For the sake of things, I am hopping that people understand the numerical and qualitative identity distinction. Descartes basically brings up this distinction in order to come up with a “particular body”, and he gives an example with the piece of wax. The wax is one numerical object, and this one numerical object has different qualities. For example, the one object is hard and cold. At another time, the same object is soft and hot. These are two different qualities. But these two different qualities are properties of the same object, i.e. the numerical wax. This is basically made up of the distinction between properties of x and x itself. X itself is numerical identity and the properties of X is qualitative identity.
Now we also say that certain objects have spatial parts. For example, there is the top part of a building (spatial) and a bottom part of a building (spatial). But these spatial parts all make up the same object, or are part of the same numerical object. Now eternalism uses this type of thinking and applies it to time. Like there are spatial parts, there are also temporal parts.
The temporal parts are qualities, or properties, of an object. The objects qualities, or temporal parts, may change, but the object still exists. So at t^1 x is a baby. At t^2 x is a teenager. At t^3 x is middle aged. At t^4 x is old aged. Each of these times, t^1 through t^4 are temporal parts. Each of these are temporal parts of the same numerical object like the wax was numerically the same but had different qualitative identities at different times.
Now this all appears to be consistent with reincarnation as well. Each lifetime (newborn baby to old age) is a temporal part of the same object. Thus, you have different temporal parts (different lifetimes), but they are all properties of the numerically same thing.
Think of a line. We can chop this line up into 8 parts. Each of these parts would be temporal parts of the line. Each part is only a property of the line, but not the line itself.
What about the transition from solid wax to melted wax remains numerically the same? What about the transition from infant to adult remains numerically the same? Thus what does “numerically the same” mean?
Really, as I see it, the only thing that remains identical between the solid wax and the melted wax isn’t the qualitative properties of course (solid & cold ↔ soft & hot) but a mind-created concept of “the wax” that gets read into this fluctuating mass of material as useful illusion of consistent thingness. A narrative really.
Saying the wax is numerically the same after having been melted is a vague and unhelpful way of stating things in my opinion. The wax has changed not only qualitatively but quantitatively too in some ways. Melting wax - but not burning it (two different things) - does not result in a chemical change in its molecules, that’s true, but it will result in a different total mass, it will result in altered atomic activity, so there will be some “numerical” changes.
So your just basically attacking if there are things themselves, which Descartes said that we never discover them by the senses, since the senses only show the qualities of things, and we never discover them by imagination. IOW, one never discovers “a material body” by experience but it is something that our minds construct as a narrative.
Interesting thing about this is that it would rely on some sort of relative identity.
You, appear, basically to be bringing up what Heraclitus brought up with “you cannot step into the same rive twice”. In other words, there is no becoming or change of things. Instead, there are distinct or new things that come into existence and go out of existence at every instant. So at one instant a person has black hair and at another instant they have blond hair. Everything else about them is the same, but you would say that they are not the same person. This can apply with anything from losing one molecule to losing one strand of hair, or anything like that. IOW, they are two people instead of the same person. There is nothing that is changing, but new things coming into existence and going out of existence.
And the point about numerical identity is that the thing did not change quantitatively, which is another way of saying numerically. Its properties changed, but the thing itself did not become another thing. Its properties became something else, but not the thing itself. Basically, it relies on the idea of identity being a thing is identical to itself, and Leibniz Law.
No I would say it’s the same person, but I don’t think numerical sameness applies to/explains a person’s identity. A person surely does not stay numerically the same in all respects.
What about my counterexample? The things you are calling “numerically the same” have changed quantitatively:
I have no problem with saying there’s a consistent identity between a piece of solid wax and that wax melted (i.e. being wax), but we need to clarify the nature of identity.
That’s what numerical identity does. It clarifies the nature of identity. The nature of identity is numerical and not qualitative. Like we differentiate between properties of something and that thing itself, so too does qualitative identity differentiates between somethings property and that thing itself.
No, it’s not clear. “The nature of identity is numerical [quantitative].” I have raised some objections to that very statement which you have yet to address. Things you haven’t responded to:
[size=85]-What about the transition from solid wax to melted wax remains numerically the same?
–What about the transition from infant to adult remains numerically the same?
–Thus what does “numerically the same” mean? (does it mean occupying the same space at the same time? does it mean having the same chemical structure? how so? etc. be specific.)
–The wax has changed not only qualitatively but quantitatively too in some ways. Melting wax - but not burning it (two different things) - does not result in a chemical change in its molecules, that’s true, but it will result in a different total mass, it will result in altered atomic activity, so there will be some “numerical” changes.
–A person surely does not stay numerically the same in all respects.[/size]
Where are you attempting to go with this? While the argument of properties and thing-in-itself has been around for a few centuries, I’m unclear how this is related to reincarnation. Reincarnation implies persistence of ego over the life-death cycle, and I fail to see how the examples you have provided have any connection to the concept. Reincarnation attempts to “fix” the flow of mass and energy via ego. It is a controversial claim and unsupported by any known evidence other than the ubiquitous anecdotal testimony common to religion. The distinction beween reincarnation and eternalism isn’t made by the properties/thing-in-itself argument.
I am perhaps confused, but can you clarify your direction with this?
I’m not sure I understand this. How does wax melting result in different total mass? And how does different atomic activity equate to a “numerical” change?
That’s a good question, I think I got it wrong. If wax burns, it loses mass because there is a chemical change, but if you just heat it up a little where it melts it should have the same mass. My error.
However, the speed of molecule movement is quantifiable (the more energy in a system, the faster its molecules move, the warmer it is). The new space the wax takes up is quantifiable. You can say these numerical changes don’t affect a thing’s identity, while other numerical changes do, e.g. chemical changes (I’m assuming ZenKitty thinks chemical make up is an important part of numerical sameness, but I’m not sure because he hasn’t gotten back about that). But why? Any good theory of identity should explain the difference.
Also, there are all sorts of mass changes, chemical changes, etc. that go on in a human body. So if we want to say that a human being from year ‘x’ to year ‘y’ is the same person (I do), numerical sameness doesn’t seem to be a satisfying definition for identity.
In fact, a lot of what we’re calling qualitative (shape, texture, etc.) can be translated into numerical terms. So at best numerical sameness is a numerically selective theory of identity. I want to know the rational behind which numbers count which don’t.
Considering 3/4 of the OP is spent describing numerical identity, I think it’s on topic to clarify that concept before we can say whether or not it applies to people being reincarnated.
Identity is also qualitative. Every actual entity is unique. At the same time, everything is related to everything else. Everything that has ever happened in the past has some impact on the present. Everything that happens in the present has some impact on events in the future. Every past actual entity is present in every other future actual entity. Actual entities are both subjects and superjects. As superjects, we are all reincarnations of past actual entities.
This isn’t very complex. The whole thing about properties and thing itself also works with reincarnation, besides it being what identity is about, if anyone knew about what eternalism (or the 4 dimensional view of time). This life (from your birth to death) is a temporal part, or a property of the thing itself, and the thing itself contains many different temporal parts, which means it contains many different properties. These different properties are different lifetimes that you live through. This temporal part will end, and another temporal part will come about (even though technically they are all equally existent).
And I never said that the distinction between reincarnation and eternalism is made by the qualitative identity and numerical identity argument. But it is consistent with the eternalism view and reincarnation. Eternalism also has a basis in qualitative identity and numerical identity. And eternalism gives a way of reincarnation. Since qualitative identity is temporal parts in eternalism, and the “world-line” is the numerical identity.
And we only have ancetodal testimony that life ends when you die.
I actually did respond to those points you bring up. The solid and melted are qualities of the object that is the wax, it is the properties of the wax. Properties change, the thing it applies to does not change. Like have the number 1 is qualitatively different from the number 1, but they are numerically the same, which is that they are the number 1. You just might as well say that you don’t believe in numerical identity, which means that you believe that you are not the same as you were when you were born. This is fine, but that just means that each instant you are not identical with yourself. You can get rid of the law of identity if you want, but that comes at a cost.
And atomic activity does not add anything, since that is based on numerical identity. And people do stay numerically the same in all respects, only their qualitative identity changes. You appear to want to confuse qualitative identity with numerical identity. Not sure how come.
I agree. And I like the idea you proposed earlier–that we impose an identity on a thing from a mental construct. I thing may change in time, but so long as we impose on it the same identity across this time, it will seem like a constant thing to us.
Also, keep in mind that change need not mean that past states are never reacquired. Think of the seasons. Think of the orbits of the planets. Think about your own memories, how they come to mind time and time again. Think about your name. That’s certainly something that keeps coming up again and again and is usually attributed to you.
Actually, it does mean that the past states are never reacquired, since you are assuming that the same thing exists to be reacquired, even though this would be impossible under the supposition that fuse and you agree to. You are sneaking in numerical identity again, which you two rejected as us imposing upon the world.