solving kantian problems

[gib]

I’m hellbent on solving the Kantian thing-in-itself problem. The problem is as follows:

Kant says that the true form of things in the world - i.e. the noumenal forms - are not only beyond our perception, but beyond our conception as well. That is, we can’t even imagine them. So then what is Kant doing when he talks about them? Is he not imagining them in those instances? Obviously he’s imagining something, but because the noumenal forms are unimaginable, he’s necessarily got it wrong.

What I would like to propose is that there is a difference between imagining something and referring to something. In order to be a proper reference, it need not be an accurate conception of the thing referred to.

There is also a related Kantian problem which goes as follows:

If the noumenal forms are unimaginable then we can’t say anything about them. Therefore, we can’t even say that they’re there, that they exist.

I’d just like to say this is wrong. You can say things about them. What you can’t say is anything about their intrinsic properties. I’m going to define an “intrinsic” property as a property that depends only on the thing that bears that property. So the redness of a red fire truck depends only on the fire truck itself. An “extrinsic” property on the other hand is a property that depends on other things besides the thing that bears that property. So the fire truck belonging to Joe Smith depends not only on the fire truck, but on Joe Smith as well (i.e. you have to refer to Joe Smith in order to describe the property).

So you can’t describe the intrinsic properties of things-in-themselves, but you can describe their extrinsic properties. You can say that “they are unimaginable” because imagination is a human function and so their being unimaginable depends on there being an imagination that can’t fathom them. You can say “they are not phenomena” because there is phenomena in relation to which they are not. You can say “they exist” because there is existence in which they reside (in fact, to say something exists is probably the most extrinsic description you can give it - it bears this property in relation to everything).

So in conclusion: we may not be able to imagine noumenal things, but we can certainly refer to them, and in referring to them, we can certainly say things about them.

[Carleas]

What does it mean, though, to refer to them, if you can’t ever form a reference that has any consequence? It’s necessarily an empty reference, isn’t it? So what good is it?
I think a better explanation for what’s going on is to say that you’re actually only referring to imagination when you say that things are “unimaginable”. You aren’t referring to the thing, because you have no concept of the thing. You have a bunch of place-holders, a bunch of arrows that point to a place and you refer to the place, but not the thing in the place. I don’t think I’m expressing myself very well. Let me try a different tack.
Basically, when you attempt to refer to noumenal things, aren’t you actually only referring by proxy? Like, when I refer to a square-circle, I’m actually referring to a square and a circle and the idea of all their properties being combined in one object, but I can’t refer to the object itself because it is unimaginable. Similarly, when I refer to noumenal objects, I’m actually only referring to regular objects, which is actually just referring to my experience of regular objects. We deduce from those experiences that there is a ‘real’ thing, a thing that causes the experiences, but one which is inaccessible to me by definition. The reference can never be direct, so in the strictest sense you’re referring to imaginable things.

[Impenitent]

@gib

I’m hellbent on solving the Kantian thing-in-itself problem. The problem is as follows:

Kant says that the true form of things in the world - i.e. the noumenal forms - are not only beyond our perception, but beyond our conception as well. That is, we can’t even imagine them. So then what is Kant doing when he talks about them?

Is he not imagining them in those instances? Obviously he’s imagining something, but because the noumenal forms are unimaginable, he’s necessarily got it wrong.

What I would like to propose is that there is a difference between imagining something and referring to something. In order to be a proper reference, it need not be an accurate conception of the thing referred to.

accurate conception of that which cannot be conceived? how would you judge that? a reference to a thing in itself is not a thing in itself, it is a mere reference…

There is also a related Kantian problem which goes as follows:

If the noumenal forms are unimaginable then we can’t say anything about them. Therefore, we can’t even say that they’re there, that they exist.

I’d just like to say this is wrong. You can say things about them. What you can’t say is anything about their intrinsic properties. I’m going to define an “intrinsic” property as a property that depends only on the thing that bears that property. So the redness of a red fire truck depends only on the fire truck itself.

no, the redness of a red fire truck depends on far more than that… light, shadow, colorblindness… is the firetruck itself red or is the paint on the firetruck red?

An “extrinsic” property on the other hand is a property that depends on other things besides the thing that bears that property. So the fire truck belonging to Joe Smith depends not only on the fire truck, but on Joe Smith as well (i.e. you have to refer to Joe Smith in order to describe the property).

ownership of a property is not a property of the property but rather a property of the owner of the property. joe sells his truck to fred. has the truck changed? no…

So you can’t describe the intrinsic properties of things-in-themselves, but you can describe their extrinsic properties. You can say that “they are unimaginable” because imagination is a human function and so their being unimaginable depends on there being an imagination that can’t fathom them.

you have yet to describe one

You can say “they are not phenomena” because there is phenomena in relation to which they are not.

no, the noumena are something outside the phenomena…

You can say “they exist” because there is existence in which they reside (in fact, to say something exists is probably the most extrinsic description you can give it - it bears this property in relation to everything).

no, there is no evidence of their existence

So in conclusion: we may not be able to imagine noumenal things, but we can certainly refer to them, and in referring to them, we can certainly say things about them.

saying things about that which cannot be described is very useful…

attributes of god…

does it mean anything?

-Imp

[anon]

An interesting question is how does the posited existence of noumena differ from say the posited existence of black holes. I think the difference is a logical one, and all in the definition of noumena. If noumena means fundamentally discrete essence of an object, then I believe that is a logical impossibility.

[gib]

@Carleas

What does it mean, though, to refer to them, if you can’t ever form a reference that has any consequence? It’s necessarily an empty reference, isn’t it? So what good is it?
I think a better explanation for what’s going on is to say that you’re actually only referring to imagination when you say that things are “unimaginable”. You aren’t referring to the thing, because you have no concept of the thing. You have a bunch of place-holders, a bunch of arrows that point to a place and you refer to the place, but not the thing in the place. I don’t think I’m expressing myself very well. Let me try a different tack.
Basically, when you attempt to refer to noumenal things, aren’t you actually only referring by proxy? Like, when I refer to a square-circle, I’m actually referring to a square and a circle and the idea of all their properties being combined in one object, but I can’t refer to the object itself because it is unimaginable. Similarly, when I refer to noumenal objects, I’m actually only referring to regular objects, which is actually just referring to my experience of regular objects. We deduce from those experiences that there is a ‘real’ thing, a thing that causes the experiences, but one which is inaccessible to me by definition. The reference can never be direct, so in the strictest sense you’re referring to imaginable things.

Well, Carleas, I think I understand where you’re coming from, and if there’s a difference between what you’re saying and what I’m saying, it’s that you seem to be saying the reference and the imagined object being referred to are two distinct things. I say they’re one. When Kant talks about “noumenal things”, he has a thought in mind (obviously imaginable), and that thought is not being referred to - it is the reference. I don’t think the reference has to match the referred in form in order to be a reference.

[gib]

@Impenitent

@gib

I’m hellbent on solving the Kantian thing-in-itself problem. The problem is as follows:

Kant says that the true form of things in the world - i.e. the noumenal forms - are not only beyond our perception, but beyond our conception as well. That is, we can’t even imagine them. So then what is Kant doing when he talks about them?

Is he not imagining them in those instances? Obviously he’s imagining something, but because the noumenal forms are unimaginable, he’s necessarily got it wrong.

What I would like to propose is that there is a difference between imagining something and referring to something. In order to be a proper reference, it need not be an accurate conception of the thing referred to.

accurate conception of that which cannot be conceived? how would you judge that? a reference to a thing in itself is not a thing in itself, it is a mere reference…

Right, that’s what I’m saying.

@Impenitent

@gib

There is also a related Kantian problem which goes as follows:

If the noumenal forms are unimaginable then we can’t say anything about them. Therefore, we can’t even say that they’re there, that they exist.

I’d just like to say this is wrong. You can say things about them. What you can’t say is anything about their intrinsic properties. I’m going to define an “intrinsic” property as a property that depends only on the thing that bears that property. So the redness of a red fire truck depends only on the fire truck itself.

no, the redness of a red fire truck depends on far more than that… light, shadow, colorblindness… is the firetruck itself red or is the paint on the firetruck red?

Well, I guess that depends on how you want to interpret the fire truck “being red”. If you want to say it depends on light, shadow, colorblindness then I’d say the property is not just “being red”, it’s “being perceived by me as red” in which case that’s obviously an extrinsic property. As for the paint, I include the paint as part of the fire truck.

@Impenitent

@gib

An “extrinsic” property on the other hand is a property that depends on other things besides the thing that bears that property. So the fire truck belonging to Joe Smith depends not only on the fire truck, but on Joe Smith as well (i.e. you have to refer to Joe Smith in order to describe the property).

ownership of a property is not a property of the property but rather a property of the owner of the property. joe sells his truck to fred. has the truck changed? no…

That’s neither here nor there. You can interpret it how you want. Ultimately, Joe’s ownership of the truck is both a property of the truck and of Joe - rather, it indicates that there are two properties: Joe’s owning the truck (which belongs to Joe), and the truck being owned (which belongs to the truck). If Joe sells his truck to Fred, it has not lost any of its intrinsic properties, but at least one of its extrinsic properties has changed.

@Impenitent

@gib

So you can’t describe the intrinsic properties of things-in-themselves, but you can describe their extrinsic properties. You can say that “they are unimaginable” because imagination is a human function and so their being unimaginable depends on there being an imagination that can’t fathom them.

you have yet to describe one

I just did. What have you missed?

@Impenitent

@gib

You can say “they are not phenomena” because there is phenomena in relation to which they are not.

no, the noumena are something outside the phenomena…

Does that contradict what I said?

@Impenitent

@gib

You can say “they exist” because there is existence in which they reside (in fact, to say something exists is probably the most extrinsic description you can give it - it bears this property in relation to everything).

no, there is no evidence of their existence

There doesn’t have to be evidence. I’m saying you can establish it as fact that they exist, I’m just saying that to say “they exist” is not inconsistent or meaningless.

@Impenitent

@gib

So in conclusion: we may not be able to imagine noumenal things, but we can certainly refer to them, and in referring to them, we can certainly say things about them.

saying things about that which cannot be described is very useful…

Who cares about usefulness. Why do people always think that’s a good retort?

[gib]

@anon

An interesting question is how does the posited existence of noumena differ from say the posited existence of black holes. I think the difference is a logical one, and all in the definition of noumena. If noumena means fundamentally discrete essence of an object, then I believe that is a logical impossibility.

Well, I don’t know about “essences” if that’s what Kant meant by “noumena”. All I mean to argue is that something being inconceibable does not mean we can’t talk about it.

[Ingenium]

I think Kant was pointing out the blind spot that runs through the metaphysics of Being, which had been handed down from Aristotle. His critique of reason led to his realization that thing-in-itself is unattainable through theoretical reasoning, which was a great insight. So he made a metaphysical shift, from theoretical thinking to thought linked to the subjective, or from ‘is’ to ‘ought’. I’d say that’s fine, except that of course it still doesn’t resolve the blind spot of thinking itself.

I’m going to define an “intrinsic” property as a property that depends only on the thing that bears that property. So the redness of a red fire truck depends only on the fire truck itself. An “extrinsic” property on the other hand is a property that depends on other things besides the thing that bears that property. So the fire truck belonging to Joe Smith depends not only on the fire truck, but on Joe Smith as well (i.e. you have to refer to Joe Smith in order to describe the property).

So what does that tell you about how the fire truck exists? Meaning that it’s enough of a clue for you to discern that, without having to analyze the truck by its ‘properties’ as a way of determining what it ‘is’.

Anyway, your definition of ‘intrinsic’ as a property that depends only on the thing bearing the property seems circular to me.

[gib]

@Ingenium

So what does that tell you about how the fire truck exists? Meaning that it’s enough of a clue for you to discern that, without having to analyze the truck by its ‘properties’ as a way of determining what it ‘is’.

I’m not sure what you’re getting at. Are we saying that a thing has no intrinsic properties because all such properties are necessarily dependent on my perception of them?

@Ingenium

Anyway, your definition of ‘intrinsic’ as a property that depends only on the thing bearing the property seems circular to me.

How so?

[Impenitent]

@gib

@Impenitent

@gib

I’m hellbent on solving the Kantian thing-in-itself problem. The problem is as follows:

Kant says that the true form of things in the world - i.e. the noumenal forms - are not only beyond our perception, but beyond our conception as well. That is, we can’t even imagine them. So then what is Kant doing when he talks about them?

Is he not imagining them in those instances? Obviously he’s imagining something, but because the noumenal forms are unimaginable, he’s necessarily got it wrong.

What I would like to propose is that there is a difference between imagining something and referring to something. In order to be a proper reference, it need not be an accurate conception of the thing referred to.

accurate conception of that which cannot be conceived? how would you judge that? a reference to a thing in itself is not a thing in itself, it is a mere reference…

Right, that’s what I’m saying.

accurate conception of that which cannot be conceived cannot be measured. it is an a posteriori analytic judgment in kantian terms…

@Impenitent

@gib

There is also a related Kantian problem which goes as follows:

If the noumenal forms are unimaginable then we can’t say anything about them. Therefore, we can’t even say that they’re there, that they exist.

I’d just like to say this is wrong. You can say things about them. What you can’t say is anything about their intrinsic properties. I’m going to define an “intrinsic” property as a property that depends only on the thing that bears that property. So the redness of a red fire truck depends only on the fire truck itself.

no, the redness of a red fire truck depends on far more than that… light, shadow, colorblindness… is the firetruck itself red or is the paint on the firetruck red?

Well, I guess that depends on how you want to interpret the fire truck “being red”. If you want to say it depends on light, shadow, colorblindness then I’d say the property is not just “being red”, it’s “being perceived by me as red” in which case that’s obviously an extrinsic property. As for the paint, I include the paint as part of the fire truck.

if the property depends on outside observation, what then is intrinsic?

@Impenitent

@gib

An “extrinsic” property on the other hand is a property that depends on other things besides the thing that bears that property. So the fire truck belonging to Joe Smith depends not only on the fire truck, but on Joe Smith as well (i.e. you have to refer to Joe Smith in order to describe the property).

ownership of a property is not a property of the property but rather a property of the owner of the property. joe sells his truck to fred. has the truck changed? no…

That’s neither here nor there. You can interpret it how you want. Ultimately, Joe’s ownership of the truck is both a property of the truck and of Joe - rather, it indicates that there are two properties: Joe’s owning the truck (which belongs to Joe), and the truck being owned (which belongs to the truck). If Joe sells his truck to Fred, it has not lost any of its intrinsic properties, but at least one of its extrinsic properties has changed.

@Impenitent

@gib

So you can’t describe the intrinsic properties of things-in-themselves, but you can describe their extrinsic properties. You can say that “they are unimaginable” because imagination is a human function and so their being unimaginable depends on there being an imagination that can’t fathom them.

you have yet to describe one

I just did. What have you missed?

you did not describe an intrinsic property

@Impenitent

@gib

You can say “they are not phenomena” because there is phenomena in relation to which they are not.

no, the noumena are something outside the phenomena…

Does that contradict what I said?

@Impenitent

@gib

You can say “they exist” because there is existence in which they reside (in fact, to say something exists is probably the most extrinsic description you can give it - it bears this property in relation to everything).

no, there is no evidence of their existence

There doesn’t have to be evidence. I’m saying you can establish it as fact that they exist, I’m just saying that to say “they exist” is not inconsistent or meaningless.

of course the purple wombats on jupiter control the universe (they are the ultimate noumenal things)… no evidence? why? as you say “There doesn’t have to be evidence. I’m saying you can establish it as fact that they exist, I’m just saying that to say “they exist” is not inconsistent or meaningless.”

@Impenitent

@gib

So in conclusion: we may not be able to imagine noumenal things, but we can certainly refer to them, and in referring to them, we can certainly say things about them.

saying things about that which cannot be described is very useful…

Who cares about usefulness. Why do people always think that’s a good retort?

good retort? nope, just following your train…

usefulness is meaningless to the purple wombats (which you have just proven control the universe)…

-Imp

[gib]

@Impenitent

accurate conception of that which cannot be conceived cannot be measured. it is an a posteriori analytic judgment in kantian terms…

Sorry, I’m not sure what that means.

@Impenitent

if the property depends on outside observation, what then is intrinsic?

I’m not sure. But what does that matter? I’m just defining a term; I’m not saying there have to be any. I leave it up to you to decide whether they exist or not.

@Impenitent

you did not describe an intrinsic property

Why do I need to? I said it was extrinsic properties that can be described.

@Impenitent

@gib

There doesn’t have to be evidence. I’m saying you can establish it as fact that they exist, I’m just saying that to say “they exist” is not inconsistent or meaningless.

of course the purple wombats on jupiter control the universe (they are the ultimate noumenal things)… no evidence? why? as you say “There doesn’t have to be evidence. I’m saying you can establish it as fact that they exist, I’m just saying that to say “they exist” is not inconsistent or meaningless.”

Sorry, I meant “I’m not saying you can establish it as fact…” I think that changes your point about the purple wombats.

[Impenitent]

@gib

@Impenitent

accurate conception of that which cannot be conceived cannot be measured. it is an a posteriori analytic judgment in kantian terms…

Sorry, I’m not sure what that means.

it is a contradiction. there can be no conception, accurate or otherwise, of that which cannot be conceived.

@Impenitent

if the property depends on outside observation, what then is intrinsic?

I’m not sure. But what does that matter? I’m just defining a term; I’m not saying there have to be any. I leave it up to you to decide whether they exist or not.

kant (as well as the empiricists and the idealists) had very definite definitions for intrinsic property
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intrinsic_ … philosophy
plato.stanford.edu/entries/intrinsic-extrinsic/
bookrags.com/research/extrin … ties-eoph/

@Impenitent

you did not describe an intrinsic property

Why do I need to? I said it was extrinsic properties that can be described.

extrinsic properties of what? of something that cannot be described? how do you know that the properties described are in fact properties of that which can not be described?

@Impenitent

@gib

There doesn’t have to be evidence. I’m saying you can establish it as fact that they exist, I’m just saying that to say “they exist” is not inconsistent or meaningless.

of course the purple wombats on jupiter control the universe (they are the ultimate noumenal things)… no evidence? why? as you say “There doesn’t have to be evidence. I’m saying you can establish it as fact that they exist, I’m just saying that to say “they exist” is not inconsistent or meaningless.”

Sorry, I meant “I’m not saying you can establish it as fact…” I think that changes your point about the purple wombats.

not at all. the purple wombats still exist and their existence is neither inconsistent or meaningless…

not factual, but their existence is granted because there “doesn’t have to be evidence”

or will you say now that there does have to be evidence?

evidence of the existence of that which can never be conceived…

-Imp

[gib]

@Impenitent

it is a contradiction. there can be no conception, accurate or otherwise, of that which cannot be conceived.

I’ll contend that you can have an inaccurate conception, so long as the inaccuracy is with only certain properties, but not others. For example, Gelephants are elephants colored gurple. Gurple is a color that falls outside the standard color spectrum humans can typically see and imagine (it’s an inconceivable color). So I can’t imagine gelephants accurately for that requires imagining gurple, but to say that gelephants have trunks is perfectly accurate and meaningful.

@Impenitent

extrinsic properties of what? of something that cannot be described? how do you know that the properties described are in fact properties of that which can not be described?

Because they’re not intrinsic to that thing. To say that a thing cannot be described is to say that its intrinsic properties cannot be described. But so long as I’m referring to it (I’m calling it a “thing” after all), I can say things about it in relation to other things I can refer to.

@Impenitent

@gib

Sorry, I meant “I’m not saying you can establish it as fact…” I think that changes your point about the purple wombats.

not at all. the purple wombats still exist and their existence is neither inconsistent or meaningless…

I agree. It’s not inconsistent or meaningless. Doesn’t make it true.

@Impenitent

not factual, but their existence is granted because there “doesn’t have to be evidence”

No, it’s not granted. It’s just consistent and meaningful.

If the boogie man lives in my closet, then there is a monster in my closet. That’s perfectly consistent and meaningful. Nevertheless, there is no boogie man.

[Impenitent]

@gib

@Impenitent

it is a contradiction. there can be no conception, accurate or otherwise, of that which cannot be conceived.

I’ll contend that you can have an inaccurate conception, so long as the inaccuracy is with only certain properties, but not others. For example, Gelephants are elephants colored gurple. Gurple is a color that falls outside the standard color spectrum humans can typically see and imagine (it’s an inconceivable color). So I can’t imagine gelephants accurately for that requires imagining gurple, but to say that gelephants have trunks is perfectly accurate and meaningful.

[b]an inaccurate conception is nevertheless a conception. a conception of that which cannot be conceived is a contradiction.

“but to say that gelephants have trunks is perfectly accurate and meaningful.” as much as saying purple wombats control the universe is perfectly accurate and meaningful[/b]

@Impenitent

extrinsic properties of what? of something that cannot be described? how do you know that the properties described are in fact properties of that which can not be described?

Because they’re not intrinsic to that thing. To say that a thing cannot be described is to say that its intrinsic properties cannot be described. But so long as I’m referring to it (I’m calling it a “thing” after all), I can say things about it in relation to other things I can refer to.

is its “thingness” an intrinsic property of it or is that just a game with the language that is only accurate and meaningful within the small confines of the language game and never reaches the outside universe?

@Impenitent

@gib

Sorry, I meant “I’m not saying you can establish it as fact…” I think that changes your point about the purple wombats.

not at all. the purple wombats still exist and their existence is neither inconsistent or meaningless…

I agree. It’s not inconsistent or meaningless. Doesn’t make it true.

it makes it as true as any noumena…

@Impenitent

not factual, but their existence is granted because there “doesn’t have to be evidence”

No, it’s not granted. It’s just consistent and meaningful.

then none of your noumena are granted either

If the boogie man lives in my closet, then there is a monster in my closet. That’s perfectly consistent and meaningful. Nevertheless, there is no boogie man.

oh sure there is… you simply cannot sense or describe him… but he’s there holding the noumena in his jazz hands…

-Imp

[gib]

@Impenitent

@gib

@Impenitent

it is a contradiction. there can be no conception, accurate or otherwise, of that which cannot be conceived.

I’ll contend that you can have an inaccurate conception, so long as the inaccuracy is with only certain properties, but not others. For example, Gelephants are elephants colored gurple. Gurple is a color that falls outside the standard color spectrum humans can typically see and imagine (it’s an inconceivable color). So I can’t imagine gelephants accurately for that requires imagining gurple, but to say that gelephants have trunks is perfectly accurate and meaningful.

an inaccurate conception is nevertheless a conception. a conception of that which cannot be conceived is a contradiction.

Then it’s not a conception of gelephants. It may still be a reference to one.

@Impenitent

“but to say that gelephants have trunks is perfectly accurate and meaningful.” as much as saying purple wombats control the universe is perfectly accurate and meaningful[/b]

Nope. Gelephants, by definition, have trunks. Wombats don’t control the universe by definition. It may still be meaningful but not accurate.

@Impenitent

is its “thingness” an intrinsic property of it or is that just a game with the language that is only accurate and meaningful within the small confines of the language game and never reaches the outside universe?

I don’t know if it’s an intrinsic property, but I know what I’m thinking about when I think of “things”. That’s a meaningful word in the English language and you can look up its definition in a standard dictionary. Insofar as noumenal things are indeed “things”, then I’ve got an accurate conception of them insofar as I categorize them as “things”. What I can’t conceptualize are any of the intrinsic properties it bears below the level of “thingness”. Whether “thingness” is itself an intrinsic property or not, I can’t say, but if it is, and if noumena are indeed “things”, then I guess I’d have to change my position. I’d have to say that noumena are not inconceivable, but all its intrinsic properties (save “thingness”) are (kind of like gelephants - some of their properties are conceivable, some not) Is this what Kant meant? Maybe it is. Maybe he didn’t articulate his philosophy right. But in any case, it’s what I’m saying. I’m saying that so long as something is a “thing”, even if all its other intrinsic properties are inconceivable, it can be conceived as a “thing” at the very least.

@Impenitent

@gib

I agree. It’s not inconsistent or meaningless. Doesn’t make it true.

it makes it as true as any noumena…

And that’s fine. Noumena haven’t been proven to be true (proven to exist) either. I’m not partial either way on the actual existence of noumena, I’m just concerned with our ability to talk about them in a meaningful and consistent way.

@Impenitent

then none of your noumena are granted either

Fine. I’m not asking for them to be granted.

[Carleas]

Hi Gib,

I think the difference between noumenal objects and regular objects is that with regular objects, it’s OK to say that the reference is the object, while with noumenal objects it’s not. The ideas we have in mind when we talk about and refer to noumenal objects are all references, but not to noumenal object, rather to things that point to noumenal objects. That’s why I called it reference-by-proxy. Encapsulating all those pointers in simple terms like ‘noumenal’ doesn’t change the way we’re referring, it just wraps all the circumlocution in a neat little package. A noumenal object that could be referred to directly couldn’t be noumenal, at least not if the reference is the object; isn’t that part of what noumenal means?

[Impenitent]

@gib

@Impenitent

@gib

@Impenitent

it is a contradiction. there can be no conception, accurate or otherwise, of that which cannot be conceived.

I’ll contend that you can have an inaccurate conception, so long as the inaccuracy is with only certain properties, but not others. For example, Gelephants are elephants colored gurple. Gurple is a color that falls outside the standard color spectrum humans can typically see and imagine (it’s an inconceivable color). So I can’t imagine gelephants accurately for that requires imagining gurple, but to say that gelephants have trunks is perfectly accurate and meaningful.

an inaccurate conception is nevertheless a conception. a conception of that which cannot be conceived is a contradiction.

Then it’s not a conception of gelephants. It may still be a reference to one.

a reference to that which can not be referenced?

@Impenitent

“but to say that gelephants have trunks is perfectly accurate and meaningful.” as much as saying purple wombats control the universe is perfectly accurate and meaningful[/b]

Nope. Gelephants, by definition, have trunks. Wombats don’t control the universe by definition. It may still be meaningful but not accurate.

no, wombats control the universe by definition. period. gelephants don’t exist. gelephants have no meaning nor accuracy. neeh.

@Impenitent

is its “thingness” an intrinsic property of it or is that just a game with the language that is only accurate and meaningful within the small confines of the language game and never reaches the outside universe?

I don’t know if it’s an intrinsic property, but I know what I’m thinking about when I think of “things”. That’s a meaningful word in the English language and you can look up its definition in a standard dictionary. Insofar as noumenal things are indeed “things”, then I’ve got an accurate conception of them insofar as I categorize them as “things”. What I can’t conceptualize are any of the intrinsic properties it bears below the level of “thingness”. Whether “thingness” is itself an intrinsic property or not, I can’t say, but if it is, and if noumena are indeed “things”, then I guess I’d have to change my position.

things can be described. noumena can not

I’d have to say that noumena are not inconceivable, but all its intrinsic properties (save “thingness”) are (kind of like gelephants - some of their properties are conceivable, some not)

no, thingness is not a property of a thing, it is a pawn in a language game.

Is this what Kant meant? Maybe it is. Maybe he didn’t articulate his philosophy right.

LOL… maybe not… then again, he may have been so anal in his articulation it is ridiculous…

But in any case, it’s what I’m saying. I’m saying that so long as something is a “thing”, even if all its other intrinsic properties are inconceivable, it can be conceived as a “thing” at the very least.

is the corner of the sphere not a thing?

@Impenitent

@gib

I agree. It’s not inconsistent or meaningless. Doesn’t make it true.

it makes it as true as any noumena…

And that’s fine. Noumena haven’t been proven to be true (proven to exist) either. I’m not partial either way on the actual existence of noumena, I’m just concerned with our ability to talk about them in a meaningful and consistent way.

ability to talk about that which cannot be described in a meaningful way indeed…

@Impenitent

then none of your noumena are granted either

Fine. I’m not asking for them to be granted.
[/quote]
then what will you speak about?

-Imp

[gib]

@Carleas

Hi Gib,

I think the difference between noumenal objects and regular objects is that with regular objects, it’s OK to say that the reference is the object, while with noumenal objects it’s not.

I don’t think the reference is the object, I think the reference is the conception of the object (whether accurate or not).

@Carleas

The ideas we have in mind when we talk about and refer to noumenal objects are all references, but not to noumenal object, rather to things that point to noumenal objects. That’s why I called it reference-by-proxy.

Let me see if I understand. Is it like referring to dark matter by referring to the observable signs of its presence (like regular matter acting as if a strong force of gravity is nearby even though nothing can be seen at the locus of that force)?

@Carleas

Encapsulating all those pointers in simple terms like ‘noumenal’ doesn’t change the way we’re referring, it just wraps all the circumlocution in a neat little package. A noumenal object that could be referred to directly couldn’t be noumenal, at least not if the reference is the object; isn’t that part of what noumenal means?

Does it change things to say that the reference is not the object but the concept of the object?

[xzc]

I don’t think a conception of the noumenon has any significance if we’re agreeing that the noumenon is not 1. experienced by the senses 2.or achieved through mathematical means.

[gib]

@Impenitent

a reference to that which can not be referenced?

Now you’re just pulling things out of thin air. No one defined noumena as unreferencible.

@Impenitent

no, wombats control the universe by definition. period.

That’s just an incoherent definition. They actually have to exist in order for that to hold. Gelephants, on the other hand, don’t need to exist in order to have trunks.

@Impenitent

things can be described. noumena can not

Of course things can be described… as “things”. If noumena are also things, they too can be described as “things”. When Kant says they can’t be described, he means something entirely different: that beyond being a thing they can’t be described (at least, that’s how I read Kant).

@Impenitent

no, thingness is not a property of a thing, it is a pawn in a language game.

OK, but things still exist. A book in front of me is still a thing.

@Impenitent

is the corner of the sphere not a thing?

It would be if sphere’s could have corners. Obviously, spheres can’t have corners. That’s one way things are inconceivable (by being impossible), but it’s not the only way. Noumena may very well be inconceivable things that are in fact possible.

Ask me about atoms if you want an example of inconceivable things that we know exist.

@Impenitent

ability to talk about that which cannot be described in a meaningful way indeed…

Why would it not be meaningful? I’ve already established that the word “thing” is meaningful.

@Impenitent

then what will you speak about?

The possibility.