Context (Continued from S/A Knowledge Part 2 Analytic Knowledge)
As we saw in the marriage example in the last post, whenever two or more people are involved in any kind of knowledge, context comes into play. Thinking back to the backroom marriage, one of the contexts to consider could have been that Mary's definition of marriage was different then Steve's. Another context to consider is Mary perceived Steve as being serious, though Steve was actually dryly joking. As there is a distinction between analytic and synthetic knowledge, there is also a viable and useful distinction between analytic and synthetic context. As I began with synthetic knowledge before diving into analytic knowledge, I will now do the same to the respective contexts.
Synthetic Context
If it is assumed that every person has the same analytic knowledge, synthetic context would be how one experiences and claims to match to their analytic knowledge. A blind person will have a different synthetic context then a person with sight. I walk outside and see the sun. A blind person is walking outside and will not see the sun. The blind person is walking on the sidewalk quite a distance from me. I yell, “Watch out!” as I see the person is about to walk into a wavy puddle. The blind person has never heard my voice before, and does not think I am talking to them. As such, they continue to step forward as their cane does not detect any puddle. As their feet step forward, they come in contact with dry concrete, as the puddle I saw was simply a mirage.
Synthetic context comes about because of a difference in one’s experiences. A strong man would view moving a few desks and chairs as an easy task, while a weak person would view it as difficult. An intelligent person will view a complex problem as solvable while a slower person will think it impossible. Without an understanding of synthetic context, one’s justified knowledge can differ from another’s. If I am strong, I will say that 20 pounds is light. To myself, this is necessarily justified. 20 pounds cannot be matched to anything nearing middle to heavy weight within my definitions, and any further experience of such weight, as my build is now, will not contradict my conclusion. It is when other people are included in the equation and I claim 20 pounds is light that problems begin to crop up.
Understanding synthetic context is only necessary when one begins to communicate claimed knowledge with other beings with the same analytic knowledge and context. I am necessarily justified in claiming blue is the best color in the whole world for a flower...for myself. Yet, I cannot be necessarily justified in claiming my experiences are identical for all people.
Justifying within a synthetic context expands upon point two of what is needed for necessary justification. What is further able to be possibly experienced may expand or contract depending on the possible potential experiences of the particular synthetic context at hand. Thus I can say, as part of learned society as a whole, that I know what an atom is made of, even though I myself have no capability of experiencing exactly what an atom is made up of. Because a group of people have used necessary justification in their claim of the components of an atom, and no one within the society has been able to necessarily justify a refutation, the knowledge can spread throughout the society. At the same time, a small group within society may have necessarily justified the existence of bigfoot (in their very limited understanding of definitions) but when introduced into the society at large, their closed necessary justification will be found to be refuted. Theoretically, the more people you introduce a claim of synthetic knowledge to, the more possible synthetic contexts you allow your claim to encounter, thus raising the assurance of one’s synthetic knowledge as you raise its risk of refutation.
This is why people like myself write papers on claims of knowledge and send it out to a larger community. It may be that in my limited analytic knowledge and potential to experience, that I am necessarily justified in believing what I write. Yet I understand that society as a whole allows a greater stretch of possible experience and definitions of which I am not capable of. If my claim to synthetic knowledge fits societies expanded capabilities, than this knowledge can be used in society at large and I am more vindicated in using it myself.
An understanding of synthetic context may require a slight tweak in some previously established analytic knowledge; mainly, our knowledge of fact and opinion. I can say, “I should work out more,” and that be perfectly sound synthetic knowledge. It turns out that more exercise would benefit me in every way, so it is a fact, not an opinion. Yet if I claim, “Everyone should work out more,” it is no longer synthetic knowledge, and becomes an induction, or opinion. An opinion has sometimes been defined as a non-objective statement. Yet I would like to replace that today by saying an opinion is a synthetic belief which is not necessarily justified for all involved in the synthetic context addressed.
When considering what is a fact or opinion, the synthetic context must be taken into account. If I am part of a professional body builders club, stating that, “20 pounds is light for curls,” among a company of bodybuilders who weigh over 200 pounds, the understanding among the context of these people is as a necessarily justified fact. As long as the possible experiences of the individuals within a group are the same, claims made to that group can be synthetic knowledge if they remain in that group. If possible experiences deviate within the group, then the claim may become an opinion. For example, in the body builders club a man hurts his biceps and 20 pounds becomes heavy. My statement that “20 pounds is light for curls,” is not necessarily so, and becomes an opinion.
Thus we see that two different synthetic contexts may come to different conclusions. In the case of two competing synthetic contexts, which one should we state is necessarily justified for the whole? First, one side must enter into the synthetic context of the other. If I claim that 20 pounds is light in front of a couple of elderly infirm people, then I will never think I am not synthetically justified until I understand how others view the world. I must either have known what it was like to lift something heavy, or I must observe the elderly infirm people and determine that elderly infirm people find 20 pounds to be a heavy weight. This can have the advantage of allowing insight into other people's synthetic context, and can also be twisted into prejudice. One must in essence understand how one can be synthetically justified in another person's synthetic context, something which may be impossible. In this case a necessarily justified inductive belief may be all we can accomplish, but we will get to cogent induction later.
Once one has entered into the other person's synthetic context, or found something common to both the synthetic sides, then one can apply necessary justification within the broadened synthetic context. If it is found that the issue can be necessarily justified in a way that fits both contexts, then this is the synthetic knowledge which one should use. Thus the conclusion, “Among those who can easily lift 20 pounds, 20 pounds is light,” can be necessarily justified within both contexts.
However, it may also be found that in one way information is synthetically justified in each particular context, but when taken in a larger synthetic context, there is no necessarily justification found. This is then an opinion. We could say sock wearing people like to wear socks, Non-sock wearing people do not like wearing socks. However, when the issue of whether people as a whole like to wear socks, the issue cannot be necessarily justified positively or negatively.
Thinking back to the back room marriage, if Mary did not know what sarcasm or a joke is, when Bob jokingly married her, in Mary's synthetic context, Mary was necessarily justified that Bob seriously married her. This is because, with her analytic context, the experience she had can only match to one definition in her mind, that of marriage. I believe we have examined synthetic context enough, and for further understanding, need to evaluate analytic context.
Analytic Context
Though we have examined synthetic context, analytic context is a whole other ball game. Obviously when I wrote, “a whole other ball game,” you didn't really think analytic context had anything to do with a ball based sport. This is because you took the analytic context of what I wrote into account and changed the definiens within the definiendum within the appropriate context. “It’s time to take out the trash!” said in excitement has a different analytic context if exclaimed by a single male in front of a full trashcan, than from a male action star as he readies his body into a martial arts stance.
Analytic context happens when two people use the same definiendum, yet the definiens changes. I feel differing analytic contexts within philosophical conversations are one of the greatest sources of confusion. Have you ever argued for hours over something with another person, yet when you dug down deeper, you found you both meant the same thing? This is typically because the analytic context of one or more of the words you were using was different from the analytic context of one or more of the words the other person was using.
Analytic context differentiates itself from synthetic context in that it is indifferent to the capabilities of other people's experiences. If I tell a blind person, “My shirt is red,” the fact that the other person is blind does not change what the analytic meaning of the terms I used in that synthetic statement. When I stated, “This shirt is red,” whether I meant red as in the color, or as a slang for communism, the definiens which I intended on my side is irrelevant to the other person's ability to see. Not only must people consider the synthetic context when they speak, but people must be very much aware of everyone's analytic context so that communication can be as clear as possible.
Analytic context brings up so many important points within knowledge as a whole, that it is difficult to know where to start. As such, several points of analytic knowledge will be presented with no particular reason for their order. First I will address the notion of vague analytic terms and their relation to more specific ones.
When I say “tree”, what do you think of? Everyone thinks of a different plant made of wood and leaves, yet we all are able to come to the same page when we talk about a tree. Why is this? Within any definition there are properties which are considered necessary to viably match one’s experience to the term, while other properties are irrelevant. In the utterance of the word “tree” did I specify a color? No, you could have thought of a brown and yellow tree in fall, and it still would have been a tree. Yet there are some things which you needed to think of without having to actually modify the term tree. A tree must have a trunk, and the potential to have some kind of leaves, at least within the context of general English.
It is the case that I an able to imagine a tree which has had its branches and leaves cut off. Yet trees normally do not grow without branches and leaves, so to imagine such a tree, I must make modifications to the term tree for proper communication. “It is a tree without branches or leaves,” becomes the new identification. There is no name for a tree shorn of branches and leaves in its natural state (to my analytic knowledge), so we use other descriptive terms to ensure the image of that particular tree is communicated properly. Descriptive terms are used when there is a small enough change in the identity that it does not prevent us from labeling the experience as a whole new identity.
A fair question at this point would be, “How do we determine what the necessary properties for a tree are?” People may singularly vary in what they think is necessary for the definition of a tree. For example, my friends and I walking through the woods may call a short tree a bush, as the important distinction for us is height when the plant looks mature. A botanist would look at the “bush” and classify it as a tree as the distinction between a bush and a tree is important when applied to more applications then the plants apparent maturity and height.
What is considered a necessary property to appropriately classify an existence to a term is dependent upon the person using the term. A more amusing example which can answer this question can be shown in the difference between stereotypical men and women’s vocabulary when it comes to communicating clothing to one another. A man may look at a shift and say, “That’s a dress.” He may say, “That’s a dress,” to a skirt, a mini skirt, or a kilt. A man may understand there are different types of “dresses” but ignore them in his communication. This is because to the man, the differences in the dresses are unimportant; they are not essential properties. A stereotypical woman may discriminate between the different flows of cloth as it allows a woman to have a different sense of fashion and expression that day. A man does not typically care what type of dress a woman is wearing (except perhaps a mini-skirt) and men themselves do not wear flowing cloth, with the exception of a kilt. Typically, men who wear kilts do not wish them to be classified as a dress. It seems what one accepts as analytic context is dependent upon how useful it is for one to distinguish useful identities. Different people may find different identities useful, so may include or disclude analytic knowledge based upon this.
However, in an established language, the analytic context of the community, or at least the authorities of language, determine when a term's essential properties are within a given situation. What is essential or non-essential property is determined by us, as it is analytic knowledge. Most likely what is essential is some property that we could not imagine a certain identity without at least the potential of this essential property existing.
Let us examine the difference between a tree and a “ pine tree” as an example. We can imagine that there exists a very select group of people that live with the knowledge that all trees have broad leaves. Thus being able to have broad leaves is an essential attribute of a tree. One day they encounter a pine tree. There are options for these people. They may look at the pine tree and think the difference in the leaves is enough to make it an entirely new analytic word separate from tree. An example of this is the term “bush”. There’s not much of a difference to some people between a tree and a bush, yet we call a bush as something distinct from a tree.
Though they could have gone many different routes, the people notice only the leaves are really different (they haven’t seen the pine cones yet) and decide to call it a tree with pointy leaves. Now if this was a rare occurrence, perhaps they would continue to call further experiences with this existence a “pointy leaves.” In our imaginary world however, they have just arrived at an area where many of these “pointy leaves” reside. As it is common to encounter such an existence, yet this existence is similar to a tree, they include all “pointy leaves,” as trees. This broadens what may be considered an essential property of a tree, and at the same time, lessens the specificity of the essential properties of a tree. Now when these people in our though experiment an existence with pointy leaves, they call it a “tree with pointy leaves.” As the past use of “tree” was established to have broad leaves, and the norm for the majority of trees is they have broad leaves, the people modify the term tree when specificity is needed to include the pointy leaves. Including the “pointy leaves” within the potential essential properties of the term “tree”, changes the essential attribute of a tree from having “broad leaves,” to “broad or pointy leaves”.
Thus, when more differences in possible properties are included in a term, the less specific and useful it is in ascertaining differences among similar objects unless certain modifiers are added to allow a more clear distinction. The citizens of this imaginary land could continue to call the existence a “tree with pointy leaves,” “pointy leaves,” or even a “pine,” depending on what analytic terminology they wish to use.
The difference in analytic context can be broad or subtle. Imagine that my friend and I, Mr. Chap, are walking through a forest. Within the forest, we stop next to a particular tree and I exclaim, “Chap! Is that not the most amazing tree you have ever seen!” Mr. Chap, who is blind, understands what I mean by “see”, and walks over to the tree and touches it. “Why yes old boy, this is the most amazing tree I have ever seen with my hands!” “See” in this instance has gained the definiens of observed. Yet an outsider might be confused and state we were completely wrong if they did not understand the analytic context we were using.
Yet does analytic context change what is necessary for necessary justification for synthetic knowledge? Let us say that the next day I talk to Mr. Chap again and ask, “Want to go look at that tree we saw the other day?” Now if Mr. Chap did not remember the context of yesterday, he might raise a quizzical eyebrow and say, “Old boy, you must have spent too much time in the sun, for yesterday we walked through a FOREST.” However if Mr. Chap remembers the analytic and synthetic context of, “that tree we saw”, he will understand what I mean.
The explorations into context thus far have revealed there is both a relative and absolute component to total knowledge. The synthetic and analytic context are relative to the situation of knowledge, but once the contexts are established, the method of necessary justified true belief is absolute. Once Mr. Chap and I remember “that tree we saw,” we have a particular analytic memory which can be matched to a synthetic experience. Thus, if we walked through the forest again looking for, “that tree we saw,” there would be an undeniable match.
With context explored, the synthetic/analytic theory of knowledge is now complete. How can we use such a theory of knowledge in our lives? I will now apply this theory of knowledge to math and science, demonstrating how this theory of knowledge allows us a better understanding of math and science as we use it today, as well as setting a firm foundation for future scientific theories and experimentations.
Math and Science
An understanding of the analytic/synthetic distinction within knowledge allows us to both synthetically and analytically know math. We can begin by looking at the analytic part of math. “One” is the basic number from which all math is built upon. What is “one”? One is the label one gives to the realization that one is experiencing an identity. It is the labeling of a discrete experience. It is the essence of language. Without the ability to distinguish “a” difference in the experiences we have, we would not be able to function in the world. “One” is an analytic term which is constantly necessarily justified in our day to day experiences.
“Two” is another simple concept. “Two” is the analytic term we give when a one and a one are seen both separately and together. An example is the human brain is made of two hemispheres. We see a separation, yet group them together into a number. The beauty of math's language is that it is one of the broadest words/numbers we use, and its requirements to be synthetically justified are incredibly specific, and easy to meet. Amazingly enough, these simple requirements with strict regulations allow a methodology, mathematics, that allows the discovery of many potential and actual occurrences. This is why math has always been considered untouchable in the field of epistemology; it has always been synthetically known.
Maths methodology allows us an insight into a necessarily justified science. Math takes its most basic concepts, necessarily justifies them, and then tries to apply new concepts on top of them. One and one are two. One added one time is 1 times 1. 2 divided by 2 is how many times two can be added into, or taken away from two. Geometry. Algebra. Calculus. Each is built on a necessarily justified base within society that allows understanding beyond experience. Because the laws of mathematics necessary justified beliefs, one can predict what will happen in the future. I know that if I add three apples to three more apples, I will have six apples. I do not actually have to analytically know what an apple is, or synthetically add said apples to know the addition and sum to be true both analytically, and synthetically.
Synthetic knowledge is a bit tricker in science, as the concepts sometimes involve linguistics, which is a more efficient, yet sometimes less precise way of communicating identities. Science first tries to prove the simple. Newton's laws introduced the equations of force and motion. Based on necessarily justified math, the equations were for a time necessarily justified themselves. Yet eventually problems cropped up that did not necessarily justify Newton's laws. Notably, these problems occurred when Newtons laws were applied to extremely large bodies orbiting paths, such as planets. Einstein came along and introduced the special theory of relativity which fixed Newton's problems. Yet though Einstein introduced the special theory of relativity, why was the entirety of Newton's laws not thrown out or disproved?
The way to view science is like a tree. At the bottom you have a necessarily justified base. Upon that base, you begin to build branches. “Hm, if one and one are two, then perhaps I could designate a means to measure length through numbers...” This new branch is then necessarily justified. “Hm, because I can measure distance, perhaps I can measure time.” “Maybe I can find a way to measure movement over time by their relation...” This building of branches continues on, being intersected with other branches on up.
Yet a problem arises. One day a theory thought to be necessarily justified doesn't work. Does one destroy the entire theory and the building blocks upon which it stands? Of course not! The building blocks upon which it stands should be synthetically known already. This means there are two possible problems. One is someone incorrectly used a building block of knowledge to determine an incorrect conclusion, the other is that one of the building blocks is itself flawed, and must be reexamined.
It is easy to see how someone may have misused the building blocks of knowledge to establish a new theory. Someone could have based a new theory of optics based on a misunderstanding of the eye, or a simple error in their calculations. Or how about all the people who sent in patents for perpetual motion machines based on only one or two loaws of physics? I have many times in my math classes added numbers such as 352 and 351only to get 603. Does the fact of misinterpretation or error in the use of laws demonstrate the laws failure? No, only a failure in the laws use.
However, there may be times in which one's building blocks used as a base for other knowledge are actually at fault. If one fully understands the building blocks, and one can find no errors in their use of the building blocks, then one must reexamine the building blocks themselves. Many times in science, a conclusion which becomes a building block was reached either inductively yet taken to be necessary, or the building block was actually synthetically justified at the time, but knew analytic knowledge or possible means of experience has come about that now refute it.
Take the example of our analytic and synthetic understanding of the human heart. The human heart was once thought to be located in the human chest, its function was it pumps blood through the body, and was considered the place in the body where our thoughts came from. Note that the heart as a place “where thoughts happened” was never actually necessarily justified, yet highly educated people agreed that this was so. Later on the brain was necessarily justified as the source of human thought. In this case, a clear analytic term, “the brain”, was revised and synthetically justified as being the place of out throughts. This new synthetic knowledge contradicted the old synthetic confirmations of “heart”. The analytic term of heart did not change, yet it was found that no one could ever again necessarily justify the old term of heart in synthetic use. Since new information came along which destroyed the old analytic knowledge of heart what did people do?
People had two options. Either they created a new analytic term which would designate the heart as discovered so far, or they would keep the old term, yet amend it. In this case in science, people simply continued to use the old term heart, yet amended its definiens. A heart was now simply an organ located in the human chest which pumped blood throughout the body; while the property of “where thoughts happened” was removed. The former property within the definiens of heart, “where thoughts happened”, was found to be false, and thus removed from the definiens. The location and other function of the heart were still found to be necessarily justified, so continued to remain in the definiens of heart.
A similar example can also be used to illustrate what happens when there is a problem within the building blocks of a theory. Let us say that in an alternate world, people were at one time necessarily justified in thinking the heart was the source of all thoughts. This is due to their limits in analytic knowledge, and ability to experience. From this knowledge, a whole set of theories is developed. These theories are fine until one day, someone develops a drug that is supposed to ease depression. People who take this pill are cured of depression, yet it is found the medicine concentrates in and only affects the brain. At first, scientists think the brain assists the heart in its thoughts, yet new technology has been developed that continually demonstrates more correlative actitivity in the brain oppossed to the heart when a person thinks.
Let us say the theory of an anti-depression pill were based on two separate theories. First the theory that certain medicines could help the heart, such as recover from a heart attack, and two, that the heart was the source of all thoughts. The new information that thoughts originate in the brain does not refute the fact that previous medicine affected the heart in a particular way, if of course it did not rely on the fact that the heart was the source of all thoughts. However, any theory which relied on the portion of the definition of a heart, “where thoughts happened,” would necessarily be shown to no longer be considered necessarily justified. Thus, science pulls out the shears and takes out the bad branches while keeping the healthy one's alive.
Looking further into science, its methodology is built upon cause and effect. Anyone who has read David Hume knows he is infamous for claiming we cannot know cause and effect. Can the S/A theory of knowledge solve this dilemma posed by Hume?
(Continued in S/A Knowledge Part 4 Cause and Effect)