Searle's weird theory of consciousness

[Moreno]

@gib

You’re still thinking of these things as objects. Properties aren’t objects; they’re closer to states an object is in.

IN a sense that is my Point. We can have adjectives describing a body or an object that are nto states, they are contingent qualities. Sweaty seems like a borderline case.

We don’t have a word ‘wally’ in our language, but if people really needed a way of describing people who lean against walls, why couldn’t they say such people are wally?

They could, sure, and they would and I am sure there are things like this. But is that body causing its wallyness? Or did the person who pushed them up against the wall cause their wallyness? (I used this example as a step further away from the sweat example. Here we have something on a lot of the skin that was not exuded from the skin. I am not questioning that we could come up with an adjective, I am raising it as an example of language categories not being necessarily at all the same as real ones or even useful ones.

@Moreno

Is my body creating it’s colors?

If you were a chameleon, it would.

But I’m not. Again, I am not arguing that bodies cannot create any of their properties. I am arguing that there are properties that they do not create. Some of these were created by something else. Some of them cannot be separated from the essence of the body.

And also, the colors are not only created by the chameleon. Depending on how the Word color is defined, the sun or light source is also creating it and then possibly the Eye of the beholder.

Yes, we can always say this. But I don’t see why that makes the use of “causal” terminology mistaken. If my body doesn’t cause my color, that fine; something else does (although you could say my body participates, or has a say, in which wavelengths get reflected and which don’t). With things like mass and shape, again, it depends on whether we’re talking about an emerging property or not. Shape can change, but it will still be the same object (and the object itself might bring about its own change in shape).

yes, though the range is set and some facets of that shape are not changeable.

Same with solidity–imagine it was ice that melted. I don’t think mass can be said to be an emergent property. Searle talks about things like mass and velocity as being the sum of the parts (velocity would probably have to be talked about as an average of its parts) whereas emergent properties are typically more than the sum of their parts.

Mass probably is an emergent property, but it happens well below the level of bodies.

Ice that melts…is that caused by the object ice block?
I don’t Think that makes sense.

@Moreno

Now my body has caused an object. This sounds magical.

So don’t say it like that–stick to properties

But my Point was that instead of Calling them properties, some of them are objects.

If you want to translate “being sweaty” into object terms, you have to also translate how you describe the cause/effect relationship properly. Obviously, the object that your body had an effect on was the sweat, but it didn’t “bring it about”; rather, it pushed it from inside to outside–it caused an action.

and when that sweat evaporates, did the body cause the non-sweat state?
I don’t Think so.

@Moreno

It’s not something beyond the chemical and physiological properties of the body. It doesn’t need new laws to describe.

Why should it need new laws? As I said above, don’t think of emergent properties as new objects that come into existence; they’re more like states the object enters into.

It is also that new sets of causation get set up at the new whole level. The behavior of the new whole cannot be explained simply in terms of the lower levels.

You mean because all properties can be thought of as effects? And there’s nothing left of an object once you take away all its properties? Remember that every effect can be a cause of something else, and visa-versa. Put it this way: all actions or state of affairs are effects brought about by some cause. Since the entire universe is composed of nothing but actions and states of affairs, the universe is made of nothing but effects. Where did all the causes go?

They were also the effects. But it is different with a body causing all of its properties. Here you have causeless effects. Something without properties causeing effects. In normal science causes have properties.

@Moreno

Does the body cause its shape?

Sure, if I were a gymnast.

LOL. Even a dead gynamist is no longer causing his shape.

Ha! Maybe. But I try to steer as far away from anthropomorphism as possible. I doubt metals ever get “freaked out” or care what happens to alloys. I think they feel something, but it’s probably incomprehensible to us.

I am not basing it on humans, just on what it is to exist. I am pretty good with animals. I don’t assume they are like us. I’ve spent time understanding them. Though sure, slabs of metal, I am more cautious about my empathy for.

[gib]

@Moreno

Or did the person who pushed them up against the wall cause their wallyness?

If you’re thinking of someone pushing someone else, then yes, the cause of their “walliness” was the other person.

@Moreno

I Again, I am not arguing that bodies cannot create any of their properties. I am arguing that there are properties that they do not create.

Oh, is that all you’re arguing? Then I fully agree. I think Searle would agree too.

@Moreno

Mass probably is an emergent property, but it happens well below the level of bodies.

Searle doesn’t put it this way, but one way to think about an emergent property is to ask whether you can have a single particle with that property. Wetness, for example, is said to be an emergent property because it makes no sense to talk about a single H2O molecule as being wet. You need a whole bunch of them, and they need to cohere together in liquid form, in order for wetness to emerge. With mass, it’s a different story. Mass is one of those properties that physicists tell us is fundamental even to elementary particles.

@Moreno

Ice that melts…is that caused by the object ice block?
I don’t Think that makes sense.

Why not? The melting of ice is simply a matter of the H2O molecules loosening their bonds such that they slide over each other in a fluid form. But obviously, you need a source of heat for this to happen. This is perhaps what you’re getting at–the external cause again. So the melting of ice is caused by something internal to the body of ice (loosening of molecular bonds) and that in turn is caused by a source of heat (and that in turn by… and that in turn by…). Causal chains can be traced back to the beginning of time if you like.

@Moreno

So don’t say it like that–stick to properties

But my Point was that instead of Calling them properties, some of them are objects.

But that’s where you’re running into problems. I’m not saying the objects aren’t there, I’m saying that strictly speaking, a property like sweatiness does not denote sweat droplettes; it denotes a state of the body (taking into consideration what you said earlier about not all properties being states but contingent qualities instead), although it involves (necessarily) sweat droplettes. This means that you can do a translation from speaking in terms of properties to objects (from “sweatiness” to “sweat droplettes”), but as I said earlier, you need to know how to do the translation properly. Going from saying “The body causes its own sweatiness” to “The body causes its own sweat droplettes” (or perhaps “sweat molecules” would be more illuminating of your point) is the wrong translation; Translating “The body causes its own sweatiness” into “The body causes it own sweat molecules to go from inside to outside” is the proper translation.

@Moreno

and when that sweat evaporates, did the body cause the non-sweat state?
I don’t Think so.

I agree with that. This is probably the point you were making earlier–about not all properties being brought about by their body. That’s not a problem for me.

@Moreno

It is also that new sets of causation get set up at the new whole level. The behavior of the new whole cannot be explained simply in terms of the lower levels.

You mean in the sense that there’s always concurrent causes for any event? I’ll agree with that too.

@Moreno

They were also the effects. But it is different with a body causing all of its properties. Here you have causeless effects.

No, it’s just that some of the effects are also going to be causes of other effects. An object has a set of properties. Some are contingent, some are essential. The essential properties are just those features of the object that make it what it is. Change those, and you’ve changed what the object is. Ultimately, if we say that an object causes its own properties, we usually mean that the essential properties are causes of the contingent properties. But the essential properties can also be effects, but they would be effects of something else (some other object, or perhaps its prior states (in which case it made itself into something different), or even its own contingent properties (which would mean that not only could it make itself into something different (indirectly via the contingent properties that it may have caused itself to have), but that the causal relation between essential and contingent properties is bidirectional).

@Moreno

I am not basing it on humans, just on what it is to exist. I am pretty good with animals. I don’t assume they are like us. I’ve spent time understanding them. Though sure, slabs of metal, I am more cautious about my empathy for.

When I talk about anthropomorphizing, I usually mean the attribution of human mental states (beliefs, desires, sensations, emotions, memories, etc.), which many animals may have, but when it comes to consciousness in general, my rule of thumb is to imagine its contents as, first and foremost, qualitative (a system of qualia), but as to the question of what those qualities are (i.e. what they feel like), I make no assumptions except that there are no limits (i.e. any quality of experience you can imagine, it’s possible; any quality of experience you can’t imagine, it’s possible). And I imagine that there could be consciousnesses that are composed of nothing but unimaginable qualities.

[Moreno]

Gib, I Think I am going to not respond to more on this line - objects causing properties. We seem to be at least on the same page, see below, but also I Think it is not quite the core part of the thread. I mean, I will read what you write, but probably will let that issue drop.

@gib

If you’re thinking of someone pushing someone else, then yes, the cause of their “walliness” was the other person.

So if someone has sweat all over them, because they had sex with a sweater - not the piece of clothing, though I suppose if it was sweaty that would work too - that person - likely a female - would be sweaty, but this property of sweatiness would NOT be caused by her body. Or was it caused by her body because she chose to have sex with a sweater?

Oh, is that all you’re arguing? Then I fully agree. I think Searle would agree too.

Oh, thank God. I am sweating less now suddenly. But I Think you caused that, not me or my body.

Searle doesn’t put it this way, but one way to think about an emergent property is to ask whether you can have a single particle with that property. Wetness, for example, is said to be an emergent property because it makes no sense to talk about a single H2O molecule as being wet. You need a whole bunch of them, and they need to cohere together in liquid form, in order for wetness to emerge. With mass, it’s a different story. Mass is one of those properties that physicists tell us is fundamental even to elementary particles.

I Think it is more complicated than that. There has to be a higher order of organization. Many water particles at high temperatures do not form the kinds of non-Atomic bonds that make wetness.

[Why not? The melting of ice is simply a matter of the H2O molecules loosening their bonds such that they slide over each other in a fluid form.

Yeah, but if I threw the block in the microwave, didn’t I cause that? It seems to me we move from is to is, not one kind of causation to Another.

I Think it is stretching and already stretched concept, causation, to now include characterisitics. Am I causing my maleness? I don’t Think that helps me understand anything. It sounds like it is adding something. It is not simply that I am male, I am causing it. But I don’t Think it is adding anything.

But obviously, you need a source of heat for this to happen. This is perhaps what you’re getting at–the external cause again.

Well, two things. 1) external causes 2) identity with the property. That the property and the thing are one, so to now extend causation to include causing facets of identity in objects, seems not to add anything useful, give any information.

So the melting of ice is caused by something internal to the body of ice (loosening of molecular bonds) and that in turn is caused by a source of heat (and that in turn by… and that in turn by…). Causal chains can be traced back to the beginning of time if you like.

But you see it is precisely NOT a part of a causal chain. REmember the liquid water, will still be ‘causing’ its liquidity in all moments it is liquid. Instantaenously, it seems.

But that’s where you’re running into problems. I’m not saying the objects aren’t there, I’m saying that strictly speaking, a property like sweatiness does not denote sweat droplettes; it denotes a state of the body (taking into consideration what you said earlier about not all properties being states but contingent qualities instead), although it involves (necessarily) sweat droplettes. This means that you can do a translation from speaking in terms of properties to objects (from “sweatiness” to “sweat droplettes”), but as I said earlier, you need to know how to do the translation properly. Going from saying “The body causes its own sweatiness” to “The body causes its own sweat droplettes” (or perhaps “sweat molecules” would be more illuminating of your point) is the wrong translation; Translating “The body causes its own sweatiness” into “The body causes it own sweat molecules to go from inside to outside” is the proper translation.

But that, as in my example above, is not sweatiness. That is one way a body can become sweaty. And if we look at most properties, they are not caused, in this way, by actions performed by the object. Here we have Little cells working hard to accomplish something - unless it was like my example. But an objects redness or weight or shape, this is Another can of beans. Oh, can of beans is an example. Is the bean mass in the can causing its shape`? Is the can? Is the metal causing its reflectiveness?

I agree with that. This is probably the point you were making earlier–about not all properties being brought about by their body. That’s not a problem for me.

Thank God. I forgot again in the heat (and sweatiness) of specific examples.

When I talk about anthropomorphizing, I usually mean the attribution of human mental states (beliefs, desires, sensations, emotions, memories, etc.), which many animals may have, but when it comes to consciousness in general, my rule of thumb is to imagine its contents as, first and foremost, qualitative (a system of qualia), but as to the question of what those qualities are (i.e. what they feel like), I make no assumptions except that there are no limits (i.e. any quality of experience you can imagine, it’s possible; any quality of experience you can’t imagine, it’s possible). And I imagine that there could be consciousnesses that are composed of nothing but unimaginable qualities.

I certainly respect this stance, but I want to push on it. There are clearly people who can work with and communicate with animals and predict their actions and so on much better than other people. In science, not even 40 years ago, if they wrote about the emotions, intentions, any cognitive activities of these animals, they would have been accused of anthropomorphizing and if professional scientists, it would have damaged their careers. Sicne then things have loosened up in science about what is, well, obvious. I bring this up here to say that we don’t know where that boundary is, where the human or other species - I mean mammals, for xample certainly can read us also - can read the emotions of non-humans and where they cannot. It’s a nice rule to rule it out, but the fact is there are wildly different abilities here. And making a rule would be self-contradictory, since it would mean one could know, from the outside, what is possible here.

What was ruled out as not scientific, taboo, and destructive illogical anthropomorphic thinking - by the consensus of science - is now a few decades later accepted within science - with cautions, but no longer bans and taboo labeling. Where will we be in 40 years?

[gib]

@Moreno

Gib, I Think I am going to not respond to more on this line - objects causing properties. We seem to be at least on the same page, see below, but also I Think it is not quite the core part of the thread. I mean, I will read what you write, but probably will let that issue drop.

Ok, Moreno; it seems we’re agreeing on most parts anyway: some properties on some objects are sometimes partially caused by those objects, and other times not.

@Moreno

So if someone has sweat all over them, because they had sex with a sweater - not the piece of clothing, though I suppose if it was sweaty that would work too - that person - likely a female - would be sweaty, but this property of sweatiness would NOT be caused by her body. Or was it caused by her body because she chose to have sex with a sweater?

You can say whatever you want–so long as you use language properly. Personally, I wouldn’t say her body caused her sweatiness, but all this proves is that in some cases, we can say that the body causes its own sweatiness and in other cases not.

@Moreno

Yeah, but if I threw the block in the microwave, didn’t I cause that? It seems to me we move from is to is, not one kind of causation to Another.

It’s a chain of causes, like I said.

@Moreno

Am I causing my maleness? I don’t Think that helps me understand anything.

No it doesn’t. So let’s not say that you cause your maleness. Remember, we don’t have to say this for every causal relation between an object and its properties.

@Moreno

That the property and the thing are one, so to now extend causation to include causing facets of identity in objects, seems not to add anything useful, give any information.

I don’t know that you can say a thing and its properties are one. A property is usually one part of a thing (otherwise, we’d have to say that the color of a car and its mass are the same thing). The fact that solidity is accounted for by molecular interactions tells us a lot.

@Moreno

REmember the liquid water, will still be ‘causing’ its liquidity in all moments it is liquid. Instantaenously, it seems.

No, in this case we shouldn’t say that. We should say that the molecular activity of the water causes its liquidity.

@Moreno

But an objects redness or weight or shape, this is Another can of beans. Oh, can of beans is an example. Is the bean mass in the can causing its shape`? Is the can? Is the metal causing its reflectiveness?

No, but these are just cases in which we shouldn’t talk about these properties in causal terms.

@Moreno

I certainly respect this stance, but I want to push on it. There are clearly people who can work with and communicate with animals and predict their actions and so on much better than other people. In science, not even 40 years ago, if they wrote about the emotions, intentions, any cognitive activities of these animals, they would have been accused of anthropomorphizing and if professional scientists, it would have damaged their careers. Sicne then things have loosened up in science about what is, well, obvious. I bring this up here to say that we don’t know where that boundary is, where the human or other species - I mean mammals, for xample certainly can read us also - can read the emotions of non-humans and where they cannot. It’s a nice rule to rule it out, but the fact is there are wildly different abilities here. And making a rule would be self-contradictory, since it would mean one could know, from the outside, what is possible here.

As I conceive it, the rolls played by the brain and the mind with respect to behavior are complimentary, the brain playing the roll of the cause and the mind playing the roll of the reason. So whatever it is that the brain causes the body to do, the mind functions as the reason why the person did it. Given that there is no limit to the qualities of mental states, I would say that there can be any reason whatsoever for any causal nexus between brain and behavior. To the extent that animals behave like us in response to similar things as us, I think it’s fair to infer similar reasons, which is to say mental states.

@Moreno

What was ruled out as not scientific, taboo, and destructive illogical anthropomorphic thinking - by the consensus of science - is now a few decades later accepted within science - with cautions, but no longer bans and taboo labeling. Where will we be in 40 years?

Panpsychics like us? Even if we do swing in the opposite direction, I think there’ll always be an elastic effect whereby the pressure in the philosophical and scientific community bring us back to common sense. Radical materialism is completely counter-intuitive, which is probably why it could never last, but so is extreme panpsychism and idealism. You and I may believe in such a thing, but the average man on the street doesn’t have the time to think philosophically or scientifically about these things. He relies more on certain hard wired systems in the brain that tell him that if it looks like a duck, quacks like a duck, it is a duck (if it looks conscious, acts conscious, it is conscious). This is most likely stimulated by features such as eyes, facial expressions, voice, and probably also behaviors and certain mannerisms. I don’t think we’re ever taught to recognize these as signs of consciousness; I think we naturally grow to recognize consciousness at the sight of these cues. I think this will always keep us, or at least the average person, midway between radical materialism and extreme forms of panpsychism and idealism.

[Moreno]

@gib

I don’t know that you can say a thing and its properties are one. A property is usually one part of a thing (otherwise, we’d have to say that the color of a car and its mass are the same thing). The fact that solidity is accounted for by molecular interactions tells us a lot.

I meant something more like an object is the sum of its properties. But actually in the negative sense. If you take away all the properties of something, there is nothing left. This is not quite the same thing as saying it is (only) the sum of its properties - sums potentially being more than the sum of its parts - but that something without properties at the very least does not exist for others. But whatever it might be beyond its properties can’t still be around or there would be properties.

No, in this case we shouldn’t say that. We should say that the molecular activity of the water causes its liquidity.

Which isn’t being caused by individual objects and then it would be odd to consider the lump of liquid an object, or maybe not, but I want to mention the issue.

@Moreno

REmember the liquid water, will still be ‘causing’ its liquidity in all moments it is liquid. Instantaenously, it seems.

No, in this case we shouldn’t say that. We should say that the molecular activity of the water causes its liquidity.

@Moreno

But an objects redness or weight or shape, this is Another can of beans. Oh, can of beans is an example. Is the bean mass in the can causing its shape`? Is the can? Is the metal causing its reflectiveness?

No, but these are just cases in which we shouldn’t talk about these properties in causal terms.

As I conceive it, the rolls played by the brain and the mind with respect to behavior are complimentary, the brain playing the roll of the cause and the mind playing the roll of the reason. So whatever it is that the brain causes the body to do, the mind functions as the reason why the person did it. Given that there is no limit to the qualities of mental states, I would say that there can be any reason whatsoever for any causal nexus between brain and behavior. To the extent that animals behave like us in response to similar things as us, I think it’s fair to infer similar reasons, which is to say mental states.

To me the terms mind and brain are fluid evolving terms. We find more ‘things’ that are encompassed by these terms. I don’t know how all the various ‘things’ in the mind set relate to the ‘things’ in the brain set, and everyday one has more to deal with. I don’t Think physicalism is a useful rule, since it no longer means anything but realism. So I don’t really try to work out how mind and body relate, even if this is somehow a meaningfull issue.

Panpsychics like us? Even if we do swing in the opposite direction, I think there’ll always be an elastic effect whereby the pressure in the philosophical and scientific community bring us back to common sense. Radical materialism is completely counter-intuitive, which is probably why it could never last, but so is extreme panpsychism and idealism. You and I may believe in such a thing, but the average man on the street doesn’t have the time to think philosophically or scientifically about these things. He relies more on certain hard wired systems in the brain that tell him that if it looks like a duck, quacks like a duck, it is a duck (if it looks conscious, acts conscious, it is conscious). This is most likely stimulated by features such as eyes, facial expressions, voice, and probably also behaviors and certain mannerisms. I don’t think we’re ever taught to recognize these as signs of consciousness; I think we naturally grow to recognize consciousness at the sight of these cues. I think this will always keep us, or at least the average person, midway between radical materialism and extreme forms of panpsychism and idealism.

There is a trend to accepting consciousness in a wider range or organisms, likewise intelligence. Right now the cutting edge is plants, and this is in mainstream science/botony. So I have some hope that the set, which has been increasing steadily, will keep increasing.

[gib]

Moreno,

I’m going to have to respond to you after a few days–maybe even a week. Life’s getting in the way right now and I have to sacrifice my precious ILP time.