Not everything is meant to be deep, right, but depth is not intended. It is not a reduction, as laid out eidetically, by Husserl as an inducement, or a willful intent, to forward a program. It is ‘there’ , where? ; and if you dare to look into it , it will stare back at you, ; not as a retort, a sought after justification, as to it’s content. It is there simply and formally, because it is there. If it’s a staring down, into the cave, then you are likely to fall, to fail, since the cave is where it is. You can also look up or away from it, so the transcendental be humbled into an immanent existence, and the depth , as it were disappears, but then, you cannot re-capture it. The main proponent of this idea is Proust.
So there is no contest, and it does not dissolve into the issue of value, or what’s it worth, or is it worth pursuing, - because that question ties in with the paradox of what comes first, the existenz or, the essential element which postsribed it, strictly a product of formal arrangements and perceptions thereof.
More likely, questions of focus, of where to look, that satisfies the conditional qualifier of it’s reason d’etra. The unity sought after, is redeemable up to t’s probable limit, but as has been beat to a pulp, that limit escapes at the ever vanishing horizon of sensibility. Ultimately, it’s not what we can apprehend, but what we can sense. And that sense, is inherent in the unity, the commonness of what is inherent in the common sense of intelligibility. That is Rorty’s mirror, reflecting exactly what you are implying: It’s not an attack on Continental philosophy, but a shift in focus to common sense.
Is this satisfactory as a solution or even as a reply? Probably not, but unity has been approached from the point of view of synthesizing both elements, and the question of which focii would be most appropriate, is i am afraid more a question of who proposes it, and why, which are of secondary importance.
The propositions themselves are primary within their own structure, regardless of whether they are understood, or not, regardless of the fields of association. Communication fails at certain levels is not the fault of the communication, but the transcription.
If a computer were programmed to write a totally disassociated narrative, it would fail, because there could occur a re-association of propositions, from the available memory, to establish a meaning to it. The question of whether that particular interpretation was the intended one, would seem more likely be the one Rorty would shift focus away from. That is pragmatism and the only qualifier is, it the application works or not. If it works, than it can adapt to any specific application, and the secondary task of finding out whether it was the intended one , or not, becomes a further effort of remixing other possible re-assembliges. Usually the one which works best, is the key to this type of program.