We’re an electromagnetic field because of culture?
I do think we think for ourselves. I mean, I started to think because I had a strange feeling and that caused me to question.
So, it’s pretty much personal and the main focal point is the personal feeling.
And I do think almost all of us start to think because of personal reason.
In other words, I do think all of us are egocentric in thinking.
And all our experiences and associated (scientific and other) assumptions come from our personal sensory and other input and evaluations that I don’t see much possibility in “non-egocentric” thinking.
Whatever you think is always based on your own sets of preferred perspective and thus egocentric in nature, as well as taking ego related focal point all the time, IMO.
Even your preference of “non-egocentric” approach is a result of egocentric thinking, I’d say, and so it’s contradicting in a way. I mean, egocentric thought is advocating non-egocentric approach, in this case.
I would say that major possibility of growth in human thinking ability is in destroying lots of insane presumptions such as presumption of human intelligence, presumption of certainty on many matters, and so on.
To my personal taste, you are still presuming too much. What is “egocentric” and moreover “ego”, for the matter? Aren’t you presuming too much without actually having examined these adequately?
I say so because I don’t think you would use such word in the way you are using if you did examine the concept conveyed by the term, deep enough.
Try to draw exact and fine line between “egocentric” and “non-egocentric”, for example.
Also, I have the feeling that you are more interested in pretty casual and not very precise way thinking and talking. If it’s the case, sorry for annoying you with my comments and questions. Maybe I misunderstood what you wanted.
Right, but this “knowledge” can be either correct or incorrect and so assumption might base itself upon knowledge or error. And whatever might be the case here, empirical verification or falsification of an assumption will inevitably contribute to our existing stock of knowledge regardless of the degree of error that afflicts us at the outset.
And since this utilization is constant, our experiences will always be constituted by this knowledge, and thereby infect our assumptions, creating a self-perpetuating cycle that is difficult to subvert. In other words, knowledge bleeds over into our experiences and robs them of their transparency, and, therefore, their value as definite sources of further knowledge.
This difficulty would seem insurmountable if experience were the basis of empirical knowledge, but empirical methods deal with observation, not experience. Empirically, there is no such thing as experience. By deferring to observation (and not just isolated, but repeated, observation), empirical methods circumvent the pitfalls of experience-based inquiry. The comparison of multiple observations distill the corruptive errors that inevitably afflict any particular observer as the result of the existential frame of observation out of our knowledge of things and places it on stable ground; false assumptions, when subjected to empirical inquiry, lead to genuine knowledge and the mistakes that propagated them are exposed as such. This leaves us with a relatively “purified” knowledge of things in the world, but, in my opinion, rather bewildered with respect to ourselves.
How can you test a non-empirical assumption empirically? If the subject-matter is indeed non-empirical, it cannot be detected and so is precluded from either verification or falsification through empirical investigation. Empirically it simply is not, and can never become knowledge. So in what does the value of non-empirical assumption consist if we have no other means besides empirical methods through which to derive knowledge? It seems to me that any assumption that cannot be framed empirically (and this category would include the assumptions that we have experiences, feelings, emotions, consciousness – the entire array of “inner” facts) has absolutely no value for knowledge and should simply be dropped from consideration. This assumes, of course, that knowledge is the ultimate purpose of assumption.
I think your example here clearly reveals an inconsistency in your thought. I understand that by shedding the cultural determination of experience to which he belonged, Newton was able to approach the world “non-egocentrically.” But the concept of the ego that you employ here is very specific and contrasts decisively with the sense you use when you say that empiricism is egocentric, which is the more conventional understanding that points simply to the priority of the subject. The rejection of the first sense of the concept does not necessitate the rejection of the second. Quite the contrary in fact because if we hope to retain any justification for truth claims, when we reject the first we still need the good old ego in the second sense and its observations “in the world” to act as the basis on which we stake our claims (I don’t think this works anyway, but that is another issue).
Put another way, if Newton’s evidence was empirical, then he had to find this evidence in the world. As we discussed before, the world only comes into being along with the subject, the ego, so his approach, though non-egocentric in the first sense, is still egocentric in the second. To assume that “he didn’t even need to be there for the apple to fall to the ground” does not eliminate the ego in his approach either; it is enough that it is a possible observation to implicate the ego as a constitutive structure of the world.
Your ego is the ego released from all existential determination, unencumbered by time, in a stance of pure, undemanding relation to the world. However, being in the world, it is still the ego though it is a thoroughly attenuated one. Your ideal is already achieved to an extent in the natural sciences, where the limitations of the isolated ego are compensated for by the establishment of a rigorous inter-subjectivity, a kind of “collective ego” that the world collects around. There doesn’t seem to be much difference between this and your own ideal, and your use of the Newton example only seems to lend credence to this comparison. Thus your use of the term “non-egocentric” is rather misleading, not only because your use of the ego concept was rather imprecise, but also since what you advocate is more of an hygienic egocentrism that conforms rather closely to the scientific method. However, despite these difficulties, I do agree with the general thrust of your argument.
You do not always need Empirical testing to come to the assumption, but you need Empirical tests to come to knowledge, that is my point. So, we figure out what our assumptions are, and then (if possible) we test them Empirically.
If the assumption itself cannot (eventually) be Empirically tested, and that is provable (that it can not be tested), then you are dealing with a matter that is strictly belief or conviction in which the best assumption is none whatsoever.
The purpose that the Non-Empirical assumption serves is that it helps us focus the question, or specify it, so that we can then apply our Empirical observations, or later apply them.
Ultimately, it was the pictures from outer space that absolutely proved the Earth is not flat.
Exactly. I do not think that it necessitates rejection of the second sense of the concept, and I would not have said that it does. When I talk about Non-Egocentrical approaches, I’m talking about removing ourselves from the question to whatever extent is both possible and appropriate. When I attempt to dismiss the purely Egocentric approach, I’m saying that Empirical considerations need not come into play in every case and in every aspect in forming assumptions and that to rely on Empirical considerations in every case and in every aspect can be (but not always is) fallacious.
Whether or not there is a difference in that approach and in my approach would depend on the question begging for assumption and what approach ought be taken to that.
I believe that you are correct in stating that my use of the term, “Non-egocentric,” is misleading, so let us now take it to mean (for the purposes of this discussion) as non-egocentric as possible.
It is a question of extent, and whether or not the extent to which we are is suitable to the question at hand.
If you are saying that we cannot evaluate something without evaluating it, I definitely agree to that. My point mainly has to do with pure egocentricity with regard to how we perceive ourselves to relate to the things around us.
Can two things relate to one another without us being involved? I think so.
Can we know how two things relate to each other without having any experience of either (or both) thing? No.
The less egocentric approach is such that we understand (and think in a manner) that will occasionally have two things directly relating to one another without our involvement, particularly when only those two (or more) things are in question. The more egocentric approach is that nothing can directly relate to anything else without our own individual involvement.
That’s a fair IYO to have. I just disagree insofar as we are not always the focal point of the question itself, nor are we necessarily one of the focal points.
The concept of empathy, though, is to consider from other than your own preferred perspective, or at least to try to.
Can I advocate something without advocating something? Any Philosophical advocation is going to be egocentric.
Work in progress.
Why? They can’t even draw an exact line between alive and not alive when it comes to the abortion debate.
I would say egocentricity occurs anytime the, “I,” enters the question or process of reaching an assumption before the assumption is actually reached. As I’ve stated, this is often necessary, but not always.
You’re not annoying me, I enjoy responding to all comments and questions. I’d be at the wrong place if I didn’t.
I agree that I am guilty of circularity here, although it wasn’t immediately apparent to me in what way. I’ll do my best to clarify my meaning.
According to my previous post, a non-empirical assumption cannot be tested empirically and is therefore irrelevant to knowledge. What I have in mind here is the form of the assumption itself rather than the way in which it was discovered. So what I mean is that a statement such as “the earth is round” is an empirical assumption because there are possible observations we can make to validate or invalidate this claim. However, the statement “the earth is of divine origin” is a non-empirical assumption because no possible observation could confirm or deny this statement. I believe that this latter statement and those of its kind cannot contribute to the pursuit of knowledge as we define it (despite the fact that they helped to create the conditions whereby knowledge of this sort becomes possible).
After some thought, however, I realized that this distinction is not present, or at least not dominant, in your understanding of non-empirical assumption (your Newton example should have made this obvious to me; thus this example will seem obvious to you, but I want to make sure I understand you completely). Imagine I stand in front of a door, and I am suddenly struck by the fear that someone is behind it holding a gun. My fear leads me to assume that, “Someone is behind the door holding a gun.” The assumption was reached non-empirically, but is itself empirical in form because I can open the door to test it. Prior to this test, however, the assumption is non-empirical.
Now if I were to reject this type of assumption as insubstantial, I would essentially deny the possibility of assumption altogether because an assumption would only be able to state what already had an empirical basis, i.e. already confirmed knowledge. This would amount to a wanton equivocation of assumption and knowledge as we have defined them so that I would only be able to say “Someone is behind the door holding a gun” after I had already looked behind the door and seen that someone, and would thus account for the circularity of my argument. The only way I can escape this dilemma is to restrict the sense of “non-empirical assumption” to those statements that are empirical in form, or, in other words, that are testable by empirical methods.
Noted. I would also suggest (assuming that I have now understood you) that we retain your use of the term “non-empirical assumption” as lacking empirical confirmation since it preserves the sense of its precursory relationship to empirical knowledge, and respecify my initial use of it as non-empirical in form as “metaphysical assumption.”
If you feel satisfied that I have provided you with solid ground on which to say so, do you feel that metaphysical assumptions have any value for knowledge?
That’s a great example of what I am talking about. Let’s imagine that you are in your house and you see someone come up through the back yard from your window, you notice that this person has a gun. After that, you hear a window break, but then a few minutes pass and you hear no sound whatsoever. At this point, you are assuming that the guy is in your house. You have empirical evidence that the guy was in your yard, and you have empirical evidence that the window was broken, but you can’t know that the guy entered your house, you can only assume that.
Having assumed that, you lock the door to whatever room you are in at the time and call the police. You’ll probably tell the police there is a guy with a gun in your house even though you can not know it to be so. You hang up with the operator and then you hear someone try the door to your room. You assume it is the guy with the gun, so you don’t call out to him.
That whoever just tried the door is the guy with the gun is a non-empirical assumption, much like Newton, this non-empirical assumption is based on some empirical evidence and some speculation/inference. The only things that you know is that there was a guy with a gun in the yard, that you heard a window break, and that someone (or something) is trying to open the door.
You can open the door to test the assumption, and if there is a guy there with a gun, the assumption becomes knowledge, provided it is recognizable as being the same guy.
In the case above, if you reject that type of assumption as insubstantial and open the door unprepared, you will probably die or go through the horrific ordeal of being held unarmed at gunpoint.
Everything that you have said here makes sense, because it does not seem to me that any other category of assumption should be necessary. An assumption (God exists, for example) that cannot be verified empirically at this point, or could not reasonably be empirically verified at a later time would simply be an assumption.
For the egocentric that accepts only empirical evidence for the purpose of gaining knowledge, but refuses to make any assumptions, again I don’t have any qualms with that guy. It is with the egocentric that wants to make assumptions, but assumes that he must be directly involved in the equation by which he comes to an assumption that I think approaches the problem fallaciously.
I do not, if the assumption were capable of being adequately tested (Empirically) it would cease to be metaphysical in its nature.
Just because a philosophy is egocentric doesn’t make it any less valid.
Take Schopenhauer for example:
The reason he is so pessimistic is because people fucked with him his whole life. He fell in love with two women, and if I remember correctly both of them rejected him; His mother told him his philosophy sucked and that he was a delusioned idiot; some hag sued him for a life’s-worth of compensation because he pushed her out of his doorway when she began making loud obnoxious noises and refused to leave - a childish act like hers deserved the childish response of getting shoved out of the way, yet she decided to be a total unnecessary bitch and get legal on him; Notice the pattern yet?