"Shattering a Cartesian Sceptical Dream"

I just read an interesting paper by Stephen Hetherington that was entirely too long and complicated, my guess is that I can summarize what he said in about one page.

He notes that Cartesian argument can be broken down to this:
Let p= “You are wearing pants”
Let S(p)= It seems to you that p
Let K(S(p))= It is known to you that (S(p))
Let d= you are dreaming

  1. K(p)->K(~d) (definition of Cartesian skepticism)
  2. K(p)->K(~(S(p)&~p)) (definition of dream)
  3. K(p)->K(~S(p)v~~p) (DeMorgan’s Theorm)

Now a Cartesian skeptic will grant us that S(p) so we can get rid of one of those disjuncts in 3… so we are left with ~~p which, of course, reduces to p. So now our argument looks like this:

  1. K(p)->K(~d) (definition of Cartesian skepticism)
  2. K(p)->K(~(S(p)&~p)) (definition of dream)
  3. K(p)->K(~S(p)v~~p) (DeMorgan’s Theorm 2)
  4. S(p) (Disjunctive Syllogism 3)
    .: K(p)->K(p)

And that seems trivially true.

There we go, a 15 page paper summed up in a couple lines… who needs professional philosophers?

I don’t think that this “shatters” a cartesian argument as the title of the article implies, but I thought it was interesting nevertheless.

Troy,

Can you provide a reference for the Hetherington paper, please!

Elizabeth

Here you go…

Principia 8 (1) 2004, pp. 103-117. Published by NEL-Epistemology and Logic Research Group, Federal University of Santa Catarina (UFSC), Brazil.

A friend passed this article along to me, so I suspect there is an online source for it (I have never heard of Principia before). Regardless, the above is the original citation where the article was pulled from.