Sorry to add yet another Iraq topic.
This essay is about to be submitted to an anit-war site: it needs to be cleaned up a bit, but will be posted pretty much as is.
The following is a critical analysis of the speech made by Colin Powell in front of the United Nations on the 5th February 2003. It is worthwhile remembering that the evidence presnted by Powell represents - by and large - the entire case that the United States currently has for their proposed military invasion of Iraq.
He seemed to split the speech up into five major categories (in that he addressed each of the major issues in turn, without much overlapping) so I suppose that’s the way I’ll talk about them here.
The first area dealt with Iraqi deception, and he attempted to prove the lengths to which the Iraqi government went to in order to cover up its “production of weapons of mass destruction”. It was essentially a series of character judgements of the Iraqi state, rather than a genuine presentation of direct evidence.
There were three recorded messages in the speech, all, really, were attempts to demonstrate just how subversive the Iraqi’s were being in their attempts to throw off the UN Inspectors.
The first recorded message was between a colonel and a brigadier general in the Iraq army, and was, probably, the most convincing evidence presented:
COL: We have this modified vehicle. #
GEN: Yeah. #
COL: What do we say if one of them sees it? #
GEN: You didn’t get a modified… You don’t have a modified… #
COL: By God, I have one. #
Here, the colonel has contacted the general - as you can see - with the concern that he possesses a “modified vehicle” ahead of a visit from Mohamed El Baradei, the director of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The phrase “By God, I have one” would appear - in the translation - to be an show of panic, but I wonder how accurate the translation is (As’Ad AbuKhalil - a Political Science professor at the California State University - was another to take issue with the accuracy of the translation). It should be remembered, that while the phrase “By God” - used in English - may be an expression of exaggerated awe or angst (as in “By God, what is that thing?”) the divine reference in Arabic may well be a more passive expression relative to the phrase “in all honesty” in English. It is important to remember that much can be lost (or gained) in the translation. We should be looking for direct evidence in the translation rather than rhetoric that may seem - in the way it has been translated - to be condemning. Thus, here no direct evidence has been given by either party, and the US seems to be relying more on the appearence of “panic” rather than upon any admission of guilt. The second part of the message is more illuminating though:
GEN: Which? From the workshop…? #
COL: From the al-Kindi Company #
GEN: What? #
COL: From al-Kindi. #
GEN: Yeah, yeah. I’ll come to you in the morning. I have some comments. I’m worried you all have something left. #
COL: We evacuated everything. We don’t have anything left. #
GEN: I will come to you tomorrow. #
One of the more interesting points here is the mention of the “Al Kindi Company”, and a point the Powell dwelled on briefly after the message had played. In his words “The al-Kindi Company: This is a company that is well known to have been involved in prohibited weapons systems activity”. The difficulty here is that the are two Al Kindi companies in Iraq, but we may as well address the threat that each poses before continuing. Remember, the claim here - that the “modified vehicle” constitutes evidence of Iraqi non-complience - is highly dependant on this link between the modified vehicle (a phrase which, in itself, is inconclusive) and this “Al Kindi company” which Powell has described as being involved in “prohibited weapons systems”.
The first Al Kindi company ( fas.org/nuke/guide/iraq/faci … jesira.htm ) and was well known to the Americans both before and after the Gulf War. There is little doubt that the organisation was involved in reasearch into prohibited weapons (they were researching weapons grade uranium for one) and was heavily bombed in 1991 and 1998. The three Al Jesira sites (out of seven in total) known to be used in the research of nuclear weapons were bombed into insignificance, the Al Kindi company included. While it has been rebuilt since, it no longer has a nuclear program and production there is limited to “small, defensive missiles with a range of less than 93 miles” (as I understand it, these missiles are permitted under Resolution 1441). Thus, the threat Powell speaks of here has been heavily bombed twice in the past decade or so, and has been subsequently rebuilt as a mere shadow of its former self, and its activities are well known to Americans and inpectors alike.
The second Al Kindi company ( ph.ucla.edu/epi/bioter/troublingfirms.html ) specialises in the production of Veterinary Medicines, suspected - at one stage - of also producing anthrax (this was prior to the first wave of UN inspections). Initial investigations revealed nothing, though new US suspicion arose recently, and a suprise inspection was conducted on December 22nd. Bugging devices (used to record conversation that may be indicting, or indicitive of Iraqi subversion) were left there and a second suprise inspection followed in January. Despite the close attention, no evidence of prohibited activity whatsoever has been uncovered.
Thus, what we essentially have here, is an issue concerning the “evacuation” (once again, I wonder how much rhetorical merit the US have gained from this translation) of a vehicle modified by either an obsolete arms factory (that produces items permitted under the UN Resolution) or a Vet Clinic. I’ll leave it to the reader to ponder whether or not this conversation constitutes the solid evidence of WMDs that the US have been looking for.
The second message was similar, with a higher official talking to a lower official about the upcoming visit of some specific part of a UN inspection team. To quote CNN, one official said:
“They are inspecting ammunition you have … for the possibility there are forbidden ammo”
And the other replied:
“We sent you a message yesterday to clean out the areas, scrap areas, abandoned areas. Make sure there is nothing there.”
Here they speak of “forbidden ammo”, yet there is no necessary connection between the “ammo” and the “cleaning” referred to by the second soldier. That is, the UN are coming to examine “the possibility there are forbidden ammo” and the reply is “clean out the areas, scrap areas, abandoned areas” yet there is no definite connection to suggest that the two points are related (that is, just because one is saying that the UN are on their way to look for ammo and the other one says to clean the place up a bit, it requires some degree of “presuming the conclusion” to assume that the second officer is telling the first to clear out the “forbidden ammo” he “by chance” possess). If I were the UN inspection team, I would probably quite appreciate having the “scrap areas, abandoned areas” cleaned up - might make it easier to search the place without all that mess!
Once again, it could be construed as evidence of the Iraqis cleaning out evidence of WMDs in anticipation of UN inspections, or it could be construed in a number of ways. The phrases are ambiguous and taken out of any meaningful context. As with the preceding transcript, it strikes me as very odd that US intelligence can tap into so many calls, and be precise enough in their tracing to identify the people speaking and the sites they are referring to, yet cannot convey this information to inspection teams who would have - if the allegations are correct - ample time to catch the Iraqis with their pants down. If this really is evidence that the Iraqis are moving large amounts of weaponry, then surely the US could have instructed the UN to visit these sites as quickly as possible (you cannot dispose of evidence pertaining to chemical and biological weaponry overnight) and would have long found the “smoking gun” they seek by now.
The third message (which appeared much later on) seemed irrelevant to me, with one official telling another to take the phrase “nerve agents” out of a report. Taken out of context, the phrase is meaningless and could have been referring to anything. I’ll leave it to your own judgement though.
Continuing the theme about how deceptive the Iraqis were being, Powell decided to declare the Iraqi declaration (of weapons it possessed) as “rich in volume, but poor in information and practically devoid of new evidence” on behalf of Mr Blix suggesting that - essentially - Iraq was keeping valuable information away from the inspectors. Perhaps Mr Powell forgot the part where Hans Blix said of the declaration “In the fields of missiles and biotechnology, the declaration contains a good deal of new material and information covering the period from 1998 and onward. This is welcome.” Which goes somewhat against Powell’s follow up statement: “Saddam Hussein and his regime are busy doing all they possibly can to ensure that inspectors succeed in finding absolutely nothing”. However, not only have Iraq voluntarily surrundered a great deal of information to the Inspection Team, they have also not stood in the way of the inspection teams wishing to inspect sites. While Hans Blix was disappointed that the Iraqi co-operation was “passive rather than proactive” and that they hadn’t been given access to all the scientists they were interested in speaking to (which has demonstrably changed since this first report) Iraqi co-operation was still good enough to warrant a “B” assessment. In Hans Blix’s own words:
“Iraq has on the whole cooperated rather well so far with UNMOVIC in this field. The most important point to make is that access has been provided to all sites we have wanted to inspect and with one exception it has been prompt. We have further had great help in building up the infrastructure of our office in Baghdad and the field office in Mosul. Arrangements and services for our plane and our helicopters have been good. The environment has been workable. Our inspections have included universities, military bases, presidential sites and private residences. Inspections have also taken place on Fridays, the Muslim day of rest, on Christmas day and New Years day. These inspections have been conducted in the same manner as all other inspections. We seek to be both effective and correct.”
One of the major problems that Blix cited in his report ( washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/wo … 12703.html ) was the fact that Iraq was refusing to allow U2 flights over the country (important, apparently, for surveyance) or to allow any aircraft to fly over the No-Fly Zone in the south (presumably for security reasons). In recent days, Iraq has now permitted both (the UN can now use the U2 planes and can send in helicopters etc over the no-fly zone) and Hans Blix and his inspection team - after recent talks in Baghdad - remain confident that Iraqi co-operation has been and is continuing to improve. Iraqi non-complience is slowly becoming a less relevent excuse for warfare.
Moving on, the second part of the speech dealt with supposed evidence pertaining to Iraqs production of chemical and biological weapons, and most of it was heavily dated and skewed so that Iraq could be allowed no right of reply. For instance, Powell accused the Iraqis of possessing large amounts of biolgical agents “before the Iraq/Iran war” and then challenged Iraq and suggested that the fact that it had not been accounted for was evidence enough that Iraq was guilty of this material for 20+ years and that it was up to Iraq to prove that it had been destroyed. And if I may side-track for a moment, that was another main thrust of Powell’s speech - that the burden of proof is on the Iraqis rather than the Americans. That is, that the Iraqis are guilty until proven innocent. Quite what you can do to prove that you don’t have any WMDs apart from saying “I don’t have any WMDs, come in and take a look” is beyond me, and severly subverts my own conceptions of justice - but then maybe that’s just me.
Anyway, Powell made a long list of substances that Iraq used to have, and punctuated these statistics with graphic references as to how potent these materials really are, using his pen-lid, at times, as a point of reference. Nonetheless, throughout all the statistics he provided, none, from memory, were more recenent than 5 years old (i.e. 1998 or earlier, the time, he said, when Hussein “booted out the inspectors” when it was actually Bill Clinton who kicked out the inspectors at that point). Once again, he made numerous assertions that Iraq did have this that or the other at some point in time (most of which was supplied to it by the US anyway - not that it should matter of course) and once again demanded that Iraq prove that - after 7 years of inspections - it no longer had these materials. Once again, Powell and his government are the protagonists, the ones pressing for a war, so why should the burdern of proof be on the Iraqis? Could I justly accuse a man of murder and assert that he prove otherwise, especially given that I am the one determining the merit of the evidence he presents in the first place?
The only present (i.e. post 1998) evidence he presented on the issue was that of satellite photographs taken of Iraqi sites supposed to be producing chemical/biolgocial weapons. By his own admission, the photgraphs require expert analysis to be made meaningful, but I’m sure that we can examine them and do our own analysis:
This image is from the BBC website. It was a lot more clear in the presentation, but essentially what Colin Powell was trying to show was a site busy with activity in November and then being bulldozed in December. In the first image he presented (you can’t see it on the image above) he showed a warehouse (the big square thing in the image on the left) being surrounded by trucks, tents, personnel and other things that, in his view, demonstrated that the site was active. Now I have no qualms with the summation, the site was active (which seemed to be the point Powell wished to stress the most - that something was happening there in November) but I still see no proof that this site was a production site for WMDs. Perhaps you need to have a better trained eye than I do, but to conclude that the site was used to store/produce weapons merely because there were trucks/security there, you would - in my eyes - need to draw quite a long bow indeed. If the site was being monitered so closely, after all, surely they would have noticed massive missles being loaded into the back of the trucks? Or, if it’s not quite that simple, but if they were so sure that the site was producing weapons, then surely they could have traced the trucks to wherever they were headed, passed the information onto the UN and demanded a thorough search of the relevent complexes? Surely this would have provided the excuse for a war that they were looking for?
Besides, I think that the subsequent slides (and the commentary provided by Mr Powell) actually end up working aginst the US in their assertion that Iraq are moving weapons around at will. Look at the dates separating the pictures: one month. That is, going by this case study, it takes one month from the point at which weapons are removed from a factory, to the point at which it is demolished “and the top soil removed” (Powell’s own words) to remove any evidence of weapons from the site. Remember, as I said earlier, you can’t just sweep chemical/biolgical/nuclear weapons production under the carpet overnight. Toxins and radioactivity have the habit of staying around long after the responsible materials have been removed, and the UN inspectors aren’t stupid. They aren’t just looking for boxes labelled “Weapons of Mass Destruction”, they are thoroughly analyising the sites thought to have housed weapons production plants. If there had been large scale chemical/biological weapons production plant at a particular site, it would take a long time to clean it all up. You couldn’t just throw everything into a few boxes, drive them away and then deny everything. Even if the Iraqi officials had a few days warning prior to UN inspections (which, most of the time, they don’t) disposing of the evidence isn’t that easy, it’s a long process (a month in the above case) and I’m sure that with the US’s satellite monitoring capabilites, sneaking large amounts of chemical weapons around the country would be pretty difficult. But perhaps the Iraqis are able to get tip-offs about which sites the inspectors will be visiting, giving them time to move weapons around in advance of their arrival? Not likely. According to the Guardian (an English newspaper): “He [Blix] also contested the theory that the Iraqis knew in advance what sites were to be inspected. He added that they expected to be bugged “by several nations” and took great care not to say anything Iraqis could overhear”.
To quote Phyllis Bennis:
“Contrary to Powell’s pronouncements, Hans Blix said the UNMOVIC inspectors have seen ‘no evidence’ of mobile biological weapons labs… and no evidence of Iraq hiding and moving material used for weapons of mass destruction.”
The “mobile labs” mentioned here correlate to the assertion made by Powell that Iraq are manufacturing biological and/or chemical weapons on the move - an elaborate procedure staged on the back of trucks. Hans Blix, once again, dismissed this suggestion out of hand, saying that he had already been alerted to this possibility by the US (that is, well in advance of Powell’s speech) and that searches uncovered nothing. See here: truthout.org/docs_02/020603A.htm .
As you should be able to see, US “evidence”, in this case, amounts to little more than mere speculation.
The third part of the speech had to do with Saddam Hussein’s attempt to build a nuclear weapon, and it failed to tell us anything that we didn’t already know. Basically, Powell ran through a long list of items that Hussein had either procured or attempted to procure, and how these may be tied in with the aim of building a nuclear bomb. Yet, even by Powell’s own admission, Hussein does not yet have all the components necessary to build one, even if he wanted to. He went on at length about the “aluminium tubing” that could be used in the production of a nuclear bomb, despite the fact that this issue had been addressed by the IAEA several weeks before. Taken from the BBC website (an article concerning the allegations made against Iraq, written on 20/01/03):
"There was better news for Iraq on the mystery of its attempted import of thousands of aluminium tubes.
The suspicion was that it wanted these for centrifuges to enrich uranium for a nuclear bomb but Mr ElBaradei’s report to the Council said that the IAEA analysis “indicated that the… tubes sought by Iraq… appear to be consistent with reverse engineering of rockets” as Iraq had asserted."
So on the nuclear front, much as we had suspected. Saddam doesn’t have a nuclear bomb, and couldn’t make one even if he wanted to.
The fourth part of the speech concerned Iraq’s links with Al Qaeda, and was even more spurious than the preceding parts of the speech. The entire argument rested on the assumption that Hussein had links with a man named “Abu Musab Zarqawi” which Colin Powell made little effort to verify. The evidence presented to link Zarqawi to Saddam Hussein basically consisted of the fact that Zarqawi went to Baghdad for medical treatment and ended up staying there for a few months (the fact that Zarqawi and his operation are mainly based in the Kurdish areas to the north of Iraq - areas outside of Hussein’s control - was quickly skipped over).
To be sure, Powell made out a great case as to why this “Zarqawi” is a threat to global security (making sure to specifically spell out the threat he posed to the nations present at the council - Spain, Italy, Russia etc) but his ties to Hussein were undeniably tenuous at best. Apparently the fact that he and some of his factions were working within Iraq (as I said, mainly in the areas outside of Hussein’s control) and that he had met with some Iraqi officials were enough to suggest that Hussein had ties with Al Qaeda, but, needless to say, there was little evidence presented to support this assumption. If Zarqawi is such a threat, then it is he who needs to be stopped. If these threats are coming out of the Kurdish part of Iraq, then I fail to see what Baghdad has to do with it. Also, he asserted that “Iraqis visited Osama Bin Laden in Afghanistan and provided training to al-Qaeda members” in the early 1990s and that this was grounds to condemn Hussein. But didn’t the US do exactly the same thing? Did they not fund and train Al Qaeda and Bin Laden? I’m not angling at hypocracy here, merely that Hussein may well have funded Al Qaeada many years ago, but that it does not constitute any grounds for war (otherwise, would any of the countries who lost citizens in the Sept 11 disasters be able to lay a similar claim against the US for funding these terrorists?).
“Ambition and hatred are enough to bring Iraq and al-Qaeda together” Powell continues, barely acknoledging the fact that the Secularism of Hussein and the theism of Bin Laden drive them further apart than a common hatred of the US ever could bring them together. Though perhaps As’ad AbuKhalil does a better job at dismissing the Iraq and Terrorism argument:
“The claims of terrorism links remain hollow: even the State Department report ‘Patterns of Global Terrorism’ states that Iraq has not been involved in terrorism since 1993. As for a Bin Laden link, that was not proved, but alleged without any substantiation… Two groups mentioned by Powell have been largely defunct since 1985. Two others, the alleged ‘Zakawi network’ and Ansar al-Islam, operate in northern Iraq, outside Saddam Hussein’s control. The leader of Ansar al-Islam has denied having any links to either Hussein or Bin Laden. The Arab media is reporting that the Zakawi story was provided by Jordanian intelligence, which has a record of torture and inaccuracy. Prince Nayif, the minister of interior and chief of the Saudi effort in the ‘war on terrorism,’ denied ever hearing about the two al-Qaeda members sneaking from Iraq into Saudi Arabia.”
Or, perhaps I could just point out that both the FBI and CIA ( news.independent.co.uk/world/mid … ory=375403 ) deny the links. Either way, I think it that the link between Iraq and terrorist activity has been adequately dealt with.
The last part of the speech (which was much shorter than the other parts) was essentially a moral condemnation of Hussein’s human rights record, which - while being technically accurate - was rife with hypocracy, and as much a justification for a pre-emptive stike on the US as it was justification for a pre-emptive strike on Iraq. Firstly Powell cited Iraqi violation of UN resolutions and treaties, which - while they may be valid, do not excuse the fact that many other countries are guilty of violating many more (and much more serious) resolutions than Iraq, and the fact that the human rights record of the US (as well as their violation of similar UN treaties/resolutions) has been, especially for a western country, abysmal. Secondly - in a statement that nearly had me cough up beer through my nose in shock - Powell condemned Hussein for gassing his own people in 1988.
Now I’ve already run through this before, so I won’t labour the point, but essentially most of the chemical weapons used by Hussein against the Kurds in 1988 were supplied by the US and after the event, the US government (headed by Bush snr, and of which Powell - unless I am very much mistaken - was a part) actually increased the export of such weapons to Iraq. Thus, to spell it out more bluntly, Powell condemns the Iraqi president for murdering his own people when it was his government who supplied him with the means to commit such an action, and his government who - being so outraged by these “humanitarian attrocities” - increased the supply of such weapons after the event. I’m not sure what else to add, as the US begging along the “human rights” angle really does speak for itself.
Anyway, overall, having said all that I have, I believe that Powell came across quite confidently and spoke forcefully and passionately. I am proud that he has - or at least has been shown to have - convinced Bush to pursue the UN angle as far as possible. I doubt that any of the other individuals holding Bush’s strings would have come across quite so convincingly, so in that sense, at least Powell presented a semi-reputable argument and presented the bare, necessary legal justification for a war on Iraq. Having said that, though, much of the information was aged and outdated, and virtually all of it relied on “human accounts”, or - to put it another way - “things that people told us”. In a court of law, that would be classified as hear-say and conjecture, and I’m not sure it would be enough to convict Hussein of the crimes with which he has been charged. I’m fairly certain I’ve addressed most of the substantiated points (in the sense that there is evidence supporting the claims that reaches beyond mere hearsay and conjecture) and if I haven’t, then I’d be happy to address it should you remind me of it (as my memory ain’t what it used to be).
The speech did little to convince me that a war on Iraq is the right thing. Powell did not address the many deaths certain to occur from such an action (and this is by far the most major issue to be considered in the justification for war) nor did he address what would happen once Hussein had been deposed as leader. Neither was that tiny, unmutterable “O” word mentioned. The speech did moderately well in detailing why the US might be legally justified in going to war, but did nothing to clarify why war is the best available option, or why other diplomatic avenues have necessarily been depleted.
Perhaps, to finish with, perhaps I could pose these questions:
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If the evidence presented in the speech is as conclusive as the US have said, why did they wait - up to twelve months in some cases - to communicate it to the UN? Wouldn’t it have been better to have communicated it to UNSCOM or UNMOVIC and have the threat dealt with earlier on (Saddam Hussein being the ticking time-bomb that he is… )?
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Given that much of the evidence presented here came within the few months preceding the speech (just a few days beforehand in the case of one of the recorded messages) why was the push for war so strong in September/October of last year before much of the evidence was available? On what, exactly, was this push for war based? Could it be that the desire for war preceded all evidential justification? Could it be (hush, hush) that the initial push for war was based on something other than the issues raised here by Powell?
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Why is the onus of proof being placed so heavily on the Iraqis? Given that it is the US who are making the deafening call for military action, why have they offered so little evidence to support the fact that Iraq may be hiding something? Why are they so against giving the UN inspectors more time to find this definitive proof that they seek? Why are they being allowed to manipulate the natural course of justice in this sense, by being able to dictate the rules of their game to everyone else?
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If Iraqi co-operation continues to grow as it has done in recent days, will that be enough to satisfy the US government? If nothing turns up, will that merely be further evidence of “Iraqi deception”? If the discovery of a WMD is justification for war, then why must the absence of a WMD indicate that they just must be hidden “real good”? Is there anything Iraq can do to avoid a miltary conflict?
I’m sure that, given more time, there are more questions I could raise about Powell’s “compelling” speech, but I suppose I’ll leave it there. I doubt very much that I have been successful in rendering Powell’s speech “false” or “useless”, but hopefully I have accurately represented the view that runs contrary to those presented by Colin Powell in front of the UN and - from here - I suppose that it is left up to you - the reader - to decide which view point is the more meritorious.
Any thoughts/suggestions/noted errors?