Spinoza's prop VIII on mind

[Rounder]

PROP. VIII. The ideas of particular things, or of modes, that do not exist, must be comprehended in the infinite idea of God, in the same way as the formal essences of particular things or modes are contained in the attributes of God.

Proof.–This proposition is evident from the last; it is understood more clearly from the preceding note.

Corollary.–Hence, so long as particular things do not exist, except in so far as they, are comprehended in the attributes of God, their representations in thought or ideas do not exist, except in so far as the infinite idea of God exists; and when particular things are said to exist, not only in so far as they, are involved in the attributes of God, but also in so far as they- are said to continue, their ideas 'will also involve existence, through which they are said to continue.

Note.–If anyone desires an example to throw more light on this question, I shall, I fear, not be able to give him any, which adequately explains the thing of which I here speak, inasmuch as it is unique; however, I will endeavour to illustrate it as far as possible. The nature of a circle is such that if any number of straight lines intersect within it, the rectangles formed by their segments will be equal to one another; thus, infinite equal rectangles are contained in a circle. Yet none of these rectangles can be said to exist, except in so far as the circle exists; nor can the idea of any of these rectangles be said to exist, except in so far as they are comprehended in the idea of the circle. Let us grant that, from this infinite number of rectangles, two only exist. The ideas of these two not only exist, in so far as they are contained in the idea of the circle, but also as they involve the existence of those rectangles; wherefore they are distinguished from the remaining ideas of the remaining rectangles.

Is this Spinoza’s attempt to sidestep the contradiction that follows from the previous proposition? when one contemplates ideas that do not exist, such as flying spagetti monsters?

Corollary.–Hence God’s power of thinking is equal to his realized power of action-that is, whatsoever follows from the infinite nature of God in the world of extension (formaliter), follows without exception in the same order and connection from the idea of God in the world of thought (objective).

The quote above makes obvious said contradiction

This is one proposition of Spinoza’s I’m quite sure I do not grasp. Since Spinoza was unable to shed anymore light on the subject maybe we can mentally masterbate about such things.

[Gobbo]

I found this one to be wonky as well as he seems to ran into an empiricle wall. For instance we don’t have a conception of The ‘FJSOLSJ’ because no one here has seen or experienced the concept of one.

I took Spinoza’s long sharade to basically point out the fact that we can think about that which we don’t know, but it is conceptualized in this sort of ubiquitous a priori sense that he would claim is God.

So in other words, even though these exist within the folds of extension, we are seemingly divorced from our empiricle abilities.

The ideas of particular things, or of modes, that do not exist, must be comprehended in the infinite idea of God, in the same way as the formal essences of particular things or modes are contained in the attributes of God.

Comeprehended by God, but in his faceless nature.

but also in so far as they- are said to continue, their ideas 'will also involve existence, through which they are said to continue.

The fact that I can think about that which I do not know involves them in existence.

Now, I’m pretty ripped so I may be totally off here… but I don’t see the contradiction. At least not within Spinoza’s system.

[Rounder]

Yeah I get all that… Spinoza’s concept is a weak form of correspondence theory. The contradiction I thought was inherent in the mechanism where the order of thought is paralleled by nature, and I saw this proposition as a rather poor attempt at explaining thought which doesn’t corrospond to an object. You are probably right that its consistent… I don’t know Spinoza’s line here is what befuddles me

Hence, so long as particular things do not exist, except in so far as they, are comprehended in the attributes of God, their representations in thought or ideas do not exist, except in so far as the infinite idea of God exists; and when particular things are said to exist, not only in so far as they, are involved in the attributes of God, but also in so far as they- are said to continue, their ideas 'will also involve existence, through which they are said to continue.

Something doesn’t exist…EXCEPT… as its comprehended in the attributes of God…but of course the attributes and representations doesn’t exist… But wait… EXCEPT they do exist… in so far as…

WTF

Its probably just the wording thats throwing me here, but I thought Spinoza made it pretty evident that God was limited in possibility. Thus infinity is not to be understood as “anything at all”… yet only that which follows from the nature of substance. Thus there are laws in nature which cannot be broken, thus some things are not possible. So can I imagine a breaking of said law, and therefore such a thing could not have an extension.

But I suppose Spinoza would say that such thoughts would not be possible, since the thoughts would have to logically follow from the first cause anyways… Whatever I think Spinoza needed a little Russellian lecture on Denoting Complexes 101. Or perhaps a little scolding from Davidson on how to use Tarski’s ‘Convention T’.

[Rounder]

I thought it might be relevant, in case anyone saw this thread, and gave a shit(other then Gobbo, and thanks for the reply mate ), to note that it has recently been brought to my attention, via a peer, that Spinoza’s theory is actually better viewed as a coherence theory. It did not take long for this interpretation to coalesce and open my eyes to a deeper and more sophisticated(at least I appreciate Spinoza more) view of Spinoza’s work. I think this is an idea that anyone taking Spinoza seriously must be aware of(Whether you accept it or not), and if anyone is interested I have an essay by Ralph Walker on the subject. Just pm me if you want it, This I recieved from the same source, far be it from me to take credit.

In any case I’m fucking ripped as Gobbo would put it

So night all.

[Mastriani]

Honestly, not very well read on Spinoza, he hasn’t illuminated for me as others have, but that’s just personal supposition.

If Divine Being is a determinate object, subject to definition, then it would appear that Spinoza’s assertions will stand, on their merit.

If Divine Being is a determinate subjective, without definition, then my perspective is that Spinoza fails. As a subjective, laws of physical order, perceived by the cognitive processes, would be inapplicable to any entity seemingly outside that realm of preception/understanding. Which would lead to the understanding that any idea existent within, and consistent with the attributes, of a stated entity, is possible, plausible and viable.

So in my estimation, Spinoza was correct within his proposition, although lacking proper definition of the subject entity … unless that was given outside the quote provided.