The conversion of the Skeptics.

Philosophy Forums Philosophy
1

Nah, not going to happen.

The subject of Skepticism proved to be a lot more hair-pulling and teeth-pulling than I initially thought. For one thing, there are varieties of skeptical arguments, and for another, they are all logical arguments and can wield power. So, I am focusing on one variety only: the radical argument or RA (or Radical Skepticism). [to be distinguished from cartesian and skeptical hypotheses: brain-in-a-vat, spell-of-evil-deceiver, etc.]

The Skeptical conclusion (their claim): Knowledge is impossible.

It sounds very simple. But this conclusion seems like a shot in the heart of epistemology. It is universal in scope and encompasses all putative knowledge, or what we would generally regard as knowledge: scientific, inferential, experiential (perceptual), mathematical, etc.

So, what do the skeptics want from us hunter-gatherers of knowledge? Well, they want us to admit that all we really have are opinions, or beliefs without truth-backing or real justification. We could try arguing for a claim, but they would have us cornered and commit one of these:

  1. cling to the Doctrine of the Given (dogmatic assumptions)
  2. justify a belief with another belief ad infinitum (infinite regress)
  3. argue in a circle.

One comforting note: the skeptics would leave us alone if we don’t put forth any statements as claims or assertions.

But the minute we do, they get the upper-hand to ask for an explanation or reasoning to back up those claims: and so, doubt-injection begins. And we are obliged to give an explanation. Now, one of my questions is: Why? What’s the use of giving an explanation to the skeptics if they’ve already presented us a logical conclusion: something they can’t afford to give up without at the same time losing their identity of being…well…skeptics?

Comforting note no. 2: It turns out, it is not to them we need to prove or, in a more modest move, explain that what we claim is justified or true and therefore, knowledge. Their task is done once they’ve injected this suspicion in us. It is us, ourselves, who we must convince (!). We need to explain to ourselves how we can have knowledge. It kinda look like this: If we are to stay true to our commitment to knowledge (what it means, what is its nature, etc), we need an explanation with which we could live to back up our claim: we need to be able to say our claim is rational in spite of the presence of the skeptical conclusion.

So, how to proceed? How is the possibility of knowledge to be explained? What account of knowledge do you have in mind to dodge the skeptic’s claim?

2

C.S Lewis said that the indignancy with which an atheist proclaims that the Universe is lacking in mercy and justice is really just an indicator that he does believe in such things, in fact so strongly that they can condemn the very Universe for not living up to them.
Similarly, the skeptic doesn’t just bellow that nobody knows anything (at least, not the skeptics worth talking to). They have a developed system of what truth would be, why we don’t have it, and what hurdle we would need to jump in order to claim knowledge. In other words, they do have a claim. And as you point out, any claim can be examined.
They cannot exist in an epistemological void, not once their infant brains begin to develop. They claim skepticism because they know very well their are facts out there, and think they can never get at them.

3

Just because a human desires something does not mean that he is reflecting the existence of that thing. I love this idea that because it’s happening for me that it must be happening everywhere.

Now I’m worried that The Chronicles of Narnia is going to be both boring and illogical.

4

One of the problems with Skepticism dating back to the Greeks is the argument, “How do you know that you don’t know”.

It isn’t just that a claim or an assertion is just belief, an important question which follows is, what is the grounds or criterion for that belief? And that is the question that seems to strike into the heart of epistemology. A true skeptic doesn’t assert what the grounds or foundation (a better word) would be, since such an assertion would simply be yet another claim, and it follows then that a Skeptical claim with absolute certainty that there exists no foundation for knowledge (here I believe I split with Imp on this issue) is self refuting. As you say,

When a skeptic denies even the possibility of knowledge they are no longer a skeptic, they are nihilists, magical nihilists at that, who somehow seem to know that we and they know nothing. So, to my thinking at least, a skeptic simply must reserve or suspend judgement in regards to certainty.

Some might argue that this is what Kant did (or attempted to do). I have read papers where some Philosophers advocate simply ignoring Skeptics, that the point is moot, for all intents and purposes, and that Grad students are once again free to write dissertations concerning the philosophy of long vowels. I believe that this view prevails, especially in America and Britian, where the history tends to be more empirical/positivistic/pragmatic. Which is a tad strange, since Hume’s skepticism shredded induction and the entire empirical approach. It would be a German on the continent that would try the hardest to save it.

5

Well this post comes from a man who seriously tried in essays, more than once, to demonstrate how A can never equal A, how there is no foundation for numbers and certainly no such thing as a priori knowledge. So naturally I’d agree with skeptics, but I’d find them tiresome because who cares, get with the game.

6

Yes, definitely. A very good point. Of course, the skeptics could easily respond to us by saying that their own claim does not have to be fool proof: only that it creates suspicion in our own claim to knowledge. In fact, for a skeptic to even claim “truth” to what he/she says is to pose problem to his own thesis that knowledge is impossible [knowledge being belief having truth-content]. That there is truth, the skeptics won’t deny: they are, after all, Realists by nature. That we can have access to this truth, hence knowledge, is what the skeptics deny.

So, to reiterate what I’m trying to say: it is not important that their belief “knowledge is impossible” amounts to knowledge, for this would be self-defeating. It is only that it induces doubt in our own.

And with that, I think even the skeptics would agree. :slight_smile:

Thankfully, both—boring and illogical—can be excused given a thoughtful explanation of what the Chronicles of Narnia is. Remember that it is not to the skeptics we need to make a convincing explanation, it is to us.

And to answer that question is to also assuage the skeptical worry that we really do not have justification or logical grounds for knowledge claims. This is what the skeptics say: we only think we are giving justification to our statements/propositions, but in fact we are only either resorting to belief to justify another belief, or assuming something to give us some grounds for saying something else, or go back to what we said before to arrive at a conclusion. To the skeptics, to make a real claim to knowledge is to make the connection between what is the case in the actual world and what we say about the world.

I would disagree that skeptics are nihilists. They are, as I say to Ucci, Realists because they do, in fact, acknowledge that there is an objective, real world. Their task is simply to deny that we have access to this objective world. As to the certainty: talk of certainty is moot with the statement “knowledge is impossible”. It is not to the certainty of knowledge they object, it is to knowledge in general that they object.

Yeah, one of the usual responses is to ignore the radical skeptics: but to ignore their argument does not help if what we want is an explanation of how knowledge is possible while taking into consideration the skeptics’ charge of assumptions, circularity, and infinite regress.

:smiley: The Gamer philosophy. Or deikmyne = thought experiment.

7

Whilst I would like to post something half decent on this thread, I will instead content myself with contributing my ‘Five Maxims on Skepticism’.

No. 1 - Skepticism is for stupidheads.
No. 2 - Skepticism is for stupidheads.
No. 3 - Gamer is über, but GCT is überer.
No. 4 - The Chronicles of Narnia are fucking awesome.
No. 5 - C.S. Lewis is a wanker.
No. 6 - ‘Romanticism was a breed of Enlightenment Rationalism, because it perpetuated the schema of rigid distinction between mythos and logos, only reversing its values.’ - There is a certain logic here which must be attended to when considering the nature of skepticism (and not just skepticism!) Have you read any Hegel? He is a fucking abomination - (and that’s why we love him, btw.)

Regards,

James

p.s. I am well aware that there are six maxims. :sunglasses:

8

:smiley: :smiley:

Very apt. Was ist der Grund, James?

9

Well actually the German ‘Grund’ has a very rich meaning - I would definitely recommend you have a look at Heidegger’s 1955-6 lecture course; Der Satz Vom Grund - given his retentive attention to etymological and semantic nuance. The protagonist in the European tradition is undoubtedly Nietzsche though; however if you want something a little more ‘conservative’, have a look at Truth and Method by Gadamer. Gadamer is what Heidegger would have been if he hadn’t gotten caught up in his Auseinandersetzung with Nietzsche. And that Heidegger was caught up in it, to some extent, means that Foucault was as well - whereas the more comprehensive reader is probably Derrida - whose consciousness of Hegel was, compared to Foucault, I think significantly more sophisticated.

Oh and I almost forgot. Give Habermas a go as well, if you haven’t already.

Regards,

James

10

Hi to All:

For me, I can not simply dismiss the Skeptic, in part because I think he is part of me.

How I handle this situation, is to cave in. I simply say that I know nothing. However, I have formed a set of axioms. The only constraint on those axioms is that they be consistent.

Additionally, being human on occasion, I allow myself the luxury of defining some of the axioms as beliefs.

How many sins have I committed?

11

arendt:

  So then, give the devil his due. Can we not just acknowledge that for anything we believe, there is a non-zero probability that we're wrong (call it factor [i]S[/i])? What harm is in it? [i]S[/i] does not lead us to psychological doubt, I don't think- we are more than capable of [i]feeling certain [/i]of something, while being aware of the fact that it is logically possible for us to be wrong. In most cases, the doubt the skeptic conjures up isn't even really epistemic doubt- is [i]S[/i] alone enough to move from affirming a position, to affirming it's negative, or to being undecided? I don't see why it should be. Outside of mathematics, it's pretty much already acknowledged that we make decisions based on the [i]weight of evidence[/i], not on achieving perfect certainty. To move a person from a position well founded by evidence, a skeptic would have to actually build a positive case for some other position, or else actively tear down the supporting evidence for the original position- the first is hardly skepticism, and the second is impossible without affirming [i]something[/i].
12

Ed, you’re home free. There is something to be said about our sense of entitlement to knowledge: it is sort of like an elevated position, I think. Something we value because it sounds positive, because it is like a privileged position in which truth is the currency stamped with the word “Reliable 100%”. Like 100% silk or 24 carat gold.

:smiley: Skeptics are not out to discriminate between sinners, losers, saints, and winners.

Ucci, you just pointed out something I wanted to add to my earlier post. The radical skepticism targets our epistemic claims—hence, it is not psychological doubt that they are trying to imbue. In fact, I think they’d be more than willing to allow us this everyday psychological claim that you “know”, for instance that the person sleeping in the bedroom is your girlfriend: it is not necessary that you justify each time you refer to your girlfriend as your girlfriend. That we have a sense of entitlement that we know many things in our everyday encounter with the world is allowed.

Their charge is much more serious. That is, if we really value “knowledge” with truth-content and truth-connection as outlined, for example, in JTB, then we are indeed in trouble of just blowing air if we claim what is the case, if we claim we know something that exactly fits the world, because to the skeptics, our knowing is always mediated. This is where their argument takes off: sense-perception and experiencing the world is always something mediated by something else. This intermediary is the source of false sense of seeing the world as it really is. So, we talk about what we think we know using arguments whose premises are just beliefs from further beliefs. We are making connections between beliefs, but not between beliefs and the actual, objective reality.

So, it is an epistemic problem.

Okay, about certainty: I will address why it is not the issue here. Certainty only becomes a problem in the standards of analysis of what constitute knowledge and what is merely belief. Some conception of knowledge requires absolute certainty. Others, like the fallibilists, incorporate error and truth-tracking in their idea of “knowledge”, meaning, we know something for now until we acquire new evidence that says otherwise. At least with the subject of being certain, there is still a possibility of saying that “we know” with much epistemic force.

The problem that the radical skeptics are pointing out is, knowledge is not possible because we cannot make that direct connection between what is the case in the world and the belief we form of it. In fact, even they would grant us uncertainty if connection is not the problem, but according to them, we can’t make this connection at all.

13

arendt:

Ok. So looking at the epistemic side of things, what is it the skeptic is denying us? Now, I don't adhere to the JTB model, I find the Gettier problems quite convincing that there needs to be more. By Justified True Belief is still a nice thing to have. :slight_smile: 
 The idea that our knowing is mediated has it's root in the 'fact' that what we are aware of are not things in themselves, but only our ideas of them, or the impressions they make in the mind. That's where the seperation you talk about comes from- but I don't think it's a fair request. The only way for that seperation to be gone would be if everything was literally part of my mind at every moment- so there was no relying on sense, and no relying on memory. In other words, I see no useful way to define 'certainty'. It was a straw-man right from the start. That a skeptic denies us this certainty means very little. 

  Well, why not? Other than the crazy standard I set above, where to know a tree is to have one's mind be the tree, it seems 'directness' is a rather flexible term. That I am appeared-to treely, and at once believe that I am seeing a tree is [i]very[/i] direct. It occurs without any noticeable deliberation or interpretation of sense experience. Indeed, it occurs without any seperation that I can point to at all- I would go so far as to say that being appeared to treely and believing that there is a tree in front of me is under normal conditions [i] the very same event[/i]. We tend to think of it as two things with a seperation A) because 'to believe' and 'to see' are linguistically very different terms, and B) because we've been taught to stick something called an 'idea' between the tree and our minds, as the thing we 'really' see.  
 In other words, seeing [i]is[/i] believing (not knowing). Now, the beliefs that form when we have sensations [i]can be wrong[/i]. But this is not arbitrary, constant, or expected- it is the result of special circumstances that can nearly always been accounted for after examination. Most importantly, these mistakes can be corrected [i]by other sensations. [/i] I say there is no such thing as the dark, misty 'real world' of which our minds have no grasp.
14

Ucci, you are addressing some very important and pertinent points. I really like your post. I will give my response later on tonight.

James, Thanks for the reference. :slight_smile:

15

Okay, I’m back. [Lots of interruptions over here.]

Yeah, some feel it needs some tweaking. Maybe, maybe not. But better than nothing.

Mediated in the sense that our language, concepts, sense-perception serve as sort of like screen that gets between the world and our knowing the world. Our belief/knowing, in other words, is not direct.

Yeah, you could argue, by using the traditional realism, that we do have direct access to the objective world: the unmediated, mirror-image experience. Or you could argue, with a representationalist bent, that although our belief/knowing is only mediated, we can give an account of knowledge that rests on this belief. The question is, you still need to address ( we all need to address this, insofar as we believe knowledge can be had) the three things I’ve said earlier: circularity, infinite regress of justification, and beliefs resting only on assumptions. These are the things we need to address.

(And it is not the certainty the skeptics deny, it’s the whole knowledge gig they deny.)

Okay, I’m going to drop the bombshell right now: Self or the mind is the intermediary(!). That’s right. To a representationalist the structure takes the form of a triangle. In each vertex 1) the world, 2) knowledge/belief, then 3) the self. Knowledge and the world are always mediated by the subjectivism of the mind: we read into the picture. We don’t take it in as it is. We give it description, interpretation, context, concept,etc. We are the culprit. To reach to the truth or facts or what is the case in the world, it must necessarily involve our consciousness of it. So, if there’s this separation, as you explained, it is occurring between “knowledge” and “truth, reality, the world”.

Error is not an issue to the radical skeptics. If this is only the problem, they would grant that we can have knowledge: knowledge is still possible. But error is not what is preventing them from saying, we cannot know.

EDIT:

Okay, got to make some correction in what I said earlier in my post. I said the above. I meant: sense-perception (experiencing the world) and making sense of this experience by way of language, description, etc. is always the mediating factor.

16

arendt:

Yes, it’s like certainty- JTB isn’t suffecient for the vulgar understanding of ‘knowledge’, but the difference is such a trifling thing that if a person shoots for JTB they do very well for themselves.

  I'm not sure that this is a fact in the way I'm taking you. As I said, I consider there to be nothing between sense-perception and belief, except in the case of what we could call 'complex beliefs'- you see your wife walking out of a hotel room wearing dark sunglasses in a hurry. That she is walking out of a hotel is a simple belief directly connected to the perception, a belief like that she is cheating on you would be 'complex'- at that point language and concepts jump in and mess with things.  I think you will find that in the cases of concept and language adjusting our beliefs, that always comes upon [i]reflection[/i], not sense experience. 

Yes, definitely. I lean towards a sort of foundationalism. I call it 'developmental', untill I hear a better term. Loosely, what I believe is that at birth we are not accountable for why we believe the things we do- we are creatures of instinct. We reach a intellectual maturity sooner or later, though, when it is incumbent upon us to examine what we believe. Through childhood, we reach this point with a full, healthy set of beliefs [i]already ingrained[/i], including metaphysical beliefs like that there is a physical world, that other people have minds similar to our own, and so on. 
When we start to think critically, what we do is essentially see which of our 'starting beliefs' ought to be rejected, now that we're capable of thinking for ourselves. We continue to believe those things for which we either find support, or those we find no reason to question.  From this perspective, if the skeptic asks you "Why do you believe in a material world," the best answer, and in fact the [i]true[/i] answer, is "I always have. Why shouldn't I?"

I half-agree with this. I think that for all or for most of us, sense-data and the beliefs that arise from it come to us direct and unmolested by subjectivism. I do agree, though, that subjectivism can reinterpret these beliefs very easily and very quickly. There is little practical difference between what you say above and what I say here, except that I want to point out that subjectivism is not an impervious barrier between us an reality- it is something that can be overcome with various degrees of success through disciplined thinking. In other words, you say the natural state of man is to get the wrong data because of subjectivism. I say the natural state of man is to get the right data, and reflect upon it poorly due to subjectivism.

17

arendt

knowledge is personal knowledge. when we speak, we just omit the ‘I’

for the sentence,

‘the sky is blue’

is really in the form

‘I see’ ‘the sky is blue’

‘Nietzsche was a lunatic’

is really in the form

‘I think’ ‘Nietzsche was a lunatic’.

The skeptics play on the uncertain. that we are uncertain about ourselves. we lack confidence. skeptics introduce uncertainty in us, so we doubt.

the explanation I give is because ‘I feel like it’. or ‘because I said so’. when a skeptic ask ‘why do you do this’, I retort with, ‘why don’t I do this?’ essentially, a skeptic is just as vulnerable to skepticism as his intended victim. why not make a skeptic doubt skepticism? make a skeptic skeptical about skepticism.

all the skeptics have is tricks, and I see through them all. for I once was a skeptic myself.

18

Pinnacle, this is what Ucci asks. I’m going to explain what these skeptics are denying us. Hopefully you get the sense of what they mean.

As I said before, we are talking about radical skepticism in the epistemic sense, not the psychological sense. “Certainty” is not what they take issue with. Because if it’s only certainty, then knowledge is still possible, isn’t it? But what they’re saying is, we cannot have this knowledge at all. You know—“at all”. Because to them, the truth-content of knowledge lies in the way the world is. But since we can only have mediated belief of the world due to our constitution: that is, we can only make sense of the world by describing it or interpreting what we perceive through our senses and applying our concepts to this experience, then there is no way knowledge actually contains “truth” or “what is the case” in the world. It is all about what we say about what we previously said but we have not really said anything “true” to qualify it as knowledge.

Now, if you say “knowledge is personal”—then, I take it to mean, you agree with the skeptics that what you normally call “knowledge” is really not in the epistemic sense, but rather in the ordinary sense. “I know where the store is”. “I know the streets in Venice”. “I know who my parents are”.

And yeah, your response to the skeptical question does not negate what the skeptics are saying. In fact, that is exactly what they want you to say and admit.

Ucci,

I will respond to your last post tomorrow.

19

And here now, I will take temporarily the skeptical stance to show, hopefully, what the epistemic skepticism means and how it attacks your “knowing”:

You say your wife is walking out of a hotel room wearing dark sunglasses in a hurry. I (the skeptic) ask you: How do you know it is your wife? You say: I see her. It’s her. She is wearing the dress she bought last month. I recognize it.

At this point, I got you where I wanted you to be so I could attack your reasoning. When you say your wife is walking out of the motel room----you are actually saying “I see my wife walking out of the hotel room.” And if I ask you, how do you know it is your wife and the dress she bought last month?” You say, “Because I see her. I saw the dress when she bought it, and now I see her wearing it.”

Guess what fallacious reasoning this shows: the assumption (foundationalist belief) in sense-perception is the actual fit of what is the case; and the circularity of concluding you see your wife, with the premise ‘because you see your wife’. To the skeptic, you have not put any truth-content in what you’re saying about your wife walking out of the hotel room in a hurry (what is the case). You assume the sense-perception/experience, and through this, you concluded that therefore, it is your wife.

I know, I know…….this explanation would make a curmudgeon out of all of us believers in truth/the world/what is the case = sense experience. (I’m only hoping that I could faithfully interpret what the skeptics are trying to do, if not, hey, we could give it a go one more time).

[BTW, the application of concepts, language use, is all part of the whole shebang. That you are able to makes sense of the situation, describing it, interpreting it as such is the intermediary factor.]

Excellent!! THIS is what we tell the skeptics. We are not in control of what we believe. The world as we “know” it is the scripted film that we couldn’t help but make. It comes patterned, organized, meaningful, and it tell a story to us: it has to be if we want to say anything about the world at all. And of course, the skeptic once again asks: So, how does this tell me that my accusations are false? And we say, we have come up with a conception of knowledge that could admit axioms or foundational beliefs.

The epistemic attack of skepticism has nothing to do with “barriers” or hindrance that could be remedied. They are saying, we cannot make the connection at all. Whether we get the data right or wrong sometimes, oftentimes, never, occasionally is not the issue.

20

arendt

knowledge is not possible if you are not certain about it. think of Descrates doubting about everything. in the end he can not doubt he is doubting. thus he becomes certain that he exist through doubting. all he is doing is finding certainty in the uncertain.

you really ought to examine what you are saying, because if you want to understand the ‘thing in itself’, then you are really wasting your time. science at its best is a repetitive behavior, you can’t see UV light but its effect uncertain certain repeated experiences.

you are really referring to the ‘thing in itself’. which is simple nonsense. it is a mistaken concept derived from our experience with causation, more precisely the statement, ‘everything has a cause’, so you imagine your sensations are CAUSED by THINGS in themselves. but how do you know it is caused. I have solved this problem before, I say we have awareness. the question is to react to our awareness, if I point a gun at you, are you going to duck or stand still waiting for the bullet to hit you?

the essence you have to understand is that the skeptics want you to doubt!

for example, you have parents, and you know who you parents are. the skeptics would say, could it be that at birth, you got mistaken with some other baby? it is not beyond the realm of possibilities for that to occur, so you doubt. but could it also be that no mistake was made.

skeptics play on uncertainty! not knowledge, for they themselves see the world as sensations. an object meaning is a group of sensations, with top sensation, bottom sensation…

all the skeptics do is to make you doubt. and it is up to you if you are going to let that happen.