Semantics VS Ideas?

" Nothing is more usual than for philosophers to encroach upon the province of grammarians; (SIC for semicolon) and to engage in disputes of words, while they imagine that they are handling controversies of the deepest importance and concern."–David Hume.
Comment?

Well, the way we use language, and how we apply our terms is intrinsically philosophical. Failing to work out our semantics when we engage in a philosophical endeavor often has devastating consequences. I wonder if you could expand on the context of that quote, and what Hume meant by it. I’m not sure if its intended as an attack or a defense on the philosophy of language.

“Philosophy does not allow us to say what we know - it allows us to know what we are saying.” - faust

The quote is from Appendix IV., “Enquiry Concerning The Principles Of Morals”, p. 261, 1777 edition. For me it is clear as it stands.

I wish! :smiley: Philosophy has never come to grips with the findings of empirical science that relate directly to epistemology.

Well, if its clear for you as it stands, then may I ask for you to explain your thoughts about it?

You must be new to philosophical discussions in fora. What it means to me is that philosophers often waste time quibbling over the meanings of words when they have not even established the meaning of meaning.

This is an excerpt from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy’s article on David Hume: (plato.stanford.edu/entries/hume/#HumAccDef)

While Hume’s empiricism is usually identified with the Copy Principle, it is his use of its reverse in his account of definition that is really the most distinctive and innovative element of his system.

As his diagnosis of traditional metaphysics indicates, Hume believes that “the chief obstacle…to our improvement in the moral or metaphysical sciences is the obscurity of the ideas, and ambiguity of the terms” (EHU, 61). However, Hume argues that conventional definitions — defining terms in terms of other terms — replicate philosophical confusions by substituting synonyms for the original and thus never break out of a narrow “definitional circle.” Determining the cognitive content of an idea or term requires something else.

To make progress, we need “to pass from words to the true and real subject of the controversy” (EHU 80) — the ideas involved. Hume believes he has found a mechanism that permits us to do so — his account of definition, which he touts as “a new microscope or species of optics” (EHU 62), predicting that it will produce as dramatic results in the moral sciences as its hardware counterparts have produced in natural philosophy.

This account of definition is a device for precisely determining the cognitive content of words and ideas. Hume uses a simple series of tests to determine cognitive content. Begin with a term. Ask what idea is annexed to it. If there is no such idea, then the term has no cognitive content, however prominently it figures in philosophy or theology. If there is an idea annexed to the term, and it is complex, break it up into the simple ideas that compose it. Then trace the simple ideas back to their original impressions: “These impressions are all strong and sensible. They admit not of ambiguity. They are not only placed in a full light themselves, but may throw light on their correspondent ideas, which lie in obscurity” (EHU, 62).

If the process fails at any point, the idea in question lacks cognitive content. When carried through successfully, however, the theory yields a “just definition” — a precise account of the troublesome idea or term. So, whenever we are suspicious that a “philosophical term is employed without any meaning or idea (as is too frequent), we need but enquire, from what impression is that supposed idea derived? And if it be impossible to assign any, this will serve to confirm our suspicion. By bringing ideas into so clear a light we may reasonably hope to remove all dispute, which may arise, concerning their nature and reality” (EHU, 22; Abstract, T, 648-9).

Thanks, S.,
The quotes only clarify what I hoped might be a topic of debate.

I like Hume, but I don’t necessarily agree. The way to handle controversies of deep concern is to engage in disputes of words. Meaning is a word, a representation of a concept. I generally spend a good deal of time quibbling over the meanings of words (criteria for concepts) before trying to expound. Concepts can only be defined in relation to other concepts, not independently, or strictly from sense experience.

Ierrellus - I think some progress has been made since Hume. And he was speaking mainly about metaphysics, which dominated philosophy up to his time.

Russell and the Logical positivists had something to say about this - about meaning. But Hume was already dead. He just didn’t know.

Philosophy, in my view, should abandon epistemology. When Nietzsche did, for instance, he didn’t need to “come to grips” with it.

When I say that philosophy allows us to know what we are saying, I am speaking to Russell’s idea of significance, and to the real purpose of logic, which Hume only partially understood.

Meaning itself has been roundly abused by philosophers, I agree. But that doesn’t mean that philosophy cannot be done. If we use the everyday meaning of meaning, we won’t stray too far. What is left is to try to speak clearly. I see here, most every day, posters who have no shot at philosophising, because they don’t know the difference between the several senses many words have. I have also seen this problem thoughout the history of philosophy - starting with Plato.

The mere misunderstanding of words accounts for all of metaphysics. It was true in Hume’s time, and is true now. But metaphysics is not all of philosophy. Hume was correct within the limited scope of his comments.

The map is not the terrain. Who was it that said something like that? I don’t think that all ideas can be verbally expressed.

The ambiguity of the phrase “dispute of words” is what troubled me, and I think its now troubling you. I think the excerpt I posted from Stanford reveals that Hume isn’t saying that we shouldn’t “quibble over the meaning of words” or rather, Hume isn’t saying that we shouldn’t work out our semantics before having a philosophical debate. I think he’s saying that we run into trouble by going straight into the philosophical debate before working out our semantics, and that’s what he’s describing as a “dispute of words” - as in, the dispute is based on a difference of definitions.

Certainly our concepts are interconnected, but Hume’s point is that when we offer a definition of a concept in terms of other concepts, then we encounter an infinite regress where we now have to define the concepts that we used to define the first set of concepts. Hume wanted to find a termination point of this infinite regress - that’s what he meant by “impressions”. I don’t think he meant “strictly sense-experience” by “impressions”. I think he meant something more like pure cognitive impressions - implicit definitions.

If confusion necessarily arises from the infinite regress of defining concepts in terms of other concepts, then we need a way of terminating that regress in order to understand any concept. That termination point cannot be a concept, because that will only continue the infinite regress - the new concept must still be defined.

The infinite regress can only be terminated by a pure cognitive impression. An implicit definition that was probably apprehended early on in life before too many concepts were established. An impression of a resemblances between particulars, which is used to abstract a concept.

This impression, once apprehended, cannot be stated in words, because the words are mere tokens. In order for true communication to take place, we must each attach the same impressions to the same tokens. These connections will function as base metaphors for understanding more complex concepts. Only when we succeed at doing this can we even begin to do philosophy.

But how do determine whether or not we have attached the same impressions to the same tokens? If we can only exchange tokens, and if I cannot give you my impression, and if you cannot give me your impressions, then we cannot hold our impressions up beside each other and compare them. If we cannot do this, how can we achieve real communication, and consequently, how can we do real philosophy?

Perhaps the answer lies in Wittgenstein’s treatment of rule following. How do we determine if somebody has understanding? We determine whether or not somebody has understanding by observing their behavior to see if it corresponds to the rule in question. If the correct behavior is displayed, then we are want to believe that the person has understanding, and is following the rule.

To determine whether or not somebody has attached the same impression to same token as I have, I must become familiar with that person. I must observe them to a sufficient degree that I can reach a conclusion as to whether or not they are following the same rule as I am. The rule is implicit and cannot be stated. I cannot merely ask, I must observe. If another person’s behavior appears to be following the same rule as I am following, then I have justification for thinking that we have attached the same impression to the same token. We can now communicate.

But a new problem arises when I encounter somebody how has attached a different impression than I have to the same token. How are we to determine who is right and who is wrong? What is the objective fact of the matter? Is there one? We only have one recourse, and it is even more intensive than establishing convention between two people. We must become familiar with an entire community of language users. This community need not be all of humanity, but it should function as an atom of humanity. We must become familiar with this community in the same way as we become familiar with the individual, and we must wait and see what the dominant convention is. This dominance must be clear. If there is no dominant convention, then we cannot establish a fact of the matter about what impression goes with what token. In cases where this obtains, we should consider the concept we are trying to define as being overly metaphysical. If it were otherwise, then we would expect to find a significantly common impression among a community of human beings.

An interesting corollary of this, is that the breakdown of cohesive, atomic communities of human beings runs the risk of defeating our ability to understand each other, establish which impression goes with which token, and engage in the real work of philosophy.

I would say that resemblance is a concept. Certainly the particulars are necessary for abstracting concepts, but an apple does not seem to have the intrinsic property of ‘resemlbing others like it’’ We draw that correlation. Can more than just the particulars be directly impressed? Through which means? Conceptual ability?

Following Wittgenstein, we could never have knowledge of matching impressions.

I don’t think so. Concepts don’t exist objectively. They are a product of the mind. I think it a bit silly to argue over such objective definitions. Better to me is to try and reach some sort of inter-subjective agreement regarding a concept (which certainly is distinct from objectiveness).

The termination of the regress through these means seems to be even more troublesome than the regress. Maybe I don’t quite understand the idea of a pure cognitive impression.

Ah, the infinite regress. It’s a ruse.

No, we can never know with metaphysical certitude that our sensory impressions are exactly the same as those of other people. In fact, they are not. They are close - which is what language reflects. Language is not completely, precisely, exactly reflective of reality.

Live with it.

'Cuz that’s what we do.

You have to start somewhere. Philosophy seeks to know what the basic assumptions are, and to reduce them to the smallest possible number. Trying to make that number zero is a waste of time.

Wittgenstein managed, once again, state the painfully obvious. If you didn’t know about Wittgy, you could always ask your grandmother - she would come up with essentially the same answer.

Philosophy begins after language - language is the foundation of philosophy.

I am not arguing with you, synt - you have it more or less correct.

The only beef I have here is with thestranger - the regress is not a problem. It all starts with simple words. Which are collectively defined, yes. I don’t understand where there is any problem. It’s not about the intrinsic properties of apples, it’s about what we recognise as properties. Collectively. It’s a societal thing - it’s language.

I like this part.

Concepts don’t exist objectively, but impressions come in the form of logical structure and semantic structure of the sentence itself – these are more objective, despite the fact that the speech act itself can be wholly subjective under the right circumstances. There is a lot of room to circle-jerk at the nexus of semantics, philo of language, and logic. It is only through these, though, that the concept can even be considered.

I like Emma Borg’s take on this:

Emma Borg explores the notion of an ‘unarticulated constituent (UC). In this light a unarticulated constituents “are supposed to be propositional elements, not presented in the surface form of a sentence, nor explicitly represented at the level of its logical form, yet which must be interpreted in order to grasp the (proper) meaning of the sentence or expression". Similar to Cappelen and Lepore, Borg seems to be interested in a type of re-explanation or clarification of the exact role of semantic content. In particular Borg wishes to dissolve the bridge that UC’s seem to holding between both the difference between knowledge of truth conditions, and knowledge that truth conditions are satisfied; and the difference between knowledge and meaning and understanding of communicative acts.

After defending the counterargument that some sentences without UC’s are non truth-evaluable, by pointing out that what we are really looking at this a (standard) case of speaker meaning, Borg is left with another problem: If we are to eliminate UC’s completely, then it seems there is a rather limp theory of meaning left in semantics. That is, there doesn’t seem to be a gap to pragmatic components required for proper communication.

Borg examines this gap further. Wanting to stay away from UC’s, Bord explains that we do not start at the semantic level in our analysis of communication. This equates to starting in the language faculty itself, which she claims far too complex. Rather it is the ‘structural description of the surface level content of a sentence’ which is supplied by semantics, from the language faculty, which then in turn utilizes other pragmatic components to determine things such as disambiguation, reference, etc. That is it contributes one, necessary, but far from sufficient, element to our understanding of a communicative act.

Fuck this shit makes my head hurt.

What are the chances of someone named “Borg” being involved with this stuff? Why not Robinson or Williams or any other name that any run of the mill neurodynamonologist would have?

Five bucks says that person had their name changed and is also a Trekky.

I like her just for that fact. Likewise I liked Cappelen and Lepore because I envisioned them to be a duo of midgets when I was reading their text.

I’m that shallow.

I didn’t do so well in philosophy of language class. haha

Hume would recommend backgammon, but that makes my head hurt too. :slight_smile: