don’t think so.
We could stop counting [and hence arrive at stop/start] when everything has occurred [end of time], or if we counted all things occurring now [if we could do that without taking time to do it that is]. My suspicions are that there is never an exact amount of stuff occurring, that you couldn’t count all the quanta in the universe right now, or overall, because something is fundamentally not allowing that to occur.
I feel there is one of those fundamental principles in there somewhere [not just improbability and wierd quantum stuff, but that from which such things derive].
yes, when there are no more left. You know when there are no more left the same way you knew there was one - you look.
it requires other than the description of the elements.
But your use of “description” allows for so much equivocation that it’s difficult to know what you are talking about. I can describe each object in a set, but I don’t need to do that to count them.
Russell himself solved it - a set is neither a member of itself nor not a member of itself. it’s just nonsense to ask the question. it is type theory, yes.
No, iam. This is merely an attempt at deconstructionism. Deconstructionism is, in my view, anti-philosophy, and not philosophy.
it is also my view, by the way, that when you come to a philosophy board with the intention of attempting to render philosophy meaningless, you may not be met with a sympathetic crowd.
Yes, I think Kant in particular was right about this question. Kant put boundaries on the limits of our knowledge. There are certain questions (such as this one) which run up against these limits of—not just our knowledge, but—our ability to even begin to answer them. And when that happens, these questions reverberate in a series of ongoing echoes—where we can ask the question again, and then again, and then again. You’ve presented the form that certain questions can take—I’ll give a particular example of a question that takes that form. One example is about the fundamental constituents of reality. Quite humorously, quasi-science has sought out the basic constituents of nature by looking closer and closer at smaller and smaller parts. As if size was to ‘reality’ like a golf score was to the winner. And for this they built bigger microscopes. You can go from substances, to chemicals, to atoms, to electrons, to quarks, and so on. And this still goes on. In your language, “a total is an idea verging on absolute mystery”. Because you can always divide something into smaller parts. And on, and on, and on. You’re right, theoretically speaking, you will never know when we’ve reached the total.
Hence, you’re right about Kant too—in my opinion. These problems emerge because of the way our mind works, and also can’t be resolved because of hte way our mind works.
Another example you might use to flesh out your OP is about calculating the total distance of a finite universe. Doesn’t it make sense to think we could always just add more?
What I should have said initially was just ‘science’—all science, legitimate science, and add to that: all philosophy (practically the entire discipline of ontology), and natural science too.
Perhaps you ‘get’ the OP better now? (…There are some ‘totals’ that you can’t arrive at “just by looking”, as you said)
The Planck length is the theoretical limit to a conception of space-time that allows for the division of space-time into smaller parts. Philosophers are the guilty when it comes to infinite divisibility of matter. Not scientists.
I don’t understand it. My point before was that a search for the basic building block of reality (the subject matter of ontology) seems hopeless, for Kantian reasons. This was just an example I offered to supply some content to the form of the question that JohnJones raised. In other words, conceptually, it seems (to me) to always make sense to ask “the question of totals” over again, and then again. JohnJones mentioned a few examples that might work, as well. As far as I know, nobody knows how to say “that’s all there is” (as JJ said). I agree, for Kantian reasons.
Furthermore, perhaps Planck has an answer. But I never accept a dropped name for an answer. And, like philosophy, the interesting theories in science don’t remain constant for long.
Also, I find it slightly hard to believe that this problem has nothing to do with scientists----since it seems always to be scientists coming up with a new “smallest part”. I’ll look into Planck when I get a chance. It’ll require whole paragraphs before I understand it. Not really your style. That said,
My main goal was to get the discussion going. Make some sense of the direction. Try to do away with insults and questioning of motives and intentions. Like this:
The OP was a good one, in my opinion. I’m not sure who you’re talking about.
Max Planck. The guy who came up with that whole quantum theory thing.
My point is that Kant never gave a good reason for blowing your nose. I hate Kant and I hate Wittgy, but only philosophically. I’d buy them, you and JJ a beer, any time.
We could talk about making oral sex a universal law, and discuss why it’s something that is whereof the girl can’t speak to our wives about and therefore must be silent.
But in any event, it’s rather Wittgensteinian to mix up metaphysics (ontology) and science. Scientists, qua scientists, do not do that. So let’s not accuse science of what philosophy (all too often) does. That’s just projection. This is what JJ consistently does, what you have just done, and is what I disagree with both of you about. JJ doesn’t understand set theory but wants to talk probabilities and you don’t know who Max Planck is but want to discuss infinite divisibility - and impugn science for the very sins that philosophers like Kant are guilty of.
Yes, I should have given a dissertation on quantum mechanics. It’s Max Planck. You’re telling us what’s wrong with science and you don’t even know the name?
Monooq - I am trying to take you seriously - I really am. But you can’t blame me if you don’t know anything about the Planck length - that’s high school physics.
Look - none of this is personal. I really would buy you and JJ a beer. And Wittgy. Okay - maybe not Kant. He doesn’t seem like a lot of fun.
The other reason that I hound JJ so much is also not even a little bit personal. I am a linguistic philosopher, in the tradition of Nietzsche and Russell. I am most interested not in positions, but in arguments. But also in the meanings of words. JJ consistently equivocates. He uses a word in two different senses as if they are the same sense. He also uses two different words as if they are the same. “Total” and “whole” often enough mean the very same thing. He does not allow the reader to know the sense in which he uses these words relative to one another. He does the same with “explanation” and “description” - so when he says “that might mean that totals are not amenable to explanation” (might!) it is difficult to know if he is saying anything at all, or if he is, what he is saying.
I have, since I have been posting on this board, been asking people what they mean, objecting to equivocation, and railing against linguistic nihilism. There’s nothing special about JJ unless it is that he is an extreme case.
You ask him about totals, and he replies “I don’t think that they will deal with this in a mathematics course.”
And adds: “Wittgenstein said that the world is the totality of facts.” - Which is a metaphysical statement, not one of science. But I never met a metaphysicist that didn’t equivocate.
No - they won’t deal with this in a mathematics course.
Scientists and metaphysicians have different motives and intentions. To ascribe the motives and intentions of the one to the other is what you and JJ are doing. I am just trying to keep them separated. I think that’s a legitimate philosophical stance, no matter how much it annoys you.