My understanding of psychological egoism and its cogency, should anyone want to read about it or comment…
Every action every man has ever performed must be motivated by something. Psychological egoists hold that all action is ultimately performed with one consideration only: one’s own welfare. This renders all human action to be guided solely by self-interest. But how accurate an account of human nature is this? My aim here is to analyze the cogency of psychological egoism, and whether it can stand against any objection. With one tenable objection, this generalized theory cannot be valid.
Unlike ethical egoism, which prescribes you ought to act in your own interest, psychological egoism is a descriptive theory, claiming all people do act only their own interest. All motives obviously come from the self, but psychological egoists go further and hold all such motives regard the well-being of the self only. Every action is performed because, and under the supposition that, it will beneficial to he who acted. This, of course, eliminates any possibility of actions being performed solely to benefit others. Even if others happen to benefit, all action is undertaken in a manner which only aim at self-interest. No matter how selfless an action may appear, psychological egoists hold the motive for action can always be routed back to a motive of pure self-interest.
If one is to accept psychological egoism, which covers all men without exception, society and the nature of man is fundamentally different to how many suppose. Real moral sentiments are an illusion. Notions of friendships and family relationships are fundamentally altered; love itself could not be reciprocal. Any relationship is but a modified version of self-love, the friend or relative merely serving the purpose of gratifying the self. All hopes of human progress through time become tainted; everyone’s life is just a battle for self-preservation. Such a world, however, though having no human spirit, does not suggest a particularly malevolent picture of man. It simply identifies the underlying motive of man’s actions.
In “Leviathan”, Thomas Hobbes argues for the need of an absolute and sovereign power so strong that all men, having been rationally compelled to lay down their natural rights for their own benefit of peace, must carry out promises made to each other. Underlying Hobbes’ work is a world where the fundamental motive of all men’s actions is preservation. All actions serve this purpose and no other:
It is either in consideration of some right reciprocally transferred to himself; or for some good he hopeth for thereby. For it is a voluntary act: and of the voluntary acts of every man, the object is some good to himself. (Hobbes, “Leviathan”, p. 88, 1955).
A pre-social state of nature would not be able to facilitate contracts, because, of course, why act for another if the act will not be reciprocated? If Hobbes were to observe modern society, he may concede that not all action is egoistic, but would still hold that modern society was set up by egoistic, pre-social people. This, of course, seems impossible to test, but it is doubtful that pre-social beings could co-ordinate a state. Therefore, egoism of pre-social beings is not sufficient to argue for an egoistic society. Moreover, trust, which is fundamental for the carrying out of promises, is not necessarily exclusive to humans: a cat, having known a dog for a long time, is able to sleep (be vulnerable) in the presence of this dog. This could suggest an element of trust, without the need of language. However, it could still be argued that the cat was simply ignorant of the danger. Hobbes would retain, though not always acting in our best interests (which cannot possibly be known) we simply act in our own interest. Long-term detriment could therefore be ignored under the weakness of will succumbing to short-term interest; for example, indulging in the pleasure of smoking or drinking. A mother will raise a child by threatening pain and scorn for bad behaviour, and promising reward and pleasure for good behaviour. Such a method would appear to make psychological egoism more likely, but only shapes the beginning of life which later gives rise to moral faculties and the consideration of others.
The major problem for psychological egoism is, expectedly, the converse to which it claims: altruism. Altruistic acts are those which, supposedly, regard only the interest of others, and not the self. The greater the benefit caused for others, and the greater the sacrifice of the self, the harder it is for the psychological egoist to argue against it. This can range from avoiding stepping on a pigeon to sacrificing one’s life for another. A psychological egoist would argue the pigeon was dodged to avoid abuse from the public (or being seen as a brute), and in order to avoid any subsequent guilt. However, for the public to disapprove of such action would appear to make evident concern for others. But again, the psychological egoist could retort by claiming that keeping a good reputation offers rewards. Freedom from guilt would also appear to demonstrate concern for others, but the psychological egoistic could dubiously claim the avoidance of the feeling of guilt proves self-interest. Interestingly, the convincingly altruistic act of giving up one’s life for another could also fall victim to similar arguments. Consequently, all action, no matter how seemingly altruistic, is reduced to self-interest; or, as David Hume more eloquently put:
“the most generous patriot and most niggardly miser, the bravest hero and most abject coward, have, in every action, an equal regard to their own happiness and welfare” (Hume, “Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals” (1758).
Despite these refutations of altruism, psychological egoism undermines its own validity in the process. Though being valid, by adopting such a broad sense the theory becomes nothing more than trivial. Thus, if psychological action is just a matter of acting out one’s preferred course of action, the theory seems a matter of common-sense. Despite the use of this broad sense when refuting altruism, the essence of psychological egoism lies in man’s selfishness and lack of concern for others, or at least the value of the self over and above all others. One may genuinely think his concern does extend to others, but subconsciously a priority and love for himself governs all his actions.
Psychological egoism could, as Hume recognises, be seen as a hasty theory aimed at defining human action in the simplest of manners. The moral psychologist Butler offers a fairly comprehensive refutation. This is done be examining the complexity of the causes of human action. For Butler, there is an ideal that exists amongst men collectively. In “Five Types of Ethical Theory”, Broad thinks Butler would agree that this ideal “certainly involves the subordination of particular impulses to the more general principles of prudence and benevolence” (Broad, 1930). Further, he states more prevalent manifestation of this ideal is what is needed and, interestingly, not less self-love, as doing so often involves suppressing impulsive actions which often prove detrimental. Thus, actions of self-love “would not differ greatly from those which benevolence would dictate.” (Broad, 1930). It follows that excess of either self-love or benevolence can have negative effects, thus requiring the conscience to regulate impulses towards either of the two. Some impulses, of course, are more likely to lead to benevolent acts, and others to acts of self-love, and proportions of these impulses with vary from man to man, including the way the conscience deals with them. This resembles Aristotle’s notion of virtue, which is found by learning to exercise characteristics in moderation. As a result, Butler offers a more comprehensive and hierarchical outlook on the system whereby impulses pertain to potential actions which, under the attitudes of society and the individual, are assessed by the conscience and then either suppressed or acted upon.
Varied opinions of egoism in general could always be put down to the disposition of the speaker. Egoistic approaches could be deemed as attempts to justify one’s own selfish morality. The emotionless life of Hobbes, compared with the benevolent character of Hume could be the perfect example of their antithetical views.
To claim we live in a world governed by psychological egoism would, from a brief look at society, appear true. Particularly in modern western democracies, capitalist culture is but a transactional world of competition. Where people live in communities, consumers live in the marketplace; life in the latter seems all the more common. The economy is a battleground for getting the most for doing the least, that is, minimising reciprocation. As a basic description of the driving force behind mankind, psychological egoism is hard to reject. But as an essential explanation of human nature, it cannot be valid. Where basic action is generally geared towards personal interest, closer examination of human conduct is simply irreconcilable with psychological egoism. On a subtle level, human interaction continually involves behaviour which contradicts psychological egoism, from unrewarding courtesy to strangers, to placing litter in the bin (when out of sight from anyone). On a more significant level, similar to Butler’s view of a driving ideal of human nature, the vast majority of human action does steer towards one general direction: improvement. Such improvement could never be aimed for if benevolence was an illusion.