Probability and Truth

Philosophy Forums Science, Technology, and Math
1

Probability is no measure of truth.

Probable only means something common to our human experience, and therefore certainly true.

Improbable only means something uncommon, and not that the something is untrue.

The improbable is merely a reflection of our inexperience or our lack of knowledge.

When we say that it is highly probable the sun rises again tomorrow we are just saying that we strongly believe the sun will do so, although logically there is no reason at all to believe so. We are simply trusting (who? or what?) that what we know yesterday will continue to hold true tomorrow, even the next moment.

When we get an experimental result that which we reject at 99.99% confidence level, we are not saying that the improbable event is not true. All we are saying is that the our present theory makes that event so improbable. That event could well be true, if only we discover the right theory to explain it.

Probability is merely the degree of belief we attribute to an unknown or yet to be known event. To based your belief on probability is circular reasoning.

So probability cannot be the means to access truth.

2

There are no absolutes, their are only probabilities. WE accept these probabilities not as truths, but out of necessity. We live our lifes according to these probabilities because we have to…If we didn’t we would be paralyzed and unable to progress.

If their’s a 1 in 1000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 chance that you’re not going to come back to earth if you jump, it is reasonable to accept the idea that you’re going to return to earth each and every time you jump. Accepting probabilities is reasonable.

3

Human beings have no choice but to live with unknowns and uncertainties. Such is just part of human limitations.

And this uncertainty is expressed through the concept of probabilities - which is defined as the measure or degree of belief of an event.

But the point here is that an improbable thing does not mean a false thing or an impossible thing.

Improbable only means you know almost nothing, and thus when the improbable happens - and they do - you are surprised.

So if I say the sun will not rise tomorrow, you cannot say that this event is impossible, you can only say it is highly improbable.

4

Nice exchange, guys.

Chan is taking a Humean approach…

Excellent, Mr. Chan.

Nihilistic responds with an equally strong proposition, taking a sort of Kantian approach…

Absolutely wonderful. It is the “have to” that is to be considered. Synthetic a priori is necessary for there to be any objectivity at all, whether probable or certain matters not. This principle holds for both. With an very good finish…

“Reasonable.” Therefore it appears “logical” that the will sun rise tomorrow, even if the sun is only an appearance itself. The objective state of the sun is not what we conceive when we infer the causal relationship, that is irrelevent. What is important is the epistemological coherence of the proposition, it is the tripartite value of the statement that can only make sense: If A and B then C. Firstly, because there is no such thing as a “sun” if you mean that which you meant that second ago when making that statement. It(the sun) has changed ever so slightly and is no longer the value of A. Secondly, the concept of rising changes each and every time an individual object “rises” as it involves these changes in the empirical conditions, and is no longer B. Lastly, we would call “the sun rises probably” the value of C, as usually when there is an A and a B there comes a C.

But this logic exists with or without A, B, or C. It is the “IF” such a proposition were made amongst ever changing objective empirical truths there could never be any absolute truth, that voids Hume’s idea. Truth isn’t experienced, it is constituted by logic and rationale.

If Chan and Hume were to claim that “reason” is possible without “logic,” then they undercut their own proposition. Hume would say that it is reasonable to believe that the sun will rise tomorrow, but that this belief is not derived from logic. But what is “logic” if not the rationalization of likely possibilities at most. Then it is merely probable that things are probable, and this belief fails epistemologically from the start.

Yes it is logical that the sun will rise tomorrow. For there to even be the contemplation OF such a thing there must be logic. For there to be even the contemplation of the contemplation that this is wrong there must be logic. This is a rational truth and is not subject to empirical contingency.

Why?

Well, what is the “sun?” What does “rise” mean?" These items are changing, so obviously the statement “it is logical that the sun will rise tomorrow” is absurd.

But wait…for different reasons than what Hume believed.

Is the statement “it is snowing here right now” true? Sure, but not because there are flakes of ice falling towards the ground, or, for you physicists, subatomic particle energies interacting and conforming to physical events. But because if there is such a thing as a “snowing,” there is also and necessarily a “place” and a “time” for it. These space/time categories are inferred before there is any experience, during any experience, and after any experience. The only value left in the statement “If A and B then C” is in its epistemological coherency, it is a rational truth and cannot be used by Hume to begin with. It is absurd to assume that Hume has proven that there is such a thing as a “sun” and a “rising” here.

Who cares about the “isness” of the sun or its rising. Hume is in error to begin with to assume that he could even demonstrate causalty by mentioning empirical contingencies such as “rising suns,” and then turn around with the same logic and claim that such a thing is possible but not necessarily logical. Rubbish.

It is like asking the question "is “is” possible as a probable “is” or as a certain “is.” So the qualities of the “sun” are ambiguous and irrelevent. IF there is such a case where a rising “sun,” or collection of empirical contingencies, is experienced as a probable and causal event, it certainly isn’t because one logically deduced that a “sun” could “rise.” Why? Because remember, there is no such objectivity certainty such as a “sun” in the first place.

The logic is inferred synthetically, it is absolute and not merely probable. You posit the structures and categories for the experience and any possible empirical events. Here, “logic” and “probablity” are one and the same, but inaccessible according to Kant. The Truth is that there is a causalty that is only given to reason and not raw experience: whatever it is that is happening, is happening the same way regardless of what we believe is only “probable.” The sun, the rising, all are subject to change and therefore have no objective affect on the truth of the event.

Hume and Chan, I don’t think, can use the previous assertion to prove a distinction between pure reason and logic.

But don’t get me wrong, Chan, I’m not disagreeing with the fact that probability is not a means to truth. I’m just saying that “logic” IS probability and that we believe it will rise by logical deduction, but, at the same time, there is no such thing as a sun or a rising.

I know.

Don’t say it.

Just give me time and I’ll work it out.

5

Meaning that you are also not disagreeing that “Logic is not a means to the truth”?

6

“Reasonable”.

The reason to believe the sun will rise tomorrow is that it has always done so for all my life and even for all of mankind’s living knowledge, and that there was never a day in recorded history when the sun didnt rise.

Now is that a flawed reason? An illogical one? Is such a reason not founded on private as well as collective experiences? Is such a reason not a reason at all?

The implicit rationale in the reason is that “what is common is more likely than not to continue to be common” (called this proposition ‘C’). This is the notion motivating the concept of probabilities. Is such a rationale humanly unacceptable?

Now can we prove, logically, that C is true? I do not think so. It is an example of a ‘self-evident truth’, or perhaps more accurately, fundamental instinctive beliefs, founded on our collective human experiences.

And it is in this sense that “the sun will rise tomorrow” is not logical, as it is instead inferred entirely and reasonably from fundamental experential beliefs, namely proposition C. Is such an inferrence flawed?

And does it follow too, logically, from proposition C, the proposition that “what is common for a long long time is necessarily a certain thing” (called this C’)? Absolutely not.

On contrary the reason why an event is called common and not certain is that it admits to other events occurring other than the common one.

Of course you can make the assertion that “The Sun will rise tomorrow” a Certainty (and I do not think you are making such a claim). However if you do can you claim that this assertion follows logically from … what?

I rather adopt the less narrow position, on the basis, ie with the reason, that I never know what will happen tomorrow, such as an asteriod crashing into earth, only the hypothesis that “the sun will rise tomorrow”, giving allowance, however miniscule, that it may be false.

I am very confident - to the extent that I can bet lots of money - of the likelihood of the hypothesis continuing to be true, from experience, and not logic, so much so that I can lived and planned my life according to it, ie pragmatically I live as if the sun will always rise the next day.

But the epistemological problem is that as long as the sun keeps rising the next day, I will never know whether my hypothesis is true. It is proven false immediately the day the sun didnt rise. And further most people forgot that the sun will rise tomorrow is merely a hypothesis and instead have taken it as a certain fact.

Now what is the practical difference between an almost certain hypothesis and a certainty? Well in the former you have to make allowance even no matter how miniscule the chances are, for the consequences of it being false are literally life changing, if not earth changing.

Such is the fact that mere humans have to live up to.

7

Chan,

I’m with you, man, but I’ve been real busy the last few days.

You will have to excuse me if I have implied a different essence to the term “logic.” Its quite possible, as I have never studied it exclusively, that I am using the term incorrectly.

Your post was very good but it doesn’t detract from what I am saying. This might be because of my misuse of the term. I feel that if you understood what I meant by the term “logic,”(whether it is formal or original), and saw it in proper context you would agree. I admit, this is my fault, I should have given you the “Complete Guide To De’tropian Terminology.”

I want to show you the important part of my last post again, and further explain what I meant.

When the statement “the sun will rise tomorrow” is made, the only reason why it has any value is because it consists of coherent possibles. This is for three reasons:

  1. There might be a case where a Sun exists
  2. There might be a case where that Sun will Rise
  3. There might be a case where that Sun will Rise at another point in time Tomorrow.

The reason why that statement has logical value has nothing to do with the actual causal state of the three. This is for three reasons:

  1. The Sun will be different tomorrow
  2. The future doesn’t yet exist
  3. Rise(upward) is a relative motion

For all you know, that statement might mean that a leprechaun will vacum your living room tonight. But you don’t need to know that to propose a logical statement with real epistemological value: “the sun will rise tomorrow.”

You don’t need to know what a “sun”(the object) is. You don’t need to know what the “rise” (the motion) is. And you don’t need to know what a “tomorrow” (a future) is.

The fact that it isn’t logical that the sun will rise tomorrow isn’t because it is possible that an asteroid smashes it, or the hand of God wipes it away, of WW3 ends civilization before 12:00 midnight, or any other empirical event that, unfortunately, are no different than the events made in the proposition “the sun will rise tomorrow.” You see, you can’t relinquish the logical value of a statement by comparing it to real objects and events in the world. I could merely tack on a “D”(asteroid smashing sun) to the equation: If A and B then C unless D. But what is “D?” We’d have to do the whole thing over again, ad infinitum.

To rely on the ontological premises for an epistemological truth isn’t necessary. All we get out of the statement: “the sun will rise tomorrow” is a series of proximal and intersubjective liguistic affirmations. There is no experienciable(is that a word?) objective facts that could be used to prove that statement wrong, hence, the ad infinitum process of defining the unlimited particular points in the premise: C won’t happen IF D. And “D” is?..etc., etc.

Is it logical that the sun will rise? Yes and no. Because logic doesn’t corespond with the mutability of the empirical world, but logic and reason cannot exist without certain a priori conditions.

In lamans terms, “I dunno if the suns’ gonna rise tomorrow, but I know that I can think it.”

8

Off course I can do logic with abstract, unreal, and even unconceivable entities, called A, B, C, D etc. But the outcome of the logic-based reasoning are simply about these A, B, C and Ds, and nothing else and nothing more.

For any thinking to be practical, for any reasoning and philosophising to be of epistemological value, for any logic to lead to truth, the A,B, C and Ds must correlate to the real world, mutable albeit.

Someone here have said that truth must correspond to reality. So if your logical conclusions have no interpretations in the real world, not grounded in the messy reality and uncertainty of physical facts, do not give me insights upon which to act, then they are of no practical value, at best some delightful excursions into the rational mental world of your mind.

And we are not talking here merely about logic. We are talking about reasoning, and in general rationale is not synonymous with merely being logical. The are more grounds for reasons than just logic.

Logic is not an ends in itself, and, as it is apparent by now, that it is neither necessary nor sufficient to attain the truth. It is but a mere tool for effective reasoning.

I think of reasoning as purposeful imagining, and the reason why logic is effective is because it guide my imagining to arrive at pragmatic conclusions and not lead me to false ends, ie things not congruent with reality, eg leading me to conclude that I can fly or wont die. And what logic tells me is that the sun may not rise tomorrow (the premise being that no one knows about tomorrow), which is both practical and a wise thing to constantly keep in mind.

9

That does not prove the statement right either.

10

See, I disagree here. I could say that a shniggle(A) and a plurtz(B), when added together, make a vilivil(c), and the statement will be perfectly logical and correlated in and with itself. These items need not be “real” to be assumed in a logical relationship.

This was my point two posts ago.

You say:

But wait. What makes the reasoning that the sun will rise tomorrow any less logical that your reasoning that you can’t fly or won’t die? These are merely more A’s and B’s.

According to this, Chan, there is no logical reason for you to believe that you can’t fly, is there?

I’m sorry, dude, I just ain’t into this argument right now. You can let it lie and I’ll pick it up later.

This is becomming frustrating because essentially I’m agreeing, but for different reasons, which I don’t think you are seeing here.

11

I do not disagree either. It is logical. But thats not my point.

You are right, there isnt. Yes indeed there is nothing logical or epistemological to say that we cant fly and live forever. Only our experience say that it does not happen, and pragmatically lived like we dont.

12

Reminds me of college maths, topic Logics…but we aren’t that perfect to get the right experimental procedure to prove the theory is right…if not we could have won the Noble Prize for Chemistry!!!