The statement “the thing-in-itself exists” is equivalent to the statement “the world is representation”.
True?
false
-Imp
I’m glad someone has deigned to reply, albeit in the negative!
Here’s what I mean in more detail. Human metaphysical investigations have led us to the knowledge that the world is representation. This begs the question “what’s being represented?” and Kant named “it” the “thing in itself” (das Ding an sich). The point I want to make is the well-known point that the Ding is unknowable in principle to animals, because space and time are bases of our knowledge and the Ding “lies outside” them. Thus, even naming “it” is misleading, because all things are in space and time. So we can say “the world is representation” but nothing more, because we’ve reached a limit. To say “the thing in itself exists” is to say the previous statement but from the “other side”.
in order to make the claim the world is representation one has to know what the world actually is (as representation). the only thing that the mind plays with are perceptions. the mind may believe that these perceptions are externally based, but there is no perceptable evidence of such. now we can argue what is mind seperately, but I hope you understand my position. the mind plays with perceptions…
-Imp
I don’t quite understand.
You say one has to know what the world-as-representation is. That’s obvious (macroscopically): it’s a spatially extended, time-flowing environment filled with colours, sounds, smells, and physical feelings.
Looking at a man physically, it’s clear that he’s perceiving things and then, in his brain, using these perceptions to construct his world.
C.S.,
I tried this in another thread using “rockness” to indicate a perceived object, which is seen as a thing in itself. I gave an explanatory model, attempting to show that relationships allow no concepts of things in themselves, that the subject/object dichotomy is false and that it can be proved biologically that what we perceive is what is out there. If the last statement were not true, we would be trying to eat rocks and mate with trees.
Are you saying that “things seem as they are, and are as they seem” ?
Could you link me to this previous thread? (I’m surprised to hear you don’t believe in the subject-object dichotomy.)
C.S.,
The thread is “The Rockness Monster”. I’m a biological pragmatist, not a locical positivist; hence I cannot envisage any separation of knower and known/ subject and object, noun and verb which could postulate a thing in itself.
I’ve looked at that thread, but it goes over my head. Allow me to discuss it in layman’s terms.
Is your argument that because two independent observers observe something, it isn’t a figment of one of their imaginations, so has an independant existence of its own? If so, I agree, but in a Kantian sense. If we assume there to be two “parallel universes” (the thing in itself and the representation(s)), then all object can exist in two ways. When no one is looking at the rock, it isn’t there “as a rock”, but it retains its existence in-itself.
yeah… ‘das ding in sich’ or whatever is supposed to be the trascencdental absolute, right?
I don’t think ‘the other side’ or the ‘ding an sich’ exists… just the representation… because, to me, even the DING (hehe) is or can be as fara as we know a representation of other ding dong (jk I know it’s german).
I don’t think ‘the other side’ or the ‘ding an sich’ exists… just the representation… because, to me, even the DING (hehe) is or can be as far as we know a representation of other ding dong (jk I know it’s german).
no, that’s not what I say. the world is unknowable. the representations/sensory impressions are all that exist in the mind. the external world can not be known.
you may think you are sensing “something,” but in actuality all you are doing is playing with the information that your senses present.
nothing is clear. he is perceiving perceptions and nothing besides. to claim that something perceivable actually exists outside of the perception itself requires proof that we do not have.
there is a perception. the mind judges the perception and acts as it has been trained to act. the actual existence of the perceived thing is not only never perceived it is irrelevant (for one never acts on “it” itself because if “it” exists it is extrasensory).
-Imp
Hi impenitent. You said, â€â€¦the only thing that the mind plays with are perceptions. the mind may believe that these perceptions are externally based,â€
Sounds like Berkeley. passion
I read through the other thread and I found it very interesting, but I have a few quetions about your claim that it can be bilogically proven that what we perceive is what is out there.
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While it is abundantly clear to a normally sighted person that red and green lights emit different colored lights, an RG color blind person cannot perceive the difference between these two things. Indeed, what they perceive is most definitely not what is out there.
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I’m tempted to agree with you that we are very capable of distinguishing what things are (brings new meaning to tree hugging doesn’t it.) But that we may not be perfectly sure that our preceptions of meaning, motive, and intent are completely to be relied upon.
What do you think?
cheers,
gemty
yes, the bishop was correct on a few points. esse est percipi…
-Imp
Hi impenitent. You said, â€yes, the bishop was correct on a few points. esse est percipi…
Yes, “esse est percipi.” Berkeley was extreme… but I’m fascinated with some of his ideas. I get a headache every time I try to figure him out though. Berkeley is like Descartes on steroids! 
And that business about hawking “tar water†only adds to his eccentric aura. passion.
gemty,
Thanks for your qualified agreement. Why should we talk of things that are not while we must deal with things that are? It baffles me. Exceptions are modifications of rules, not denials of rules. To the extent that we cannot know, we cannot survive. This is proved daily, while whether or not a rock exists independent of our knowing is hypothetical b.s.
Which is why I generally agree, and I didn’t offer the questions as challenges to the soundness of the general statement but as issues which would require a refinement of the rules.
I think existential propositions are fairly simple to resolve, and I agree that we have very good reason to believe that the thing itself exists. However, it seems to me to become a lot more complicated when we come to intangible things like meaning and motivation.
I also brought it up to refine the notion you’ve stated here “to the extent that we cannot know we cannot survive.” To the extent that we cannot know what exactly?
cheers,
gemty
gemty,
If we cannot know what really exists outside our bodies, we cannot in any way adapt or survive. The extent to which we have a real, nonillusional take on what’s out there determines the viabilty of our existence.