Reply to Dunamis on free will

[Dunamis]

Ucc.,

What I’m wondering, though, is if the interpretation isn’t part of the experience in cases like this?

I believe that the “interpretation” of Freewill certainly has conditioned the bodily experience it may once fundamentally have arisen to explain, so that now we “act as if we are Free” with the conception of our freedom in mind, and experience the confirmation of a pre-interpreted bodily experience, but this not does not mean that we are free. In fact contrarily, is suggests that even in our sense of “freedom” we are conditioned.

You seem to prove me right with every word. What I say sounds bad, it’s unbecoming of a philosopher, and it’s just not the way things ought to be done. I’m far more concerned with being correct or incorrect.

You apparently missed the point about a Cardinal of the Church, and the veiled reference to Galileo. The Church was correct, if you keep asking these kind of questions, all kinds of things break out, the Reformation, atheism, the Simpsons. But of course, the Church was not “correct” in its debate over Galileo in the sense that its version of reality was not to be supported by history, that after hundreds of years of Inquisitions and the banning of books, you cannot stop questions, you can only answer them. Your position is unphilosophical. It is dogmatic. Only dogma resists questions.

The neutrality of skepticism… these experiences are the best evidences for these things that we will ever have

You imagine that “these experiences” are neutral? And by what reasoning do you foreclose the understanding of experiences in the future. Experiences are ever coming under re-description based on what is “discovered”. You are simply placing one’s head in the sand it seems.

they aren’t operating against their constitutions, they are just suffering from a few severe inconsistancies in their beliefs.

One may operate “as if” free, but only in understanding that which you are not free from are you able to effect that determination, and be relatively more free, moving from a passive to an active agent. If they continue for instance to buy the cereal they saw on T.V. without reflection or understanding, floating in the “I am free in everything I decide” self-deception, they will remain passive agents to forces in history they may otherwise object to. By realizing that one is not free, one gains a bit of freedom. Your solution is to float mindlessly on the sea like a cork whistling “I am the master of my domain”.

Dunamis

[Jerry]

@Dunamis

By realizing that one is not free, one gains a bit of freedom. Your solution is to float mindlessly on the sea like a cork whistling “I am the master of my domain”.

Not to be a wise guy but it’s not as if one has a choice about making the realization, is it? I would think Ucc’s “solution” to be just another expression. Am I wrong…?

[Dunamis]

Jerry,

“Not to be a wise guy but it’s not as if one has a choice about making the realization, is it?”

It’s called operating within an understanding. When you have been convinced by an argument, you have not decided to be convinced, you have been “convinced against your will”, if you will, that is if you had a Freewill. The realization that you are determined is simply an affect, just as the realization that you have Freewill. Spinoza would argue - as an agent more active than passive - that the realization that you are determined produces more happiness.

Dunamis

[detrop]

that the realization that you are determined produces more happiness.

It wasn’t until “freewill” was invented that there could be relief from its consequences and dangers by adopting determinism and fatalism. Before such time there was no moral regret or remorse, and only after one power was established over another could there be the anticipation of punishment. Which is to say-- freewill and determinism were not ethical subjects until there were consequences for actions, those enforced by moral rule. The doctrines, in and by themselves, are entirely metaphysical and neither have the least bit of ethical significance. Whether or not I ‘chose’ an action had nothing to do with its qualification as ‘good’ or ‘bad.’ ‘Happiness’ is directly related to the notions of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ in this ethical realm, but did not originate hand-in-hand with it. I’m saying that the sense of happiness has nothing to do with the agency of choice-- a body and its sensation of pleasure is not concerned with its freedom to choose actions, or its determination. One finds relief in determinism only when they are convinced that they can act wrongly by way of freewill. Without concepts of right and wrong there would be no distinction between freewill and determinism outside of the the metaphysical postulates which produce them.

The concepts ‘freewill’ and ‘determinism’ can not produce ‘happiness’ unless they are associated with some ethical intent. The concepts cannot become ‘ethical’ until there is an enforcing of law and the danger of consequences. Moral contracts produced this.

Here, what was once a rather irrelevent subject in politics becomes the founding doctrine upon which it is built. With it comes the invention, or administration and distribution, rather, of rights. With rights come responsibility-- with responsibility comes the possibility for guilt. Guilt is a device which makes those who deviate more managable, that is, there is less resistence to punishment by those who are convinced that their actions are ‘good’ or ‘bad’ by their own choosing.

[Dunamis]

detrop,

One finds relief in determinism only when they are convinced that they can act wrongly by way of freewill.

The concepts ‘freewill’ and ‘determinism’ can not produce ‘happiness’ unless they are associated with some ethical intent.

For Spinoza the “relief” of determinism is not that we act “wrongly” by way of Freewill, but the simple transformation from a relatively passive state (ignorance of specific causes that determine us) to a relatively active state (the ability to act up those causes, while still being determined in other ways), a passive-to-active shift which marks the transition from sadness to happiness. This empowerment is the ethical intent, it is not associated with it.

Dunamis

[Uccisore]

I believe that the “interpretation” of Freewill certainly has conditioned the bodily experience it may once fundamentally have arisen to explain, so that now we “act as if we are Free” with the conception of our freedom in mind, and experience the confirmation of a pre-interpreted bodily experience, but this not does not mean that we are free.

    It doesn't [i]mean [/i] that we are free to a philosopher, any more than seeing a tree [i]means[/i] that there is a tree. However, both are very significant if the question is "Are there trees/free will?" Again, I fail to see how we can do better. I have yet to see a strong rational argument that free will must be false or determinism must be true, and your arguments to the effect that believing in determinism is good for us are completely subjective- there are of course merits to believing in free will as well.  As has been said by my betters, Nature brings about the experience of free choice in me. If I cannot trust it, then what cause do I have to trust other deliverances of the same source, such as Reason?  

But of course, the Church was not “correct” in its debate over Galileo in the sense that its version of reality was not to be supported by history, that after hundreds of years of Inquisitions and the banning of books, you cannot stop questions, you can only answer them. Your position is unphilosophical. It is dogmatic. Only dogma resists questions.

  Oh well, my positions have been called worse. If the best attack against my position is that it leads to nasty labels, then I'm content. I'm also content in my existence as a thinker and a questioner, enough that your accusations of dogmatism fall on deaf ears. 

You imagine that “these experiences” are neutral?

Neutral with regards to the debate of free will vs. determinism? No, not at all. Our experiences come down heavily in favor of free will- I thought I made that clear. 

And by what reasoning do you foreclose the understanding of experiences in the future.

 If humans of the future see themselves in a radically different way, and somehow do not have the experience of free choice, then apparently something happened to them, such that their will is no longer free. Or, if you prefer, man's will was never free, and the man of the future is Enlightened enough that they have escaped the illusion. Or, maybe neither of these will ever happen.  In any of these scenarios, it doesn't change the fact that actual living humans with the actual experiences we have are at their most rational when they believe in free will. 

One may operate “as if” free,

One must.

If they continue for instance to buy the cereal they saw on T.V. without reflection or understanding, floating in the “I am free in everything I decide” self-deception, they will remain passive agents to forces in history they may otherwise object to. By realizing that one is not free, one gains a bit of freedom.

   On the surface, this makes no sense. If one can act to gain a bit of freedom, then in 'realizing they are not free' is a false realization- or at least, it becomes false the moment they realize it. Also, you seem to be expressing this as a worthwhile end. Why should one seek to 'gain a bit of freedom'? Is that a good thing for some reason in a determined universe? Suppose you're a bit of cork chanting "I have no choice in where I float" as you drift about. How is it that you're any better off than I am?

[Dunamis]

Ucc.,

Suppose you’re a bit of cork chanting “I have no choice in where I float” as you drift about. How is it that you’re any better off than I am?

“I have no choice where I float” is a song that directs the gaze to the currents of the ocean, and to the determinations that direct one’s floating. If this gives rise to dipping an oar in the water then the movement is from relative passivity to relative activity. “I am the master of my domain” is a song that is strictly self-delusive and passive and a call to ignorance as virtue.

Nature brings about the experience of free choice in me.

It certainly does, through the historically contingent evolution of language which gives orientation and meaning to experience. Language is a part of Nature as well as any other, and in man a determinative part. “Language speaks man.”

"If humans of the future see themselves in a radically different way, and somehow do not have the experience of free choice, then apparently something happened to them

What would have happened to them is that language would have changed so as to give new description and meaning to experience, something which you necessarily state as impossible.

it doesn’t change the fact that actual living humans with the actual experiences we have are at their most rational when they believe in free will.

With this I will disagree. An prime example of such being “at their most rational” would be being convinced by another in a rational argument. One of course does not decide to be convinced, one simply is convinced, it happens. You are absolutely powerless to freely choose to be convinced by my arguments. Powerless. Once convinced though, the endless reasons supplied for being convinced are not the reasons that ground a rational Freewill decision, - there was no decision - but only a retrospective inventory of the causes of an event. Freewill functions exactly like this. “Decisions” happen, then they are rationalized, so that the illusion of Freewill can be hypostated.

Then again, long live dogma.

Dunamis

[Uccisore]

If this gives rise to dipping an oar in the water then the movement is from relative passivity to relative activity. “I am the master of my domain” is a song that is strictly self-delusive and passive and a call to ignorance as virtue.

 If freedom is a delusion, then it seems acknowledgement of determinism only complicates it, if I read the above correctly. The person who believes in free will lives in ignorance of the causes that shape his actions. The person who believes in determinism knows something of the causes of his actions, and thus tricks himself into thinking he has some level of control (what else can 'dippnig an oar' mean?) when he really doesn't. It sounds like trading one illusion for another, to me.  The determinist adds a level of dishonesty though- claiming there is no free will, because they privately believe it gives them free will to do so?

It certainly does, through the historically contingent evolution of language which gives orientation and meaning to experience.

If I grant that language and culture has played a part in shaping my base experiences, then I don’t see how that changes anything, as I will explain below.

What would have happened to them is that language would have changed so as to give new description and meaning to experience, something which you necessarily state as impossible.

I don’t think it’s impossible (I don’t even think hard determinism is impossible), I think it’s irrelevant. Even if one day, the nature of our culture and language changed such that humans no longer saw themselves as free, and didn’t take themselves to be deliberating or choosing anything, that wouldn’t change the fact that the humans living now do have these experiences, and have no good reason not to take them at face value. Bear in mind, I’m only granting the above as possible in the broadly logical sense. I see it as more likely that the experience of free will has been pretty much the same throughout human history, and probably only changes as the evolution of the brain changes.

An prime example of such being “at their most rational” would be being convinced by another in a rational argument. One of course does not decide to be convinced, one simply is convinced, it happens.

The parallel you draw here is very interesting, and giving me pause for thought, because it does present a good model.  In the ordinary course of things, we do not directly choose what to believe, certain evidences compell us, or else they don't.  The arguments and evidence given are, in that sense, more like causes of an event than elements in a decision.  You could say that it is just the same in all actions, we look back at what we call factors in a decision, but what we are really doing is acknowledging causes of an event. I do have a problem with it, though. 
  In many cases, elements of a decision make no sense as causes of an event. Suppose I say some inflammatory things about your mother, and you punch me. That is very easy to understand in terms of a decision based on various factors, but much less easy to understand how my vibrating the air with my vocal cords results in your arm moving just so. Why didn't your fist sail off in some other direction, instead of into my nose? The explanation will likely invoke the [i]language[/i] of desire, will, mind, and choice.     
   Now, the determinist/behavioralist would [i]assume[/i] that it could not have gone otherwise, but once the concept of 'acting on desire' is introduced to the explanation, one is no longer being implicitly deterministic- determinism retreats to just being an [i]assumption[/i] while one states the obvious- that people do stuff for reasons.

[Dunamis]

Ucc,

The person who believes in determinism knows something of the causes of his actions, and thus tricks himself into thinking he has some level of control (what else can ‘dippnig an oar’ mean?) when he really doesn’t. It sounds like trading one illusion for another, to me.

By dipping the oar one is freed from one set of determinative causes, while still being determined by others. In an immanent conception of the universe, this is a move towards unity, and hence perfection.

that wouldn’t change the fact that the humans living now do have these experiences, and have no good reason not to take them at face value.

The “good reason” is the have greater understanding of the forces on whose behalf you are an agent, to move to greater unity and comprehension. You are right though, just as a horse cannot help kicking a dog that bit it, simple stimulus-response is the most that humans can ask for. I suggest that knowledge of certain elementary stimuli allows a response to “higher” (more abstract and comprehensive) stimuli.

Suppose I say some inflammatory things about your mother, and you punch me.

It is interesting. You just were claiming that Freewill factors into the most rational of human events, yet when faced with trying to explain how Freewill is evident in the most rational of circumstances, the abstract discussion of a philosophical point, you come up dry.

Then you turn to the least rational of events, an angry response to insults. What follows though I have no idea how it grounds the idea of Freewill at all

Now, the determinist/behavioralist would assume that it could not have gone otherwise, but once the concept of ‘acting on desire’ is introduced to the explanation, one is no longer being implicitly deterministic- determinism retreats to just being an assumption while one states the obvious- that people do stuff for reasons.

Each of these positions is an after the fact description of an event, punching in the mouth. That “reasons” that are given, as is the case in rational argumentation, are simply an inventory of causes of something that simply happens. A rationalization. Now after hearing insults one may very well say “I’ve got a problem with my temper because I was insulted by my father mercilessly when I was a child”, “I like the placid way my wife deals with problems and I wish I was more like her, she seems happy”, and “decide” to not throw a punch. But just like in rational discourse, where you weigh the arguments presented to you, you cannot decide – in a Freewill act – the effectiveness of a particular causal force. Whether the punch is thrown or not happens. After the fact, reasons are given why (a rationalized, inventory of causes), but just as in argument you have no power to chose to be convinced, so in the heat of exchange, you have no power to chose to be convinced. You simply are. Retroactively - even if in split seconds - you are described “to have chosen”.

Dunamis

[Uccisore]

By dipping the oar one is freed from one set of determinative causes, while still being determined by others. In an immanent conception of the universe, this is a move towards unity, and hence perfection.

I can see some consistancy in that, though it still seems to me that if one has no control over whether or not they reject free will, there's no real 'striving' or accomplishment here. Also, it seems a little odd to say that by accepting determinism, one is 'freed' from certain causes- wouldn't it be more accurate to say that they were never under the control of those causes to begin with? 

The “good reason” is the have greater understanding of the forces on whose behalf you are an agent, to move to greater unity and comprehension.

 I must be confused. Isn't the above only a good reason to reject the free will apparent to our senses [i]if [/i]determinism is true? If that's so, what am I supposed to do with your statement? If I reject determinism, then no doubt I reject the idea of it being a 'greater understanding' of anything whatsoever- I think it's a falsehood.  Is there a way to phrase this so that someone [i]believing in free will [/i] can see a reason to doubt their belief? Frankly, it seems a great deal of what you're arguing is in this same vein- it is good to reject free will, because of the peace and understanding it brings of the deterministic universe we live in.  Now, this all seems very coherent to me, but it's also all quite useless to the sincere believer in free will. I have no desire to fit in with a deterministic universe-I don't think there is such a thing. 

is interesting. You just were claiming that Freewill factors into the most rational of human events,

Let me clarify- When I say “humans are at their most rational when they believe in free will”, what I mean is “free will is one of the most rational things a human can believe”.
As long as you bring it up, though, I do believe that free will is evidence in philosophical discussion, even if it doesn’t directly influence belief-forming. For example, at any point, I have the option to not continue the conversation anymore- perhaps your arguments are so good that I can’t handle them shaking my beliefs, or so bad that I can’t be bothered to correct you anymore. I could find some essay advocating free will on the internet, post a link to it, and demand you repond to every little point, while I look up another link just in case you are capable of defeating the first. Or, I could continue the discuss as I have. Any of these things could lead to me reinforcing or changing my current beliefs, even though I cannot directly choose to believe this or that. I apologize if I’ve used this comparison before, but it’s rather like appetite- I cannot, through an act of will, make myself be hungry or full. However, if I knew there was an eating contest in a week, I could take indirect actions to ensure that I will be very hungry at the time of the contest.

Each of these positions is an after the fact description of an event, punching in the mouth. That “reasons” that are given, as is the case in rational argumentation, are simply an inventory of causes of something that simply happens.

But this doesn't change anything. I think it was Bertrand Russell who pointed this out: even if I agree that there are exhaustive list of deterministic causes for every human movement, all I need do is stipulate that one of those causes is "X [i]chooses[/i] to perform Y" and free will is preserved. 

Now after hearing insults one may very well say “I’ve got a problem with my temper because I was insulted by my father mercilessly when I was a child”, “I like the placid way my wife deals with problems and I wish I was more like her, she seems happy”, and “decide” to not throw a punch.

Which brings us back to the ‘strength of desires’ point we touched on before. You say that the strongest desire always acts on us, I say that we choose to act on our desires (or judgement) through a process of evaluation. Both of us admit that ‘desire’ is an element, which means that determinism in human action is already a great deal more abstract than determinism on a pool table. The problem with your assessment is that there’s no consistant way to define a ‘strongest desire’ that matches the facts. To define the ‘strongest desire’ as the one that acts on us is useless- it only says ‘we do what we decide to do’ which is obvious to both of us. If you define ‘strongest desire’ in any useful way, though, exceptions can be found where a person apparently chose not to act on the strongest desire.
I will agree with you on one thing- reflexively punching someone after a bad remark is not free will in it’s finest, it will generally happen without thought, and rationalization will come later. That will lead us to the role ‘character building’ has in free will, if we choose to persue it.

[Dunamis]

Ucc,

I can see some consistancy in that, though it still seems to me that if one has no control over whether or not they reject free will, there’s no real ‘striving’ or accomplishment here.

Striving amounts to inscribing yourself into higher orders of organization. The way that one does this is by becoming conscious of elementary determinations. For instance in Spinoza, the striving is simply for self-preservation, and rationality leads one to greater instances of unity, through the awareness of causes.

wouldn’t it be more accurate to say that they were never under the control of those causes to begin with?

You were passive to them when you were in ignorance of them. When aware, you pass out of their control and into the other, more complete unities.

Isn’t the above only a good reason to reject the free will apparent to our senses if determinism is true? If that’s so, what am I supposed to do with your statement?

You accept determinism to be true in all instances except for one, in which you make an exception. I am only providing you with a prospective advantage for not making that exception.

Is there a way to phrase this so that someone believing in free will can see a reason to doubt their belief?

The only thing I can say is that some of the primary reasons for some people for believing in freewill, for instance a sense of control and meaningfulness in life, might very well be better reasons for accepting determinism, if you would see the universe as a meaningful and unifying place.

I have no desire to fit in with a deterministic universe-I don’t think there is such a thing.

I’m sure to a large degree you do believe that the universe is deterministic, i.e. follows a general law of cause and effect. If not, I would be interested in the universe as you so conceive it.

“free will is one of the most rational things a human can believe”.

So far I have seen no argument from you that suggests a rational foundation for the belief in freewill, other than that is the way it seems. In fact freewill requires several logical aporias in description, that are not rational.

I do believe that free will is evidence in philosophical discussion, even if it doesn’t directly influence belief-forming.

You leave freewill out the most “rational” part. The “decision” to be convinced, which it seems is by your complete admission, to be determined.

Any of these things could lead to me reinforcing or changing my current beliefs, even though I cannot directly choose to believe this or that.

All of these things would fall under the example of listening to arguments and being convinced, if we are to assume that there are “reasons” why you decide to do these things. As I showed in the example of rational argument, and in the example of an angry response, you cannot choose to be convinced by a reason. You are simply convinced – whether it be reasons floating in your mind, or reasons proposed by me- , and then it is established that you have been convinced. Freewill is just a retroactive description of an event that has no choice.

all I need do is stipulate that one of those causes is “X chooses to perform Y” and free will is preserved.

As I illustrated in the instance of being convinced by argument, you can just as easily say that “x chooses to be convinced” but we both know that this is not so. Saying it, just because its irrefutable, does not make it so. Go ahead and show me that you can choose to be convinced by my arguments. The argument that convinces is the cause. The desire that wins out, is the cause. But we have been over this before.

To define the ‘strongest desire’ as the one that acts on us is useless- it only says ‘we do what we decide to do’ which is obvious to both of us.

Take the example of logical argument. The strongest argument is that which convinces us. We do not chose to be convinced. Another person for instance may hear that argument and not be convinced in the slightest. The strongest argument isn’t inherently stronger, it is causally stronger, for the person that is you at that point in time. Such is the case with the strongest desire. It is strongest to the relative position of your mind, your orientation to the world. There is no inherently stronger desire, or argument. The entire history of your being needs to be taken into account. In either case, there is no choice.

If you define ‘strongest desire’ in any useful way, though, exceptions can be found where a person apparently chose not to act on the strongest desire.

By “useful way”, you mean a way not consistent with reality, in other words in a way that it is supposedly inherently stronger, an absolutely unnecessary and in fact contradictory way of looking at desire or argument. One can make general assessments of desires or arguments based on their general effect upon the population given cultural standards, meanings and language use, but really strength is entirely due to circumstance.

Dunamis

[detrop]

Dunamis:

For Spinoza the “relief” of determinism is not that we act “wrongly” by way of Freewill, but the simple transformation from a relatively passive state (ignorance of specific causes that determine us) to a relatively active state (the ability to act up those causes, while still being determined in other ways), a passive-to-active shift which marks the transition from sadness to happiness. This empowerment is the ethical intent, it is not associated with it.

This is more hocus-pocus. There is only one function that determinism serves on the ethical plane and that is to relieve the individual from an alienation, from the sense of contingency of one’s acts-- it is an attempt to bond oneself with the order of fate and purpose. There is a comfort in surrendering control to forces beyond oneself. But why? Because the concept of guilt was already established…for Spinoza, for Plotinus, for everyone in the company of an Other. Without the notion of immorality already in place there was no weight of responsibility, there was no occasion to do wrong, following this, there was no need to reconcile one’s choices with fate; nobody had to remember that their actions were determined by forces beyond their control to find solace in their life.

For millions of years we plodded along with no concern for things like this. It was only after the human being had to answer to consequences, political and ethical consequences, that he began to entertain the idea of freewill and determinism. When things worked out in his favor he called himself “free.” When he opposed another and faced consequences he called himself determined…that way he could bare the punishment of another man while believing himself to be in good keeping with the order of the universe.

Recall the criminal who answers only to the Gods and is affraid of no man. Suddenly, after he is caught, he is no longer “free” but a “manifestation of powers beyond himself.”

“The universe made me do it” is what we hear, and indeed this is true, but never had this been emphasized until he faced an opposition.

You, Spinoza, and the rest of the gang have got it completely backwards.

[jjg]

Man has free-will: otherwise counsels, exhortations, commands, prohibitions, rewards and punishments would be in vain.

In order to make this evident, we must observe that some things act without judgement; as a stone moves downwards; and in like manner all things which lack knowledge. And some act from judgement, but not a free judgement; as brute animals.

For the sheep, seeing the wolf, judges it a thing to be shunned, from a natural and not a free judgement, because it judges, not from reason, but from natural instinct. And the same thing is to be said of any judgement of brute animals. But man acts from judgement, because by his apprehensive power he judges that something should be avoided or sought.

But because this judgement, in the case of some particular act, is not from a natural instinct, but from some act of comparison in the reason, therefore he acts from free judgement and retains the power of being inclined to various things.

For reason in contingent matters may follow opposite courses, as we see in dialectic syllogisms and rhetorical (probable) arguments. Now particular operations are contingent, and therefore in such matters the judgement of reason may follow opposite courses, and is not determinate to one. And foreasmuch as man is a rational creature it is necessary that man have a free-will.

To summarize, it is because of reason tht man has a free-will. There is a popular misconception that sees reason as unfree and deterministic, and freedom as irrational and arbitrary. It arises from the nineteenth century Romantic reaction against eighteenth-century classical rationalism and determinism.

[Dunamis]

detrop,

“There is only one function that determinism serves on the ethical plane and that is to relieve the individual from an alienation, from the sense of contingency of one’s acts”

That is because you do not understand the Ethical. But I do wish you relief from your alienation.

Dunamis

[Dunamis]

jjg,

“Man has free-will: otherwise counsels, exhortations, commands, prohibitions, rewards and punishments would be in vain.”

Incorect. They simply would not be the sole expression of an entirely autonomous agent.

Dunamis

[detrop]

That is because you do not understand the Ethical.

Sure I do. Ethics is mesolimbic activity.

You don’t decide what is “ethical,” my good man. Your nervous system does.

[jjg]

Dunamis, they would not be the expressions of an entirely autonomous nature, because they are free-will expressions.

[Dunamis]

detrop,

“You don’t decide what is “ethical,” my good man. Your nervous system does.”

Which is exactly Spinoza’s point. It is the con-fusion of the idea of the “external” object with the idea of the “internal” perturbation of the nervous system that produces the inadequacy of ideas, and the bodily root of all understanding. A good book that addresses this in terms of the neurosciences is Looking For Spinoza, by Damasio, which traces the prescient understanding of the emotions that Spinoza had, from the point of view of recent discoveries in neurology. The “ethical” stems from the source of this confusion, to the mind’s ability to achieve understanding beyond the limits of simple nervous system response and association, an increased ability to comprehend being beyond the sphere of one’s bodily being, and link the individual in assemblage to forces greater than itself. There is no liberation of the soul, without the liberation of the body, no liberation of the self, without the liberation of others.

Dunamis

[Dunamis]

jjg,

“they would not be the expressions of an entirely autonomous nature, because they are free-will expressions.”

If I understood this I would ask a pertinent question. Since I don’t, welcome to the forum.

Dunamis

[jjg]

I’m saying your comment is self-contradictory.

This debate shows that free-will and reasoning are not separate. All these differing arguments are from our reason, but we have the free-will to take whatever stand we want.