Rescuing Morality; Or Saving the Teleological suspension o..

I. Either there is a morality Or We cannot dismiss the teleological suspension of the ethical.

First, I’ll clarify my position: it is rationally agnostic, and emotionally atheistic. That is to say, I’m an atheist because of the problem of evil: terrible things happening in this world, which are unjust, cruel, absurd, and wrong to my heart’s judgment, so wrong, that I cannot believe in any good God to have created such a horrific world. Therefore, I conclude, there is no good god – and an evil/amoral god is simply not worth my faith.

However, there is a dilemma: If God does not exist, some conclude that “Everything is permissible” (Dostoevsky); or, as Détrop said in another thread, “If god does not exist there is no right or wrong.” But, if you haven’t caught the problem yet, if there is no right or wrong without God, how can I determine that there is no God because I find so many things to be wrong? It seems to reason, that if there is no right or wrong, one cannot say that there cannot possibly exist a God because of the problem of evil, for if there is no God, there is no problem of evil.

Yet, if people continue to insist that there is no right or wrong, then I would not be right to dismiss Kierkegaard’s argument for the teleological suspension of the ethical (for there wouldn’t be an ethics to suspend). Therefore, it seems to really be an Either/or situation; but an either/or in this sense: Either A) Morality exists and we reject God on the basis of it, Or B) Morality does not exist and therefore we can teleologically suspend the ethical.

The first part of the above argument (A) follows from Plato’s Euthyphro dialogue, which understood correctly, argues that good and evil does not depend upon the existence of God. But if that is the case, then it follows that if we reject god based on morality, we at the same time cannot reject morality. In other words, to say that “If there is no God everything is permissible” is an invalid inference, if we reject god on the basis that he is immoral. But that leads us back into the Either/Or situation.

or perhaps men began with the concept of the ultimate infinite good and assigned that as a quality of god…

when looking at the sky as the sun is setting, the various shades of blue that are visible change…

is there a definite meaning of the concept “blue” that exists for all blue things to be compared?

the single perfect ideal blue does not exist any more than the perfect ideal morality exists…

human inventions, nothing more…

-Imp

Impenitent,

That is fine. The question is not whether this morality is perfect or ideal; the question is whether we can speak of morality at all (perhaps it’s better to substitute the word ethics for morality). I would be much more willing to dissuss shades of right and wrong, then to say there is no right and wrong to disscuss at all. That is to say, whether or not there is an ideal blue is a moot point, for we are able to still percieve the shades; because some types of blue, though they vary, do exist for us. Unless there is no blue at all, in which case we cannot reject the teleological suspension of the ethical. That is all that my argument purports to show.

The Underground Man, what’s the origin of morality?

Uniqor,

What is the origin of reason?–or, rational life? I don’t know; the same way that I don’t know what the origin of morality is (though I can formulate a few hypotheses). We can’t deny the existence of an object, because we do not know where it originated from; so though, that is a good question, worth serious contemplation, it is irrelevent to this disscussion. The issue which is at hand here is: what are the consequences of holding the postion of either the existence, or non-existence, of morality, in relation to the teleological suspension of the ethical.

i only read the title and i can’t read no more.

morality doesnt need saving. morality needs shooting. drowning in a septic tank. so forth (i could get really gross here, but i will spare the weak at heart)

that’s the thing… iff there was an overriding morality to which even god was subject, then he should never have asked abraham to murder, for that would violate that morality, both god’s request and abraham’s deed…

but as the stories go, god did ask and abraham was ready to do the deed… god apparently violated the overriding morality, unless god in his omnipotence suspended the ethical in order to violate it, god would have simply violated it… that leaves soren in fear and trembling…

the result is that god is not subject to god’s morality…

-Imp

Underground M.,

If you simply make “God” an immanent process instead of an author of an external template, you dissolve the problem.

Dunamis

Nice. I was searching for a way to say this but couldn’t do it in such a concise, clean way. I’m glad I waited.

Impenitent,

Imp, that is not news to me. Violating the “universal” by God and Abraham, according to Kierkegaard himself, seems “absurd,” and yet, the argument is that the universal can be violated if it serves a teleological end (which can only be known to god; you know the deal, we’re finite and imperfect, he’s infinite and perfect).

All that my argument purports to show is that if there is no universal, then we shouldn’t be outraged by god’s request of Abraham to violate it, for the universal doesn’t exist. Hence, an individual who rejects faith in the teleological end on the basis of the universal, and at the same time claims that there is no universal, is in an obvious contradiction. The only way to be consistent in rejecting the teleological suspension of the ethical when doing so through the universal, is to maintain that there is, indeed, a universal. Again, if the existence of the universal is denied, we are no longer faced with Kierkegaard’s problem of suspending the ethical; therefore, in such a situation, if one wants to reject the teleological, one needs to find another means to do so (not through the universal).

My purpose here is rather simple. All I’m attempting to do is to point out the contradiction between maintaining that there is no universal, and rejecting the teleological by claiming that God is subject to the universal (as is often done by many athiests). I’m merly showing that one can’t have it both ways, it’s Either/Or in that sense (I know Kierkegaard means it differently, but I hope you understand what I’m saying).

Dunamis,

Though that concise statement seems to have gotten through to Jerry, it hasn’t to me. I’m a bit slow to understand, so if you would do me the honor, by explaining a little better what you mean, I would greatly appreciate it.

Underground,

I’m really not sure what your project is. Is it to conceive of morality without resorting to the legal metaphor of Laws being handed down by a superior power, or of retaining the legal metaphor but somehow reconciling that power to its laws?

Dunamis

are you trying to derail or support the argument that says god cannot exist as an omnibenevolent god because evil exists?

-Imp

Impenitent,

I’m derailing it for someone who holds that there is no universal.

(if you want another re-statement of the argument see below)

Dunamis,

I’ll restate my project, as well as the argument in a more broken down way.

A person can adopt one of two positions:

Either A) There is a universal (morality, ethics) to which humans, as well as Gods, are subject to, Or B) There is no such universal.

If one chooses A (there is a universal) then one is able to maintain the following arguments without contradiction:

  1. An omnibenevolent God cannot exist because of the problem of evil,
  2. One cannot accept the teleological suspension of the ethical because God(s) must be subject to it.
    Furthermore, if one chooses A, then they acknowledge a morality, independent of god(s).

But if one chooses B (There is no universal, i.e., ethical duties people and gods are subject to), then they cannot support the argument against the existence of an omnibenevolent god due to the problem of evil,
and, they cannot undermine teleological arguments by the common means of pointing out that Gods are subject to the universal (for they reject the universal).

My project is to demonstrate that by taking up one of the two positions, one is subject to one of the two aforementioned consequences. I’m attempting to illustrate that one can’t have his cake and eat it to–nothing more, nothing less.

U.M.

Either A) There is a universal (morality, ethics) to which humans, as well as Gods, are subject to, Or B) There is no such universal.

Implicit in your model is the concept of free will, and the projection of an intention upon a “God”. In teleological thinking one sets up an intention and establishes an instrumentality of acts (and in the case of Gods and men, Laws). The problem is only one of this projection of intention. Consider the horn of a rhinoceros in metaphor to that of a law. Teleologically it can be described as an instrument of defense. But in “actuality” it is not created for the purposes of defense by a freewill’s intention. Rather it is simply an expression of the genealogical history of the development of what is termed a “rhinoceros”. It can be described teleologically, but an imposed design did not lead to its development. It is an expression of a multiplicity of factors that goes far beyond the simple teleos of defense. Such is the same with the ethical. It can be described teleologically, but it is not reducible to that teleos, as far as that teleos is imagined to be the result of a projected (divine) intention. God as an immanent process does not fit into your constrictive model. There is no intention that is instrumentally using the acts of men and the laws of religion to achieve a desirable end. It is simply an unfolding.

Dunamis

The Underground Man hi.

Could you describe it briefly for us, I myself don’t have much on it, except some Nietzsche of course, I’d be really interested in knowing yours.

Sure, also I’d say that we wouldn’t truely grasp the nature of the existence of the an object if we are ignorant of its origin.

Ditto, that’s the reason I asked.

imp made a response to that I concord with him. Still I’d like to know what you guys think about the origin.

hi all

i don’t think the universe has any morality really, it appears to be a concept invented by dictatorial beings in an attempt to control the population.
Religion and morality seem to go hand in hand so one would assume that religion and morality began around the same time.

Hi Uniquor

I’ve come to believe that morality is a man made effort to mechanically recall what at one time was understood consciously in association with conscience on the same level as consciousness.

Lack of consciousness though has devolved objective conscience into strictly a subjective programmed view of right and wrong. The result is subjective morality that differs between cultures.

Sorry I haven’t responded in a while been a bit busy. But here goes.

Dunamis,

I didn’t catch on to the misscommunication at first, but I think I see the problem now. I am not implying that there is a teleological end created by God. The statement which you quoted is with regard to a universal (an ethics) which is independent of teleos and God(s).

However, I do concede your point [on the teleological] and will refine my argument accordingly. Since you have demonstrated an alternative way of concieving things in the world, as an unfolding, I will withdraw the teleological, and limit the argument to this:

The rejection of God, due to the problem of evil, cannot be maintained if there is no universal (ethics, morality).

Therefore:

Either A) There is an ethics, to which we thinkers ought to put forth our energy in order to try to understand the nature of,

Or B) We cannot maintain the argument that an omnibenevolent God cannot exist because of the problem of evil.

So it logically follows that holding one position, nessesarly implies the rejection of the other, and vice versa.

Uniqor,

[Remember this is just a hypothesis]

When I speak of morality or ethics – I don’t speak of it, or think of it, in deontological terms. Nor do I think of ethics in terms of a religious morality (anymore anyway). So, in my opinion, Nietzsche may have hit the nail on the hammer, or came pretty darn close, when he described the genesis of religious morality.

However, in my opinion, a moral person, someone who accepts ethical claims, has a conscience, ect., develops this conscience, not because religion indoctrinates it within them (though later on, if one places faith and love into God, it will serve to indoctrinate a lot of a person’s morality), but because they know, or have known, love.

A childs love for his syblings, mother, father, grandparents, causes the child pain. For example, if a child does something displeasing to them, offends them or hurts them, by the very fact that the child loves them, the child ends up hurting itself.

In relation to that, I want to bring up Levinas’s idea that “to be human is by definition to be in relation to the other” --and the child, is more than in mere relation to the other, they are in a loving relation, which, I think, enables them to develop that “conscience,” that moral right and wrong. For, the child itself will be in pain when it hurts that whom it loves.

For example, stealing is not a part of a childs ethics, the child has no knowledge of it being right or wrong, that is, until the child steals something and then observes the embaressment it causes his or her parents. Then the parents teach the child that it is wrong to steal – and the moral conscience, that pain which, if not after the first time, sooner or later, will become a part of that child’s being.

What happens then is, I think, a child, out of love, internalizes their parents, and later on God, and fears not their punishment, but fears their dissapointment because of the belief that the parents, and God, love the child. Holding this belief [parents and god loving the child], they accept what is taught to them by their parents, and God, for they believe it is for their own best interest. So it is a twofold proccess: First, the child is dissapointing them who the child loves [and believes loves the child], and second, the child is acting to his or her own moral disadvantage by disobeying [for the belief is that the commandments, comming from a loving place, are for the child’s own best interest]. I also think, that the fear of Hell, plays a role in Christian morality, but their are conscientious people who grow up without the idea of Hell.

Furthermore, one has to, I think, understand the nature of a childs world. A child is a lot more in-the-world than us theoretical farts. They are able to have such strong vicarious experiences, where the difference between a movie and real life, to the child, is almost non-existent. What can be inferred from this? The child’s world, the ego dominated and centered world, is a lot more emotionally connected to the world. Because whatever enters a child world, the child seems to think of it as an extension of themselves. At least in very early childhood. For instance, a child can believe that people who die on t.v. actually die.

So, when injustice is percieved by the child – which the child merely judges in terms of how they would feel in that situation – morality is created. In other words, Kant’s a big baby looking to rationally justify his childhood moral sense of right and wrong.

All deontological principles, on the other hand, are built into society to protect the weak from the strong; and to help society flourish and prosper.

That’s my 3 cents anyway. I’d be interested in hearing yours, or anyone elses thoughts on the matter, if you guys wish to share.