Marx is correct in saying that cognition is an effect of social interaction; he is, however, utterly and entirely wrong in reducing ‘social interaction’ to ‘modes of production’.
Communicability exists prior to productivity.
Okay,
Cite chapter and verse as I requested. Marx never said this. It’s a misquote.
Note: to avoid any misunderstanding, I am not a Marxist. Rather, I don’t believe in quoting out of context regardless of who is being quoted.
“Modes of production” does not just account for economical relations, but also aesthetic relations, ethical relations, political relations, and anything that is mechanical and operational in the sense that it is created and “appropriated” by man. We produce our ideas and our customs and our languages just like we would a commodity- the activities of people design and produce them. Each is instrumental. There is nothing we, as a species, share that is not the consequence of a dialectic at work; what is lacking leads to the idea of what should/could be produced. So our “social interaction” is the product of a refinement of historical circumstances as trial, tribulation, experimentation, and improvisation. This process of developing and refining is a “mode of production”. Everything about man is in praxis…it is evolving dialectically from the material to the idea- the latter is the effect of the former. Therefore, nothing about man is not “produced”.
I do agree with the Nietzsche quote though. “Consciousness” is indeed a fairly recent development in the human animal…almost superficial, when how long it didn’t exist is considered. But this isn’t to say that “social relations” are possible only for a conscious animal. A species that has no language still participates in social relations and therefore “modes of production” of its culture (being the entire scope of its nature…how and what it makes of itself).
I think you are wrong. “Die Religion … ist das Opium des Volkes”
comes from Introduction, 1843 Contribution to Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, also in Marx’s Journal, Deutsch-Französischen Jahrbücher—a collaboration with Arnold Ruge. Here it is:
"… Religion is the general theory of this world, its encyclopaedic compendium, its logic in popular form, its spiritual point d’honneur, its enthusiasm, its moral sanction, its solemn complement, and its universal basis of consolation and justification. It is the fantastic realization of the human essence since the human essence has not acquired any true reality. The struggle against religion is, therefore, indirectly the struggle against that world whose spiritual aroma is religion.
Religious suffering is, at one and the same time, the expression of real suffering and a protest against real suffering. Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world, and the soul of soulless conditions. It is the opium of the people.
The abolition of religion as the illusory happiness of the people is the demand for their real happiness. To call on them to give up their illusions about their condition is to call on them to give up a condition that requires illusions. The criticism of religion is, therefore, in embryo, the criticism of that vale of tears of which religion is the halo.
Criticism has plucked the imaginary flowers on the chain not in order that man shall continue to bear that chain without fantasy or consolation, but so that he shall throw off the chain and pluck the living flower. The criticism of religion disillusions man, so that he will think, act, and fashion his reality like a man who has discarded his illusions and regained his senses, so that he will move around himself as his own true Sun. . "
And yet, nevertheless, communication must exist prior to any of these social relations coming into being; they do not generate spontaneously, like the medieval myth of flies in a jar.
Sure, I agree with that. But I cannot deduce communication to language alone. How would you explain, for example, being motivated to behave a certain way because of a scent, or an image? Do you exclude any sensory data that is not language as being incapable of producing communication?
Of course it isn’t, and I absolutely agree with you. However, this fundamentally refutes one of the core tenets of Marxism: no social relationships arise prior to communicability, including labor arrangements. Therefore we ought to look instead to communication, in all of its forms, before we appraise material productivity as the defining characteristic of human activity.
Well, tunis, what did you find out? Was that citation correct or not?
Patience!!
I’m working on a reply.
Very good CharlieGadfly. Now we can read it in context to see what Marx really said. Quoting it this way:
…Communicates quite a differant meaning, and seems to communicate what the author had intended (even if one disagree’s with it), as opposed to quoting it this way:
Also, including the previous sentence in the quote…
…Sounds like he meant to say that religion gave some sort of relief, analogous to opium which offers pain relief to sick people suffering (Religious suffering is, at one and the same time, the expression of real suffering and a protest against real suffering…).
One thing I get out of reading the “religion-opium” thing in context is that he does not seem to be demonizing opium. Religion? Not sure.
Here is what Marx really said, in context, citing chapter and verse, as requested:
"… Religion is the general theory of this world, its encyclopaedic compendium, its logic in popular form, its spiritual point d’honneur, its enthusiasm, its moral sanction, its solemn complement, and its universal basis of consolation and justification. It is the fantastic realization of the human essence since the human essence has not acquired any true reality. The struggle against religion is, therefore, indirectly the struggle against that world whose spiritual aroma is religion.
Religious suffering is, at one and the same time, the expression of real suffering and a protest against real suffering. Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world, and the soul of soulless conditions. It is the opium of the people.
The abolition of religion as the illusory happiness of the people is the demand for their real happiness. To call on them to give up their illusions about their condition is to call on them to give up a condition that requires illusions. The criticism of religion is, therefore, in embryo, the criticism of that vale of tears of which religion is the halo.
Criticism has plucked the imaginary flowers on the chain not in order that man shall continue to bear that chain without fantasy or consolation, but so that he shall throw off the chain and pluck the living flower. The criticism of religion disillusions man, so that he will think, act, and fashion his reality like a man who has discarded his illusions and regained his senses, so that he will move around himself as his own true Sun. . "
Introduction, 1843 Contribution to Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, also in Marx’s Journal, Deutsch-Französischen Jahrbücher—a collaboration with Arnold Ruge [emphasis added].
Now, when I said Marx actually said “is the opium of the people” you said: “Marx never said this. It’s a misquote.” Again, I think you are wrong. After we agree on what he said, then we can discuss what he might, or might not, have meant by what he said.
Now, I pulled that off Google and don’t really know what he said because I don’t trust the internet. However, I was hoping you had some hard copies of the cited documents demonstrating that Marx never said the contested statement. However, since it appears, so far, that he actually did say it, I’d like that matter cleared before proceding.
Hello CharlieGadfly,
I’ll leave it set where it is for now. I’m not really very well read on Marx. Only know that the quote we were discussing is almost always quoted out of context by people in the society at large. And it is usually the only quote they know by Marx.
“Religion…is the opium of the people”, like any quote, needs to be read in context.
Thanks for giving us the introduction to the 1843 “Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right”. If anyone wants to read it in context, that’s where it is.
Well, now I’ve read several different views on what he meant because many people, like yourself, suspect that there was more to it.
Some folks see it as a slam on religion. Others see it as a slam on opium. Others point to some lauditory language that he uses toward religion. And still others, like your quote, point to lauditory language for opium.
But when all is said and done, it seems to me that what he meant is not inconsistent with the general understanding of those who throw the quote around without context: i.e. religion, like opium, treats a symptom and not a cause. It can be a good and understandable thing to want either religion or opium, and he doesn’t fault the want or the treatment. But he faults the cause of the “want” and feels that such will never be addressed so long as people are under the influence. In short, religion, like opium, is accepted by oppressor and the oppressed because it meets the goals of both with addressing oppression.
In otherword, religion is a tool of oppressors willingly taken by the oppressed. Religion, like opium, sucks because it dumbs the patient down from searching for the cure of the disease. When addiction occurs, it IS the disease. Keep the masses in a stupor.