Rationality

[arendt]

@Pragmatist

Notice that I am not trying to define what is and isn’t “rational.” Rather, I am defining that activity which is capable of producing what is both rational and irrational. For, only an organism capable of rational thought can be said to have acted irrationally.

@Dunamis

“There has to be a well-defined criterion or criteria.”

But isn’t the question whether this “criteria” is imposed upon fundimentally arational events, like perhaps a particular narration is imposed, or if this criteria is the base-form from which non-rationality is judged or understood? Only a rational person can act irrationally is like saying only a civilized person can act like a beast. Yes, civilized as a category also promotes its anti-thesis “beast-like” behavior, but that certainly wouldn’t pre-suppose civilization the starting point of all behavior, would it? I think there should be a distinction between irrational and arational behavior perhaps. What do you think?

@Arendt

But isn’t the question whether this “criteria” is imposed upon fundimentally arational events, like perhaps a particular narration is imposed, or if this criteria is the base-form from which non-rationality is judged or understood?

Well, I think we are mistakenly ascribing two different things to the issue. The fact that we can talk about what’s rational is an evidence that we have a sense of what is rational. From this sense of rationality comes what we think are the conditions which we deem to be the case for something to be rational or irrational. BUT—our conception of what’s rational hinges on, or presupposes, what’s irrational and vice versa. THIS is what it means to say we have a sense of rationality. You say ‘Is our criteria of what’s rational and irrational imposed on fundamentally arational events?’ is a bit confusing because the fact that right now you are able to identify that these are, if indeed they are, arational events says enough that you know the distinction and would, perhaps, be foolish to go further and say that we might be ascribing the criterion of rationality to some events that do not qualify to be such.

“Only a rational person can act irrationally is like saying only a civilized person can act like a beast. Yes, civilized as a category also promotes its anti-thesis “beast-like” behavior, but that certainly wouldn’t pre-suppose civilization the starting point of all behavior, would it? I think there should be a distinction between irrational and arational behavior perhaps. What do you think?”

Again, that we have a sense of what’s rational or irrational is a testimony that we are capable of judging an act or behaviour. I think the proper formulation of your statement is “Only a rational person can judge whether an act committed by him or by another rational being is rational or irrational. It is in the judging that we assert our sense of rationality. Can I judge that a shark has acted irrationally when it attacked the unsuspecting surfer? No. A madman by definition is irrational—because there is a presupposition that human beings are rational. That he himself cannot judge that his act is irrational is understandable, and acceptable. That I judge that his act is irrational is understandable and acceptable.

@Dunamis

“Only a rational person can judge whether an act committed by him or by another rational being is rational or irrational.”

You are right to shift the emphasis onto judging. The question is whether judgement is arbitrary in its standard, but nonetheless definitional, or if its standard is the standard. I’m inclined to think that “rationality” is a form of storytelling.

@Arendt

You are right to shift the emphasis onto judging. The question is whether judgement is arbitrary in its standard, but nonetheless definitional, or if its standard is the standard. I’m inclined to think that “rationality” is a form of storytelling.

I don’t quite understand when you say “if its standard is the standard”. It’s not like this is a proposition which we can ascribe truth or falsity. That is why I said JUDGMENT. We can judge something to be “good” or “bad”, just like we can judge something or an act to be “rational” or “irrational”. Now, by arbitrary do you mean----cultural based? Notice that I said SENSE OF RATIONALITY. Just like there is such a thing as experiencing, there is such a thing as “sense of”—this is not something I am inventing. If you want to call it a form of storytelling—by all means call it that. But my explanation of how we ascribe rationality (or irrationality) to an act, in response to your ‘how does a person know he is acting irrational’ bit, is in terms of our sense of what’s rational or irrational.

@Dunamis

" Notice that I said SENSE OF RATIONALITY."

So you are saying that something that is judged to be rational, is only corresponding a sense of rationality which is a subjective judgement, (i.e. with no rational basis)?

[arendt]

Du,

Let us define “rationality”. Do you have any suggestion?

[Dunamis]

Arendt,

Perhaps that is something you should sense you were using the word in a particular sense. I rather was questioning its use.

Dunamis

[arendt]

My asking you is so that we can have at least an agreement, therefore, a good start on the issue instead of keep missing the point. Now be a good poster and answer my question.

[Dunamis]

Arendt,

For me rationality derives from narration. The roots of rational explanation are linked to the roots of narrative structure. See how they are entwined using these two examples cited by Feyerband to make this same point,

Aristotle writes of tragedy, that its end “is that which is inevitably, or as a rule, the natural result of something else” (De poetica 7.5), so implying that “the incidents [of the plot] must be so arranged that if one of them be transposed or removed, the unity of the whole is dislocated and destroyed.” (8.4)

This essentially is the structure of rational explanation, the relationship between a thing proven or caused to what goes before it. Rationality is narration.

Lessing asks,

What does a poet do who finds in history the story of a woman [Medea] who murders her husband and her sons? If he is a real poet then his problem will be, above all, to invent a series of causes and effects according to which those improbable crimes simply must occur.” (Hamburgische Dramaturgie, sec 32)

Detrop made this point about the rational nature of actions earilier.

Dunamis

[arendt]

Okay, so we are really not in disagreement when you say rationality derives from narration. To me judgment (coming from our sense of rationality) is to you the narrative structure. Ultimately, we are able to have this narrative because we have a sense of rationality, first and foremost. Without this sense of rationality, how can we even begin to say what we want to say about rationality?

[Dunamis]

Arendt,

I never really thought we were in disagreement. I was seeking clarification. But if you could answer the question I ask, it would be more clear,

“So you are saying that something that is judged to be rational, is only corresponding a sense of rationality which is a subjective judgement, (i.e. with no rational basis)?”

Dunamis

[arendt]

If you call having a sense of rationality, and using this to make judgment about what could be ascribed rationality subjective, then it is a subjective judgment. But keep in mind that we might again run into disagreement on what is subjective. Please clarify. Because earlier, I have already made a point that a judgement, in the form of propositions, statements, utterances, on what’s rational or irrational is something that a positivist would call not capable of being judged “true” or “false” in the sense that, for example, factual occurences, are judged true (or false).

[Dunamis]

Arendt,

How about subjective means relative to one’s position?

Dunamis

[arendt]

Okay, can you explain how you would explain how one’s action can be judged irrational based on "one’s relative position’?

[Dunamis]

Arendt,

Well to use Detrop’s example. It begins to rain and you see someone walking slowly down the street in very fine clothes with no umbrella. From one position, someone who values fine clothes and acting in customary ways, this would be irrational. But to someone who values communing with nature, this might be rational.

Dunamis

[arendt]

Then you are talking about practical rationality—a form of rationality based on deliberative reasoning about a specific or particular situation. In this sense, what’s being judged is what is best or desirable to do given a set of alternatives—weighing these alternatives to come up with the best decision. Others call this instrumental (?) reasoning— a form of rationality which, given a set of choices (alternatives), an agent chooses the most desirable or the best course of action at that particular moment. Again, this is in line with what the point I made earlier when I said our sense of rationality is what basically allows us to judge a particular action rational or irrational. So, I really don’t see what’s so objectionable about what I said earlier.

[Dunamis]

Arendt,

It may very well be that we are in agreement. I was only looking for clarification. It seemed to me, and I have not inspected the context, that Prag was providing a rational basis upon which rationality and irrationality subsists. Rather it seems to me that events are arational until they are rationalized.

“In this sense, what’s being judged is what is best or desirable to do given a set of alternatives—weighing these alternatives to come up with the best decision.”

It seems to me that the rational process is a reconstructive one, similiar to what Lessing was suggesting of the great poet. (Wouldn’t it be nice if we were all great poets). What if the choice itself was arational, but only through a reconstructing of the past do we find rationality in it, post event, pre-positing its reasons?

Dunamis

[arendt]

@Dunamis

It seems to me that the rational process is a reconstructive one, similiar to what Lessing was suggesting of the great poet.

Pretty much so.

(Wouldn’t it be nice if we were all great poets). What if the choice itself was arational, but only through a reconstructing of the past do we find rationality in it, post event, pre-positing its reasons?

Yes, I think poets have something to say about us, and understanding them would be really helpful. It seems they are dismissed easily at times in philosophy—I don’t agree with this.

Yes, we can find that something—an event, an action—could be judged rational or irrational–at least in theoretical rationality, or perhaps in scientific rationality?

[Dunamis]

Arendt,

“Yes, we can find that something—an event, an action—could be judged rational or irrational–at least in theoretical rationality, or perhaps in scientific rationality?”

But wouldn’t this place an arational character upon all events? This perhaps would be possible in a stochastic universe, were only degrees of probablity exist and not determination proper. This would also be a universe with no free will. Or perhaps more radically, a universe where the will is so free there is no way to choose it. It just happens.

Dunamis

[arendt]

But wouldn’t this place an arational character upon all events?

Okay, I think I know what you mean by this. You brought this up earlier, too, and I think we could go a little further and clarify what it is we mean by our sense of rationality and judging a particular event/action rational or irrational. The ascription of rationality (or irrationality) is not like an ascription of properties to an object. That a triangle has three sides is something that exists independent of our judgment that it has, indeed, three sides. It is a property of a triangle that it has three sides. Not so with our judgment of an action ( as being rational or irrational). The action does not exist rationally or irrationally independent of our judgment that it is rational or irrational.

Also, just for the record, could you define what you mean by arational?

[Dunamis]

Arendt,

“The action does not exist rationally or irrationally independent of our judgment that it is rational or irrational.”

This is what I would call “a-rational”, like a-moral.

But would this not suggest, since rationality is subjective, that each event has no series of explanations sufficient to explain its state? I have no problem with that, but it does have serious consequences.

Dunamis

[arendt]

If you mean by “state” as its historicity, then maybe you are right. But please explain what could these serious consequences be. I think you are bringing up an important point. I’d like to know.

[Dunamis]

Arendt,

Well the impossibility of free will to start with. Any form of determination.

Dunamis

[GateControlTheory]

Wouldn’t, assuming a soft determinism, rationality become normative?

That what you mean Dunamis?