Ok, I think I’ve got a better grip on my admittedly vague initial question. For anyone who might care, I’ll briefly explain what I found out and how it might apply to Rorty. Otherwise just skip down to the bottom.
Saussure’s and Pierce’s projects and goals are different: Saussure’s semiology deals only with human signs and discourse (conventional signs) and Pierce’s semiotics deals with all possible signs (natural and conventional signs).
As far as I can tell, there’s no overt conflict between them, but each is better suited to its ultimate aim: Saussure for examining language and writing, and Pierce for exploring biological/animal communication/body language. Some have made the argument that Pierce’s approach is more comprehensive than Saussure’s, in that language ultimately falls under the pretense of our neurological physiology (but that’s a whole other topic).
Anyway, it seems that structuralism grew out of Saussure’s concept of langue, which stands for ‘difference between arbitrary signs’ without giving proper attention to parole, which is the ‘individual, contextual use of signs’, which Pierce’s approach would be more concerned about.
Poststructuralism arose out of frustration with structuralism’s seeming obsession with langue, but it backfired. Poststructuralism resulted in (1) the realization of an inseperable signified and signifier, and (2) arbitrary signification (unchanged from struturalism). Deconstruction attempts to take this to the ultimate conclusion, where Saussure’s 'difference’ comes full circle as Derrida’s ‘differAnce’ where it resembles Pierce’s unlimited semiosis (in Saussurian terms, “unlimited connotationâ€). So it’s kind of a long way around back to Square One.
Originally my feeling/misunderstanding went something like:
Rorty, an American ‘pragmatist’, rejects American pragmatic linguistics by basing his theories on Saussure’s semiology instead of Pierce’s semiotics (which all pragmatists have adopted as far as I know: James, Mead, Morris, etc.).
I found that, as the situation now stands, many philosophers including Jakobson and Eco have mended the two semiotic approaches by arguing that signs are not completely arbitrary – signs work because they’re useful and that language is ‘motivated’ to some extent, again showing that all signification is not arbitrary.
If all signification is not arbitrary as many claim, this exposes major inherent weakness in structuralist (and post-structuralist) positions. The thing is, I can’t tell if Rorty is implicated here. It seems like he uses structuralist techniques in formulating his positions and observations, but I keep reading that he’s post-analytic, so I get confused. faust makes a good point that Rorty is hard to pin down, and Lord knows I’m having a hell of a time of it.
What I suspect is that language itself is not the only tool we have to formulate philosophical thought. Other signs, inherent to our experience, provide material for contemplation and carry meaning outside of (and in addition to) language. I know that this may seem oblique to Rorty’s main project, but as a neopragmatist, he’s gotta land somewhere, right?