The way I choose to refute Anselm is to show that with the rationale of his argument, we are led to ridiculous consequences.
However, as Gaunilo has pointed out, it is possible to use a similar reasoning in order to prove that a perfect island exists. Think about it:
What does not exist is less great than what exists
There is some poor island which exists somewhere (say, Cuba)
Therefore, what does not exist is less great than this poor island.
But the perfect island is by definition greater (not less great) than this poor island.
But, if this perfect island did not exist, it would be less great than the poor island.
But it is a contradiction.
Therefore, the perfect island exists.
Such a reasoning implies that the perfect island is necessarily existent. If it is necessarily existent, its non-existence is impossible. If its non-existence is impossible, there cannot be a time when it did not exist. But Science teaches us than islands are not eternal. They can’t be older than planets, and planets had a beginning.
Who is right? Anselm or Science?
Also, we can prove the existence of unicorns.
What does not exist is less great than what exists.
There is some worm which exists.
Therefore, what does not exist is less great than this worm.
But the unicorn is by definition greater (not less great) than this worm.
But, if the unicorn did not exist, it would be less great than the worm.
But it is a contradiction.
Therefore, the unicorn exists.
We can also prove the existence of an Anselmian Monster:
By Anselmian Monster, I mean a thing which has all properties which begins by the letter E. Therefore, the Anselmian Monster has existence, which begins by E. Therefore it exists.
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I think the basic error in that ontological argument for God’s existence is in treating existence as a property. There is “what it is to be” a thing, and then whether or not any of these things actually exist is always an additional qualifier that’s not part of the essence of the thing. When we conceive of anything, we necessarily conceive of it as existing; existence does not need to be introduced as a property. And then whether this thing we conceive actually exists is entirely separate from its conceivability.
One can say that we conceive it as having an indeterminate kind of existence, until its ontological status will be determined by the way it is used in a proposition.
So if you’re arguing fairly, why didn’t you present Anselm’s response to Gaunilo. (It’s been years since I’ve read it, sorry.) I don’t think your work is ready to defend before the committee in its present form. (Or do i win something if i present Anselm’s rebuttal myself?)
How do you define island? Land above water level? Then Eurasia is probably the greatest island on our planet. But if an island is seen as land, since even parts or Eurasia are covered with water, then the Earth itself is an island. If islands are not transcendental truths, does that allow islands to become and pass away without offending their essence?
How can a unicorn have a definition if it doesn’t exist? Isn’t it defined as a fictional animal with traits of several actual animals?
#5 was an interesting twist…I guess i would hold there is a greatest island in any category you wish to determine the “best” – largest, richest, etc.
Okay, are we getting silly here?
I think Anselm’s argument might show that we must conceive of God. I also do not think it is the best argument for the existence of God. Take the (i think similar) Aristotelian-Thomistic argument where the highest form in every category is the cause of everything else in the category. It might be able to buttress a quasi-Anselmian train of thought, i think.
