Russell, Kaufmann, and Martin on William James’s “Will to Believe”
William James comments on Pascal and Clifford in his essay, “Will to Believe,” and that essay chronologically follows, in some Philosophy of Religion textbooks, what those authors said. If left there, there may be a perception that James’s is the last word on the topic of the reasonableness of believing in God. It is not. Bertrand Russell, Walter Kaufmann, and Michael Martin criticize what James said, just as James criticized Pascal and Clifford. They expose a philosopher who is not very careful, as we expect philosophers to be. Russell is the most sympathetic, saying “Will to Believe” should not be considered in isolation but as a transition to James’s more credible work developing pragmatism, but Kaufmann goes ahead and calls the essay a “slipshod work.” This may not be uncalled for, since James seems to imply that people who think like Clifford are cowards, but he does blur the distinction between those who hold out for 100 per cent proof and those who may settle for 90 per cent. Are we cowards if we refuse to indulge in a belief that is supported only by the argument that after all it could be conceivably true? There is also the matter of “live” options, which are really pretty subjective. James also comments on Pascal, and Martin spends a lot of time refuting Pascal. I am mostly interested, though, only on the first part of James’s essay, his “live” option, criticism of Clifford, and alleged justification for unjustified belief in God.
In this paper, I will use the following three references above and beyond the text:
Bertrand Russell, A History of Western Philosophy (New York: Simon and Schuster,1945)
Michael Martin, Atheism, A philosophical Justification (Philodelphia: Temple University Press, 1990)
Walter Kaufmann, Critique of Religion and Philosophy (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1958 )
Clifford’s side, “Is belief in God immoral?”
William Kingdon Clifford (1845-1879) was Professor of Applied Mathematics and Mechanics at University College, London. In an essay titled “The Ethics of Belief,” he supports the view that one is morally culpable for any belief beyond sufficient evidence. He, therefore, rejects theism because there cannot be sufficient evidence to justify a belief in God. It is, in fact, morally wrong to believe in God or anything beyond the evidence.
Clifford begins his essay with a scenario about a ship-owner who was about to send emigrants out to sea on a ship that perhaps needed to have some work done on it. The ship-owner, however, convinced himself that the ship was seaworthy, that it would be safe to send it out with emigrants on board. He believed it to be safe, even when evidence told him it needed repairs. Well, the ship sank, and all the emigrants and crew died. Was the ship-owner negligent? Was he guilty of believing something he had no right to believe, especially since that belief resulted in action which resulted in catastrophe? Would he have been guilty even if the ship had not, by chance, sunk? Clifford says, “Yes!”
With this case in mind and other imaginable situations, as when a doctor does not question antidotal evidence enough and bases his subsequent beliefs on where to cut in surgery, Clifford announces that we have a “universal duty of questioning all that we believe.” Failing to do so would be immoral.
If there is, as in many moral codes which adopt universal principles such as the golden rule or categorical imperative or natural rights, a prohibition against harming others; then believing what is false, which is often the result of believing on insufficient evidence, can lead to actions which harm or threaten others.
Not questioning evidence also leads to bad habits which weaken our judgment and mental powers. It can make us gullible and careless, vulnerable to liars and cheats. We can also lose respect of people who have higher standards of intellectual rigor. We can lose credibility and simply become objects of pity, dependent on those who are individuals, on those who think for themselves, on those who have a passion for truth whether it sooths us or not, on those who would rather be dissatisfied Socrateses than satisfied fools.
In Clifford’s own words:
William James on William Clifford
There is clash between William James, America’s first philosopher, and William Clifford. William James calls Clifford “…that delicious enfant terrible.” He characterizes Clifford as expressing himself “…with too much of robustious pathos in the voice.” When Clifford says, “It is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence,” James says, “Our passional nature not only lawfully may, but must, decide an option between propositions, whenever it is a genuine option that cannot by its nature be decided on intellectual grounds.” When Clifford says, “If the decision between believing P and believing not-P cannot be made on the basis of evidence, then one ought to remain agnostic about P,” James says, "If the decision between believing P and believing not-P cannot be made on the basis of evidence and the option is a genuine one, then it is not wrong to believe P (or to believe not-P) as one wishes.
In the passage below, James implies that Clifford and anyone who thinks like him is a coward, nervous and afraid of being duped:
Both Clifford and James agree that it is moral to believe P if there is sufficient evidence in P’s favor, and they both agree that it is moral not to believe P if there is sufficient evidence against it. To this extent, they are both evidentialists. James would not say that we can make one dollar in our pocket a hundred dollars just by believing it to be so. The clash is only when there is insufficient evidence for believing P. Clifford would consider it a moral duty to suspend judgment, while James would hold that it is permissible to follow our emotional inclinations to believe P if that hypothesis presents us with a genuine option.
A “genuine option,” according to James, is a decision between two hypothesis that is living, forced, and momentous.
An option is “living” for us if we actually care. It would probably not be meaningful to westerners to be a thesophist or a Mohomedan, but the option of being an atheist or a Christian is, according to James, an example of a more “living” option.
An option is “forced” if it is a genuine option without the possibility of a middle grounder an escape route. Choosing between going out with one’s umbrella or without it is not a genuine option because one can always choose not to go out. Calling a theory true or false is not a forced option because one can remain indifferent. However, choosing between accepting a truth or not is a real dilemma. There are only two options. It is “forced.”
An option is “momentous” when it is less than trivial, as in a once in a lifetime chance or a life altering decision, not just something that can be put off or that has no real consequences. Choosing jobs or to get married might be decisions of this type.
James feels the decision to be religious is just such a genuine option, and he tends to use an argument similar to Pascal’s wager, even though he criticized Pascal’s wager earlier in the essay. He criticized the gaming terminology, that it’s good to be a Christian because it’s a safe bet. Religious people would rather it be a calling to be religious, not just a safe bet. However, he then says if by being skeptical, like the scientist, he misses his chance to be on the winning side, then it is a live and forced and momentous choice for him to believe in the face of insufficient evidence.
Then, he seems to slip into an ontological argument to support the liveness of the religious hypothesis. “The more perfect and more eternal aspect of the universe is represented in our religions as having personal form.” He talks about how the universe, if we are religious, becomes more personal to us, and this adds to the momentousness of our decision. James thinks the agnostic is missing out on this personal relation with the universe.
Elsewhere in his essay and in his other writings, James discusses self-fulfilling prophecies, or instances where what we believe helps bring about some truth. If we are mountain climbing and caught on a ledge where our only chance of survival is to jump to another ledge, and there is insufficient evidence to know for certain we can successfully make the jump, perhaps the belief that we can will provide that bit of positivism we need to make our beliefs true. We do this also when we believe in overcoming obstacles and making our marriages work. Perhaps we don’t have sufficient evidence to predict the future, but we act anyway, and we don’t miss out on possible knowledge while waiting for sufficient evidence to become available to us.
“The Will to Believe” came from an address to the Philosophical Clubs of Yale and Brown Universities. Published in the New World, June, 1896
The source for the excepts in this piece came from “The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy”(New York: Longmans, Green & Co, , 1897): 1-31
An online text can be read here:
ajburger.homestead.com/fi...k.htm#will
Bertrand Russell on William James
Bertrand Russell picks up on James’s concern that shunning error may prevent one from believing truth if something is true but not verified by sufficient evidence. By believing, one has a chance of believing truth, but there is no chance if one suspends belief. It seems like a version of Pascal’s wager, that it is a better bet to believe and have the possibility of great reward than to refrain from believing and have no chance whatsoever.
Russell constructs a scenario where he meets a stranger on a train and wonders, to himself, is this man’s name Ebenezer Wilkes Smith? Certainly there is not enough evidence to support the belief that that is his name, but if there is a chance that it is, he should not fear being duped. Positive veracity should prompt him, especially if he had been hoping to meet a man named Ebenezer Wilkes Smith, to believe every male stranger he meets is this man, until he has sufficient evidence that this is not the case.
Well, we are not in total ignorance in such a situation because we know that the chances of actually meeting Ebenezer Wilkes Smith are not great. Most people are not so named. But, James never says anything about probability in “The Will to Believe.” Suppose, says Russell, a Chinese person comes into contact with Confucianism, Buddhism, and Christianity. If all three have an equal chance to be true, than all are more likely to be false than true. According to Russell, “James’ principle collapses as soon as we are allowed to bring in considerations of probability.”
Russell also notes, as others also observe, that James speaks as if the only alternatives are complete belief or complete disbelief. He ignores all shades of doubt. If I am looking for a book, I may think it “may” be in this shelf. I look, but I don’t think “It is in this shelf.” So, we act on hypothesis. We don’t need to consider them certainties.
Rather than accepting James’s precept of veracity, Russell would say, "Give to any hypothesis which is worth your while to consider just that degree of credence which the evidence warrants. And if the hypothesis is sufficiently important, there is the additional duty of seeking further evidence. This is plain common sense, and in harmony with the procedure in law courts, but it is quite different from the procedure recommended by James.
Russell, Bertrand, A History of Western Philosophy (Simon and Shuster, New York 1945) pp. 814-816
Walter Kaufman on William James
Walter Kaufmann begins his comments on William James’s “Will to Believe” by referring to it as a “slipshod but celebrated essay.” “Instead of admitting that some traditional beliefs are comforting,” says Kaufmann, “James argued that “the risk of being in error is a very small matter when compared with the blessing of real knowledge,” and implied that those who did not accept religious beliefs were cowards, afraid of risking anything.” And, it is here that he reminds us of that quote in Section VII about the general afraid to send his soldiers into battle least they suffer a single wound.
Kaufmann agrees with Russell that James speaks as if there is only complete belief or complete disbelief, he blurs the distinction between those who hold out for 100 per cent in a matter in which any reasonable person would be satisfied with perhaps 90 per cent, and those who would refuse a belief which only could conceivably be true.
James did attempt to define the permissible cases where believing without sufficient evidence would still be intellectually reputable, but Kaufmann contends he failed utterly.
The “live” option is really just subjective and relative. One man’s live option is another man’s dead option. It simply means the belief must tempt us.
The “forced” option is just a matter of phrasing. It’s not forced if we say, “Either call my theory true or call it false,” but it is forced if we say, “Either accept this truth or go without it.”
Finally, the option must be “momentous,” which is just another way of saying that it is important and matters. So, if an option has all three of these, it is genuine. Or, in other words, if I want to believe something very much but there is insufficient evidence, I have a right to believe it. Isn’t this just an invitation to wishful thinking, provided we are tempted very much?
Sure, we can’t always have sufficient evidence. We do, if we are involved in life, make decisions on the basis of partial evidence. And, we are bound to make mistakes. However, we can act on what seems most probable. It doesn’t need to be a situation where we either accept this truth or go without it.
It is not true that the only alternative to firm faith is weak indecision. We can act with vigor, realizing we may be wrong. We can be confident that we are acting with integrity and that our decisions were arrived at conscientiously, (or that we are taking chances and know we are taking chances, not deluding ourselves that we are right.)*
In the case of the mountain climber jumping to another ledge, one need not believe one can make the jump to succeed. One merely needs to do one’s best. If one believes one can succeed but does not try hard, the belief alone may not sustain one. What matters is not faith but effort.
Then, the “religious hypothesis.” Remember, James said that religion says the “best things are the most eternal things.” Well, ““Best” is vague, and “more eternal” comes close to being nonsense,” says Kaufmann. “either something is eternal or it is not.” This “religious hypothesis” seems nothing like a scientific hypothesis which can be tested and determined to be true or false.
Kaufmann concludes with one final point, that James confuses the kind of truth which belief can perhaps bring about, like making my marriage work, and alleged truth for which there can never be sufficient evidence, like the existence of God or whether Jesus was resurrected on the third day.
Kaufmann, Walter, Critique of Religion and Philosophy (Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1958 ) pp. 115-120
*that which is in ( ) is actually my own little add on, not something Kaufmann said, but I thought it fit there nicely.
Michael Martin on William James
Martin begins his evaluation of James’s argument by citing Kaufmann’s observation that “live option” is subjective and relativistic, but he takes it a bit further. He notes that what may appeal to a person as a real possibility may in fact be impossible, while ones that do not appeal, ones that may be dead options, may be more real. Should Buddhism be excluded as a religion for an American because in is not as alive as Christianity? Is this a good reason for excluding Buddhism? Objective investigation could show that Christianity is less plausible than Buddhism.
Martin suggests that James could have been more careful and said that live option is one that is not improbable in light of available evidence. However, even then, there are more genuine options than what James may have imagined. There are many religions, not just Christianity and Buddhism. There are many kinds of religions within those religions, and there are many concepts of God. How is a person to chose?
Martin also agrees with Kaufmann that the “religious hypothesis” is unclear. He quotes Kaufmann talking about “best” and “more eternal.” Then, Martin challenges an assumption that “eternal” is better than “non-eternal.” Numbers are eternal, but why would they be better than all non-eternal things?
Then, to say that something “is better,” as it is better to believe in a perfect being than not to, is contextual. Something is better for some purposes but not for others. A hammer is better for pounding nails than an eternal being.
However, even if atheists accept the first part of the religious hypothesis, that it is better to believe in a perfect being than a non-perfect being, it doesn’t mean that this being exists.
Now, Martin goes into the Pascal’s wager type argument that James seems to be proposing, that it is better to believe in God than not to. Perhaps it will lead to a better life than will not believing, and perhaps it is true. In either case, it is better to believe in God than not to, according to James.
However, this is not born out empirically. There is not evidence that theists live happier, healthier, and more productive lives than non-theists, neither in America nor in the world at large In fact, if studies were to be done, it seems most likely that religious families would generally be the least educated and more poor families. If one wants to be happy and successful etc., it seems better to choose to be an atheist than a theist.
It might be maintained that theists are able to be more qualitatively happy, more at peace with themselves and spiritually satisfied than atheists or agnostics. However, Buddhism also claims this benefit, and it is an atheistic religion. How is being high on God any different from being high on drugs which also lead to serenity? Couldn’t atheists achieve satisfaction from achieving goals on their own, not subjugated to any supreme being?
Martin assumes that even if theists can achieve a higher level of happiness than non-theist, given that non-theists can still achieve a more modest level more easily than theists can achieve their higher level of happiness, calculations of probabilities would still favor the atheists. However, there is no reason to suppose the assumptions are true.
Martin notes, “There is a certain value in self-reliance that may go far in outweighing the value of any happiness and the like that a belief in God may produce. Thus it is by no means clear that we are better off even now in believing that God exists. Indeed, nonbelief seems preferable when all the relevant values are taken into account.”
James’s religious hypothesis seems to want some undifferentiated theism, but are different gods of different religions, and there are religions which are not even theistic. the religious hypothesis doesn’t seem able to account for all this.
Many people claim that accepting the religious hypothesis can lead to knowledge of God, that God can be verified this way, that this is a beneficial reason to believe in God. However, what kind of god reveals himself to believers and not to skeptics? Isn’t this just rewarding those who go beyond sufficient evidence? And, since they already believe, why do they need verification more than the skeptic? Why should being cautious be punished?
And, as Kaufmann alluded, this whole “hypothesis” thing sounds like a scientific experiment which can be tested, but how is it possible to disconfirm the results. If one believes in God and experiences no evidence of his existence, James doesn’t allow that this could count against the existence of God.
Martin concludes:
Martin, Michael, Atheism, A Philosophical Justification (Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 1990) pp.240-248
bis bald,
Nick
