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So religion means indoctrination, and god is an omnipotent invisible being? Ok!
Some religions include doctrine, which I think is a different thing. God is omnipotent is a thought, by virtue of being a thought, omnipotent God exists. So the question becomes, what does omnipotent God entail?
God means good is also a thought, I am not attempting to dispute that. I give you simply my opiniion that I don’t think it’s an apropriate description, and I tell you why.
But God means good is certainly a thought. As such, the question can still be asked, what does it entail? My suggestion was that the question would become what good entails.
What does God mean good entail?
How about you?
I’ll take that for now… it’s getting late here, is why.
…the question becomes that for you, yes… for me, no. Guess why?
Because you don’t think God is omnipotent?
I’ll talk to you some other time. Wish I could sleep as well, other matters attend me.
…because god is not what we think, is why.
Ok…
But that God is not what we think is also a thought, and entails something, likely some things. The question becomes what.
No, seriously, anyone else? [-o<
Yea, you.
What’s your take on the inquiry? and don’t make it a circular non-sequitur of an argument… or is that why you refrain from the partake further, because you can’t help that?
I wanted to add another thing here. Aside from concerns about the actual substance of God, not of any manifestation of God but of god himself, the substance of God is also a thought which requires no substance. It is simply what is in the thought: the substance of God. God himself, too, remains unchanged. So, while wondering about the miracle of the transubstantiation of the flesh in Catholic tradition is really a though of God, is wondering about a question about what God entails, the postmodern concern about what the substance of the thought god itself is, (not the source, because the source is clearly and patently God through revelation as contained in the thought of God) is a question hiding a nonsensical question which is: does God exist.
Patently, he exists, as here he has been evoked, and if he didn’t exist, nothing would have been evoked.
What thing outside the thought God sustains the thought God has, of course, no effect on the existence of God. God anyway is, exactly as God is, all the same. But, because this would make the entire endeavour ridiculous, the postmodernist must maintain either the lie or the confusion regarding the existence of God, so that his true interest, fussing about substance, can be pursued. Because this existence cannot be doubted with a direct question that would make the absurdity obvious, a direct approach is not to be expected from the postmodernist.
When we say postmodernist, of course, we are using a polite euphemism for nihilist.
We can define nihilism as seeking to deny existinence, affirming nihil, Latin for nothing, which, of course, already as an affirmation makes a mockery of itself. It then becomes that a nihilist must, by definition, be one who takes nothing, not thought or himself or anything, seriously, but sees everything, including himself and his thoughts, as mockery.
To the extent that it ceases to be mockery at any moment and to any extent, the moment any seriousness emerges, it becomes either lie or confusion.
There is, of course, an exception. There can be a situation where an amount of pain so great exists, that nothingness is affirmed, not as a denial of existence, but as a rejection of existence, and more, as an affirmation of the possibility of the lack of existence. This isn’t nihilism, for it does not actually postulate the existence does not exist. The proper name is budism.
To the extent that the pain lifts enough that thoughts other than of nothingness emerge, the affirmation of the possibility of the lack of existence ceases for as long as the pain is lifted, and may return if the pain returns to enough of an extent, without contradiction throughout, and thus without mockery.
The affirmation of nothingness, when not nihilism, is a symptom of pain, and a method to relieve it.
The crucial difference is that, for a nihilist, the affirmation is: nothing instead of something. For the budist, it is simply: nothing.
As soon as the pain is relieved, the affirmation becomes unnessesary.
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I thought god was that which created 'all’.
Did you?
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Isn’t that what ‘god’ signifies around the world, in all religions that have a god… as not all religions do.
I think that’s a very tricky assertion on many levels.
For one thing, it can be argued that only one religion has God, or that there is only one God which is worshipped in more than one religion.
It’s tough.
Whatever the case, God the creator of all exists.
I have said that my self here, before… thanks for confirming that thought.
…in thought only.
What else do you need him to exist in?
The interesting quesiton is what that thought entails.
Leibniz pointed out that if God the creator exists, which he does, and God is good, which he is, and God is omnipotent, then this is the best of all possible worlds. That is just one postulation, Leibniz wrote a good amount of theology, but it’s one demonstration of the power of Leibniz’s proof.
If you don’t like the thought, you don’t need to think it. I suppose an interesting question would then be why you don’t like the thought.