Reply to Dunamis on free will

[James_No_2]

Due to the amount of discussion on free will which has been taking place here, I will not be able to address everything that I would like to. For this reason my responses may appear disjointed or random.

How do you distinguish between a “cause” and a “reason”? This seems a completely arbitrary line, simply an invention of the explanation, does it not? - Dunamis

I might have a reason for doing something but this might not be the cause of what I do; therefore the two are different. Perhaps we could call this ‘rationalization’, and it is what people like POR find distasteful when they complain about determinism as an abjuration of ‘responsibility’. I can look back upon a past event and offer reasons for why I did it; that is, causes which ‘made me do it’, and yet I am fallible and perhaps am mistaken. It would be a fantastic fact indeed if I were infallible in this regard. In fact it is no less arbitrary to cherry-pick causes than to cherry-pick reasons, by which I mean that if indeed we view the world through deterministic eyes, there is then no way to enforce any hierarchy of causes upon your past or future experience; everything causes everything. Ergo there is no cause of an event which is in the world or can be isolated in anything but a crude and arbitrary fashion.

You wrote;

This is one of the primary illusions of freewill, a retrospective insertion of additional possibilities. - Dunamis

And it is illusory also to retrospectively project a cause for your action into the past, as if there were only one. However if doing this is illusory, by which I mean rough and coarse and ultimately arbitrary but useful (i.e. ‘mythology’), then we cannot after all be metaphysical realists about determinism. So your rhetoric of illusion and mythology are out place unless you apply them so broadly that they fail to mark the distinctions you wish them to mark. The ‘actual reality’ of causation in my past; what can this possibly mean for a thinker such as yourself?

The question then becomes whether a reason can be a cause, without simply being a cause and no more. What additional baggage do we attach by calling it a ‘reason’, and not a cause, I suppose is your question? So we might say that every reason which is not a ‘rationalization’ in the normal sense, is a cause. We might venture that what separates causative reason from cause is an ‘awareness’ of the cause, rather than an ignorance of it. However I consider the whole thread of thought from this period on to be rather distasteful, really; by which I mean that it is confused. This is precisely why, in my eyes, you and Uccisore are going around in circles wondering where the other has gone so wrong.

Dunamis I can only know where you are arguing from based on your posts here on the forum. Because none of us provides any exhaustive position statements, I need to make assumptions about what is not said here, in order to address you correctly. Based on these two observations, I generally read you as a pragmatist with rationalist tendencies and a few other things which I can’t quite articulate but which seem to ground and inform your arguments.

The reason I have raised these observations is because there are occasionally arguments which you use which I find to be in contradiction or which are inconsistent with this general position I have attributed to you. Arguments such as;

1. Pointing out circularities when in fact you are not an epistemological or semantic foundationalist.
2. Being a metaphysical reductionist and physicalist whilst proclaiming pragmatism about truth and anti-realism about knowledge.

You even seem to be a realist about determinism, whilst deflating free will as ‘description’ and ‘interpretation’. Such as here;

The same is the case with free will. It is only a description and interpretation… - Dunamis

I also am unsure how you are able to argue that the argument for free will is ‘internally incoherent’ if indeed you are thorough-going enough with your insistence that something is only incoherent or false when viewed from somewhere else. It seems question begging. And it is confusing to say the least that you make many arguments that do not seem to tow the line vis-à -vis your pragmatist stance on truth. You use arguments like this;

The problem is that the mind does not exist as a fact, but only as a description. – Dunamis

But the determinist refers to the facts of the matter. - Dunamis

…which seem hopelessly ungrounded. Is there such a thing as a fact, I might ask? If not, the rhetorical force of this argument dissipates. If so, I imagine the consequences of this commitment reverberating through your other commitments, creating other inconsistencies.

Your language of ‘desire’ I find to be anachronistic. Desire in the usual sense (which must be associated with your usage otherwise you ought to drop that usage) is an intensional notion, whereas all over the place in your overall argument you seem antagonistic to many intensional notions, such as ‘mind’ for instance. Indeed I can see many difficulties in picking and choosing, as you seem to do, your intensional and extensional commitments when trying to construct an argument for determinism. A hardcore physicalist reductionist you are not, which in my opinion is to your credit; however your hesitancy here may be an inconsistency on your part.

I don’t take this to be skepticism at all, but rather an attempt to understand the person as an expression of larger things. - Dunamis

Again I am disinclined to accept this apparent (correct me if I am wrong) privileging of certain conceptions of scale or perspective; pragmatism tends to make genuine disagreement impossible unless you simply call everything we do argumentatively ‘pragmatism’; i.e. reduce truth to praxis and then continue arguing as if it were truth after all, only to disclaim at the last moment the very possibility of argument whatsoever. Understanding the person as expressive of larger things seems to me to mean reading the person as the appearance of the reality of larger things. Ask yourself whether this argument is available to you. Due to the above I also reject the following;

That is because the “mind”, as you refer to it, is a mythological invention used to identify certain behavior patterns. It does not exist. It will never be found. Not because it is a spiritual otherness but because it is pure projection. - Dunamis

The reason for this is, in my opinion, that it is a fiction, an artful and many times useful fiction, but a fiction nonetheless. Understood as a fiction, it then can be put along side other fictions, and compared, beyond its structuring of experience. - Dunamis

However, vis-Ã -vis the mind, it might be considered fruitless for me to simply dismiss what is a very real area of debate, simply because I have doubts about your use of it in relation to your overall position.

The question I posed at the beginning of one of these free will threads, was this;

‘is it even coherent to attempt to reverse-anthropomorphize man back into the ‘object’ half of the old ‘object/subject’ distinction, when this reduction seems itself predicated on the validity of the distinction?’ - Me

I would be much obliged if you could offer me your thoughts on this question; the one which in my mind is the mode fundamental in any discussion of free will or determinism.

Or as I also phrased it previously;

What is the trajectory of science? Is it, to dissolve even such things as the passions into pseudo-realities with no objective content? Will we end up with an account of reality wherein the real is some content without human face? This is something of a paradox on the definition of reality; what is our way of verifying the ‘real’ to which our current understanding bears inferior relation to? – Me

Anyway I am done for now. Look forward to your response.

Regards,

James

[Dunamis]

James,

Perhaps we could call this ‘rationalization’

Another words, the distinction between a reason and a cause is a linguistic product of a description, and not an objective fact.

everything causes everything.

Exactly.

And it is illusory also to retrospectively project a cause for your action into the past, as if there were only one.

Certainly. All we have are descriptions and the real world results of acting within those descriptions. The retrospective insertion of alternate possibility has a host of sociological, identity constructing consequences, among them the ideational causation of a perspective upon future events through that “freewill” identity. The retrospective insertion of the cause, leads to constructions of causal networks which also have real world consequences, that are perhaps more measurable, i.e. the sciences. The point being, the distinction between reasons and causes cannot be assumed to be ontological, but only one of linguistic convenience.

So your rhetoric of illusion and mythology are out place unless you apply them so broadly that they fail to mark the distinctions you wish them to mark.

I apply them uniformly. Cause and effect is a mythology. So is freewill. Each has its effects.

What additional baggage do we attach by calling it a ‘reason’, and not a cause, I suppose is your question?

This really is not my question. I assume that reasons operate within a deferent descriptive plane, from that of the explanation of physical causes, but this plane also has a causal relationship between elements. My main point is that reasons are causes of a kind, or are at least, least problematically described as such.

1. Pointing out circularities when in fact you are not an epistemological or semantic foundationalist.

Please give me an example of what I must hold to be true in order to point out a circularity. Secondly, if the other person in the discussion does not embrace the circularity of their argument, then it really doesn’t matter what position I hold. I generally hold that language is circular, but that is forms a kind of living prosthesis in its circularity, so that the effects that it brings are to be interpreted in and through that body. When someone is using language in a more transparent sense, the circularity of reasoning or use would seem a pertinent point.

2. Being a metaphysical reductionist and physicalist whilst proclaiming pragmatism about truth and anti-realism about knowledge.

I am unsure what a “metaphysical reductionist” is, so I do not quite see how this is incompatible with pragmatism. I see the world as a monist immanent process. Do elaborate.

I also am unsure how you are able to argue that the argument for free will is ‘internally incoherent’

The argument for freewill requires huge aporias or at least strikingly arbitrary distinctions in vocabulary use. When language has to be “bent” so severely, I view this is general to be a sign of a failing theory, one that is likely the product of historical conditions and their metaphors which no longer entirely persist. This does not mean for me that they are wrong, simply that they are less relevant.

The problem is that the mind does not exist as a fact, but only as a description. – Dunamis

Quote:
But the determinist refers to the facts of the matter. - Dunamis

You may keep in mind that in the second quote, I was – I believe - using the term “fact” in the manner in which my interlocutor either implied, or actually used. One can keep in mind that in language use there is always slippage in meaning, and here I was using “fact” in the contextual rhetorical sense, and not the philosophical sense. Something along the lines of “if you want to discuss facts in that manner, then determinism holds the cards”, if I recall.

Desire in the usual sense (which must be associated with your usage otherwise you ought to drop that usage) is an intensional notion

Actually, I do not recall the usage. But I will say that for me desire usually has strong Deleuze based overtones which are not reducible to intention at all. If you post a quote, I can respond to it better.

reduce truth to praxis and then continue arguing as if it were truth after all, only to disclaim at the last moment the very possibility of argument whatsoever.

The dimension that you may be missing is that I couch the pragmatic criticism of truth within an immanent process. Between the ur-linguistic bodily experience and a structuring and immanent real, language works as buffer and a distillation, bringing things literally into being, but into being such that their being is not completely comprehended by the inadequacy of ideas (perspective) that has brought them forth.

Due to the above I also reject the following

Again, I find the ideological structuring of the symbolic a valuable means for understanding the process. What you do not seem to include is the immanence behind my criticism.

is it even coherent to attempt to reverse-anthropomorphize man back into the ‘object’ half of the old ‘object/subject’ distinction, when this reduction seems itself predicated on the validity of the distinction?’

Yes it is meaningful, when one realizes that there is no object/subject distinction within an immanent monism. The resurfacing of the “repressed” subject only brings about further phenomenologically constructed realms which we endure and interpret along our path, that which is called history. But I rather imagine that when one conceives of the “self” as what Spinoza calls a ‘spiritual automaton’ and also as a historically constructed entity, I am unsure if that description is predicated on subjectivity at all.

What is the trajectory of science?

Science is no new phenomena. It is simply the unfolding of knowledge, and therefore of power, and with power Being. The ultimate trajectory of science is to bring things into being and to suffer their existence.

[Thanks for your thoughtful analysis. I have answered these questions off the cuff, so if any are insufficiently answered, please ask for clarification, if you wish].

Dunamis

[James_No_2]

Another words, the “distinction between a reason and a cause” is a linguistic product of a description, and not an objective fact. - Dunamis

Well I suppose you might tell me what is an ‘objective fact’, otherwise we can insert anything in the quotation marks above and the statement remains trivially true. i.e. you would be saying; '“x” is not something which I do not consider to exist anyway’. Of course the negative of adhering to this ontology is not to say that an objective fact doesn’t exist, but rather that it neither exists nor doesn’t exist. However you have said that it is not an objective fact, rather than that it is neither an objective fact nor not an objective fact; perhaps this is just your phrasing but I am interested to know for sure, because this ambiguous statement might indicate a commitment on your part to some ontology which I would love to have made more explicit.

It becomes more complicated, from my perspective, when you admit that the projection of causes is as much an ‘illusion’ as the insertion of possibilities; either you want to say;

a) neither has a priviledged ontological status OR
b) both are fictions in the hard realist sense

…further complicated by the use of phrases such as ‘real world’ which muddle the difference between a) and b) above.

Further you seem to be arguing that determinism is superior; placing it above free will not due to some ontological privilege, but only because it makes ‘real world consequences more measurable’. If they are both illusory, taking a) above as our reference, then they are both without reality or non-reality, in the priggish metaphysical sense. I do maintain though that there is no such thing as a pure question of praxis; truth does not reduce to praxis any more than praxis itself reduces to truth. I was sure this was what Quine showed in Two Dogmas, and I am of the tentative opinion that this is what underlies the difference between him and Richard Rorty; although this is besides the point for this current discussion. However if we are still talking about truth after all; remember Davidson thought there was some point to keep using this word, then perhaps we must in the final analysis still declare what we consider to be ‘unuseful’ to be ‘false’ also, which adds another layer of complication to the above distinction between a) and b). Because we can go back in the other direction and question every application of the argument against free will which says ‘well its not false, its just not as good at predicting “X” as determinism’. And the question is; in what sense is it not false if it is unuseful, unless you are covertly maintaining some kind of closet metaphysical realism after all.

Please give me an example of what I must hold to be true in order to point out a circularity. - Dunamis

Well if you taking the position of a skeptic, then in the strict sense you need not adhere to anything beyond what your opponent adheres to. However if you want to square your commitments internally, i.e. protect against possible skeptical arguments made against you, then I would imagine that, if there is no foundational analytic proposition in your language, then what counts as ‘circular’ is never more than putative or ostensive in character. Because at the end of the day you would have to hold that everything argument/theory etc was ultimately circular, because none has a more privileged ontological status than any other. If you cannot priviledge a set of statements with ‘analytic’ status in a manner which is not theoretically arbitrary, then not only can I simply pick and choose my analytic statements in such a way that the meaning and relevance of the distinction is lost, but I can also pick where to call a question ‘internal’ and ‘external’ (in the Carnapian sense), which just means that the ‘meaning’ and ‘relevance’ of the notion of anything purely pragmatic - as opposed to ‘true’ - is also lost. Which is why I say that some sort of foundationalism is required, epistemological or semantic. I understand though that you are a holist in the best Davidsonian sense, which typically just means that your foundation is a larger chuck of language than the sentence. Which means for consistencies sake that you ought not to talk of circular arguments on such a small scale as you appear to have done. It remains an open question just how small or large a chunk you are allowed to use, which for me is a major outstanding problem with holism itself.

I am unsure what a “metaphysical reductionist” is, so I do not quite see how this is incompatible with pragmatism. - Dunamis

Perhaps metaphysics in general is not incompatible, but there is I think some tension between pragmatism and any kind of reductionism. In fact I think pragmatism remains, like philosophy as a whole, inescapably metaphysics, or what one commentator (I think it was Simon Critchley) colourfully called ‘metaphysics in the dark’. Reducing every ‘appearance’ of free will to a ‘reality’ of determinism = metaphysical reductionism. To this you add the disclaimer that both are ‘illusory’, which brings this particular observation of mine back into the orbit of my other observations above. I see a tension in your position, although it may not be yours but merely my reading of your position.

The argument for freewill requires huge aporias or at least strikingly arbitrary distinctions in vocabulary use. - Dunamis

When language has to be “bent” so severely, I view this is general to be a sign of a failing theory… - Dunamis

metaphors which no longer entirely persist… - Dunamis

I am also struck by the possibility that your argument is working at different levels or ‘depths’ of analysis at different points; this is a rhetorical point once again which needn’t betray any inconsistency on your part; but is sure to confuse your intercolutors.

Equating relevance with persistance seems to be mere acquiescence to historical contingency. However you will say that this is inevitable; I think though that whilst as a whole this is true, the boundaries of this contingency are never in view and can never be consciously acquiesced to.

But I will say that for me desire usually has strong Deleuze based overtones which are not reducible to intention at all… - Dunamis

Ok.

The dimension that you may be missing is that I couch the pragmatic criticism of truth within an immanent process. - Dunamis

Well I have not missed the need for something along the lines of the emboldened above. In light of the above, perhaps this ‘immanent process’ is the trope you use to make your position work. I wouldn’t mind though if you could flesh this notion out a little more though. Phenomenlogical immanence is already ontology; it does in any case seem to be a pleasant connection you have made between these two discourses; analytic and continental. Derrida’s argument that every Other can be brought under the power of the logos, is similar to Heidegger’s emphasis on the primacy of being to the extent that being is the horizon within which truth is revealed. Levinas disagrees with Derrida’s position, which I propose might also be your position, and so his thought has consequences on your position also. At the least a confrontation with him is warranted.

Yes it is meaningful, when one realizes that there is no object/subject distinction within an immanent monism. - Dunamis

My question was whether it is coherent to dissolve the distinction using tools which assume the validity of the distinction itself.

I am unsure if that description is predicated on subjectivity at all. - Dunamis

I believe it is predicated on certain anthropological commitments which are inherent and which it makes no sense to speak of ‘escaping from’. Not only may I argue that it is distasteful or irrelevant to explain away a certain picture of man (a rather weak argument if you are not pre-inclined towards it), but more importantly I question whether such a thing is possible at all. Other portions of what I wrote earlier include;

Giving an account of being human which is dehumanizing in this manner, is essentially to dissolve the category of human being altogether. How meaningful can such a circular argument be? Are we capable of ‘explaining away’; so that our explanation does not account for the reality of what is explained away, but merely explains why the content itself was not ‘really real’ to begin with? Is science such a robust foundation from which to aspire to such heights (or depths)? Moreover, can this be done from within? Or are we still attempting metaphysics of the worst variety?’ - Me

Regards,

James

[Dunamis]

James,

Well I suppose you might tell me what is an ‘objective fact’, otherwise we can insert anything in the quotation marks above and the statement remains trivially true

That something is not an objective fact is not trivially true in my opinion. It places knowledge in the dimension of power, and not that of transparency.

because this ambiguous statement might indicate a commitment on your part to some ontology which I would love to have made more explicit.

I consider Being to exist in gradations and therefore through relations. The greater effect something has, the greater Being it has. An “objective fact” has its greatest Being through the status of its objectivity, that is the material effects it has by being such in the “mind” of the believer. To be is to have an effect.

a) neither has a priviledged ontological status OR
b) both are fictions in the hard realist sense

These are not mutually exclusive.

Further you seem to be arguing that determinism is superior; placing it above free will not due to some ontological privilege, but only because it makes ‘real world consequences more measurable’.

No. It makes real world consequences more cogent, in my opinion.

And the question is; in what sense is it not false if it is unuseful, unless you are covertly maintaining some kind of closet metaphysical realism after all.

I do not find this question meaningful in my schema. In an immanent, yet recursively constrained, process, the “closeted metaphysical realism” is simply that which is being expressed.

Well if you taking the position of a skeptic, then in the strict sense you need not adhere to anything beyond what your opponent adheres to.

There are times when you must force your partner to face the limits inherent in their argument. In those times it is necessary to enter into the idiom of his language, to speak from within. One is not arguing one’s own point, but subjecting another argument to some of the standards that it itself proposes, implies or employs.

However if you want to square your commitments internally, i.e. protect against possible skeptical arguments made against you

One can never protect against Skeptical arguments, which ultimately can always be leveled. I protect myself only to the degree that I explain the leverage of Skepticism through a larger, immanent monistic process. I experience this as internally consisted. You may not.

Which is why I say that some sort of foundationalism is required, epistemological or semantic.

The foundation is simple. It is the real world consequences of beliefs and usage, as interpreted through that belief and usage. What it produces in mutation, adaptation and change. The foundation is that of the organism to the environment, never “knowing” the environment beyond the recursion of its somatic definitions, but ever in evolution to it.

which typically just means that your foundation is a larger chuck of language than the sentence.

I interpret holism as a soma, in the analogy of evolution.

Which means for consistencies sake that you ought not to talk of circular arguments on such a small scale as you appear to have done.

Again. One must engage people upon the stage they set. People have hard enough time – you included – understanding what I am trying to say without speaking of things entirely on my own terms.

It remains an open question just how small or large a chunk you are allowed to use, which for me is a major outstanding problem with holism itself.

Read Spinoza. The “chunk” is the universe/God/Nature. All other “chunks” are expressions of that immanent process. Its not the problem with holism, it is the door.

To this you add the disclaimer that both are ‘illusory’, which brings this particular observation of mine back into the orbit of my other observations above

Illusory, but with real world effects in an immanent process.

Equating relevance with persistance seems to be mere acquiescence to historical contingency. However you will say that this is inevitable

I don’t mere acquiescence to historical contingency. I embrace it. Though inevitable, it is lived. And our lived moment is now. When language starts to bend, its time to change the language.

the boundaries of this contingency are never in view and can never be consciously acquiesced to.

The boundaries of contingency quiet often come into view in the limits of language. When one finds new metaphors to address new relations, one is consciously “acquiescing” to (I say embracing, but you prefer your own rhetorical point) history.

In light of the above, perhaps this ‘immanent process’ is the trope you use to make your position work.

This is the hinge. And it is found in the work of Spinoza.

My question was whether it is coherent to dissolve the distinction using tools which assume the validity of the distinction itself.

When you say that you are “using the tools” of a distinction, you are privileging a particular description over the another. I see no reason to privilege the subject/object distinction in a philosophy that does not really employ it, for instance in Spinoza. When bodies are conceived simply as compound bodies in relation, expressing themselves in both thought and extension with pantheistic grounding, there is no predicative subjectivity.

I believe it is predicated on certain anthropological commitments which are inherent and which it makes no sense to speak of ‘escaping from’.

Honestly, I have no idea what “anthropological commitments” may be. I suggest that by simply employing language one adequately addresses the heritage of anthropological commitments necessary for communication. What one does within that language then is up to you. One does not escape. One transforms, and understands that one is being transformed.

is essentially to dissolve the category of human being altogether.

It is essential to place the human being within larger forces, of which he is only an expression. This is an action of power, in which the human being acknowledges that which constitutes and empowers him/her.

Is science such a robust foundation from which to aspire to such heights (or depths)? Moreover, can this be done from within?

I really don’t ascribe to the narrow use you have for “science”. An ameba is employing the science of its being. Science as it is commonly referred ot is nothing more than the operative effects of bodies “within” ideational bodies. All is done “within”, but as an expression of what is “through”.

Dunamis

[James_No_2]

a) neither has a priviledged ontological status OR
b) both are fictions in the hard realist sense

These are not mutually exclusive. - Dunamis

My point was that calling something a ‘fiction’ in most cases indicates a priveging of ontological status. If it does not do so for you, then explain how the privative or deprivative use of terms such as ‘false’ has any more than mere rhetorical force.

No. It makes real world consequences more cogent, in my opinion. - Dunamis

Actually what I wrote was a quote, although I apologise if my adumbration of the original was distortionary. The original context was;

The retrospective insertion of the cause, leads to constructions of causal networks which also have real world consequences, that are perhaps more measurable, i.e. the sciences. - Dunamis

I do not find this question meaningful in my schema. - Dunamis

Again, I based my observation on a quote, which was;

This does not mean for me that they are wrong, simply that they are less relevant. - Dunamis

So I hold the question to be as meaningful as the distinction which you seem to hold.

This does not mean for me that they are wrong, simply that they are less relevant. - Dunamis

A shifting foundation was not the kind I was positing as necessary for you. Let’s leave this point for some other time.

Again. One must engage people upon the stage they set. People have hard enough time – you included – understanding what I am trying to say without speaking of things entirely on my own terms. - Dunamis

We will understand you even less if you are arguing from several different directions simultaneously. And this is besides the point, as being clear about your commitments does not necessarily equal using a language which only you understand, I believe. Part of the meaning of what you argue is the position you argue from. If I misread this, then for me you are making argument X, when in fact for you it is argument Y. Your arguments are public; they stand or fall based on others ability to understand them. Or to be more clear, anything besides this standing or falling is irrelevant in this context.

Its not the problem with holism, it is the door. - Dunamis

Well this is not the holism I know, so I suppose we will leave this for another time also.

I don’t mere acquiescence to historical contingency. I embrace it. Though inevitable, it is lived. And our lived moment is now. When language starts to bend, its time to change the language. - Dunamis

My point is that your acquiescence is outside of your ability to perceive your situation or historical context. Hence your ability to ‘embrace’ also lies outside of your control. Perhaps the difference here is that you view the situation as a more active one, and I as one which is more passive.

Or else I might say that I view the acquiescence you speak of as of lesser relevance; I suppose you might character my use of the word as being not intensional; there is no deliberation.

When you say that you are “using the tools” of a distinction, you are privileging a particular description over the another. I see no reason to privilege the subject/object distinction in a philosophy that does not really employ it, for instance in Spinoza. When bodies are conceived simply as compound bodies in relation, expressing themselves in both thought and extension with pantheistic grounding, there is no predicative subjectivity. - Dunamis

Nope I am certainly not privileging anything; I am saying that the privilege is already there, and I am concerned to point it out. I have not encountered an account of determinism which does not make this ‘error’ (if indeed it is an error or even a real problem at all - the jury is still out…), and although I have not read Spinoza, I will say pre-emptively that even a system which ostensively does away with the distinction, is still in the orbit of it in the same way that any determinist who says 'free will does not exist’ is still in the orbit of certain assumptions which I find unsatisfactory or which I put down to predisposition or unconscious bias/arbitrary/unattended to commitment. Perhaps the hardest determinisms are even the worst offenders - which is why I do not go down that route. If I thought, or come to think, that this route was open, I would take it.

I really don’t ascribe to the narrow use you have for “science”. An ameba is employing the science of its being. Science as it is commonly referred ot is nothing more than the operative effects of bodies “within” ideational bodies. All is done “within”, but as an expression of what is “through”. - Dunamis

Perhaps you think science is not the best theory we have for reality? Science can be all of philosophy too, or vice versa. Using what we have too reinterpret man as nothing at all; as a process within processes enveloped in the contingency of history and utterly given to mechanistic description; it is this picture, this trope, whose very possibility I question. Even when it is not set up explicitly against the picture of man we have inherited (if it were it would be compromised), I am not sure that it can escape this orbit. So long as you use binaries you create identities on the back of non-identities, and this remains a relation of dependency. Subject/Object is one binary. However perhaps we might say that there is no binary here, but only this single subtance-stuff which everything partakes in. A thorough-going theory it would indeed have to be to disentangle from the use of binaries in this fashion. Monism perhaps wants to be this theory. However there are a lot of determinists and determinisms out there who/which are not monistic, including those that believe they are. Several questions raise themselves.

1. Calling everything in existence ‘physical’, and then saying that everything reduces to physical processes; is this coherent, meaningful etc or a load of confused nonsense?

2. reducing every intensional notion to an extensional onel; is this any less confused than the above in the final analysis?

And finally;

3. saying that something is X is often saying that it is X-not-Y. Given that this binary dependence is seemingly antagonistic to monistic reductions, can we give an X without necessarily giving a not-Y? Can we give the object without the not-subject?

I suppose we have reached a stalemate for now.

Regards,

James

[Dunamis]

James,

My point was that calling something a ‘fiction’ in most cases indicates a priveging of ontological status. If it does not do so for you, then explain how the privative or deprivative use of terms such as ‘false’ has any more than mere rhetorical force.

All are fictions, but fictions with real world consequences. False simply means, does not work. It requires an assemblage, a discourse, in which it must work.

We will understand you even less if you are arguing from several different directions simultaneously.

One is always arguing from several different directions simultaneously. There are always multiple vocabularies being employed. When I seek to engage someone in particular using their vocabulary, someone looking on might be confused because they do not share those meanings. There is no ultimate, master vocabulary from which to argue from.

as being clear about your commitments does not necessarily equal using a language which only you understand

Ultimately I suspect that this is untrue. The utopian clarity you posit as possible is a negotiation, not a transparent state.

If I misread this, then for me you are making argument X, when in fact for you it is argument Y.

I often make the argument for “x” within the vocabulary in which the participant may be very well feel more comfortable. “x” for me then is commensurate with “y” under other constructions that are not necessary for the argument for “x” to be undertaken. I can make a Skeptical argument employing holism without having to ground my holism within an immanent process, for instance. If you wish to push further and look into the greater layers and ask questions about them, feel free to do so. For me these arguments are nested.

Your arguments are public; they stand or fall based on others ability to understand them.

People do understand them, they just may not fully understand their implications. Feel free to ask. You are asking a whole lot of questions without presenting very much of a philosophical position at all, nonetheless I understand you. When in discussion with someone, despite the public nature of the forum, my priority is to make myself clear to them, and in so doing I must employ their idiom at various times. If someone else does not understand, please let them step in, and that person too I will engage in their idiom, as I am doing now.

Well this is not the holism I know, so I suppose we will leave this for another time also.

It is the holism you know, simply contextualized by a different ontology. Your “leaving this to another time”, I suspect is producing the difficulties in your understanding my position. Immanence is the key which dis-solves the binary you would prefer.

My point is that your acquiescence is outside of your ability to perceive your situation or historical context.

It is a question that is not an either/or. One is both an agent of history, what Spinoza calls a “spiritual automaton”, but also within the locus of his experience able to relatively become free from some aspects of determination, through what is commonly called “knowledge”. One cannot stand outside of history to view one’s place, just as one cannot stand outside of a river one is being rushed along, but one can learn to swim the current some, and this is reflected in the barometer of happiness, which Spinoza makes good use of in his study of the emotions.

Perhaps the difference here is that you view the situation as a more active one, and I as one which is more passive.

This is exactly the difference that Spinoza makes between happiness and sadness. Through knowing (which is a kind of doing) one moves from a more passive state, to a more active state. These states are relative to each other. But at no time are you not expressing the whole, whether it be actively or passively.

I am saying that the privilege is already there, and I am concerned to point it out.

How amazing of you to have gained this perch above history and language. However did you get there? Why are your descriptions of subjectivity somehow transparent to the truth? (Each of us are proposing descriptions, but one suggests that his is “already there”). I wish I could point to something in the paragraph that followed this assertion that made foundation to its claim, but I could not find it. “Subjectivity” is a description like any other. You simply can’t seem to step outside of that description, so you infer it to be “already there”. Spinoza has a very good explanation for this “already there” subjectivity the produces the “object”. It is the confusion of the idea of a thing, with the idea of its affects upon the body. There is no subjectivity unless it is pre-posited and its description assumed to be true.

1. Calling everything in existence ‘physical’, and then saying that everything reduces to physical processes; is this coherent, meaningful etc or a load of confused nonsense?

Why are you asking me this? It appears to be a rhetorical question.

2. reducing every intensional notion to an extensional onel; is this any less confused than the above in the final analysis?

Not if you follow Spinoza’s parallelism – pantheism, wherein the ideational and extensional unfold together.

3. saying that something is X is often saying that it is X-not-Y. Given that this binary dependence is seemingly antagonistic to monistic reductions, can we give an X without necessarily giving a not-Y? Can we give the object without the not-subject?

This is key to your misunderstanding of the subject/object binary in relation to Spinoza. Because the “subject” is a spiritual automaton, “it” is an object of ideational and extensional existence, but as such, an object of expression. You are operating in an non-immanent model of thought. The conceptions of the “subject” are as expressive – and physical (extensional) – as the “object” they appear to be observing. Expression, think expression.

Dunamis

[James_No_2]

One is always arguing from several different directions simultaneously. There are always multiple vocabularies being employed. When I seek to engage someone in particular using their vocabulary, someone looking on might be confused because they do not share those meanings. There is no ultimate, master vocabulary from which to argue from. - Dunamis

No discourse is always inclusionary or else is not discourse at all. If you can delineate between the vocabularies employed, pick one. I doubt you think this is possible though, in which case I do not see how you are any more privileged to interpret the words you write than I.

The utopian clarity you posit as possible is a negotiation, not a transparent state. - Dunamis

This is a piece of rhetoric. If I am a utopian master vocabularist, then you are a linguisitic skeptical solipsist.

People do understand them, they just may not fully understand their implications. - Dunamis

Another way of saying this would be that they understand to a degree. However I am not asking for an absolute here. If there are degrees then I think perhaps it is possible to to facilitate greater understanding. Everyone has their line between what they consider to be the writer’s burden of making himself understood, and the reader’s burden to understand him. Perhaps we stand in different places here also.

Immanence is the key which dis-solves the binary you would prefer. - Dunamis

Oh goody. (Seriously though, I’m getting to it!)

It is a question that is not an either/or. One is both an agent of history, what Spinoza calls a “spiritual automaton”, but also within the locus of his experience able to relatively become free from some aspects of determination, through what is commonly called “knowledge”. One cannot stand outside of history to view one’s place, just as one cannot stand outside of a river one is being rushed along, but one can learn to swim the current some, and this is reflected in the barometer of happiness, which Spinoza makes good use of in his study of the emotions. - Dunamis

I have heard this before; it’s very… convenient. I remain skeptical. If you want to call this my ‘lack of understanding’ then so be it.

How amazing of you to have gained this perch above history and language. However did you get there? - Dunamis

Very humorous. Actually it is history and language that I am referring to, as a matter of inheritence.

You simply can’t seem to step outside of that description, so you infer it to be “already there”. - Dunamis

I could well go the other way, and say that whilst you think you have ‘stepped outside’ the distinction, you are mistaken, and so infer it to be ‘not there’.

Why are you asking me this? It appears to be a rhetorical question. - Dunamis

The question was a simplified position statement for another poster. It was a reference back to the general discussion of free will on this forum.

Not if you follow Spinoza’s parallelism – pantheism, wherein the ideational and extensional unfold together. - Dunamis

Ok.

This is key to your misunderstanding of the subject/object binary in relation to Spinoza. - Dunamis

Wow I have magically misunderstood a writer I have not read.

You appear to be playing with definitions in the last paragraph. When I use terms like ‘extensional’ and refer to binaries, I mean to employ common usage (yes it does exist). You create synonyms to dissolve binaries, you neologise etc.

However I will leave it, and go of and ‘think expression’. (I am out of time in any case… busy busy busy)

Thanks for the responses.

Regards,

James

[Dunamis]

James,

I doubt you think this is possible though, in which case I do not see how you are any more privileged to interpret the words you write than I.

I am no more privileged. I just tell you that I write in the vocabulary that makes the most sense to communicate my purposes at the time, rather than arguing from a fixed vocabulary, or a memorized position to which I must remain true. In other words, when discussing a point, I am thinking, not repeating.

Another way of saying this would be that they understand to a degree.

That would be another way of saying it, but that is not what I said. For me, these argument forms are nested, and very often it suffices for me to argue within only one dimension for me, i.e. to make the skeptical point, to make the point of holism, or to make the point of immanence, without each time having to marry that point to my larger project. I simply am not arguing from a system which you can look up in a philosophy book, but from a thinking synthesis of many, as I have come to know them.

Everyone has their line between what they consider to be the writer’s burden of making himself understood, and the reader’s burden to understand him.

You seem to have been confused by language used by me to communicate with Uccisore, attempting to reconcile it with language I have used in the past. As I have said, when communicating with one person, I am meeting them on their own ground. I’m sorry that in so doing I have placed undue burden on you to understand. But as I say, please be free to ask for clarification on what I mean. When in discussion that’s what people do. Simply join the discussion, as you have done.

I have heard this before; it’s very… convenient.

Is “convient” shorthand for “it makes too much sense, and frustrates my desire to remain within long cherished paradoxes within which I have found a comfortable place”

Actually it is history and language that I am referring to, as a matter of inheritence.

“Authentic” praxis of language requires its invention, not just its receipt.

I could well go the other way, and say that whilst you think you have ‘stepped outside’ the distinction, you are mistaken, and so infer it to be ‘not there’.

There are many lineages of philosophical thinking, and not all of them privilege the subject/object distinction you find so relevant. If I have stepped out of one you prefer to swim in, I have simply stepped into others. One does not step outside altogether without ceasing to speak “sense”. Which is what I suggested earlier, by practicing language one pays appropriate due to one’s inheritance.

Wow I have magically misunderstood a writer I have not read.

Your powers of incomprehension are immense.

You create synonyms to dissolve binaries, you neologise etc.

To philosophize is to re-describe. Your binaries are produced by your words, operating under a different theory of ontology.

Dunamis

[James_No_2]

…frustrates my desire to remain within long cherished paradoxes within which I have found a comfortable place… - Dunamis

Hahaha I think I am probably still too young to enjoy very much of this kind of comfort, but honesty I am not sure what the future will bring.

“Authentic” praxis of language requires its invention, not just its receipt. - Dunamis

And I say, as you might guess, that it requires its receipt, and not just its invention.

I am indeed thinking of your discussion with Uccisore. You seemed in my eyes to talk past each other at the crucial moments; perhaps you should take a few more steps ‘into’ his idiom?

Regards,

James

[Uccisore]

Who you callin’ an idiom?
Seriously though, the whole free will discussion is something I’m just getting started in. The biggest sense in which me and Dunamis were talking past each other, is that he was offering a solution to a problem, which I have not yet been convinced exists. I don’t think I have a solution to the dilemma of free-will vs determinism, because first I would need to come to believe there was a dilemma. Before I knew anything about philosophy, I believed in free will just as I believed in my own two feet. Nothing I have seen since I started studying philosophy has given me a reason to doubt either of those initial beliefs- nothing other than the philosopher’s compulsion to be skeptical of things for no reason other than to see if they can be put back together once taken apart.
The problem with that, is skepticism implies a position on the evidence. That is, to say that free will is in enough doubt to seriously criticize, one must take the attitude that all the experiential evidence we have is insuffecient. Once that is granted, it’s no wonder determinism becomes appealing. But why grant it?

[Dunamis]

James,

And I say, as you might guess, that it requires its receipt, and not just its invention.

I have received it. It is in my hands.

You seemed in my eyes to talk past each other at the crucial moments; perhaps you should take a few more steps ‘into’ his idiom?

This seems like a veiled invitation simply to agree with you, through a proxy. May I invite you into my idiom, so you can throw off those subject/object shackles?

Dunamis

[Dunamis]

Ucc.,

nothing other than the philosopher’s compulsion to be skeptical of things for no reason other than to see if they can be put back together once taken apart.

This is more than a philosopher’s predilection. For if you can take something apart and put it back together again, you receive that small portion of your destiny to be placed into your hands. One begins to effect the course in a way fundamentally different than when in ignorance. What is revealed to you once you begin to do so, depends on the path you walk. But your appeal to freewill strikes me of one more of sufficient dogma, rather than a ready attempt to comprehend. It was sufficient to imagine that the Sun rose each day, for tens of thousands of years, until suddenly one had to understand that the horizon fell, if one was going to accomplish further things. Freewill strikes me very much as a pre-Copernican idea, sufficient for many things, but insufficient for all.

The problem with that, is skepticism implies a position on the evidence. That is, to say that free will is in enough doubt to seriously criticize, one must take the attitude that all the experiential evidence we have is insuffecient.

Doubt does not equal insufficient, for sufficiency requires a goal. Ignorance may very well prove sufficient for a great many tasks. Indeed, much of our regular life depends on generous amounts of it. But I am unsure if ignorance, at least in the realm of philosophy, should be an end to have in mind.

Once that is granted, it’s no wonder determinism becomes appealing. But why grant it?

For me the reason to grant it is to knowingly, and searchingly to link the individual to greater things, and in so doing to promote the discovery of how and of what we are made, and of what forces we are the agents of. Freewill requires, it seems to me, a predisposition towards moral judgment, rather than discovery. Rather than searching for causes, the “self” becomes the cause, a cause that must be condemned or praised – as if either might really in contradictory fashion influence a completely free event. The “self” becomes the glorified and vilified entity, often in neglect of awarenesses that extend far beyond the self.

Dunamis

[Uccisore]

Dunamis-

For if you can take something apart and put it back together again, you receive that small portion of your destiny to be placed into your hands. One begins to effect the course in a way fundamentally different than when in ignorance.

 If I shared the assumption that taking these things apart and putting them together would yield in some kind of gain, then I'd agree with you. However, there are certain fundamental aspects of human life, such as belief in an outside world, ethics, free will, and probably others, that resist attempts at reassembly, and have for millennia. Now, there's two basic ways to look at that.  Either they resist being put back together (understood in a pure rational sense) because they are illusions that fall apart under examination, or else something about the act of 'taking apart' makes assembly impossible. I'm going for the latter here.

Freewill requires, it seems to me, a predisposition towards moral judgment, rather than discovery.

I can see this. I would definintely say that free will involves some kind of value judgement, but I wouldn't call it moral necessarily. There is no discovery involved in free will, or at least, there shouldn't be. Someone far gone in skeptical philosophy may [i]re[/i]discover it. 
The notion of discovery points back to the problem I'm having, though. Why assume there is something that needs discovering here? That sets up a certain attitude that may be wrong.  For example, say I was asked to argue philosophically for the existence of the ground under my feet. Were I do simply say "Of course the ground exists," and stomp my feet as a means of proving it, I would feel like I wasn't doing my duty as a philosopher. Why? Because in order for someone to ask the question, there [i]must be more to it than that.[/i] Same with free will. All I [i]really[/i] need to do to prove it exists is reflect a bit, and deliberate on something. But that would be the philosophical equivalent of Johnson kicking the stone across the churchyard.

[James_No_2]

I have received it. It is in my hands. - Dunamis

Higgelty.

This seems like a veiled invitation simply to agree with you, through a proxy. May I invite you into my idiom, so you can throw off those subject/object shackles? - Dunamis

Piggelty.

Pop.

James

[Dunamis]

Ucc,

If I shared the assumption that taking these things apart and putting them together would yield in some kind of gain, then I’d agree with you.

You would agree that in the sciences, a great many things can be taken apart and put back together, I assume.

However, there are certain fundamental aspects of human life, such as belief in an outside world, ethics, free will, and probably others, that resist attempts at reassembly, and have for millennia.

“Resistance” is different than absolutely impenetrable to. I would suggest that the reason that Freewill is resistant is that it is a sociological fabrication, an explanation of behaviors, and therefore if you wish to look to its assembly, you have to look within history, culture and language, and not perhaps in the “hardware” so much. In fact though in terms of hardware, now that the ephemeral metaphor of the “mind” is losing some of its sacred cow status, AI and brain research is making great strides in understanding how the brain, and therefore the individual may operate.

I’m going for the latter here.

This would strike me only as a retreat into dogma. If you feel sure about the impenetrability of Freewill and the mind, put such an assurance in your back pocket, for if true it will never be disproved. In such a spirit one can then fully participate in the exploration of the possible causes for Freewill and the mind, even those of cultural analysis, having the security of believing in the unassailable nature of Freewill. Yet, I suspect that the exploration of causes, which have for millennia resisted explanation, will undermine and transform the very categories you cling to.

say I was asked to argue philosophically for the existence of the ground under my feet. Were I do simply say “Of course the ground exists,” and stomp my feet as a means of proving it, I would feel like I wasn’t doing my duty as a philosopher. Why? Because in order for someone to ask the question, there must be more to it than that. Same with free will.

This is exactly the call to ignorance, the sufficient delusion that I find remarkable in you. It is as if you are saying, “it may not be right, but it works well enough for me”. To a point I can understand this, but it strikes me as incredibly complacent for someone who posts on a philosophy forum. It is one thing to say that there is ground beneath your feet, but if you want to know the nature of that ground, for instance, why it erupts in earthquakes, where the water table might be, if it is part of a flat earth or a round earth, a certain amount of questioning has to be done. The same is the case for the Sun that rises. But now for me this goes beyond simple special purposes of knowledge, for whether the ground is round or flat has enormous consequences for how we see ourselves in our place in the universe. Whether the Sun rises, or the horizon falls places us in a different conception of things. While Freewill may be very nicely operational, it in fact carries with it tremendous cosmological implications as to the centrality of the “self”, implications that may even have “spiritual”** consequence. What I suspect rather, is that whether atheist or theist, it is those “spiritual” consequences that are being fought over by opponents and proponents alike.

Dunamis

**special note to James, “spiritual” is in quotes so as to give an idiom alert

[James_No_2]

**special note to James, “spiritual” is in quotes so as to give an idiom alert. - Dunamis

That’s it?..

-“sociological fabrication”

-“explanation of behaviors”

-“hardware”

This is exactly the call to ignorance, the sufficient delusion that I find remarkable in you. It is as if you are saying, “it may not be right, but it works well enough for me”. - Dunamis

Maybe he’s a pragmatist and you’re misreading his idiom.

I suppose there isn’t actually any Dunamis; rather, a wise old tree in the woods, with a satellite broadband connection and an iBook. A big old apple tree, who (we might suppose) was probably incompatible with all the other trees when it was young, in tree school.

Well anyway you can finish this anecdote for yourself.

(The moral goes something like; its easier to be Jewish when you’ve got no mouth. Or whatever.)

Regards,

James

[Dunamis]

James,

Maybe he’s a pragmatist and you’re misreading his idiom.

Pragmatism, despite the connotations of its name, does not ultimately lead to complacency, but continual investigation and invention. By my experience though, unless I am mistaken, he is a thinking Christian, a Christian who relies on Freewill to fulfill very specific roles within theology and self-conception.

was probably incompatible with all the other trees when it was young, in tree school.

missed tree school, strangely though, very popular with birds, squirrels and insects, not to bad with the wind, lightening strikes, humus and sky-light

Dunamis

[Uccisore]

You would agree that in the sciences, a great many things can be taken apart and put back together, I assume.

Sure. Even in philosophy, I would grant that about a great many things.

“Resistance” is different than absolutely impenetrable to. I would suggest that the reason that Freewill is resistant is that it is a sociological fabrication,

Well, that's huge difference between us then. I see sophisiticated theories about free will to be social constructions (which may nevertheless be true), certainly, but I see them based on a fundamental type of experience common to every man.  It seems fanciful to say that humans haven't always experienced deliberation or acts of choice. 

This would strike me only as a retreat into dogma.

 Which is strange, because I see myself as challenging something generally taken for granted and overlooked. I'm not saying we [i]cannot[/i] question free will.  What I'm saying is that [i]we have[/i], and like others, I'm drawing certain conclusions from that questioning. Namely, that the act of questioning creates a predisposition towards certain kinds of conclusions.  

This is exactly the call to ignorance, the sufficient delusion that I find remarkable in you. It is as if you are saying, “it may not be right, but it works well enough for me”.

This is another one of those cases where I see myself in just the opposite light. In terms of what 'works well enough', aren't [i]you[/i] the pragmatist here?  

To a point I can understand this, but it strikes me as incredibly complacent for someone who posts on a philosophy forum.

Which should give you pause for thought, as anyone who has read a lot of my posts knows that complacency is not my hallmark. I agree, it is easy to see what I'm doing as being naive, or against philosophical thought. The same accusation has been leveled against before, against philosophers that think the way I do. In fact, what I'm doing is critically challenging something that lies at the very beginning of philosophical investigation. 

It is one thing to say that there is ground beneath your feet, but if you want to know the nature of that ground, for instance, why it erupts in earthquakes, where the water table might be, if it is part of a flat earth or a round earth, a certain amount of questioning has to be done.

 Certainly. I am not against questioning- but that is the point. You are creating a perfect example of the problem I'm trying to point out here.  My argument is that we can do no better than believe in free will, because, among other things, it is in our constitutions to do so. Your reply seems to be that this is insuffecient because I'm not 'questioning' things. This, though, has nothing to do with my being right or wrong, and everything to do with my taking the proper philosophical 'attitude'  to a 'complex issue'.  And there you have it- in this case, the very act of taking the question seriously creates a predisposition towards certain answers, and makes others out of bounds.  With that set up, how could you possibly come to believe in free will even if it were true? Since we all start with belief in free will, any investigation that [i]ends up there again[/i] will seem naive.

[Dunamis]

Ucc.,

but I see them based on a fundamental type of experience common to every man.

I agree that in interest of keeping within skeptical bounds it is right to assume that there is a common, or roughly common bodily experience to which all of us refer. But you seem to confuse that bodily experience with its interpretation. When that interpretation invades languages and begins to condition the experience itself, and at many times provoke it, it may become indistinguishable from it. Which of course would make the cultural ideation of Freewill the formal cause of the Freewill experience, making Freewill a determined, or as I like to say, an expressive thing.

Namely, that the act of questioning creates a predisposition towards certain kinds of conclusions.

The predisposition of questioning is that dogmatically inculcated answers may not be sufficient. You are beginning to sound like a Cardinal of the Church in the year 1580. Questioning is a dangerous thing. I suggest you are on the right track here.

In terms of what ‘works well enough’, aren’t you the pragmatist here?

I am a Pragmatist, but not pragmatic. There is a subtle difference. I see the world as made of constructed truths, truths whose project of “working well toward” should be examined. You see your truth as working well enough so as to be not worth questioning.

In fact, what I’m doing is critically challenging something that lies at the very beginning of philosophical investigation.

I missed that. What exactly are you challenging? And are you challenging it philosophically? And if so, if it lies at the beginning of philosophical investigation, how can you challenge it philosophically?

My argument is that we can do no better than believe in free will, because, among other things, it is in our constitutions to do so.

So people who do not believe in Freewill, many psychologists for instance that continually find causal explanations for actions that 100 years ago would have been easily classified as “free”, but now fall under other explanations, brain researches and neuroscientists that are discovering the mechanisms of decision, all of these people are somehow operating against our very constitutions?

the very act of taking the question seriously creates a predisposition towards certain answers, and makes others out of bounds.

I take no answer out of bounds. I in fact find it very relevant to describe human actions as freely chosen in many contexts, but I do not restrict myself to this description and suspect that it has its roots in a particular way of seeing the world which in some ways might be limiting. The spirit of philosophy is to investigate limits, their nature and reason.

Dunamis

[Uccisore]

I agree that in interest of keeping within skeptical bounds it is right to assume that there is a common, or roughly common bodily experience to which all of us refer. But you seem to confuse that bodily experience with its interpretation.

Any attempt to talk about or think about such experiences involves an ‘interpretation’, as you would call it. What I’m wondering, though, is if the interpretation isn’t part of the experience in cases like this? If every man has the experience that I call ‘choice’, and they all interpret it as being just that- themselves choosing one thing over another, then the distinction between experience and interpretation becomes very thin. What is the difference between an experience, and the way the experience ‘appears to us’? Isn’t that just reduntant?

The predisposition of questioning is that dogmatically inculcated answers may not be sufficient. You are beginning to sound like a Cardinal of the Church in the year 1580. Questioning is a dangerous thing. I suggest you are on the right track here.

You seem to  prove me right with every word. What I say sounds bad, it's unbecoming of a philosopher, and it's just not the way things ought to be done. I'm far more concerned with being correct or incorrect. 

I missed that. What exactly are you challenging?

 The neutrality of skepticism. I'm saying that approaching a topic, like free will, as though it is worthy of doubt and skepticism, is dogmatic and predisposes one to certain conclusions, in just the same way that assuming free will must be true does. This is especially poignant in cases of things (again, like free will) that we cannot help but live as though we believe.  I don't know how many more ways I can say it. Return to the example of the ground. If I asked you to examine whether or not the ground exists, you cannot simply stamp your feet to prove it.  That would be 'unphilosophical', no doubt. In other words, in order to work the problem, you have to assume that facts like seeing the ground, feeling the ground, the ground hurting you when you fall off a stepladder, are inadequate reasons to believe. Now, [i]maybe[/i] they are, but the problem is that this is done without argument, oftentimes without conscious thought.  That's what I'm challenging, and saying that really, these experiences are the best evidences for these things that we will ever have, and in fact more that adequate reason to hold a belief, if there is no hard logical argument or scientific proof to the contrary.

So people who do not believe in Freewill, many psychologists for instance that continually find causal explanations for actions that 100 years ago would have been easily classified as “free”, but now fall under other explanations, brain researches and neuroscientists that are discovering the mechanisms of decision, all of these people are somehow operating against our very constitutions?

If these people still spend a few moments deciding what to have for breakfast in the morning, or bother looking at the chess board before making a move, then no, they aren't operating against their constitutions, they are just suffering from a few severe inconsistancies in their beliefs.