The Epistemes

Excerpt from a text on the epistemes. Wordcount says near 40,000 words, or 70 pages. Really it’s just a brief digression in the text. It was a headache chopping this into five posts with all the size and font changes in the interlinear notes. Topics include:

Pierce’s semiotics
Harman’s quaternary logic
Schelling’s tautegory and system of transcendental idealism
Grothendieck’s motivic cohomology and theory of groups
Heyting algebra
Plotinian, Pseudo-Dionysian, and Eriugenean metaphysics
Krohn-Rhodes holonomy decomposition theory
Lacanian psychoanalysis
M. Ponty’s model of the entrelacs
Kunze’s metalepsis and zairja
Mochizuki’s Inter-Universal Teichmuller Theory and Frobenioid category
And much more!

We have here a dunamis, in other words, enacted between the ‘primal wisdom’ or uranfanglich Sophe that formulates the finitizing non-identity of will turned toward itself into identity, (the identity of the human ego) [Schelling, in: “Philosophical Investigations Into the Essence of Human Freedom.” “In the divine understanding itself, however, as in primeval wisdom in which God realizes himself ideally or as an archetype (urbildlich),” … “only through division, regulation of forces and exclusion of the darkening or hindering anarchy”] and the Lossagung, [the originary ‘Loss’ of mortality] that differentiates this identity from that toward which it might be projected outwardly, in the service of whichever aim, be it good or evil,- though ultimately toward that which it might be projected infinitely, namely God, deriving for us an infinite differentiation irreducible to any series of synthetic dialectical exchanges, whose force still lies trapped, beyond the lesser differentiation of the Kantian schematism, in the ‘Unconscious of the World’. [Ibid. “The arousal of self-will occurs only so that love in man may find a material or opposition in which it may realize itself. To the extent that the selfhood is the principle of evil in its breaking away (Lossagung), the ground does indeed arouse the possible principle of evil, yet not evil itself and not for the sake of evil.”] In the Grudrib des Ganzen, Schelling tells us that, in order to emerge as real from out of the depth of an infinite productive activity, (namely, this differentiation of absolute Negativity) Being must be inhibited, must contract (tzimtzum) against the apeiron or Ein-sof, that is, a God that transcends Being itself. A truly presuppositionless philosophy, a ‘primary philosophy’, must begin in such an infinite differentiation of pure Negativity, for the way is closed via the apprehension of pure Being by infinite reflection or eidesis, [Kierkegaard’s dismantling of the Hegelian dialectic through an ironic submission of the dialectic to the dialectic reveals the impossible or ‘ineffable’ Being whose Loss no power of the human intellect can account for and recover through either the philosophical synthesis of logos or the monistic synthesis of the subject viz. the ‘modality of the knower’ prompted by the apophatic or objective negation of the known. Or. as Eriugena tells us, following Dionysus and Plotinus: “Gregory of Nyssa and Eriugena both affirm that no created essence can define itself and the limits of its own nature by itself, even endowed with reason and intellect as man is.”] as it is equally closed to us via an infinite abstraction of the Fichtean ego in pure thought or noesis, * for the faculty of Reason is not independent from language, [Hamann’s primary thesis in his Metacritique of Reason is just that: language and reason are inseparably bound up in one symbolic activity characterizing the general phenomenon of human intelligence.] such that no object of noesis might be obtained that is not limited to the symbolic registers instantiated by language, ie. no infinitely abstracted recursion from thought’s ideatum,- contrary to the hope of Cassirer’s transcendental humanism, namely the Darstellungsfunktion, by which all previously “outdated” categories of philosophy (viz. “substance”, “Being”, etc.) had been supplanted in the codification of modern science and the ‘epistemological revolution’, that is, the transition from all conceptualizations of “Being” necessarily grounded in a metaphysics to a purely lexical conceptualization of “order”, (A transition that has brought about the extinguishment of Schelling’s intellectual intuition, to be sure, and therefor philosophia proper, inasmuch as the Platonic category of “Being” simply grounds the mode of reflection in the un-representable silence of what is absent, for “Being” is absent. Cassirer, doubly mistaken, reads the account of Being as simply an archaic symbolic form utilized by philosophers of the past in the attempt to consolidate the ‘physiognomic’ flux of mythical consciousness and relocate the ground of meaning in something outside the circulus of the reflective subject, in some externality, while the Socratic-Platonic dialectic, in nearly an opposite reading, serves to abrupt the reflective subject in his conformation to the organic order of things, preventing any Grund from being obtained in the very substantive realm or “Being” implicated by subjectivity, recommitting philosophy to the very circulus by which Particular and Universal, Singularity and Continuum, Truth and Knowledge, Being and nullity, question and answer, etc. must eternally trade places in sharing the burden of man’s immanent nothingness or ‘oudeis’.) by the Leibinizian ‘syntax’ of a “language of Nature” for which all distinctions of representation can be reduced to mathematical forms and thereby divorced from the vicious circulus of reflection. [Freedom, the ‘first principle’, according to Schelling, of a new philosophy for which the question of the Good is primary to any ontology, that is, primary to any question of the True, is a principle shielded within the dark prematutinal longing of Sehnsucht whose sovereign movement, as objectless poros, instigating the birth of the drive toward knowledge which proves itself coincident with the more general drive to give birth itself, that is, the procreative drive or flight of Eros within the heart of all organic life in its emergence from unthinking matter to an ascendant bent toward the Good,- toward that in whose enunciation the object of thought rests upon the very bulwark to the fury of Nature in which God’s polynomous nullity calls to the nullified anonymity of man, and that in which the aporia of language makes itself known in the attempt to name the very nameless longing to sequester from the chain of causes some initiatory motive, to conquer the elements and bring into existence, to give form, and to create, which it itself is,- always exceeds its productive results, remaining forever unbound to them and unrestricted by them,- a principle, in Spinozist vocabulary, whose ideatum always exceeds its idea, and whose activity or conatus can therefor never be subsumed by that which it engenders, leaving open no possibility of fatally abstracting the former from the later. As Plato-Socrates explains this aporia in the Phaedrus, for philosophy to love and desire Wisdom, it must know that Wisdom is worthy of being loved and desired, that it is Good; yet, in order to recognize Wisdom as Good, philosophy must already know what the Good is, that is, philosophy must already be wise. Totality would exert itself precisely by the subsumption, to the domain of the True, of the excess or ‘remainder’ latent in all questioning of the incomprehensible ground of the first principle, a principle upon which all discourses are founded that cannot itself be founded, and leaves therefor all discourse of the Good separated from the former domain by an ‘unsurpassable gulf’. The irremediable distance of the Good provokes the errant muse of that third member of the Platonic triad to wander the unclaimed space between these two domains, namely the space of the Beautiful, which Kant understood in terms of the aesthetic faculty and its access to the appercepted unity of the supersensible ground of Nature, (Noting Donelan, in “Poetry and the Romantic Musical Aesthetic: Fichte, Schiller, Schelling, and the Systemprogramm Fragment”, we see that the German idealists, seeking to overcome the Kantian system and following Hegel’s lead, saw in this unity of the supersensible ground of Nature the basis of a new self-postulating ethics reliant upon a ‘first idea’, namely the presentation of the self to itself in absolute freedom,- the self, not as an already existent subjectivity attempting to contemplate itself, but the self presented to itself imaginatively, originating in no act of a creative subject, but originating in itself as the very act, by which such self-consciousness might precede all other deductions of a priori knowledge, constituting an intuition of the aesthetic faculty satisfying, in a reversal of terms in the series of conceptual events from which Kant’s self-consciousness emerges in recognition of the Grund of Nature as its apperception or ‘first idea’, the condition of Kant’s own ‘supersensible unity’.**) for by this same faculty, man experiences a higher species of pleasure in the movement of the Will toward the True, in the movement from the formless anarchy of freedom toward the contained genius of Form, from the temporal to the eternal, and in all such diversions by which the categorical imperative might find the beginnings of its inescapable moral compulsion. However, we see that Kant is simply enumerating the movement of Eros in several assumed guises and echoing Franz von Baader’s identification of the procreative drive with the emergence of the drive to knowledge such that, just as the instinctive movement of Eros toward its object falls to the psychoanalytic critique as merely a denial of Thanatos, or its own incomprehensible ground, we find in the Kantian conceptualization of the Beautiful only a kind of philosophizing repetition of the very same unconscious forces we had deigned to explicate in taking up the question of Reason’s tentative independence from the psychical reality of human life, from history and language, etc., and certainly nothing of their resolution or annulment,- an order of abstract knowledge that further entrenches the ‘transcendental illusion’ opposing the Intellect to a modality of sensation that is at the same time concealed in Nature’s play of shadows by a veiled apprehension that requires the Intellect to consolidate and bind multiplicity into unity so as to render clear what Nature herself cannot, namely the secret of jouissance or the ‘pleasure-principle’ by which the imperative is secured, the heart of the creative impulse animating her entire multitude and excess, (the Plotinian prohodos) her overflowing from aorgic plenitude to organismal structure, thereby paradoxically reinstating the metaphysical gambit in a disclosure of meaning whose limit is once again lost upon the threshold of articulation to the ‘transcendental illusion’, to the inexorable call of the inaugural One and unity of Spirit,- a threshold like that revealed by the approach of death or madness at the nebulous periphery of our thinking which, paraphrasing Saitya B. Das, in “Political Theology of Schelling”, instead of ‘signifying the cessation of life and thought occurring at the end of their possibility’, rather opens up life and thought to the space of ‘the unconditional which defines the tragic condition of mortals as mortals’ by the imposition of an “ineluctable law of necessity” which is also Thought’s very freedom, the ‘uber etwas hinaus wherein the immeasurable abyss of freedom is furtively glimpsed’ in the “eternity of the transient” (or still better formulated, the ‘eternity of the Beginning’, that is, the radical ceaseless interruption of finitude that draws forth all that has not become immanent to itself and ensures the infinite multiplicity and generativity of Nature in Time; see Wirth, “Schelling’s Practice of the Wild”; Extinction, P. 19.) that “suspends the sacrificial foundation” of philosophy through the derivation of a Love whose desire is not lack, but rather a mobilization of the lack intrinsic to the subject’s own nullity against the fixity of repression and the constraint of the egoic self,- a threshold that returns us to ourselves by exhausting the Form into which Thought has poured itself to learn thereby the measure of its own potency,- (by way of Depontenzierung) a threshold that, as Werner Beierwaltes elaborates concerning Plotinus and Proclus’ metaphysics of the One, “presupposes the self-unfolding of the Spirit just as it preserves and annuls it”, introducing a “degree of mediation to the unity of the Spirit”, (Note Tritten, in “Beyond Presence”, P. 49. Spirit cannot be an absolute self-mediation and simultaneously acknowledge its own content as Reason, providing no means by which to comprehend the actuality of existence within the self-positing ideality of Schelling’s negative philosophy.) “for that unity remains conscious of the differentiation of the manifold eide (Forms) through the mediating prohodos even when that differentiation is annulled”, evincing the “reflexivity of the origin that persists within itself, the origin that is reintegrated with itself after enduring the self-unfolding but that still contains within itself the multiplicity and diversity constituted by the prohodos”,- a threshold by which Beauty is herself split, through chorismos and methexis, (Pugh, “Logic and Metaphysics; Dialectic of Love: Platonism in Schiller’s Aesthetics.”, P. 93.) into her antithesis in the Sublime, calling into question the autonomy of the aesthetic faculty, and therefor, the independence of Reason from the ‘Naturzwecke’ (nature’s reasons) and ‘Naturstaat’ (state of nature) by implying a doubled teleology in which the ends of man, being the perfection of Reason, and the ends of Nature, being the perfection of aesthetic form (Beauty) in the development of organic life, whose pinnacle was reached in the human body, must be somehow conjoined in the ends of the one Good, which would fulfill them both,- something that would seem to require a ‘new mythology’ as ‘a discursive correlative of the intellektuale Anschauung’, (Balfour, in “The Rhetoric of Romantic Prophecy; Holderlin’s Moment of Truth”.) that is, a new ‘category’ of the mind capable of uniting the sensible with the intelligible and so balancing the disparate fields of theology, myth, history, physics, art, philosophy, and religion, within a singular aim, and for whose production the later, more radical Schelling, turns to art itself, with the production of the art-work standing as just such an all-encompassing category. The promulgators and enthusiasts of late German idealism, accordingly, made no firmer progress in overcoming Kant and repudiating the encroachments of Totality than did the Romantics make progress in silencing the rationalism of their forbears in the boundlessness of Nature and the ‘Infinity’ of Sehnsucht, for whom the Beautiful becomes what Schiller conceives of as a zero-condition between freedom and form, sense and reason, the ‘singularity of ethical truth’ and the ‘multiplicity of natural event’,- (George Kelly, “Hegel’s Retreat from Eleusis: Studies in Political Thought”.) “a principle that is simultaneously the root of reality and ideality” (See Manfred Frank, “Schiller’s Aesthetics between Kant and Schelling”.) within whose dialectical extremity the True and the Good share one flesh, through which alone we could make comprehensible, in keeping with the more general system of transcendental idealism, “the formulation that reason encounters itself in the other of reason”; the “absolute identity of the real and ideal, of nature and spirit”, standing as the “necessary presupposition of both relations and their play of oppositions”, and through which alone the Kantian imperative could be dispensed with through the consummating act of Reason,- a supreme act by which the philosopher, equaling the aesthetic force of the poets, both asserts the absolute identity and independence of the rational faculty, subverting the primacy of the Good, and extends the intellection of this faculty across the entire unity of the Ideas, bolstering Beauty as a kind of inductress of human nature and returning us, through this final unification, to Totality. As to the second point raised here concerning the independence of man’s rational faculty, we might critique the attempt to separate language and reason across many lines: Lacan, the conjunction of the symbolic-exchange, the hypermnemata, mimesis, etc. Suffice to say that the attempt to instrumentalize Reason and assert it as an independent faculty and sovereign primacy demands the separation of Reason from Language, which cannot be done. Due to the fact that Language implies what Vico calls the circulus of history, that is, the interpenetration of the Logos (‘Reason’) by the Mythos within time, ie. a ‘mythology,’ so we find the historical media and those varied traditions, cultural exchanges and myths out of which all language grows as Sprachbezeichnung, (This term is an appropriation from Schleiermacher indicating the very intentionality of cognitive activity as innately modified by the structure of language, concerning which Kurt Mueller-Vollmer, in “Hermeneutics Reader: Texts of the German Tradition from the Enlightenment to the Present”, tells us the following: “Man, the linguistic being, can be seen as the place where language articulates itself in each speech act and where each spoken utterance can be understood in relation to the totality of language. But man is also a constantly evolving mind and his speaking can only be understood as a moment in his mental life.”) out of which all language springs forth from the very kind of ‘lived experience’ or a ‘moment of our mental life’ the philosopher would deem an arbitrary datum and aim to extract from the Idea, (Minutiae of the sensible world that Hamann would call ‘Aesopic reflections of the passions and symbols of Nature that might better instruct you’.) takes shapes and evolves in subjection to the dreaded play of Time, of imperfect change, of mutability- so we find all of these things to be equally conjoined with Reason and implicated in all its activity. For Hamann, the mytho-logos reaches its historal apex in the figure of the CHRISTUS, such that the very telos of Reason is recapitulated in the derivation of the embodied Word of God, a teleological undercurrent that the trained ‘Sybil’ might read in both the ‘poetic shards’ of the Natural world as well as the potsherds of History, both offering a ‘concealed book’ to the Philosopher in which to decipher the ‘apocalypse’ of Reason, like Adam, by means of ‘images’, and thereby ‘prophesize from bones’.] Thus, the true Text, which we might readily distinguish from the mere book, or the genuine mystery rites, as opposed to the dissimulations and crowd-pleasing shows of the Ὀρφεοτελεσταί, seek an emulation of the ineffable One through the ‘written silence’ of the philosophers, engaged as they are in an ethical commitment to a ‘Good beyond Being’, that is, the “ethical challenge of the incommunicable”, about which nothing at all can be said, as the true Good surpasses the limits of our cognitive order,- [Nicholas Banner, “Philosophic Silence and the ‘One’ in Plotinus”: “Philostratus attributes a kind of discursive silence to the ancient Pythagoreans in his Life of Apollonius: they understood that to keep silence is also to speak.”] a silence whose positive articulation, as opposed to the merely negative or apophatic, [Contra the ‘Socratic’ silence of Hamann. W.M. Alexander, Johann Georg Hamann; Philosophy and Faith: “On the one hand philosophy is given no autonomous status, nor any privileged or definitive position so that it could become, for example, the “prolegomena” to theology- because all philosophies harbor alien deities.” … “To demonstrate that God exists and to demonstrate that He does not exist are two versions of the same joke. Philosophy cannot demonstrate God …”] depends upon a new discourse grounded in a higher metaphysical Negativity than that disclosed by the “aporia inherent in language”, 1 as Levinas had sought in an infinite differentiation of Infinity and Being upon which to ground what he explicitly frames as a post-metaphysics revival of metaphysics for which ethics itself should be elevated to the status of a ‘primary philosophy’.
[size=85]* This use of eidesis and noesis calls to mind, on the one hand, the circular argument of the Descartean cogito in Reflection, (as a general theory of consciousness) and, on the other, the argument of the ‘purely deductive’ counter-Descartean, Leibnizian theory of consciousness as Representation. While no more complete than the Descartean theory of consciousness, the advantage here is we are permitted to describe an entire hierarchical chain of consciousnesses, inasmuch as human consciousness, infinitely ascending itself in recursive self-reflection, can represent its own representations,- indeed this metarepresentation of our own heuristic programmatics and underlying psychological apparatus is one of the basic elements of philosophy, while a lower mammal might only be capable of representing sensory stimuli for the purposes of formulating very rudimentary predictions in the negotiation of its environment, and a plant, being even lower in our hierarchy, capable of even less fidelity in representation, though enough at least to respond to chemical signals geotropically and phototropically, etc. Because a poppy seed will not sprout until it has been over-wintered, the fact that it hasn’t sprouted amounts to a representation of the fact that such a condition has not been obtained. In this way, a panpsychicist implication can be posited, in that even piezoelectric quartz is capable of representing a change in current, therefor possessing some minimal ‘consciousness’.

** The originary “I” as unconditioned absolute, known only through the intellectual intuition and approached by no procedure whose activity consists in merely amassing disjunctive facts,- or, recalling the Phaedrus, the “I” as no material determined by form, and yet neither a form determined by material. Because materiality can only be grasped by consciousness through a formal determination of its content, grounded in Kant’s schematic apperception, and yet form cannot be posited without an object, that is, material, we see that the emergence of the “I”, for Schelling, occurs within a ‘magic circle’ of Thought, whereby Thought appears to itself without any mediation by either Form or Material, but only through a transcendental recursive self-reference to itself whose circulus extends ad infinitum toward the auton or supersensible "I’ of God (the ideal ego) such that all determinate positing, having been excluded from the ‘magic circle’ founded in self-referentiality, serves as a self-limitation of the infinite and the production of finitary matter through the exhaustion of all conditioned determination by the Form of the unconditional. The ‘ontic closure of the ideal ego’ demands the conceptualization of some means of self-mediation by which the unconditional disrupts the circulus and allows itself to be circulated toward the conditional,- a “degree of mediation to the unity of Spirit” in the Plotinian language of divine emanation from the One, by which the nullification of the unity of the form of the Unconditional by the determinate form of the Conditional and the preservation of the conditioned multiplicity of material or ‘prohodos’ within the movement of the Unconditional toward itself, or the One dissolving itself in the Multiple of Nature and the Multiplicity of Nature expressing the plenitude of the Absolute One as mone or return, can be doubly maintained by something Schelling called ‘transcendental imagination’, a mode of connection or ‘epistrophe’ by means of which the One generates productive finitude or multiplicity through self-mediation of its own Unity, (the I is I) this constituting the self-referential circulus through which, by excluding itself from itself, (The Other is Not-I; this “other” or non-ego is what is “excluded”.) the Unconditioned generates all determinate conditioned forms (the potentially infinite list of disjunctive data the procedure of ‘thinking’ might amass; the prohodos) viz. the dark Un-grund of Being. This ‘sacrificial core’ of philosophy or “self-exclusion”,- (of a “finitizing nonidentity”) the ‘agapeic transformation’ of the paradoxical One, or “the impossibility of God’s returning to himself”, as I have elsewhere noted,- is precisely the root of the epistemes in pure Negativity. Just as the transcendental auton or “I” can be known only imaginatively through self-mediation, no object can be discovered for this “I” to derive multiplicity out of unity, or material existence from the infinite, save through self-exclusion of the I from its own circulation in the unconditional toward the conditional, this representing the self-sacrifice of God or divine tzimtzum in the creation of the World. (The Kabbalistic model of God positions God as primordial apeiron, a God higher than Being itself,- a God which must be ironically contracted before it can appear within the world of Being, moving from undiluted light or zohar into the partial light filtered out of Kether toward the World and so restricted by what it is not, this ‘what it is not’ indicating precisely “Being”. The infinite creative productivity of God must be passively inhibited in this way before any determinate form can inhere multiplicity and so eventuate an originary atomic existence that can later be unfolded into more and more complicated forms from out of an initial ‘gene’, a dyad constituted by the opposing elements of ‘Being’ and ‘Not Being’ implicated in the movement of God, that is, the elements of ‘God’ and what God ‘is not’.) If philosophy is to be anything, and if it is to address the question of Being and the question of its own origin, it must be a repetition of this divine act or sacrifice. Because there is nothing the ‘transcendental I’ can be excluded from, (for, if there were something from which it could be excluded, it would no longer transcend it, and it would therefor not be Absolute) this nullity or ‘nonidentity’ becomes a condition of the I’s otherwise unconditional positing, thereby limiting the illimitable and closing the circulus of the absolute I, converting this nothingness into a ‘something’, the self-mediation of the Unity of the One into a mediated Multiplicity, and Form into determinate Material or Being,- a ‘Being’ by means of which the I discovers an object for its own formal determination, that is, an object outside of its circulus or the ‘absconditus’, and through its self-presentation unfolds what Plotinus calls the ‘primordial dyad’ from which the form of all possible finite conditioned determinations, viz. the mathematical continuum, might be further unfolded.

  1. Consider the fact that all thought, as symbolic representation, takes place within a language,- language indicating no particular human tongue, but only the ascriptive externalization into signs (visibly encoded by letters, or audibly projected with phonemes) of an inscriptive process; to imagine a beginning without any presupposition, that is, without time or space,- a true origin of the universe, of Being itself, and an origination for which none of these can serve as suppositional logica, you would be imagining a beginning before which not even thought itself exists, and therefor, a beginning for which the very language in which thought could possibly occur does not exist: you are imagining a pure, ultimately internalized, inscriptive process, for at this point the very thought you have arrived upon defies the very language in which you have conjured it for yourself,- a total inwardness in other words, given the fact that this inscriptive process is that which gives rise to all internal reality, to thought, to egoic consciousness in our peculiar neural configuration, as human beings-- you are imagining a pure inscription of consciousness itself at this stage in your reconstruction of the creation of the world,- consciousness without thought, object, perception, etc., or any possible ascription- the ‘ideal ego’. Because this imagination you have attempted to conduct cannot itself occur outside of language, there remains only what Schelling called das Verstummen, the ‘growing silent’ that the helplessness and faint audibility (Kaumvernehmlichkeit) of mortal, human language really seeks to approach- our ‘exigency’, for that inscription of an ultimately finitary, self-enclosed and irretrievably internalized, negative consciousness, (finitizing nonidentity) without feature or object, that is, the ‘ideal ego’ that you have accidentally produced by attempting to conceive the true Beginning of things, the origin of the Universe of Being- this is the ‘Night of the World’, the silence of God. In so many words, when you attempt to think ‘the beginning’ of Being, the origin of the universe, of reality, you arrive at this aporia of thought itself, the foundational aporia of philosophy, or what Plato and Aristotle called thaumazein or wonder, which they told us was in fact the beginning of all philosophy. Philosophy, when it tries to think the beginning of itself, when it tries to find its own origin, must first find the origin of Being; but when philosophy attempts to think the origin of Being, it discovers only this aporia, that it must first have thought its own origin, and then proceeds the ‘vicious circle’ of reason back and forth ad infinitum, leaving only das Verstummen, the growing silent before the ineffable,- the irretrievable inscription upon which all ascription rests. The metaphysical ascriptions of Being (time, space, etc.) lay the framework within which interactions can take place between particular beings,- it rests in what Heidegger would call the ontic, while the inscriptive would roughly correspond to the ontological, with the point here being that this aporia leads to an ontic closure of the ideal ego, (By this closure, I mean to say that, in thinking the beginning of Being, thought reveals its own ontological core to be a pure negativity, that is, something devoid of ontic reality, or any ‘being’ of its own that could potentially interact with other beings, implying, for example, that consciousness cannot be traced to cause-effect correlates with actual brain tissue and neural activity, for again, at the level of the ontic, its own being has no way of interacting with other beings.) and thus an ontological differentiation for which no interactions can take place at the level of the ontic, (rendering the attempt of Dasein to take up its own origins impossible, nullified, negated; contra Heidegger. My own conceptualization of the ‘ideal ego’ is, more or less, simply this nullified Dasein) and thus a differentiation of pure negativity, a ‘finitizing nonidentity’. All ascription, all language, is haunted by this irretrievable loss of Being, which leaves voids or gaps behind in all symbolic construction; a negative core that remains, carrying forth the ‘ethical tears’ characteristic of philosophy.[/size]

It would serve well to here digress upon a few of our themes, namely the epistemes, and the concept of the zairja. Where the logic of computation amounts to a linear algorithmic transformation of one form of information into another, like the conversion of the result of Boolean calculations into the position of pixels on a screen forming the images of a video game, the logic of the zairja connects local processes to extra-local ones, decoding the linear data-stream driven by an incontrovertible clock-cycle into a parallel network driven by stochastic events. The zairja’s ultimate application is in the kabbalistic dream of metalepsis, that is, the act of connecting all knowledge to all other knowledge, all forms of information to all other forms of information.

The goal of Schelling’s system and the zairja is the same despite their apparent conceptual distance, considered both philosophically and historically. Their shared goal is to utilize the unconscious principle of Freedom, the activated vital impulse or ‘chaos’ of the inorganic, to set the system of reason into motion, [Through the zairja, this amounts to the incorporation of aleatory techne in the production of thought from non-thought. More precisely, we have images of the Judwalis dancers echoing the movement of the stars in Yeats’ account, or extensive diagrams plotted by the Arabic sages in the sand, by which the resonance of the stars and planets was plotted upon the microcosm, and through whose mapped trajectories ideas were cross-pollinated across multiple domains, be it medicine, philosophy, prophecy, mathematics, theology, etc., that is, all forms of knowledge in the scala ad gradum between the earth and the stars, in the attempt to reveal their hidden symmetries through ‘anamorphosis’, accomplishing a metalepsis, that is, an ‘entrelacs’ or entermeshing of things whereby the structure(s) of the inter-relating, dialectically interpolated upon the things themselves,- rendering their inner forms cognizable as what Harman would call secret essences,- becomes a means of thinking or ‘productive semiosis’ whose mimetically proliferated stochastic resonance or white-noise might amplify the otherwise inaudible signals of all that has been trapped in the ambient background, excavating nullified anonymities from the polynomous nullity of the divine ‘absconditus’. What is of account is the means of this interpolating dialectic.] that is, philosophy, without subsuming freedom to any category within it and so neutralizing its actual potency, such that the dialectical interpolation of the thinker and his own thought (‘metalepsis’) provides, through the manifestation of ‘reversed predication’, (By this we mean to indicate a reversal of the thinker and thought, of the ideatum never perfectly commensurate with its idea and the idea that necessarily exceeds its ideatum; a reversal of ‘pre-reflective unity’ and post-reflective multiplicity’; a reversal by means of which the traditional schema underlying both Hegelian and Fichtean synthesis is necessarily inverted with the admission of Schelling’s ‘impossible Real’ to stand in for a symbolic gap, a pure negativity through which the subject and object, self and world, etc. are infinitely differentiated, preserving between them, for the betterment of our philosophy, what Harman calls the ‘tragic force of opposition’,- a force sublated and nullifed by the ternary universe of synthetic logic,- a force preserved here, in opposition to the attempted synthesis of the Real * or a ‘third universe’, from an absolute subjectivity equivocating subject and object in the movement of Absolute Spirit a la. Hegel’s Geist.) the very ‘obscurity’ within which the unconscious principle is to be protected, as ‘intellectual intuition’, from absorption into the Idea, and through which the machinic logic, infinite semioses and linear flows of accelerating capital (the proliferation of a ‘free mimesis’ toward an ‘intensive-zero’ for the Landian, or ‘unlimited semiosis’ for the Lacanian) are to be decoded, (or ‘reverse-computed’; an ‘intensive zero’ would constitute the prophesized Bataillean apocalypse of an ultimately decoded machinic productivity, the final reverberation of the ‘missing third’ needed to fatally crash the System, the object of accelerationist critique, vis. the pure materiality of an apotheosized end of Capital) namely through a process of ‘continuous interruption’ (by what later psychoanalysis will come to refer to as a ‘death-drive’, or the Lacanians, a ‘symbolic gap’; an element of resistance by which the necessary delay is introduced through which all other drives can be organized as a ‘discourse of the Other’, of course leaving the human ego behind, not as a self properly speaking, but only the productivity of a kind of symbolic gap across which the metonym substitutes part for whole) through which organic Being distinguishes itself as life by reproducing a certain determinate content in accordance to its own concept or ‘form’, (Note that both accelerationists and to a lesser extent the Lacanians, hailing the ultimate victory of the death-drive over Eros or a kind of thanato-gnosis obliterating subjectivity from within, or the victory of what Schelling would call the aorgic over the organic, reject such a form, that is, a hypomnema, or a form which Yeats, noting the Gyraldian spirograms, calls a specifically mathematical form capturing the fundamental movement of Mind interpolated upon its own object; in their programme, all such forms, ‘organisms’, or ‘concepts’ are to be decoded until an ontological minima of differentiation is attained, a pure self-sublimed transcendental materiality whose apocalypse will bring about the eventuation of, in Deleuzian terms, endless independently productive semioses) effectively escaping discourse (through the ‘ideogrammatic loop’) from within and returning thought to the pre-Symbolic Real in which it was first enunciated as a daemonic confrontation and experimentation with the unconscious, a kind of divination,- an ecstatic prophesizing known to Plato-Socrates and many of the ancients.
[size=85]* Of this reversal, recall what had been described earlier as " … a reversal of terms in the series of conceptual events from which Kant’s self-consciousness emerges in recognition of the Grund of Nature as its apperception or ‘first idea’, the condition of Kant’s own ‘supersensible unity’."[/size]

Pierce details ten typological classes of signs based on three combinations of three terms in his “Nomenclature and Divisions of Triadic Relations”. This geometry can be directly adapted to the epistemes and the three dialectical triads associated with them, mapping the one scheme to the other 1-to-1. In the four-part logic of the epistemes, this ‘pre-symbolic Real’ would constitute the ‘finitizing non-identity’ of a ‘silent’ or fourth episteme, a kind of semiotic interruption of the three dialectical triads of either the inner or outer dialectic, whose internal geometry, following Pierce, can be arranged to reveal a 10-part typology, collapsible to a four-part schematic representing independent levels of abstraction through which a kind of ‘semiogenetic loop’ perpetuates itself by endless iterations of interacting trichotomies. The three active epistemes, ie. ontic, immanent, and transcendent, mark three typological classifications, that is, a trichotomy, each containing three elements of a dialectical triad, of which there are three in each of the two dialectics. Considering the outer dialectic, at the level of the ontic episteme we have 1) prohodos, epistrophe, mone, recovered from Plotinus; at the immanent, we have 2) comparatio, remotio, excessus, recovered from Augustine; at the transcendent, we have 3) lepsis, methexis, ektheosis, recovered from Pseudo-Dionysius and Eriugena. The three dialectical triads, excavated from their respective philosophical systems, express a corresponding semiotic pattern replicated at three different levels of abstraction; prohodos, comparatio, and the lepsis represent a stable or ‘complete’ semiogenetic loop through the three epistemes, as does epistrophe, remotio, and methexis, and finally mone, excessus, ektheosis. Arranging these nine typological entities into the ten trichotomies of Pierce’s inverted pyramid or what he calls the ‘cenopythagorean categories’ so as to reveal the ‘pre-symbolic’ interruption of the triads (culminating in ektheosis–mone) and their ‘global’ four-part schema, (a tetrapole or, appropriating Merleau-Ponty’s term and shifting our analysis to the intrinsic, ‘local’ dynamics of each of these four levels, an ‘entrelacs’ divided or, using mathematical terms, ‘canonically split’ by a ‘chiasmus’) we have:

(Prohodos) | Prohodos | Prohodos | ([Mone])

| Comparatio | Comparatio | Excessus | Excessus |

([Ektheosis]) | Lepsis | Lepsis | (Lepsis)

                                                          [i][b]The transcendent episteme, the 'third'.  [/b][/i]

(Prohodos) | Prohodos | (Epistrophe)

| Comparatio | Remotio | Excessus |

(Methexis) | Lepsis | (Lepsis)

                                                         [i][b]The immanent episteme. Pierce's 'second.'

[/b][/i]_______________________________________________________

(Prohodos) | (Epistrophe)

| Remotio | Remotio |

(Methexis) | (Lepsis)

                                                        [i][b]The ontic episteme. The 'first'.[/b][/i]

        Epistrophe   *

        Remotio

        Methexis                                             

[size=85]* The ‘silent’ episteme, finitizing non-identity. Here the epistrophe, the “Return” of the Remainder, exposes negativity or metaphysical absence, through remotio, to methexis, the interruption of the dialectic and a “consciousnesses infinitely suspended in an infinite object”, (Solger’s radicalization of the self-sublation of the Real) or an opening beyond what Levinas would call the Totality. Epistrophe-Remotio-Methexis is analogous to Pierce’s dicent-indexical-sinsign.
[/size]

We can abbreviate this diagrammatic by assigning letters to each member of the typology, such that

Prohodos, epistrophe, mone:
A, B, C.
Comparatio, remotio, excessus:
D, E, F.
Lepis, methexis, ektheosis:
G, H, I.

So that our model becomes:

[i][b]A A A C The transcendent.
D D F F
I G G G

A A B The Immanent.
D E F
H G G

  A        B                   The Ontic.
  E        E
  H       G

       B                         The 'silent' episteme. *
       E
       H   [/b][/i]

image_2022-12-17_183823541.png
The formula B-E-H, in Pierce’s pyramidal arrangement, indicates the dicent-indexical-sinsign; in the model of the epistemes, it indicates epistrophe-remotio-methexis. As the dicent-sinsign is a sign that returns, for Pierce, an index of the object, by which it is necessarily affected, (This index constitutes, for Mazzola, the basis of a ‘continuation and accumulation’, a morphism where the symbolic linkage constitutes a living movement toward the object of the Sign, serving as Chatelet’s accomplice of poetic metaphor and not merely as an insubstantial or arbitrary connexion.) so the movement of epistrophe-methexis returns (epistrophe, the return) the methexis (participation of God in the lepsis) or ‘participation’ of Presence to the site of negation or Absence, remotio. (negation, absence) This is the formula of symbolic interruption, the reassertion of the ‘tragic force’ of Negation; hence the logic of dicent-indexical-signsign is reflected in epistrophe-remotio-methexis.
[size=85]* All three typological constituents of the ‘silent’ episteme are drawn from dialectical triads involved in the internal world of the self exclusively; it is, as will be explained later, the sight of axiopoiesis, in which the subject has not yet engaged the world, as characterized by Husserlian logic. We see at the first episteme that two typologies are present, in keeping with the assertion of the binary operator: the original dyad of subject and object, being and nothingness, etc. This binary gap engages the dialectic at the second episteme, where the law of predication is implicated within the three typologies present, as per Lacanian logic and the law of excluded middle, or Lacan’s occluded truth. At the third episteme, this predicative chain is reversed as per Kunze, so that the contents within the second episteme can be interweaved with an entrelacs, from which a new identity is liberated that is freed from the linear or predicative-causal chain, following Bataille. Thus four typologies exist in this final episteme as per Harman, the quaternary logic fully developed.
[/size]

Each of the ten vertical groups represents a trichotomy, an active iteration of intermeshed or ‘interpenetrating’ dialectical triads. (The inter-penetrations themselves would become visible if one connected the terms throughout the entire diagram, ie. every A to every other A, every B to every other B, etc.) These interpenetrations are created by an entrelacs, chiasmus, etc. The four groups represent the four epistemes.

The entrelacs of these epistemes, (the four entries at the outer edges, cutting across each episteme’s typological constituents, as emphasized by enclosed parentheses) moving from the transcendent down, can be read: prohodos-mone-ektheosis-lepsis, (A, C, I, G) followed by two appearances of the identical entrelacs in the immanent and ontic episteme, this being prohodos-epistrophe-methexis-lepsis. (A, B, H, G.) In this repetition we see that the entrelacs has been dilated or extended, its chiasmus enlarged. The silent, inactive, or ‘fourth’ episteme contains no entrelacs, since it contains no semantic content, which is required to initiate an ‘interweaving’ of the signifying chain. The entrelacs becomes accessible at the second episteme in terms of the semiogenetic loop, though each of the three active epistemes contains one, since any interweaving of the signifying chain occurs at multiple abstract levels. The interweaving occurs across a chiasmus or symbolic gap in each episteme which engages the dialectic and the entrelacs divides, expressed in our diagram by the horizontal grouping in the middle of each collected episteme. For the transcendent episteme, the chiasmus is comparatio-comparatio-excessus-excessus, for the immanent it is comparatio-remotio-excessus, and for the ontic it is remotio-remotio. (Remotio-Remotio indicates a double negation, comparatio-remotio-excessus indicates a stable dialectical triad, while the chiasmus of the transcendent episteme, comparatio-comparatio-excessus-excessus, in fact replicates the four-part structure inscribed by the epistemes, in which two objects of comparatio, viz. Being and Nothingness, are associated to a status per privationem and per transcendentiam, giving us the quaternary formula we have noted before: Being per privationem, Being per transcendentiam, Nothingness per privationem, Nothingness per transcendentiam. In other words, this chiasmus within the transcendent episteme, carrying two subjects in comparatio and two objects in excessus, signifies what has elsewhere been described as the ideatum that exceeds its idea, and the idea that cannot be reduced to its ideatum.) The precise role the entrelacs plays will be elaborated on after we first analyze the role the epistemes themselves play.

Note that in Peircean semiotics the apex of the pyramidal structure ('interrupted by what would be ektheosis and mone here, depending on whether one moves from the top down on the pyramid or the reverse) results in a disjunction, confronting the mind with a singularity prompting semiotic shock, or Badiou’s ‘pure event’: the ‘dicent-indexical-sinsign’, analogous to epistrophe-remotio-methexis. The sinsign refers to this singularity as a non-linguistic event, while dicent signifies any complete qualitative expression. An indexical is a sign causally produced by its source object, but one which does not relate to it in terms of logical predication, using the terms laid out here, instead creating Merleau-Ponty’s chiasmus, or what Lacanians call a symbolic gap. Thus the complete expression dicent-indexical-sinsign is formulated by Pierce as an immediate emanation from a source object, opening up, across what Harman would call an efflorescence, a domain of accessible qualities within which the subject can sensibly cohere a new unity, that is, the indexical itself, (this ‘indexical’, in pure Lacanian terms, would in the corresponding logical schema signify the object petit a) though without standing in relationship to that object as its logical predication, therefor protecting itself both from the predicative logic driving the linear series and the reversals of the semiotic chains propagated in that series driving metalepsis, like an overheating wire exploding, liberating an excess mechanical force at the end of the corresponding system of which it is a part; one cannot reverse the series of events and reconstitute the mechanism by ‘unexploding’ the faulty wire. The zairja aims to appropriate this disjunction and the liberated excess, leveraging semiotic shock as a creative impetus, namely as a useful divergence from Totality capable of developing, through gradual iteration and magnification of otherwise inaudible divergences within System that respond to its originary interpolation as a randomization event or white-noise, the level of stochastic resonance needed for liberating new thought from linear predicative logic, from burial within the ambient signals of the unconscious background, that is, from the entropic bent against which Eros contends for primacy over the death-drive.

Where a typical philosophical abstraction or theoretical generalization implicates itself within its object through a causal relationship, ‘explaining it’, we see that the three active epistemes, like Pierce’s three cenopythagorean categories, serve as indeterminate generalizations (like the ‘probability’ of a quantum state) that, instead of being causally paired to what they would ‘explain’, are recursively read into all phenomenon through a matrix of self-interpretative abstractions (like a ‘quantum field’, continuing the former analogy) present at multiple levels within the semiotic chain until the arbitrary phenomenon upon which analysis has been directed serves to gradually render them more and more determinate, extracting their ‘visible forms’ or animus from the ‘internal’; such ideas, instead of explaining something, are themselves explained by it, and in fact by all possible things. The fact that all possible input (like the aleatoric randomizations of the zarija’s input, drawn from the movements of the stars) can serve to initiate a stochastic resonance within their matrix, and so render their inner forms visible to Mind, is what marks them as special categories within the cognitive order, or epistemes, in the first place. This super-phenomenal matrix, (note the etymology of the word matrix, a ‘womb’) within which the epistemes self-clarify and determine themselves,- and in fact determine the entire collective medium available to the human mind’s expression as an active, phenomenologically engaged presence,- is called by Pierce, the phaneron. The three epistemes interpenetrate like the symbolic registers of the Lacanian schema, yet they do so, unlike the registers, arbitrarily, thereby forming, not a ring-structure, but a nested hierarchy whose terms can be endlessly reiterated in a series of trichotomies or modulations; n+ BEH, (where ‘n’ signifies the last member of a preceding trichotomy) n+ BEG, n+ AEH, n+ BFG, etc. etc. At each level of iteration the distinctions obtained between the three epistemes in previous levels of iteration can be reincorporated into the next and further refined as what Pierce calls ‘tinctures’,- knowledge as ‘colorations’ gradually extracted and purified by a process that first defines a space of possible representations for signs, (Pierce’s ‘firstness’) and then fills this space, after implicating the logic of predication such that contrast and opposition might distinguish one sign from another in a concatenation of linguistic events or actions-reactions, (Pierce’s ‘secondness’) with locally tenable distinctions between signs that must then be globally unified, (within Pierce’s ‘thirdness’, the third episteme) along “a universal lattice of forms of reintegrating the Many into the One”, [“Zalamea, Peirce’s cenopythagorean categories, Merleau-Ponty’s chiasmatic, entrelacs and Grothendieck’s Resume”.] by reversing the logic of predication and interweaving (vis. metalepsis) the observed semiotic reactions occurring at the previous level into a new sign active within the first episteme. This same process is reiterated infinitely, producing more and more determinate knowledge from the nested trichotomies, that is, gradually enlarging the representational space or ‘matrix’ of the first episteme ad infinitum, (This space is, in Husserlian terms, an axiological space, an ‘axiopoiesis’ whereby theorein establishes the law of signification and what is excluded from it, that is, the lepsis, without actually asserting any operative signs or moving beyond the limit of the ‘interior discourse’ of the subject,- the purely leptic domain within which the boundary of the self is configured and the degree to which the ‘Other’ is allowed to enter into it is drawn. The Boolean operator of standard logic is here introduced. As we will see, the iteration of the epistemes gradually enriches this space and opens up new axiologies, non-standard logics, novel operators, etc.) gradually enlarging the semiotic chain of events within the second episteme (a ‘semasiokinetic series’ of signs upon which the apparent ‘law’ of causality operates, stretching from the emergence of Being to the end of the universe) while also interweaving them through metalepsis, and gradually cohering the multiplicity of these events into new singularities, into ‘temporally-bound phenomenon’, that is, coherent semioses or ‘meanings’ within the third or transcendental episteme whose content is detached (‘interrupted’) from the causal chain through a reversal of predication across a symbolic gap from whose depth the Schellingian Remainder cannot return as a new cause to precipitate a new event, (the omnipotence of the death-drive; the depth of Psyche thwarting the flight of Eros; the depth of the inactive, purely negative episteme, a “consciousness infinitely suspended in an infinite object”; a depth we understand to be Schelling’s God in exile,- a God buried in the Night of the World, who cannot return to the world after creating it; pure, unabsorbed negativity) producing from a revelatory aporia or moment of ‘thaumazein’ a novel ‘emanation’ of Pierce’s super-linguistic source object 1 whose recognition is staked within the first episteme,- with the ‘kingdom of the Sign’ accordingly enlarged,- only to repeat the process at another level of arbitrary iteration, cycling through the three epistemes actively participating as vocities in the dialectical triads. The signifying chain established within the second episteme, like the True-False of the Boolean operator asserted axiologically, relies upon the logic of the excluded middle, wherein meanings are horizontally linked as causal sequences within time connected by strings of binary-urs, * while the non-standard logics opened up by Pierce’s thirdness, and all such logics within the third episteme, reveal the excluded middle, not as something expunged from semiotic analysis, but merely occulted, buried in a metaphysics of absence referenced by metonyms, that is, a verticality which haunts the metaphorical constructions of all secondary-level signification,- (where isolated objects are conceived in separate geometries) just as Heyting algebra’s subobject classifiers within the elementary topos haunt the “sheaf of holomorphic functions closer to our usual geometries”,- [Ibid.] a verticality which haunts such constructions with what Merleau-Ponty calls an echo of the invisible, or a dynamic exchange between Real and Imaginary within which, through the reversal of predication at the Symbolic register, the transformation of things into their opposites across the Gap, or of causes into their effects and vice versa, can be reconstructed anamorphically, viz. a process ‘unfolded’ from ‘compressed folds of the visible into the invisible’, upsetting the ad aequatia of Signified and Signifier while recovering new creative forms from the interplay of absence with presence, for the reversal of predication opens up a site of exception or ‘clinamental divergence’ that echoes the absence of the ‘missing third’ with philosophy’s own “written silence”. According to Kunze, signifiers operate through stereognostic pairings or tesserae within the site of exception, an interpenetrating center and edge serving to focalize the conversion of one into another, propagating a resonance of the missing third until it is rendered visible. Crucially, the static ring-structure of the Lacanian registers locks the ‘occluded truth’ of the Other within an impenetrable Symbolic core which the Real cannot truly excavate through however many deflations of the primary-fantasy or Imaginary-Virtual registers, through however many masks reft from the subject in the attempt to peer beneath the ‘corpus superadditum’ [In Eriugena’s theology, gender was not differentiated until after the Fall, which introduced the law of the excluded middle and the symbolic gap necessary to distinguish cause and effect, subject and object, etc., in the movement from the first to second episteme. Eriugena’s model of immanence and transcendence interpenetrating supercausally offers a glimpse into a higher metaphysics, the reconstitution of the occluded Depth.] into the Paradisiacal, Edenic state of pre-reflective unity, just as Merleau-Ponty’s ‘hyperdialectic’ locks subjectivity within an ontology of flesh that cannot be detached from the multiplicitous sensible domain within which it is itself entrenched, within which it is itself compressed by an entrelacs and separated from the Real (the ‘pre-reflective unity’ or immediacy to which it cannot return subjectivity) by an impenetrable chiasmus, the inexorable demand of what Bloom’s revisionary calculus names the askesis; the nested hierarchy of the epistemes, on the other hand, reveals the same Depth as an accessible (if inexhaustible) medium open to the exploratory campaign of Consciousness,- as the ‘uncontained doxological presence’ of Plato whose disclosure rests upon a higher metaphysical aporia than that of language, ie. beyond the aporia of language as codified by Lacan’s symbolic register and occluded truth, beyond which he cannot admit any greater, that is, primary or ‘metaphysical’ category. This disclosure is the general subject of Levinas’ philosophy, who situates an ethics beyond ontology and opposes Infinity to Being in the attempt to articulate that super-linguistic aporia as one irreducible to any ontological categories (Heiddegger’s approach) as much as it is irreducible to the symbolic registers and to language.

[size=85]1. This source object of course refers to the “pre-symbolic Real” to which the “interruption” of the Sign returns us,-- a necessary ‘metaphysical substance’, a ‘Being’; a ‘reality’ within which Kant’s ‘empirical laws of nature’ allow for the integration of the contents of experience,- (if those laws were infinitely heterogeneous, that experiential content could not be coherently integrated; consciousness would, in a word, not be possible) our intrinsic semiotic representation,- serving as a substratum and connective medium for events within that experience, (‘semasiokinesis’) that is at the same time outside the dominion of the Sign and extrinsic to the phenomenologically coherent self. This will be elaborated on further in our discussion of Hume.

  • Elsewhere, beyond Pierce’s typology, the three epistemes have been described as a series of three semantic levels: “At the lowest level of purely syntactic information, there is no time, no structures, and the entire Universe exists as a distribution of informational atoms across an n-fold convertible, through multiple quantization of parabose tensors, into a single complex-valued truth variable devoid of intrinsic content. The interaction of objects over multiple semantic levels can only be described through temporal-binding of the inherent structural collectives within these levels, and this binding is precisely what ‘consciousness’ is.” The three levels are specifically enumerated, working from the theory of ur-alternatives:
    " Following the theory of Urs, the first three dimensions appear during the
    reconstruction of physics: ur-alternatives, then elementary particles as parabose tensors of urs,
    and finally quantum field theory, in which the particles constituted by the 2nd dimension here
    considered become merely syntactic elements within a higher semantic content,- namely, the
    semantic content given by particles which become field quanta, at the third-dimensional level. At
    this dimension, ur-collectives give way to un-readable (a la. the no-teleportation theorem)
    quantum information whose continuous-valued trajectory … on the Bloch sphere demands a
    reformulation of emergent ur-collectives as “paracomplex structures on a 2n-dimensional”
    [See: Cruceanu, Fortuny, and Gadea’s Survey on Paracomplex Geometry.] projective Hilbert space,
    that is, a correspondence of pure quantum states, by way of Hopf fibration, to spinors on Riemann’s
    extended complex plane, … "[/size]

While the 27 unique combinations can be infinitely permutated and iterated, the 10 groupings of three elements specifically noted above represent the ten active ‘intermeshings’ of the dialectical triads within the outer dialectic, the first of the two Gyraldian ‘gyres’. A mirrored structure, inverting this pyramidal arrangement and placing it underneath it, to utilize Cusanus’ diagrams, is integrated so as to include the 9 other terms within the inner dialectic, that is, the other ‘gyre’. A matrix is produced through these intermeshings, one upon which vectors can be mapped beyond the binary relationships between subjects and objects and their Boolean operators. The basis of the spirogram and Gyraldian gyres is reversal: such reversals in the sequential, binary logic of predication serve to plot spirals in this matrix, a higher-dimensional depth (the Platonic metaxy is ‘horizontal’, that is, only a ‘Boolean’ movement from Nothingness to Being, from off to on, while the daemon opens up a vertical space within which Eros continues a movement in three dimensions, an anabasis and katabasis, a movement from Becoming to Being) whereby patterns within the topographic projections can become, through iterated interruptions of their semiotic chain, increasingly ‘immanentized’, that is, ‘immanent to themselves’. The pulsation of Yeats’ twin-gyres is precisely this iteration, a continuous interruption of finitude by an infinity whereby ‘life’ or ‘organisms’ might be cohered from vortical disturbances within the vector-space gradually defining themselves against the entropic bent of the background environment. We must take into account the fact that it is not merely entropy against which organisms contend, but the inherent movement of the twin-gyre or spirogram itself toward an ultimate reversal, vis. from the One to the Multiple, from nothingness to a big bang, from antimatter to matter in baryogenesis, or in the opposing case, from existence to nothingness, whose law is primary to any merely physical law: the question is to what extent the organism can appropriate these disturbances in vector-space as force, incorporating extraneous material in conformation to their own ‘determinate forms’ through reversals at their own scale further sustaining their emergence. The movement from ektheosis to mone, through the two dislocated members in this cenopythagorean topology, represents just this fact, namely the return of an oppressed primary identity (Schelling’s remainder) as restored by a fourth, re-establishing, following the interruption of the semiotic chain or activation of the ‘death-drive’, the Lacanian metonym, whereby part is exchanged for whole and the discourse of the Other is mobilized, liberating a new identity from the site of exception, or what Bataille calls the ‘missing third’, revealing the ‘occluded truth’ of Lacan’s object petit a,- a minimal differentiation, an object whose expunction from the ‘discourse network’ triggers recognition of the truth of thanatos for the subject, the omnipotence of the death-drive, that is, recognition of his own alienation, the tragedy of the Symbolic,- a tragedy he re-enacts as a katabasis, or a submergence in and return from Hades, a la. the rites of Orpheus,- a Eurydice or Ideal-Ich, that is, the loss of a fictive displacement in whose shadow we might re-enact our own dialectical nullification and sublation to Totality * in relation to a Symbol that serves merely for a prompt Lacan says initiates for the self the ‘existential search out of abandonment’, given the fact that we cannot articulate the truth of thanatos at the level of the Real, or fully cognize it, ‘admitting it to ourselves’ as it were,- a truth only to be taken account of through an internal psycho-drama. The articulation of the self through this interrupted semiotic, through the emergence of Multiplicity from the One, and the return from the Multiple to Unity, is what is and has always been at stake. The Lacanian analytic proclaims the self to be merely a sequence of these deflations of the inner fantasy of primary-narcissism, a series of crises and fictive losses (the loss of love, place, honor, etc., all of them, no matter how inwardly profound, essentially mean nothing and serve no greater purpose in the attempted construction of identity, of a stable self) concatenated by arrangements of metonyms within time that help defer the fatal recognition by endlessly recirculating libido, holding back the ‘lacrima rerum’, such that the self amounts, through these crises, only to a means of excavating from the tragedy of the Symbolic the oppressed truth of the Other, the marginalized, etc.; a truth that can only ever be, for the Lacanian, the truth of nullification, the truth of expunction, the truth of disavowal,- a truth upon which the entire Babel of meaning collapses into shards. This ‘critical consciousness’ has given rise to what we now call identity politics, where all truth has been reduced to precisely this truth of the Other, excavated from a self-consciousness localized by accumulations of power within ‘successful identities’, be these identities racial, gendered, or even further granularized. Granted, most people amount to merely a series of deflated fantasies, yet beneath this fledgling ego there is awaiting discovery the mythopoeic forces engaged by Jung, the higher metaphysics of love reported by Ficino and Plato, etc.
[size=85]* This re-enactment of ‘dialectical nullification’ takes the form of a dialectics between ‘sharable’ and ‘non-shareable affects’, a dialectics between more and less structured modes of individuation worked out within the “group-subject”. The less-structured modes develop from what Klein would call an incomplete differentiation for which no object-relation yet stands between the ego nuclei and its objects, that is, the transubjective character of early infant experience in which the ‘archaic attachments’ exploited at the Virtual register (as Guattari’s ‘relational potential’ for new emancipatory politics, a ‘pathic subjectivization’ revealed in that domain circumvented by and previous to the formation of object-relations) are forged, and in which the feeling of the self is not disociated; the more highly structured modes develop from those contents of experience identified with an ‘assemblage’ mapped from ‘subjectivities of difference’ in the social relations,- (Drawing on Spinoza, Deleuze identifies the assemblage as the internal combinatorial potential of a body whose limits we do not know,- an immanent potential for affectivities in which the capacity for good and evil, for affecting and for being affected, etc. is contained as an excessive ‘unvordenklich’, a ‘pure concept’ that cannot be utilized as the presupposition to ground some more extended mode of representation meant to extract the contents of experience, as ideatum, into rational forms or ideas, but demand a later synthesis of their own mediated forms with that experience, or what Deleuze calls 'encounters, arrangements, and combinations"- a synthesis that amounts to a kind of ‘immanentizing’ of the body, the production of an ‘immanent plane’ upon which the ‘pure concept’ maps internal excitations of the organism, not to an external world to which these excitations are bound as corresponding stimuli, but to its own receptive organs, such that a multiplicity of internal connectivities is eventuated by philosophy, and with them, a heightening of the potential for experience itself.) an assemblage mapped from the glischroid or unitary ‘agglutinated object’ that sustains the ‘primary identity’ of the symbiotic linkage (as opposed to secondary identifications at the level of object-relations, which collectively amount to a series of deflations and metonymies) as an opening into affective difference and ontological pluralism within the group,- as a ‘symbolic consecration’ or binding “pact with the dead”, [Bleger, “Symbiosis and Ambiguity; A Psychoanalytic Study”.] that is, an invisible element of ‘uncertainty’ (the Lacanian, permanently occluded truth of the Other) within each unique cartography of an assemblage or ‘affective opening’ that, no matter how much it is shared with others, or adopted by the group, cannot be eradicated as a ‘multiplicity that deploys itself’ or sublimed by a new social unity for which preverbal intensities have been exchanged for concrete signifiers, [Bertelsen & Murphie, “An Ethics of Everyday Infinities and Powers.”] for the signs themselves erupt in precisely this ‘pathic’ subjectivity, that is, their true affective dimension, (at least in Guattari’s programme) from any merely “linguistic axiomatics” in which the psychic closure of the linkage could be discovered and this element of uncertainty (an element representing the truth of the Other necessarily banned from discourse and permanently occluded) reified by a cartography of the object-relations.
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The four levels of this classification represent the four terms of the two axes of the inner and outer dialectic: (taken together, this doubled axis denotes the ‘spirogram’) Being per privationem, Nothingness per privationem; Being per transcendentiam, Nothingness per transcendentiam. Each of these terms relates to one of the four fundamental philosophical vocities,- forms to which all philosophy across our history, from Thales to present day, can be reduced:

Finitizing nonidentity, the Epistemic. — Pure Negation, the apeiron, the Grund of Being. Nothingness per privationem.
Identifying finity, the Ontic. — The finitude that defines identity by privations and limitations from an infinitude, from what Husserl would call an ideal essence detached fully from the sensible realm, just as time is defined as a limitation of eternal endless continuation, as a subsection of a set or continuum that could be infinitely iterated. Being per transcendentiam: most philosophy prior to Hegel constitutes an ontology in this form.
Infinitizing nonidentity, the Immanent. — Bataille’s missing third; replaces the concept of ‘essence’ in the essence vs existence debate. It is revealed by the ‘clinamental divergence in the series’, that is, the ‘explosive’ interaction of two existents whose reaction overloads the System of which they are a part, disrupting totalization from within. Here we also see an “efflorescence” or infinite explosion of self-multiplying essences out of epistemological withdrawal via Harman and Morton. Nothingness per transcendentiam.
Identifying infinity, the Transcendent. — God, transcendence, the ‘Beyond Being’. The infinity that defines identity against or outside Totality ala. Levinas. The “Good” defined outside of or beyond Being and totalization. (ektheosis–mone, noted above; the ‘continuous interruption’ of finitude which gives rise to form, to the organic, in its emergence from the chaos of Nature; philosophically, the return to a pre-Symbolic real a la. Schelling’s intellectual intuition.) Being per privationem. This is the most obscure, least utilized, and least understood of all philosophical forms, seen in Levinas, Bovillus, etc., for it demands the preservation of the ‘tragic force of opposition’ inherent to the dialectical triads in their typological or ‘spirogrammatic’ arrangement.

We have already extensively dispensed with the Hegelian dialectic of Absolute Spirit, as well as its inversion by Marx, whereby the more commonplace thesis-antithesis-synthesis schema, often mistaken for something of Hegel’s own invention, (the fact that it is actually an inversion of Hegel is quite humorous) was produced as a model of blind, atheistic, and endless historical-materialist evolution. Suffice to say that the Sartrean dialectic of Being and Nothingness freezes thought in an entrenched ‘transcendental illusion’, (the illusion of such perfect abstractions, or more generally, the illusion of Reason’s independence from language, history, the phenomenological, etc.) that is, a perfect opposition which closes the dialectic to any phenomenological opening to the world, yet Merleau-Ponty’s ‘hyperdialectic’, supposedly an advancement, while incorporating a third term to the dyad in the subject’s self-consciousness of his own reification, or what he calls the subject as a ‘nothingness sunken into being’, sublates the ‘tragic force of opposition’, neutralizing philosophical thought * in a ‘latent structure of differentiation’ that cannot be detached from the sensible realm and committing the subject to the endless ‘discourse of the Other’ in which an ‘ontology of flesh’ is stitched together out of circulating Lacanian metonyms that will never prove itself potent enough to enunciate the presence of the true subject, that is, a self, such that the emergence of life, of the organism from the chaos of nature, of thought, remains unanswered, while Totality reigns. More precisely, the ideal essences reified by Wesenschau in the Husserlian phenomenology of the opening of a pure spectator to the world are instead conceived of by Merleau-Ponty as a latent or secondary differentiation, not primary essences to be rejoined by the movement of reason in the arrival of the subject to immediacy, (pre-reflective unity) such that, for him, truth must become only a kind of ‘good error’: not a self-identical presence to rediscover in pre-reflective unity, but a private disjunction or divergence, a happy, coincidental obviation from Totality,-- a privation that cannot be returned to the World, and to which we cannot return from the World. This kind of “truth”, a personal truth, the oppressed truth at the ‘site of exception’, is quite distinctly present in our modern political discourse. Seemingly stripped of all emancipatory potential and political force, Bataille hoped that the gradual accumulation of these divergences or ‘free radicals’, brought about by the asymmetry and intrinsic instabilities in all systems, (from organic systems to economic to philosophical systems, none of which can, in keeping with thermodynamic laws, be perfectly efficient, or hope to permanently hold their form against the entropic bent of this universe) will one day, following the logic of the accursed share, initiate an apocalyptic catastrophe that returns us, in the Landian view, to an ontological ground-zero,- hence the program of deliberately accelerating the development of Capital to surreptitiously undermine it. Yet, the hold of Totality has only grown more complete, and no such liberating apocalypse has been arrived at: nor will it. For, once again, it is not merely against entropy that organisms contend, but a primary metaphysical bent expressed by the spirogram.
[size=85]* The best example of the neutralization of the tragic force of opposition, as I have noted elsewhere, is Hegel’s famous ;negation of the negation’, a stage in the revelation of Geist which transforms negativity into positivity and thus extinguishes the opposition between the two, asserting synthetic logic as the primary philosophic vocity. After this, the Hegelian dialectic attempts to reconstruct the Real out of a codetermination of subject and object within the Absolute. The Marxist inversion of that dialectic sublates and neutralizes opposition in a different way of course, namely by reconfiguring the flow of history as an atheistic, continuous material evolution of mutually differentiated forces, a synthesis of primordial matter devoid of any higher metaphysical presence against which it could possibly articulate an absence, against which it could enunciate the tragic negativity that calls from the heart of Being and gives depth to the opposition, agonism, war, etc. enjoined by conscious subjectivity in the attempt to cohere the ‘organic’ out of ‘aorgic’ forces, in the attempt to overcome the omnipotence of the death-drive through the flight of Eros and so name the Other, viz. a ‘soul’.
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The expansion of a true four-part logic, like that explored by Harman, with the Pierceian trichotomy mapped to the three active epistemes constituting the triads, leaving the fourth episteme as a vocity of pure metaphysical negativity, is the crucial strategy here employed, whereby the force of opposition is preserved and Levinas’ aporia of Being and Infinity is thus recontextualized. [Note. The preservation of that force, the preservation of a philosophical negativity, was attempted by Grothendieck, who reversed the order of what Pierce would call firstness and secondness, placing secondness, the episteme within which opposition concatenates Boolean operators (binary states) as projective and injective products, into the primary category, to fill the role of the first episteme, asserting negativity as an axiological rather than epistemological reality. Though this program did not bring about any radical solution to the Lacanian psychoanalytic,- for the force of opposition is nonetheless still sublated, postponed as the ‘fatal annulment of the Law’ might be in this contorted or ‘reversed’ dialectic,- novel mathematical forms were discovered in the process, with a reconstruction of cohomology functors at the level of Pierce’s ‘firstness’, such that a new mathematics could be derived with possibly more secure foundations than that of the predominant mathematics of today, namely the mathematics of set-theory.]

In sum. At the level of the first episteme, where we establish the space of possible representation within which to organize signs, we have the first, most primitive axiology,- an atomic intrisicality or minimal-dimensional basis of emergence, a ‘dialectical gap’ that opens the Platonic synecdoche of Becoming for Being, part for whole, (metonymy) subject for object, etc. constituting time and space as such, that is, the continuous higher-dimensional expansion on whose order the logic of predication and causality appears: in so many words, we assert the Boolean operator. Something is either on or off, something exists or does not exist, something is included or excluded from the ‘law of signification’, from the domain of the Sign. This division, closure, and boundary establishes what Andrew Gibson calls “a split with the world which sustains the trace of nature as Spirit, something that ‘must be presumed real’, along with the constraints of a determinate reality”, inasmuch as it conforms to the demands of Kant’s rational faculty; a trace bringing with it a whisper of the Freedom for which Schelling had so desperately sought, indicating the ‘rational spontaneity’ of the Concept and an ‘intelligible world’ irreducible to empirical knowledge, deriving solely from man’s internal capacity to act both in accordance with physical limitations upon his organism, his ‘ideatum’, and the contents of the ‘Idea’, the one insufficient to the later a la. the ethical commitment to the impossible and the incommunicable, or Levinas’ infinity, the later exceeding and irreducible to the former. In the Husserlian phenomenology, this stage is understood as the self-inclusion of the subject as subject, that is, an inclusion which defines an interior space within which the subject has not yet engaged the world, but emerged as a spectator focalized inside of an edge, a boundary beyond whose limit the spectator/subject reifies (Wesenschau) ideal-essences detached from the sensible reality with which it later engages, these engagements constituting the properly ‘phenomenological’ as all that the subject can assimilate to and cohere within interiority, or include within the dominion of the Sign.

At the second episteme, we can begin to enclose syntactic elements within higher semantic contents; we can begin to enclose causal chains and ‘semasiokinetically’ arrange sequences of these chains through a process of local temporal-binding that implicates ‘the logic of predication’. The Humean assertion of causality as an accidental correlation of subjectively generated experiential datums that in reality corresponds to nothing more than the fortuity of nature, a convergent synthesis of the Real dependent upon no logically primary metaphysical category, is an assertion that cannot be held to, for causal events must participate in a medium of connectivity within which their sameness and difference is somehow reconciled and unified, and such a unification and connective medium can only be conceived of as the correspondence of syntactic and semantic layers within just such a logically preceding ‘metaphysical’ substance or ‘extrinsic reality’,- a correspondence appercepted by the subject in the derivation of an experientially coherent or ‘intrinsic’ domain in which the laws governing the correlations can be semiotically reconstructed by a chain of significations. The intrinsic apperception or coherence of the reality (which Hume would call entirely subjective) for which the law of causality holds demands an extrinsic medium of connection (the ‘metaphysical substance’ Hume rejects a la. “Being”) within which that law operates upon the things it coheres into causal sequences,- within which it operates upon subjectivity itself, absorbing it into the chain of significations and investing it with the necessary agency with which to exercise its own power and participate in the production of new effects as an interceding cause, or be acted upon in turn inasmuch as all datums of experience express themselves as the effects of causes working upon the nervous system. Note that Kant’s solution (with Kant at least aware of the defects in Hume) was to simply introduce a transcendental synthesis of this ‘metaphysical substance’ with the ‘schematic forms’ of Reason, thereby generating the laws of causality dialectically, namely as mere secondary products enclosed by the same limit of phenomenal appearance to which the subject and all the powers of Reason were entirely relegated, (leaving the noumena, the reality of that substance ‘in itself’, still inaccessible) though we have already addressed the problems of such a synthesis elsewhere. Though rejecting Kant’s solution for different reasons than those given in my own work, it is worth it to note that Heidegger thought it amounted to a ‘forgetfulness’ of Being, a gradual conflation of that logically primary substance with its secondary dialectical products.

Across the ‘dialectical gap’ introduced at the first episteme a later reversal of predication produces an entrelacs that interweaves semiotic reactions contained by the second episteme, where the logic of predication functions in one direction, into new tertiary singularities freed from the linear-causal or predicative chain, namely those ‘new singularities’ suggested by Bataille’s ‘missing third’ identity, thereby bringing us to the third episteme and closing the ‘semiogenetic loop’. Thus Vico, reversing the appearance of the mythos and logos in the development of consciousness, suddenly found himself able to ‘interweave’ the different stages of evolution observed at any arbitrary scale of history,- be it at the scale of a culture to that of an individual life, at the scale of a nation to that of succeeding nations, or even that of the species,- into a new ‘third identity’ he gave in his formula for the ‘imaginative universal’, a scale invariant, fractal representation or ‘global structure’ that locates myth in precisely that dynamic confluence of subjects and objects (a confluence of causes and effects, projective and injective processes, etc.; an entrelacs of interweaving predications, etc.) whose trajectory could possibly be mapped by the movement of the logos and so untangled from the ‘universal’ into some accreted material history, ie. into a history of locally distinct particulars descended out of an ageless, Platonic reality otherwise detached from the accidents of Nature and the fluxions of events. Thus, at the third episteme, we clarify the local patterns generated within the second episteme and develop locally distinct constructs within the ‘latent structure of differentiation’ arrived at by M. Ponty’s hyperdialectial subsumption of Wesenschau, such that, obviating the ‘law of excluded middle’ through a reversal of predication, we might then reunify them to develop the latent semantic content of global constructs. In this reunification of differences, of local multiplicity, the local constructs are seen as metonymic, asymptotic and transitory ‘partial gluings’, that is, objects replaced at a higher level of abstraction, in Cassirer’s vocabulary, by symbolic functions; (like the symbolic function of Lacan’s object petit a, of the metonym in general) self-sufficient substances replaced by order, physically distinct objects replaced by processes, etc. Global constructs are, in other words,- once liberated from the ‘site of exception’, projected from local ones stereognostically, while local constructs are injected into global processes and reconstructed within them anamorphically, that is, within global cohomologies engaged with the former in a correlative evolution of dynamic knowledge which Kunze understands in terms of an unlimited semiosis, a self-sustaining and autonomous metalepsis.

The reversal of predication opens up the site of exception at an ‘allegorical’ level of signification, a level of signification whose content is both ‘what it is’ and ‘what it is not’, that is both an exoteric representation or ‘formal projection’ of local structures and the parallel absent signification that content presumes, that is, the esoteric core whose determination requires hermeneutical excavation from the chain of signs through the ‘injection’ of archetypal global structures. These global constructs are later indemnified, as new axiologies, at the first episteme, granting us an answer (an ‘echo) to the ‘missing third’, that is, an echo of the Remainder,- an echo of metaphysical absence carried as the ‘truth of extinction’ by Solger’s ‘self-sublated Real’ (the ‘infinite face of the true Other’, for Levinas, which calls the subject out of itself to account for its own insufficiency, the incommensurate ethical commitment to impossibility and the ineffable, the inexorable gap or Infinity we must impossibly cross to meet their Gaze) following the symbolic interruption at the level of the third episteme. (this interruption signaling the destabilization of System implied by the missing third, for Bataille, yet also the later extension of System by a new axiology) They give us a formula for something Schelling had called the tautegory or ‘sign-symbol’ that produces itself out of its own excess, out of the very projective and injective chains of significations that it represents, asserting itself as its own object, fulfilling both signifer and signified, and grounding a new axiology which further extends Husserl’s edge and further encapsulates the possibilities of Levinas’ excessive or ‘uncontained’ doxological Presence through the force of opposition (negativity) as it is thereby preserved in the face of Absence, producing an eroticism of representation like that described in Plato’s epistle,- an aporia that both repulses and invites the grasp of reflective intelligence, a ‘lyricism’ of the ego in which the organic runs up against the aorgic forces or ‘intensities’ that both produced and dissolve it, unable to arrest and cohere them in a stable Concept or idea, (therefor generating a jouissance) and in which the aorgic exceeds and overflows the Concept as ideatum, thereby implicating the ‘semina mentes’ of the organic a la. Schelling’s ‘freedom’, that is, the flight of Eros from out of the heart of matter and an ‘intellectual intuition’ that finally registers the opening of the lepsis to methexis through a “dynamic reflection of the incomplete and fragmentary possibilities” which man experiences as ‘ethical tears’, daemonic potencies, and Stellardi’s “ensemble of non-beings”,- that is, something “radically problematic because simply posited”, “the metexic relationship which generates, out of its inexhaustible ontic resources, the epistemic consequences of the perpetual skepsis Stefanini has condensed into an erotic movement” [Fordham University Press; “Thought”, Volume 46; 1971.] like that of Rilke’s ur-groove; a movement that reverses the function of Gadamer’s Horizontverschmelzung (This hermeneutical function locates an axiopoiesis or opening of the subject to verstehen in terms of a willingness to engage in the domain of the Sign through an instrumental logical schema and integral mimesis,- a scheme that the skepsis noted here must instinctively refuse.) and activates an ‘anti-inscription’ that cleaves an unmediated space or site of exception in the mediated discourse which is always a network. This unmediated space is that in which the law of predication, that is, the Zusammenhang or inter-relationship of Nature, is suspended, such that a radical unphilosophie emerges, using Jacobi’s phrase, or a pure Negativity,- a philosophy that escapes the fate of all other philosophy in which the beginning of Reason is discovered in this original mediation of Nature,- all other philosophy in which an all-encompassing principle formalizing this inter-relationship like the Spinozist substantia is used to ground a geometrical series of fatalistic analysis as Reason pours forth its own potency into a form from which it cannot itself ever truly emerge,- into a series unfolded from this original relation through endless conditioned conditionals, determinate determinations, and what we call here predications, in which Reason enchains itself in its own productions as a causas transitorias [Spinoza’s terms, where substantia is inaccessible to those attributes which must always approach it through mediation.] for which the possibility of any transversal of the finite into the infinite (the excessus) or the infinite into the finite (remotio) is strictly rejected. We have, in a word, enlarged the representational space, moving philosophy beyond the primitive tautology of its inception, opening up, through successive ‘unveilings’ of the phaneron, new logical frameworks beyond the classical logic and Boolean operator asserted by the primitive axiology,- frameworks within which entirely novel mathematical, symbolic, and philosophical forms are to be discovered. We reiterate this same process, continuing to enlarge this space ad infinitum, as we go through an arbitrary number of permutations of the triads corresponding to the three epistemes. Local constructs, once temporally bound and syntactically organized, are encoded (by statistical induction of nerve fibers within a neural network) as an informational content that a global construct, following the symbolic interruption of the third episteme and a perturbatory ‘semiotic shock’, later decodes from the higher semantic level into a logical functor on yet more informational contents, (even on the information used to generate it) yet more local constructs, in a continuous back and forth by which raw information is transmuted into what Pasquinelli calls an encoded control logic, and in which logical functions are continuously decoded into information, the one automatically driving the other in a mimetic proliferation; a self-organizing feedback loop in which information reducible to the pure syntax of the mathematical descriptions of objects is transformed (at the semantic level) into logical functions on those objects, and in which these functions are transformed into new local variables, * (at the syntactic level) producing new ‘ideas’, new information, new representational elements, ie. new significations of objects and new objects in toto. This feedback loop is the ‘interpolating dialectic’ described in the beginning of this essay.
[size=85]* Note Zalamea, “Hugueth Drawings”, “Advances in Peircean Mathematics”; P. 197. Valero, “Gesture Theory: Topos-Theoretic Perspectives and Philosophical Framework”. Concerning this feedback process, a similar dialectical exchange is the basis of Mazzola’s musical-mathematical theory of adjunction or ‘diamond conjecture’, in which the scope of algebra is defined by discrete formulas, while topology is defined by the transformations or ‘gestures’ of category-theoretic modules over a commutative ring, such that music continuously transforms formulas into gestures, producing ephemeral acoustic events, while mathematics continuously transforms gestures into formulas, producing the static text. Gestoids extract algebraic data from gestures, while formoids extract topological data from formulas; the Yoneda-embedding encoded by pairs of adjoint functors on these gestoids and formoids would constitute a new representation or abstract category over the category of gestures, as the Frobenioid constitutes an abstract category over the category of monoids, following Mochizuki’s strategy,- a new universal category whose presheaves would form an associated set from which information encoded by the movement of the dialectic (the transformation of gesture into formula and formula into gesture) might be reconstructed, as the ellipsis of the hyperbolic curve is reconstructed from the classical deformations of the Reimann surface in Teichmuller space, which Mochizuki expands into a nested hierarchy of mathematical universes connected by Frobenius-like attachments and split by etale-like rigidities across which certain Galois groups can freely pass. However, Mazzola does not suggest, in his own pursuit of a unified theory of gesture and formula, a reconstruction like the one obtained in Mochizuki’s theory, where the indeterminacies introduced by the movement across the independent theaters or ‘mathematical universes’ are measured by the theta-function and accumulated within a log-shell analogous to the clarification of locally distinct structures and global structures, or the one obtained in Grothendieck’s own semiotic reconstruction of an abstract congruence between projective and injective norms (analogs of Mazzola’s gestoids and formoids) in terms of types and archetypes that are not reduced to a single bicategory, echoing what Schelling calls a copula that contains two categories that do not share any elements without reconciling or sublimating any of their contents in a third category, or a purely negative tertium like that of Bataille, which indicates for moral consciousness precisely that force which resists creation and we call evil,- a force which, in our attempt to subordinate it to creation and the Good, produces the very opposite of this subordination, that is, the basis of our freedom; instead, adopting a strategy analogous to that of the accelerationists, [Accelerationist philosophy identifies the discrete as ‘difference’, the continuous as ‘intensity’; ‘absolute production’ or the ‘primary process’ serves as a bilimit for the two, and thus produces a codeterminate form understood as ‘pure intensity’, using the language of category-theory and Kan-extensions. I refer here more generally to the attempt to perfectly unify the ‘discrete’ and ‘continuous’ and so self-sublime the dialectic as a “chiasm of fragmentary visions” (Pinilla, ibid.) for which the chiasmus is inhabited by the spectral junction of fibers on the imaginary register,- an entrelacs,- that is, the skeleta of higher dimensional topologies accessible to the hypergestures whose objects are at the same time the exponential factors of gestures,- a chiasm or ‘ontological flatline’ preceding the incandescence of matter or Harman’s ‘exponential’ epistemology of efflorescence and the unveiling of Land’s ‘absolute production’. This will be elaborated on in the following pages.] he imagines that the bicategory of discrete and continuous structures is captured by the action of gestures as ‘hypergestures’ on the topos, (in this bicategory, he discovers what we will continue to refer to as a ‘codeterminate form’) which for Grothendieck would constitute a 2-category defined by bilimits and pseudofunctors that must be indexed by the mysterious derivators, this final idea of the derivator having been first applied to the problem of functoriality given a cone construction with triangulated categories for which it serves as an index for all possible localizations of a category with the inclusion of homotypy bilimits, that is, what in the language of the semiogenetic loop would signify the necessary indeterminate accumulation of local structure as difference. The presheaves here signify what, for the Piercean model of knowledge, would be the contents of his first typological level, or what we call here the first ‘episteme’, containing the ‘tinctures’ that are to be slowly purified and extracted from a Grothendieck topos (extracted more precisely, from local structure whose indeterminacy and difference is accumulated and indexed by derivators) at the second typological level through iterations of the trichotomies,- from “infinite reflections of fibers over an imaginary sheaf”, [Zalamaea, ibid.] (this ‘imaginary sheaf’ signifying the 'artificial differentiation" of the Lacanian enonce and lipogram, all of which will be elaborated upon as well) “the complexity of knowledge, with all its different layers and mirrors” as defined by two basic interweavings or ‘entrelacs’, one representing “the fundamental doubling” of the fiber by a succession of endless iterations, (iterations captured by Pierce’s existential graphs and even moreso by the Heyting algebras of intuitionistic logic which, when extended to the Rieger-Nishimura lattice that will be discussed in the proceeding text, expose the epistemological limits of any bicategory or codeterminate form, such that any attempt to perfectly unify the contents of that codeterminate form are doomed, given the fact that no equivalence class can be discovered for it) and the other “some asymptotic circular curves” that “open up the modal realm where all possibilia expand the spectrum of the continuum”, (as Mochizuki expands the hyperbolic curve into multiple independent nested mathematical universes or ‘theaters’) to finally be reconstructed algebraically out of the properties of the classifier object in the sheaf topos, or out of the contents of a log-shell dropped from the number-field and sublated within the Hodge-theater for Mochizuki, at the third typological level.

Note that Grothendieck’s 2-category moves beyond the category of point-sets grounded on the axiom of choice and involves both categorical equivalences extended to representation theory and natural transformations extended to geometry,- or something Grothendieck called n-groups, these indicating a homotypy encapsulating the Prostinikov tower up to infinity for every topological space whose construction requires recursive Serre spectral sequencing, complex manifolds and sheaf cohomology, etc., or more generally, mappings of class groups in higher dimensions which are increasingly difficult to synthesize, moving up from 2-groups through infrastructure supplied by the Lefschetz fibration, Kirby calculus, handlebody decompositions, and so on,- such that, as is admitted in “Gesture Theory: Topos-Theoretic Perspectives and Philosophical Framework”, bilimits for these finite types are needed for the computation of a fibered byproduct of the Grothendieck topoi,- a computation representing the dialectical movement between the discrete and continuous-valued variable. This byproduct forms a residue called a locale, which emerges from the opens of a topological space in the form of a lattice for Grothendieck and encodes this implicit movement as the morphism of a topological category,- a morphism which Mazzola attempts to compute by infinitely factorizing it, which would give him his codeterminate form, the bicategory of gestures. Again, this is a doomed attempt, given the fact that Grothendieck’s topos is endowed with an intrinsic content manufactured by coverings on a category-object with morphisms whose codomain is that object, (Mochizuki obtains an analog of such coverings on his reconstruction results with Galois groups) while Mazzola’s bicategory, as tacitly admitted in Valero’s text, has no intrinsic content; intrinsic content like that contained, if one desires another example, in a circle K bounding a disk M, where the holonomy of the circle is the exponent of the integral of curvature over M, such that the indeterminacy introduced in the logarithm can be quickly eliminated by tracing the connection of a path-ordered exponential given the fact that the integral of the curvature varies smoothly and permits us to translate that variation, viz. the parallel transport of a 1-dimension manifold, into a continuous deformation on the disk up to a point for which the integral of curvature is known to be zero, generating a p-form vector which permits us to take an exterior covariant derivative, that is, a derivative that takes not not only its tensor but also the product rule applied to its basis, ie. the exterior covariant,- a fact more generally understood by the nonabelian Stokes theorem for principal bundles with nonabelian structure groups. At any rate, this infinite factorization ignores the epistemological limits on categorical equivalences exposed by the Heyting algebra we have noted earlier and attempts to reproduce what Landian accelerationism calls the ‘pure intrinsity’ of ‘absolute production’, a hyperdialectic that conflates its own discrete and continuous categories (the bilimit for Land’s categories of ‘intensity’ and ‘difference’ is just this ‘absolute production’) and abnegates its own philosophical register, as we will see later. Mazzola, however, continues to develop his hyperdialectic as a proper extension of Grothendieck’s topology and Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology, however mistaken it is, in parallel to accelerationism’s own hyperdialectic given to us in the formula of absolute production. We will make frequent comparisons of the two projects throughout this text.

The dialectical interpolation noted in this essay and explicitly invoked in the last section constructs discrete information from continuous functions, continuous functions from discrete information; discrete logic from mathematics or a continuous ‘pure syntax’, and mathematics from a discrete logic, etc. The attempt to ground mathematics in a pure symbolic logic as per Russel and Whitehead was of course doomed to failure, for it would require the cessation of this continuous movement from one to the other term of the dialectic, that is, this interpolation, though we see that the search for foundations was entirely abandoned with the development of set-theory, the hyperdialectic of bicategories employed by Mazzola, etc. Here we arrive at the fundamental issue of the ‘bicategory’ utilized by this hyperdialectic, where the process of interpolation is self-sublimed. Categories are defined axiomatically, that is, from axioms whose corresponding theorems can be deduced by any given extrinsic system of logic with which the category is deployed. In the bicategory, however, one has access only to the objects of hypergestures understood to be the multi-dimensional constructions of gestures and the operations that transform those gestures, (any extrinsic logical system has been decoded into gestures, pseudofunctors, and limits, that is to say, abandoned) such that the truth of a proposition concerning such bicategories is loosened to abduction, depending now only on our ability to construct a theorem that attests to or confirms the existence of these transformative operations on the topos, or what Pierce calls an existential graph. The operations that transform and manipulate such bicategories, in other words, encode the very logic that extends our methods of reasoning about them, recalling once more the automation of reason discussed by Pasquinelli, where the neural algorithms that extract information from raw data produce at the same time those logical forms which, when synthesized with that data, supply new algorithms for extracting still more information at higher and higher resolution, in a continuously productive, accelerating feedback. The hyperdialectical sublimation of this feedback entirely reduces knowledge to process, in Cassirer’s terminology, eliminating the ‘intrinsic content’ preserved in Grothendieck’s types and archetypes,- where an extrinsic logical system permits one to deduce the truth-value of propositions from a representational correspondence of projective and injective norms,- and therefor eventuates a kind of short-circuiting within the semiogenetic loop. [It is important to note that one system of logic deployed with an axiomatic framework might be more certain or capable than another. It is possible, for example, to entirely convert propositional logic into Boolean algebra, thereby reducing logic to Boole-Mobius transforms, that is, the purely mathematical calculations of vectors (Boole vectors) using various polynomial-expansion solving techniques, succeeding in the Leibnizian dream of fully mechanizing, not Reason herself, but at least the process of resolving a statement’s truth-value, though the number of vectors produced in this conversion has quadratic space requirements and exponentially increases with the number of variables in the expression, such that even a modestly sized statement, once converted, would inflate into a vector space that required a computer the size of the observable universe to process it.][/size]

Note that the Landian critique is entirely bent on preventing the interruption of the symbolic register at the third episteme whereby Absence reasserts the tragic force of an opposing Presence, (an opposition through which ‘materiality’ is dis-identified from the givenness of matter to thought or what Schelling calls “unvordenklich”, that part of Thought which cannot be made a presupposition for Thought) that is, an extrinsity, in this way denying any metaphysical aporia and ‘exploding’ the process of interpolation, re-establishing in its place what the Deleuzians call schizoanalysis, that is, a form of thought given as a pure, unrestrained productivity that is no longer concerned with the representational congruence of syntactic and semantic layers, the congruence of information and objects, data and functions, ideas and ‘things’, things and processes, one level of abstraction and another, etc., for the feedback-loop has been accelerated to the point that the dialectic and that upon which it is interpolated, the thinker and his own thought, no longer maps structures from an extrinsic reality, but simply plots internal trajectories within a pure intrinsity,- (an ‘inner reality’ developed from Nietzsche’s ontological expansion of the Will to Power as the “world seen from within” and the Bergonsonian conceptualization of intrinsic difference overlaid with the Kantian model of appearance) a blind material flow of libidinous intensities within which it is fatally dissolved as another singular flow, another intensity,-- supposedly instigating through its very dissolution, that is, an entirely diabatic or ‘subtractive’ process pit in contrast to the additive synthesis of transcendental subjectivity whereby the conceptual apparatus of ‘theoretikos’ is enlarged and its contents gradually extended, and by tracing a thermodynamic trajectory beyond the point at which the human ego,- attempting to maintain the illusion of an actus purus reft from the ahistorical, abiological, and the inorganic, struggling, in so many words, for stability in the face of heat-death and entropic maxima while acting under the spell of false-consciousness evinced by the protective self-deception of having crossed beyond a ‘territorialized’ ‘rational threshold’ into the scissure of madness, (the fear that led Oedipus to put out his own eyes) wherein deflated libidinal investments cannot be easily cathected by new objects and the counter-surge of thanatos disrupts the semiotic infrastructure on which the ‘petite object’ secures eros against the seductive gambit of its own maniacal excesses,- would instinctively resist, having become aware of the threat of a fatal attenuation of psychic reserve,-- from each and every sign, implacably born with the demand of signification and Klossowski’s ‘phantasmal projection of necessity’,- increasingly stratified, well buttressed, and entrenched as they might be by any given discourse network through a series of self-reinforcing or iteroecotic normative constraints taken as complex forces eventuating representational arrest,- (hetero-normative constraints, gender based, racial, etc.) a new material flow, provoking the disintegument of life’s fevered and fulgurating core, liberating the ‘human sensorium’ from pure intensities and revealing the truth of experience in the latent ‘aesthetic potential’ of materiality that “conscripts the machinic phylum” [“The Thing that Wouldn’t Die”, P. 28; see Beier and Wallin, “Walking on Sunshine”.] to philosophical praxis and involutes it upon a material form to which philosophy is granted special access by the very process that has produced it for philosophy, a “circular auto-induction” (‘pure productivity’) of materiality and thought, quality (Land’s ‘intensity’.) and difference,- (For Land, a measure of intensification.) an induction that ‘effloresces’ a new multiplicity from the body, using Harman’s terminology, and renders matter diaphanous through the vital ignition of a new ‘art’ that subsumes its intrinsic bent toward dissipation, its internal ‘trajectory’, to its own ‘clinamen’, 1 a necessarily even more energetically diffusive route veering from the extremes of the stability of form and the chaos of the inorganic to the ontological flatline of minimal difference and total nullification, from the structures and configurations of matter “that can be made to labor for philosophy”, like the human brain, and the processes by which that labor is carried out and those structures are intelligibly reconstructed within and potentially obliterated by subjectivity in the expansion into increasingly distant domains promised by the Spinozist conceptualization of matter as a ‘body’ whose limits we do not know, into the ‘nonhuman’, into the ‘geotraumatic’ core whose undulating subsurface is to provide the necessary resources for a kind of chthonic vulcanization of the human being’s own creativity. This ‘schizoanalytic’ modality, couched upon a circular argument that conflates its two primary categories, as Laruelle observed, (Laruelle, however, does not feel the need to address such a circular reasoning, for he takes it that any account of matter presupposes a stable concept by which that account, as a process, passes into form, as structure. The category of pure negation, of course, refuses such a presupposition, imputing the two categories as conflations of a higher abstract content or ‘semantics’ yet to be disambiguated and untangled.) simply refuses to acknowledge the third episteme, and epistemologically fails to self-legitimize itself, or expand its axiological basis to higher logics, providing us instead with a conceptualization of the relationship (and of relation more generally, following the suggestion of Beier and Wallin, Ibid.) actuated by the two categories that, framed biostratigraphically in terms of those “regimes of affect in which power obtains” precisely as relation, or in which, returning to specifically Landian vocabulary, difference obtains as intensity, obscures any question of the relation itself, the stability of whose concept (the ‘artificial differentiation’) again manifests itself as an intransigent presupposition, raising an uncommunicated and incommunicable prohibition against negativity that closes the dialectic to the metaphysical aporia in which intrinsity opens itself to extrinsity. Truth and falsity, for this modality, is no longer of account, for all ‘meaning’ has been reduced to a kind of performative feedback or ‘semiotic flow’ through a network whose connectivity is mapped solely by subjective engagement in a process (ie. the ‘primary process’) for which the actual human ‘subject’ amounts to a mere “anonymous reflexivity” driven by a multiplicity of “hypertextual cross-feedback circuits”,- [Cabrales, “Aesthetaphysicks and the Anti-Dialectical Hyperoccultation of Disenchanted Representation”.] an affective confluence propagated through a purely stochastic resonance, or what Kubler calls [In: “The Shape of Time: Remarks on the History of Things”.] a work of art that “transmits a kind of behavior by the artist”, doubly serving “like a relay, as the point of departure for impulses that often attain extraordinary magnitudes in later transmission”, whose dormant potential is liberated only with the ‘caveat apophenior’ belonging to the “feverish recombinance” of “premonitory synchronisms” [Couroux, “Anachronic Annexation”.] in which the human subject is hopelessly engulfed by a mimesis it cannot reproduce, a future that can never be its past, and an experience that can never be made conscious; the question of philosophy becomes simply a question of intensity, (as Brassier points out) and whether or not any particular schizoanalytic practice accelerates the primary process toward an all-encompassing, ultimate productivity which decodes and obliterates any inhibitory pressure against which it runs up, an ‘intensive zero’ at the end of Capital. Because this modality refuses to acknowledge the third episteme, its logic becomes univocal, nullifying the force of opposition and gradually reducing everything within the second episteme to the first, the ontic episteme, to a primordial axiology and single vocity (like the single-variable propositional formulae within the Heyting algebra delineated by the R-N lattice) for which the higher-order, non-standard logics we have discussed are completely inaccessible. We could attack this modality on many grounds, as we have attacked many others here, yet I believe it suffices to simply assert the epistemological weakness of it, its inability to access higher-order logics. Furthermore, the Landian, radicalized schizoanalytic completely rejects any confrontation with a personhood, a self, an identity, a subject,- reading all such concepts as so many ‘overcodings’ of transient cathexes to be destratified and libidinous investments to be deflated, closed off to any analysis of a subject’s phenomenological experience,- * an experience, a subjectivity which is essentially taken to simply not exist, eliminated and dispensed with as a meaningless ghost haunting the spectral Real; all such structures are decoded and sublated by the primary episteme,- the first episteme, and therefor reduced to intensifications of a singular intrinsic materiality, a single axiological variable: the ‘organism’ itself has been expunged from the philosophical register and engulfed by aorgic fluxions, which are all we are left with. Thus we have a philosophy of liberation and emancipation that asserts as its highest goal the production of intensified experiences that nonetheless self-sublates the representational content of all experience, eradicating it from its own register. This philosophy, intended to overcome the same defect in the Marxist programme, (The Marxist concept of dialectical-historical materialism similarly reduces identities, be they racial, gendered, or class based, to falsifications of a species-essence,- masks utilized in the attempt to conceal our supposed alienation from ourselves and from others; alienation as imposed upon us in the play of history and the formation of oppressed and reigning tribes. We see that the same error is simply repeated by accelerationism at another, higher level of abstraction.

This should serve to illustrate the intrinsic defect of all univocal thought, as insidious as it is pernicious. We of course see it just as clearly in the Lacanian reduction of identity to configurations of metonyms.) falls into the same dead end. The logical failure we are here considering is the result of univocity, of falling back to a single vocity (the ontic episteme) in the resulting equivocation of pure quality (the intensification of intrinsic productive flow) and pure difference, (the measure or ‘degree’ of this intensity, viz. a measure as to what degree any ‘secondary-process’ intensifies the ‘primary-process’) the Bergonsonian and Nietzschean-Deleuzian elements of the accelerationist conceptualization of productivity that are consequently conflated, losing all their semantic content at the level of the second episteme, ie. the episteme within which local differences are accumulated and sublimed by global structures present within the third episteme. These two elements given in ‘intensification’ and ‘difference’, which serve as a discrete and continuous-valued variable, are, like Grothendieck’s discrete algebraic constructions and continuous magnitudes, (geometrical constructions) decoded from an artificial differentiation 2 later sublated and unified within a non-separate codeterminate form. <!> Yet, in the accelerationist productivity, the content of that form is not later encoded by what Grothendieck conceived of as projective and injective norms, a type and an archetype between whose abstract levels a semantics or ‘representational congruence’ could be developed and a new model of the continuum therefor extrapolated from an otherwise destitute syntax out of which no properly mathematical objects can be derived, as he had first demonstrated with norms on the tensor product of two Banach spaces. 3 Again, we see that the issue with ‘absolute production’ is one of epistemological weakness,- a weakness illustrated most potently by the R-N lattice, which gives us to understand the inescapable discontinuity of equivalence classes, (The Rieger-Nishimura lattice (!) implies that all finite-depth Heyting algebras possess surjective epimorphisms; in an infinitely heterogeneous lattice of single-valued propositional formulae, no formulae are equivalent to each other.) and thus the necessity of developing a semantics for negotiating and re-encoding the content of any codeterminate forms. ** Otherwise, hardly surpassing the ‘finitude of interpretation itself’, we are faced with an inexorable agon that ‘ruptures all determinancy’, that is, an excess which, following Stephen Watson’s line of argument in “Extensions”, “the philosopher’s text no more accounts for than … the artist’s attempt to coincide with it”,- a total heterogeneity for which, even if productivity is accelerated, self-sublimed, and exposed to it, philosophy cannot constitute (as the Landian forces of production would aim to coincide with it) an ‘economics without reserve’ given the fact that the hermeneutical process, infinitely variable as it is in possible interpretation and semiogenic output, (viz. metalepsis) can nonetheless never be converted into its opposite, into ‘silence’, into absence,*** (this would require the sublation of the tragic force of opposition; a force we must preserve to sustain epistemological potency) leaving us with what Watson names “the fragmented and problematic status of the remainder”, something we have accounted for here in terms of a symbolic interruption, metaphysics of absence and presence, and the ‘ethical commitment of the incommunicable".
[size=85]* Heidegger’s project, being a kind of philosophical ‘cousin’ to the accelerationist critique, and if for different reasons, similarly refuses the phenomenological dimension, as I have elsewhere noted: “Heidegger finds his great task in the salvation of history by purely abstract means …”
** Without this semantics, we abandon philosophical reason to “the uninhibited synthesis of the heterogenous infinity of empirical laws for which the dream of philosophy’s Totality was called into serious doubt.”
*** As I have elaborated: “As Theory cannot circumscribe its own Negation, …” [its silence; absence; etc.][/size]
(!)The Rieger-Nishimura lattice:


[size=85]1. The clinamen,- an ‘emergence’ of Lucretius’ unseen ‘swerve’ in the linear atomic series that subsumes the intrinsic bent of matter toward de-Oedipalization, deterritorialization, and entropy to the production of what Klossowski calls a ‘tonalite’, or new ‘resonating sonorities’ within its inherence to human cognition, to a mode of thought that would assume to preserve the movement of ‘Nature as spirit’ by tracing the flow of the material transaction beyond the external limits at which point the fatal seizure of representation exposes a process that must needs give way to form, at which point energy must needs give way to structure, function to organ, harmonics to interval, (a process that Klossowski, formulating his greater theory of the drives, reads the breakdown of Nietzsche as having disclosed at the fleeting vinculum of philosophical reason, or that extreme of psychical activity beyond which the organism, consigning the novel evolutionary product of self-reflecting cognition to an equally novel end, arrests the movement of the very impulsion that has produced it out of the delirium of Natura, namely through an ‘obsessional constraint’ on the expression of erotic surplus) thereby restricting ‘absolute production’ and concealing the ‘stoical anima’ in those visible forms accreted by mere selective pressures, of whose order the Ego is perhaps the most conspicuous object of critique, for the accelerationist. However, citing Galloway, perhaps ‘no capricious swerve’ shall restitute the ethical project, or, appropriating the Heraclitean formula, hope to reach again through the panta rhei, even for a ‘second time’, that it might return ‘ethos’ to ‘anthropos’ and so reign the otherwise unbridled furies of the daemon,- that ‘swerve’ with which the traumatic severance of the Real returns the accelerationist ‘materiality’ to Philosophy only through a “misanthropic subversion”, revealing the truth of matter, not in the erotic prodigy of a new aesthetics, but in the consequences of climate science and environmental collapse, the unlimited progeneration of a nanoparticulate ‘grey goo’, the spread of bioengineered viruses, the supercession of artificial intelligence on the progress of world history, the inundation of the genotype with unanticipated and unstable modifications, nuclear armageddon, and other such vectors of annihilation, whose supramoral commitments, if they are to be observed, oblige us to abdicate the discourse of the West and the primacy of those ethical categories with which they are continuous. While the kind of arguments Brassier has levied against accelerationism,- recapitulated in this text ad necessitas,- are quite legitimate, he does not actually go beyond accelerationism; he instead postures himself the hierophant of the ‘truth of extinction’ both presumed and silenced by it, that is, the prophet of a new “alien axiomatics” [Beier and Wallin, Ibid.] whose destiny lies somewhere firmly ensconced beyond the irrecoverable demesne of human ethos,- an axiomatics not merely antihuman, but posthuman,- taking the loss of the species as inevitable and, with that fact, the truth of our ‘already being dead’, rescinding us from the philosophical register; an axiomatics that takes for its founding idea the vision of ecocatastrophic apocalypse however faintly adumbrated by theory, which hems around the labile periphery of the anthropocene and that magisterium in which theory legitimates itself as knowledge.

  1. This ‘artifice’ of differentiation corresponds to the ‘enonce’ whose ‘lipogram’ is occulted by discourse; a meaningless, empty signifier introduced only to sustain the replication of a chain of signs whose predications and reversals are stretched from genesis to apocalypse within the nomos, from a first cause to a final end, from God to man, (for this nonsignifying sign can reverse its own predication without destabilizing the chain in which it participates as what I have elsewhere called an “intrinsic operational semiotic”) whereby the independence of that nomos and the illusion of equivocation between signifier and signified are maintained,- whereby the symbolic gap is suppressed, absence is ‘banned’ from discourse, (just as God forbid Adam and Eve from consuming the fruit of Knowledge, for the recognition of the empty Signifier fatally arrests the economy of signs) and the ‘interruption’ of the Sign is ‘endlessly deferred’ to the function of a ‘logical pharmakon’ capable of acting as a cause that is both greater and less than its effect, thereby stabilizing the symbolic register and its circulation of metonyms; the sign of a participating intelligence emplaced somewhere outside the signifying chain,-- an entity that, should it enunciate for itself any sign other than Celan’s mysterious Atemwende, [the inward sigh; a ‘drawing in’ or ‘opposing breath’] or the ‘countersign’ indicated by the purely asemic differend,- whose meaning must be interminably suspended in the deferral of one sign to another, and, like the sigh of Bion, cast always between this life and the next,- would thereby divest itself to the implicate plurality of signification itself, doomed to spread itself as another ‘gnostic contagion’, blindly and without object, and so become, no longer singularity, no longer entity, but only a ‘cancer of poetry’, only language, idolum, reproduction, multiplicity,- at bottom, only another collection of words whose hopeless mimesis cannot help but obfuscate what Schiller called the appearance of Spirit to Spirit, not as language, but as Spirit, that all the more irremediably sequesters the truth of the Other from admission to the field of discourse. Because the Lacanians cannot theorize the Interruption, the deferral must be maintained or the empty signifier will crash the replicating chain in a symbolic gap from which no predication can return a new sign, from which no reversal can reintroduce a new signification,- a fatal Remainder that discourse cannot recover. This ‘artifice’ is both a tool and a genuine artifice, that is, an element of deception and trickery, for it locates the essence of the human being in something that is, paradoxically, not itself human, but stolen from the Gods by Prometheus as divine fire, something which therefor leaves the ‘human’ behind as an empty signifier; a fire giving us the symbolic function par excellence, abbreviating the entire system of knowledge.

  2. A digression within a digression: it is possible to reject the kind of axiomatics on which set-theory is grounded without embracing finitism. My own rejection of it owes itself, not to a refusal of the Platonic position or, more generally, the concept of an infinity and mathematical continuum, but to the manner in which the related abstractions have been obfuscated by an ‘improper semantics’ yet to be disentangled by a complete cycle through the epistemes. Current mathematics, basing its model of the continuum on Peano’s axioms, constructs the natural numbers by simply taking 0 or 1 as a non-logical symbol and adding 1 to it, repeating this indefinitely, generating the entire continuum number by number toward infinity on the basis of a repeated operation of ‘addition’ whose ‘unary function’, reifying the procedural coherence of the infinite iteration of the assumed variable, (ie. we assume it even makes sense to infinitely repeat an operation; we assume the nature of addition does not suddenly change at some exceedingly far point in the continuum) defines the totality of these numbers as an interminable series or ‘set’ a la modern set-theory, or set N, leaving behind the Feferman–Schütte or ‘first impredicative’ ordinal associated with arithmetical transfinite recursion as the smallest ordinal that cannot be generated through ordinal addition on 0, that is, the basis of proof-theoretical mathematics, where one moves on a recursive path from given sets of theorems toward those axioms necessary for their construction, with this impredicative ordinal signifying a minimal axiomatics necessary for the articulation of a statement or theorem with some truth-value. This makes it impossible to understand the formation and distribution of something like prime numbers, for primes are related to an entirely different mathematical operation, namely multiplication, such that simply adding one to a prime will not likely carry us to another prime, or if it does, hardly reveal anything useful about the frequency of the distribution of prime numbers in the continuum.

{ An important note must be made here. We cannot ‘disentangle’ the additive and multiplicative simply by conducting primitive recursion from any given set of theorems to their necessary axioms or ‘impredicative’ ordinal. It is, in other words, of no account as to how precisely the operations of addition and multiplication are defined,- either defining addition through Peano arithmetic, in whose logical signature the multiplication and addition relations are both contained, or defining it through Tarski’s identity by extending the first-order Skolem arithmetic (that theory of the natural numbers for whose signature only multiplication and equality are given) via the successor predicate,- for in both cases, the operations of addition and multiplication become entangled by the unary function, inasmuch as the truth-value of formulas in the Skolem arithmetic are reducible to the sequences of non-negative integers that make up their prime factor decomposition, such that the multiplication operation becomes simply a pointwise addition of these sequences. Furthermore, despite the far greater complexity and presumed foundation of the reals, moving from the natural numbers to the real numbers through yet another extension of the same unary function can be easily negotiated if we consider a geometrical analogy. If one draws a line going through a circle in a 2-dimensional plane, there is no single point where they meet; the mathematical analyst, when tasked with enumerating that point, will simply insert a new point on the plane where he wants the connection to be made, and then use converging additive sequences on that inserted point to describe the intersection of the line and circle. He has enumerated the imaginary point where the line and circle meet as an equivalence class of a family of converging sequences (fundamentally, sequences of additions) in the plane. Real numbers are simply algebraic constructions analogous to these geometrical ones. A real number is similarly constructed as an equivalence class of Cauchy sequences of rational numbers, with the continuum itself conceived as the continuity of these equivalence classes, viz. the assumption of there existing a continuous sequence of all such equivalence classes, from 1 to infinity, forming a series that can be iterated by a function (namely, the ‘unary function’, which reifies the operation of addition) and enclosed by a limit, forming a set,- or more precisely conceived topologically, a ‘dense set’ from whose metric space E any uniformly continuous function into another metric space can be extended to a unique continuous function on all of E, as demonstrated in the techniques used by Minkowski to map the quadratic irrationals to the rationals. (“Infinite Ergodic Theory of Numbers”, “The Farey map; definition and topological properties.”: “… any uniformly continuous function from a dense set of a metric space E into another metric space can be uniquely extended to a continuous function on all of E.”)

That sequence might not exist, and these equivalence classes might be discontinuous, such that no formula can be derived that iterates it, undermining our entire model of the continuum,- for it would mean, however surprisingly and unintuitively, that there are ‘numbers’ that cannot be constructed regardless of how many times the unary function is iterated; there are numbers one can never ‘get to’, no matter how far they count, in keeping with the modern presumption of ‘inaccessible cardinals’ implied by the axiom of choice. However, it would also mean the continuum hypothesis is false,- a speculation rarely ventured in the literature, though we do find some arguments for it like that in Woodin’s omega-conjecture and infinitary Ω-logic, where, given the existence of a proper class of Woodin cardinals satisfying an analogue of the completeness theorem for which any axiom exists that is comprehensive over the structure of hereditarily countable sets N3, the continuum by implication is not N1. Instead of developing, like Mochizuki, a non-set theoretical mathematics in which to account for this discontinuity, which he calls a discontinuous homomorphism, Woodin indulged in it and simply endeavored, in keeping with his overall interest in large cardinalities, to find sufficient axioms of this kind, with which to generalize the theory of the determinacy of pointclasses and gain insight into structures larger than N1, that is, the structure of N2, viz. a structure larger than the structure covered by the axiom of projective determinacy,- axioms with which an inner model of the large cardinals can hopefully be constructed as a set-theoretical universe within which the continuum hypothesis has a positive truth value, thereby rescuing mathematical platonism and set-theory from themselves. In this, we see that Woodin echoes the very same faith that had originally moved Godel to the platonizing side of the transfinite debate when the subject was first taken up by theoreticians,- a faith expressed in the belief that the undecidability or falseness of the continuum hypothesis from within any model of the universe of sets indicated nothing more than a paucity in our ZFC-based understanding of it, (internal failures of our own logical systems to fully circumscribe the universe of sets without encumbering themselves with paradoxes, counter-intuitive and often completely meaningless results, and circular arguments, like the argument given in the fact that, if an inaccessible cardinal is Levy collapsed to alef-2, viz. the powerset of the reals, the resulting constructible universe of that set, in keeping with ZFC, produces a corresponding model in which the existence of that cardinal is equiconsistent with a false Kurepa hypothesis) such that we simply need to introduce even more new axioms (generally, large-cardinal axioms) to our logic with which to construct a new model of the set-theoretical universe, ceaselessly extending and enriching our models in this campaign with more and more arbitrary axioms drawn up from the ether, until we discover a model in which the truth-value of the continuum hypothesis can finally be decided in the affirmative case owing to the coarsening and enlargement of the notion of definability over pointclasses and their interpolants from within any incomplete system afforded to us by the new determinacy and cardinal axioms we see added to our mathematics year after year,- axioms with which we have hoped to surmount the graduated universe of sets in conformation to the Borel hierarchy, the projective hierarchy, the hierarchy of universally Baire sets, etc.,- just as the Cantor-Bendixson theorem demonstrates there is no interpolant in the pointclass of closed sets.

While what has been said here might suggest a finitist philosophy of mathematics, note that someone like Mayberry, championing the finitist anti-Platonic view, rejects the ‘operationalism’ inherent in this construction of the natural numbers, (a construction he believes is descended to us in the obvious set-theory of modern mathematics through the conceptualization of the arithmos found all the way back in Euclid’s fifth common notion) whereby an indefinite process of continued addition is somehow reified as a coherent operation by a unary function that infinitely extends it to the formation of a number-field in which that function can continuously map elements of one set to those in a subset of itself, or in Euclidean terminology, an arithmos constituting ‘a whole necessarily greater than any of its parts’, simply as a consequence of his more stringent epistemological criteria for what constitutes well-defined mathematical concepts, from whose exalted order all indefinite operations and infinite series are to be expunged. Euclid establishes the concept of a ratio by taking two definite geometrical magnitudes and continually adding one of them to itself such that, if this results in a new magnitude exceeding either, they can be said to possess a ratio: here we have affirmed the basic principles of non-contradiction and identity, for two things that express such a ratio have essentially expressed the a priori fact that they are not equal to the third magnitude, and are therefor not equal to one another. Mayberry believes that Euclid took a tragic misstep when he attempted to generalize the concept of ratio by extending the notion of ‘geometrical magnitude’ with which he had been working to a purely arithmetical magnitude with unbounded quantifiers, moving from consideration of the definite magnitude of lines, angles and figures to that of the indefinite ‘arithmoi’, or what we would today call an empty set. For, if we similarly take a subset of a set and continually add it to itself, it becomes impossible to create a congruent one-to-one mapping between that subset and a subset of itself, (An incongruency first revealed by Cantor’s diagonal argument. We also have the famous Banach-Tarski paradox to consider, where it is possible to take a normal sphere in Euclidean space, partition that sphere into sets of points, that is, decompose it into some finite number of disjoint subsets,- with the paradox requiring us to utilize at least five,- and then replace some of these decompositions with congruent subsets of other sets, to finally recompose the sphere out of these replacements,- grounded firmly in the axiom of choice and arbitrarily taking them from extraneous congruent collections or what we call ‘free groups’ manipulated through nothing more than translation and rotation,- only to have the sphere doubled its original size, so that we can then redo the operation, doubling the original sphere out of nothingness repeatedly. Obviously, it does not make sense that one can take an object apart, rearrange its fragments in a certain way,- regardless of how clever our new configuration might be,- and then put it back together such that it has become twice its original size, but mathematically, in set-theory, this is possible: for each subset, as a collection of points indexed by infinite sequences that can never be written down, can for exactly that reason never be congruently mapped one-to-one to a subset of itself, leading to the ex nihilo enlargement of the original sphere after reconstructing it out of deviously articulated incommensurable subsets.) that is, a ‘set of all sets’, at least when the operation is infinitely iterated as it is in the construction of the real number line, such that the notion of ‘continuity’ itself seems to break down into the kind of paradoxes of irreconcilable and incommensurable infinities Cantor was the first to more formally explore. As Poincaire noted, this apparent ‘breaking down’ essentially means that the basis of arithmetic is not ‘self-evident’ in the way that the truths of geometry are, demanding that we fall back to mere axioms, not self-evident truths, in the development of our mathematics; it means the principle of infinite iteration, viz. the unary function on which the continuum is founded and through which the reals are constructed, is irreducible to the a priori principle of non-contradiction and the basic formalism of logical identity given by the ‘factum’ of Euclidean geometry,- a factum taken as the highest domain accessible to us,- an obviation of ‘pure reason’ that led of course to Euclid’s transition from a logically rigorous and self-evident geometry to a necessarily synthetic generalization of geometrical magnitudes and ratios to the arithmos or arithmetical operations, imposing upon us, as his intellectual progeny, a reliance on the very same ‘synthetic intuition’ he was forced to adopt, namely the concept of infinite iteration,- an intuition that both conceals from our limited human minds the a priori source of the truths of that geometry and allows us to deploy, from an ‘intuitive’ axiomatics (vis. Peano arithmetic, ZF, set theory, etc.) beyond which we simply cannot hope to venture for want of any more certain ground, precisely the basis of that arithmetic by which we have found ourselves able to navigate, if only pragmatically and not theoretically, a higher mathematics despite those human limitations. In the terms of predicate logic, we can say that the concept of equality, which can be derived self-evidently from the existence of geometrical ratios, is lost in the movement to a looser equivalence relation than equality, (this loss of the uniqueness quantifier up to equality signifies the resulting impossibility of congruently mapping the subset of a set to a subset of itself under infinite addition, as noted earlier) namely a relation that cannot be expressed by first order logic and from which the uniqueness quantifier up to isomorphism is derived that we later use to axiomatically ground the infinite quantification of the empty set and, by extension, our arithmetic, whose equivalence relation, designated category-theoretically, holds only up to isomorphism and not up to equality, or in the model-theoretical terms of elementary embeddings over the universe of sets, up to Vopenka’s principle, where it is axiomatized, that in every proper class over the universe of sets, some members are similar to others, that is, for every proper class of binary relations, there is one embeddable into another, such that for every natural number there exists an extendible cardinal. Here, however, the construction of the continuum through infinite addition, that is, the kind of number-theoretic functions over the natural numbers involved in Vopenka and Woodin cardinals, or large cardinals in general, exponentiation, Cauchy sequences, etc., and all other functions of this kind, by means of which we have attempted to transcend the rational numbers and construct the system of real numbers on which set theory and modern analysis depends, (A system whose defense has required us to embrace mere axiomatics, estranging the logical core of mathematics given by the original truths of geometry, namely the definite ratios expressible by rational numbers. In fact, it is precisely this concept of a ratio, a concept which can be proven self-evidently, affirmed by nothing more than the a priori fact of logical identity, non-contradiction, and equality,- unlike our axioms, which require the synthetic reasoning and arbitrary nonconstructive symbolic conventions employed with our adoption of free axioms on infinite sets,- that gives to us a notion of positivity, viz the idea that one number can be larger than another and therein satisfy the definition of what a number is in the first place, and thus expresses the rational continuity of ordered pairs, allowing us to construct the sequence of intervals to which the entire continuum of the natural and rational numbers conforms in 1 being less than 2, 2 less than 3, 1 and 2 both being less than 3, and the sum of 1 and 2 being equal or ‘identical’ to 3, and so on.) is rejected due to the fact that it entangles, at increasing levels of abstraction, fundamental operations and concepts in improper semantics.

Let us summarize what we have said so far. When we generalize, as Euclid did, the concept of a ratio involving definite geometrical figures to that of an empty set, we have taken two rational numbers and subdivided the interval they express once more; we then reinsert new numbers between the numbers indexed by that interval and locate a mediant between them, thereby creating a series of endless ratios between the completely indefinite, abstract ‘magnitudes’ of an ‘arithmos’, endlessly subdividing the interval into fractions, for example, between 0 and 1, eg. into 1/2, 1/3, 1/4th, and so on,-- an infinity of convergent Cauchy sequences or Dedekind cuts freely inserted and indexed between any two numbers in an interval, taken to exist under the axiom of choice regardless of the proximity of that interval to another interval, establishing, not an equality, but a virtual isomorphy of cardinality alef-0 between any subset of a set and the set from which it is amputated, whose equivalence-class instantiates an ordering-scheme (in the modular-positional arithmetic of our infinitely expandable decimal system, we move from left to right) over the mediant and what Godel understood to be a ‘computable universe’ (The basis of the Godel-constructible universe; a complexity value and information density that tells us the computability of large cardinalities.) but does not internally map and fully describe that universe, (as per the incompleteness theorem) ie. an ordering scheme encoded by the hierarchy of cardinals beyond those accessible from within any given universe of sets,- an index from which we cannot actually extract any information or ‘enumerate’ the encoded sequence of ordinals without adopting the axiom of choice or that of determinacy, that is, some necessarily synthetic external symbolic convention,- a schematism like that adopted by Kant in his synthesis of arithmetical order and temporality,- a convention that tells us where to begin and terminate any subset over a given universe,-- magnitudes that we then, to be short, simply assert make sense to add to each other forever through the infinite operation of additions, subdivisions, and additions needed to produce from them exactly that structure we call a ‘set’, or more precisely, a set up to the power-set of the real numbers, or a complete atomic Boolean algebra of cardinality Alef-2 resting temptingly and Sphinx-like upon the very edge of Lebesgue-measurability,- an edge beyond which we are forced to give up either Hausdorff or separable topologies in our attempt to define the infinite,- an edge beyond which we must on that account again revert to the use of axiomatics, namely the use of the large cardinal axioms. This assertion is indefensible save through one of two axiomatics, to which all the others reduce,- either that of the axiom of choice, which we have already discussed, or that of the axiom of determinacy; in the first case, we run into the inconsistencies and paradoxes already noted involving inaccessible cardinals, while, in the later case, we produce an equally bizarre mathematics in which all partially ordered sets can be embedded by cardinalities less than the continuum, (viz. the reals) which would mean, in other words, that it was somehow possible to decide the truth-values of all statements expressible in the set-theoretical universe from a small subset of that universe: (Here we find again the faith of Godel and Woodin mentioned earlier. It is believed, in so many words, that our model of the universe of sets can be so complete as to obviate the need to entirely exhaust the state-space of propositions, allowing us to locate from a small subset of that universe the solution to any proof involving the universe of sets in toto. This faith is also found in Japaridze’s theory of computability, where we simply enlarge our system of logic with more and more axioms, operators, and definitions, until it is sufficiently expressive, such that we can find the solution to any problem whose proof can be fully articulated in its unique extensible language.) in either case, we have lost sight of the fundamental nature expressed by the rational numbers at the heart of mathematics, as determined a priori by geometry: ratio, proportion. When we consider the rational numbers in comparison to the reals or set-theoretical model of the continuum, we see that one interval is completely equal to any other interval; there is as much information contained between 0 and 1 as there is between 1 and 2, so that we cannot begin to define a hierarchy of transfinite cardinalities of increasing density and complexity through the axiom of choice, ie. by taking any point within one interval as the beginning of a subset we can add to itself indefinitely as per the unary function, nor can we utilize the axiom of determinacy, whereby the equivalence up to equality is coarsened for isomorphic equivalence and subsets of an interval are produced incongruent to subsets of themselves, as per Cantor’s diagonal argument. If there is any hope of ‘disentangling’ the mathematical operations, it rests on an exploration of this deep-structure belonging to the rational numbers.

This deep-structure of the rationals seems to defy the kind of ordering scheme that we have utilized over prefabricated strings organized in the real number system by external axiomatic systems imposing some linear-positional encoding over binary sequences, as again, each interval of the rationals is perfectly identical to every other interval, (It should be noted, that the p-adic numbers, offering an alternative model of the continuum that is quite different than that of the number-line associated with the real number system,- at least at first glance,- still rely on infinite sets, limits, and infinite sums, extending the integers into a similar ‘linear-positional code’ through the external schematisms of modulo and base, and this to the ends of defining a concept of ‘mathematical proximity’ or congruence, that is, an ordering scheme no less artificial than that of the reals. A true alien mathematics, capable of accessing the fundamental nature of the continuum outside any schematism, would require a great deal more than this.) such that we cannot from any position determine where to begin and end a sequence of intervals relative to a mediant, as we begin from the left in a decimal expansion, to thereby produce a set from them that we can assign a value of cardinality; the rational numbers, in other words, explode noncontinuously, as a heterogeneous complexity that we simply cannot hierachialize or reduce to any number of countable pairs, even given an infinite amount of time to complete the operation, since the very positional encoding on binary sequences which the unary function extends to n-countable sets of intervals is made impossible once the rational numbers have been grasped without the baggage of the real number system and the axiomatic, synthetic constructions it has imposed over the rationals in the attempt to render them and their infinities cognizable as something we call, in a word, ‘the real number system’. This attempt, in short, has only further concealed their deep-structure; a deep-structure within which the true semantic content of the fundamental operations is still contained. To access that content, I believe we must reverse course, so that we can move in a different direction than that taken by Euclid in his generalization of the arithmos; it must be possible to generalize and extend the geometrical concept of a ratio in some other way, without adopting the implicit synthetic reasoning of the unary function, such that numbers can be discussed without having to encode them in cardinalities or impose arbitrary linear-positioning schemes viz. sets. First, we simply have to accept the fact that the kind of reasoning we use in discussing finite sequences cannot be applied to infinite sequences. That does not mean we cannot extend that reasoning whatsoever, though it does perhaps mean we will never find a means of meaningfully doing that while still carrying on with the presumption that we can apply our reasoning to infinite sets. Euclid, for example, while perhaps making mistakes in his method of generalization, did not share this presumption with us; he admitted that there were certainly more primes than are found in any finite list of primes, but he did not say that meant the primes were infinite. This concept of a ‘noncontinuous’ or heterogenous infinity eludes us,- the concept Euclid was suggesting (though a concept he perhaps did not possess sufficient language to articulate) by making such a rigorous distinction, namely the following: the ‘number’ of primes was not actually a number itself, (it cannot be encoded linear-positionally on a sequence of binary pairs) and therefor not infinite, but instead a ‘metanumber’, (what would, in the terms laid out here, signify some latent global structure at a higher, unintegrated episteme) a kind of machinically produced cluster of numbers, a complex composite structure synthetically generated and cohered by some extrinsic semiotic related to, in this case, multiplication- and precisely not the linear-positional arithmetic we use to construct the reals out of addition on a symbolic operator expressed by a binary pair or ‘interval’, that is, the continuum, in continuously subdividing an interval and infinitely adding that subdivision to itself inside of an arithmos,- an empty set we arbitrarily read by left-justifying it in the decimal expansion,- as per the unary function. We here return to the original thesis of this text, namely the semantic confusion and entanglement of fundamental operations like multiplication and addition; the obfuscation of that extrinsic semiotic. Only after that underlying syntax (a fully demodulated, heterogeneous, non-synthetic, dehierarchialized, and pure numeracy, as expressed by the ‘infinity’ of the rationals once they have been fully decoded from any obfuscating symbolic convention viz our positional ordering system, that is, stripped from any external schematism and ordinal classification) is clarified can we reencode local objects, whose distinctions have been clarified, into new global structures, unpacking their actual semantic content on some higher level of abstraction. It is precisely due to this heterogeneous infinity, a latent semiotic related to multiplication, that we find the nature of the frequency of prime number distribution cannot be determined from within an arithmetic grounded on sets and addition.

In essence, when we deal with infinite sequences and infinite sets, we are claiming that they contain an infinite amount of information,- an endless storehouse of data that exists in some other universe entirely disconnected from us, yet we cannot decode any of that information from them unless we impose an arbitrary symbolic construction on them (the axiom of choice; we can begin to map the unary function at any position within the sequence to a subset of itself, reading it from left to right in the decimal expansion) that allows us to isomorphically fix subsets of any given sequence in relation to a mediant, (as per the axiom of determinacy; the equivalency up to isomorphy of second-order axiomatics, where the uniqueness quantifier up to equality is lost) reconstructing the sequence out of binary pairs that express intervals in the real number system and enumerate the ordinals in conformation to the hierarchy that can be inductively obtained from the information density of the large cardinals, namely by adding these continuously subdivided subsets to themselves ad infinitum. [The equivalence of these two axiomatic frameworks in the context of large cardinals was proven by Woodin; the ZFC axioms, the basis of modern math, as configured without the axiom of choice but with the axiom of determinacy, are equiconsistent to the ZF axioms with the axiom of choice,- if the existence of infinitely many Woodin cardinals is accepted. Note also, that Gentzen obtains the structure of this hierarchy reductively, ie. by measuring the complexity of terminating finite deductions from the formal system of the first-order arithmetic, whereby induction on the resulting sequence of deductions permits one to extract a definition of the minimal ordinal from the system itself,- a system considered as a purely combinatorial object which would otherwise allow a non-terminating sequence of ordinals less than ε0 and thus an overt inconsistent should the original arithmetic be inconsistent itself. A similar situation is given in the Hrushovski construction, which generalizes the Fraisse limit and generates certain geometries as proofs that not all uncountable categorical theories must either interpret an algebraically closed field or be locally modular; those that satisfy neither condition, eg. stable categorical pseudoplanes with aleph cardinality, the fusion of minimal sets in disjoint languages in a third set, or sets with exotic non-disintegrating geometries that do not interpret any group, would roughly correspond, in the arithmetical and set-theoretic context, to Gentzen’s necessary minimal ordinals. While Gentzen did not prove with this technique that first-order arithmetic was consistent, he demonstrated that the ordinal hierarchy was a consistent logical extension of that arithmetic- as well as the greater fact that one cannot escape the pitfalls of set theory through that arithmetic.] However, this means,- in actuality, that the information is not contained in the sequence itself, it is being machinically produced or ‘synthesized’ with an external schematism stored, not in some other universe, but in no place other than our own brain. These supposed infinities (all of them dubiously grounded, as we have observed, on the unary function and axiom of choice; all of them inexistent, inasmuch as they contain no information) can be obtained by any number of techniques for creating infinite structures from their finite substructures,- given the Peano and ZFC axioms of course. We have Cantor’s early ‘back and forth’ argument on metric spaces, where an automorphism is constructed inductively that extends a given finite isomorphism by interchanging the domain and codomain at each step of the construction until the only countable linear ordering is found which contains all other countable linear orderings and for which every isomorphism between two finite subsets extends to an automorphism of that ordering; or one could utilize the deductive construction of the Fraisse class for which there is some unique structure quantified up to isomorphism that is homogenous, such that any isomorphism between two finitely generated substructures of that structure can be extended to an automorphism of the whole structure satisfying the amalgamation and essential countability properties,- a class of structure in which every other object of that class can be embedded homogeneously. [For these two examples, see Kubis, in “Fraïssé sequences: category-theoretic approach to universal homogeneous structures”.] One could examine many more of these techniques, however they all amount to deceptive schematisms whereby an external symbolic construction is synthesized in order to produce the numbers with bases, modulus, decimal expansions, etc., in an intellectual leap that echoes the synthesis Kant obtained with his mental schemata, viz. the synthesis of arithmetic and temporality on the order of n+1, +1, +1, etc., such that any criticism or deconstruction of the Kantian system can be directly applied to the constructions of these infinities- and vice versa. The Kantian intuitions must be refused given the heterogenous complexity of the number-field we have noted earlier,- a heterogenous complexity observed when the numbers and the number-field itself are disentangled from all external schematisms and expressed purely as a series of primes, composites, powers, and exponentiations, as they are in the multiplicative theater of Mochizuki’s theory, in which the fundamental arithmetical operations are detached from one another and the numbers are constructed from elementary monoids using only multiplicative operations; a heterogeneity observed when the numbers are conceived without the external schematism of modulus, bases, decimal expansions, linear-positional orderings, and all other symbolic conventions regarding the organization of binary strings and intervals from out of the Cantor-set, for such external schematisms lead to entanglements of the fundamental arithmetical operations, and conceal from us the essential nature of the number-field itself, limiting the extent to which we can extend latent semantic content within it to new concepts. The ineluctable ABC conjecture is the most direct result of this obfuscation,- a conjecture that owes itself to the incomprehensible distribution of the primes, this being one of the traits of the heterogeneous infinity of the numbers once stripped of any schematism. (Other bizarre traits express themselves along with this primality, including the radical complexity of enumerated powers and exponents, as well as a certain intransitivity that can assume the structure of a ring under the action of the Heisenberg group that will be detailed later, in the context of combinatorics, as part of a more detailed examination of Mochizuki’s semiotic.) Without these external schematisms, the number series explodes into a scale-variant discontiguity that is exceedingly resistant to our attempts at synthesizing it, (this synthesis indicates the binary encoding that initiates the ‘canonical splitting’ of the unit interval and the construction of the Cantor-set) that is, our attempt to impose linear-positional ordering schemes (“sets”) on it,-- it explodes into a non-progressive synthesis without continuous-quantitative trend, defying our intuitions of continuity, complexity, and intelligibility.

What these schematisms do is quite simple: they extend the mathematical operations to the number field, in more and less convoluted, entangled ways. When we list the ‘real numbers’, for example, we are extending the geometrical concept of a ratio to an empty set and using a schematism of that extension to continuously map the operation of addition to the number field. Similarly, when we list the primes, we are mapping the multiplicative operation to the number field, etc. Incompatibilities in the schematisms we utilize result in things like the ABC conjecture or continuum hypothesis. The ‘infinite series’ associated with these schematisms are not really infinite because they encode no information by themselves- that information is synthesized by the schematic form or ‘metanumber’. Thus, to make any progress in the direction suggested here, we need to see how many of these metanumbers there are. Pi would be another example of a schematism/metanumber, as it is just a schema that extends the concept of the ratio of a circle’s circumference to its diameter indefinitely, depending on how many times we iterate it to synthesize more digits and thereby map it to the number field. We will also need to investigate alternative ways of mapping the operations without causing such entanglements and incompatibilities within our schematisms. The idea of rebuilding mathematics in this way, using a new structure like the schematism, is not so foreign; Grothendieck had attempted to do so using categories and scheme theory, a school of mathematics that has been drawn upon frequently in this text. Note Voevodsky, who replaces the predicate logic serving as the deductive framework for the Peano axiomatics at the heart of most mathematics with Martin-Lof type theory and develops from it a novel ‘univalent’ mathematics based on types, not sets,- types whose equality and formal structure are determined by homotopy-equivalences, not the uniqueness quantifier of second-order predicate logic we have already discussed, whereby set-theoretic math quantifies equivalence up to isomorphy. In this case, however, the types serve as stratified higher-dimensional analogs of sets corresponding to ∞-groupoids modelled, for example, as fibrant objects using Kan complexes and simplicial sets, therefor inheriting many of the same problems faced by set-theory and deploying, (these groupoids are, in essence, generalizations of Grothendieck and Mazzola’s bicategories) if through a different deductive system, the very same axioms we have detailed, namely the axiom of choice. This is why Voevodsky reconceptualized set-theoretical math as itself a subset of the mathematics of types for which the axiom of choice is ineliminably (non-constructively) deployed. Such a mathematics uses the same axioms as set-theory, but it deploys them with a different system of deduction, producing concepts that inherit the same logical flaws as those dealt with in set theory,- concepts merely translated to a higher-dimensional analog that might be more efficient for computers to work with or possess some other interesting or beneficial property, but ultimately does not provide us with any answers for the questions noted in this text.

The naive statement that ‘we can always add one’ to produce a larger number, despite how intuitive or obvious it might seem, is only a statement of the successor predicate; if one actually wants to qualify this idea rationally, at least with anything more than fiat assertions and axioms, one is sure to encounter the abundant difficulties noted in this essay- because the entire logic of the assertion boils down to the idea that we can begin mapping the unary function at any arbitrary position (axiom of choice) in a set to a subset of that set, reading it from the left in the decimal expansion, (This is of course in keeping with the symbolic convention our culture has adopted regarding the particular encoding scheme applied to binary strings, though any number of such conventions could have been developed to represent numbers set-theoretically as essentially composed out of binary structures or intervals. This set of strings constitutes a set itself,- one which, reduced to an endless sea of 1s and 0s and extended topologically, gives us the 0-dimensional Cantor space as a countably infinite discrete 2-point product possessing the cardinality of the continuum,- a space which permits us to pair every possible binary string in that sea, by a bicontinuous or homeomorphic function, to some real number that we take the string as representing, and which can be reconstructed as a subspace out of any other complete metric space given the fact that any perfect complete metric space possesses a non-empty perfect set that contains two disjoint non-empty perfect subsets with arbitrary or zero-dimensional diameter.) thereby producing a larger set by simply adding them. (This larger set ultimately signifying the assumed ‘infinity’ of the real numbers,- an assumption we may have only perpetuated for so long due to a certain defect observed by Mayberry in Euclid’s fifth common notion, where Euclid, usually very careful about making such leaps of abstraction, generalizes from the more rigorous conceptualization of the ratio expressed by definite geometrical figures something he called the arithmos, or what today we would recognize as a set.) In other words, the argument is circular: we can always add one to a number to get a larger number because all numbers are part of a set,- this set we call the real numbers; and we can always produce a larger set in which to contain that larger number, and in which to contain infinitely many more numbers beyond it, given the fact that every set can be mapped to a subset of itself, as per the unary function and axiom of choice, so as to produce the new, larger set by quantifying it up to isomorphy. (A merely second-order logical operation, not a first-order one like the quantifier up to equality.) As intuitive as the argument might be, inverting this argument forces us into a quite un-intuitive conclusion: in terms of the first-order arithmetic, we see that any formula with even a single free variable can describe a subset of natural numbers about which we can express precisely no information at all, since we can prove for this subset that there is no single number N which belongs or doesn’t belong to it. Thus the use of second-order logic’s quantifier to steady our presumption about the informational content of endless subsets we cannot otherwise describe or extract information from.

Besides presuming arbitrary infinite sequences that require no generating function and thus cannot schematize any operations to the number field, such that no information can be extracted from them, (meaning they do not ‘exist’) we also encounter numerous computational issues with the idea of infinite series. Information cannot be infinitely compressed; depending on what compression scheme we make use of over any arbitrary symbol set, there is a certain finite number of numbers we can write down in the universe. Of course, whatever number that might be, there are infinitely many more numbers than there are numbers that can be written down or more generally accessed by us, even utilizing a Godel-numbering scheme over a ‘constructible universe’ and given the most optimal means of encoding data, namely a Turing-complete, algorithmically unconstrained notation for which the total execution-time of every number from 0 to inf, should it be output as the result of some program, is obtained by a Matrioshka brain whose processing speed and computational capacity are limited only by the fundamental thermodynamic laws and in no way by any programmatic or architectural inefficiency, along with the ability to inscribe the characters of this notation at the Planck scale; there are, in other words, more ‘complex’ or un-compressible numbers than there are expressible or ‘compressible’ numbers. One would imagine the complexity of numbers, that is, their information content, to gradually climb toward higher and higher density as one counts higher and higher, enumerating numbers that require more and more symbols to be written down regardless of notational finesse, and finally those whose expression demands memory resources beyond those accessible to us even given the most efficient means of compressing data. Yet, this is not the case; while density does tend to increase as the number increases, sudden decreases in complexity can sporadically appear, such that any number between n and K has a probability of being expressible, with most numbers being in fact inexpressible. We observe this tendency toward increasing density at the linear scale as the Kolmogorov complexity of two computable lower bound functions iterated logarithmically, which tells us that most strings of symbols (most numbers) cannot be compressed to any meaningful degree, though we also observe the sporadic exceptions to the general trend in the appearance of expressible numbers whose existence Chaitin had recognized while developing his own version of the incompleteness theorem: the incompressibility (by extension, the inexpressibility) of a string cannot be proven formally if the complexity of that string rises beyond a certain point,- a theorem constructed self-referentially given an axiomatic system over the natural numbers in which a formula can be articulated that we associate to assertions about the complexity of strings which, if provable from those axioms, proves the corresponding assertion, and therefor yields in the structure of such proofs a certain Godel numbering beyond the ‘certain point’ we are considering. The same theorem can be obtained in another way. Consider the fact that we know polynomial-time algorithms exist for classes of graphs that are closed under minors because each of these classes has a finite obstruction set of forbidden minors, as per the Robertson & Seymour graph minor theorem,- but we do not know what these algorithms are for each class, because the constructive proofs of such algorithms would require us to first know the finite obstruction set of forbidden minors for the given class about which a proof is made. Thus we are led to another conclusion regarding the number of elements in these possible sets of forbidden minors: there may exist optimal polynomial-time algorithms with just the kind of un-writable constants in them we have noted here, that is, algorithms that make use of a number of abstract representatives for their finite obstruction set on their order,- the order of these mind-boggling numbers whose complexity ensures they cannot be written down in our universe, even if we were to somehow write them at the Planck scale, simply because most numbers between n and K are precisely in their range. It follows that most algorithms between n and K make use of those numbers as constants. Even if an optimal polynomial-time algorithm exists, we cannot construct a proof for it if the constant used in it N crosses the threshold beyond which the Godel-numbering of the proof would exceed K. The probability that one of the constants in this range happens to be sporadically expressible is as close to zero as a number can be; as long as the constant is inexpressible, which it almost certainly is, the optimal polynomial-time algorithms that make use of it are inexpressible, that is, their solutions have proofs that cannot themselves be compressed in polynomial time. [/size] [/i]

[size=85]This returns us to the ‘radical’ or ‘chaotic’ complexity of the natural numbers and the ‘heterogeneous infinity’ they express once these numbers are stripped from certain entangling schematisms and expressed, for example, in their pure primality, or as a pure series of powers. To reveal this primality or ‘exponential complexity’ we can first quantify it conceptually. We define this exponential complexity as the minimum number of symbols making up any arithmetical expression that evaluates to a number N. We can establish this minimum lexigraphy using the following symbols: 0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,+×^(), where the last five symbols signify addition, multiplication, exponentiation, and two parentheses for the purposes of enclosure. For example, the number 18 would have an exponential complexity of 2, since the minimum number of symbols we can use to express that value is 2. The complexity value of 1024, however, would not be 4, as we might expect, but 3, for we can more efficiently write this value as 4^5: four-exponent-five, which has the value of 1024. Since this expression only requires three symbols, we conclude that 1024 has an exponential complexity of three. The number 371293 requires only four symbols in this lexigraphy, 13^5, so it has a complexity value of four, which varies a great deal from its direct expression as 371293, which uses six symbols. We could augment the characters 0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9 with only one operation, signifying prime decomposition, to measure the ‘primal complexity’ of the natural numbers, in which case we would take any number and decompose it into its prime factorization, such that the number 43357 can be written with seven symbols: 191x227. A single number beyond this, 43358, however, requires nine symbols: 2 x 7 x 19 x 163. A few steps further, the number 43360, requires 15 symbols: 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 x 5 x 271. Yet one step beyond that number, 43361, requires only seven symbols: 131 x 331. Jumping forward a great distance, to 4336157, we have a number that requires only seven symbols: 7 x 7 x 88493. Yet adding one to this to get 4336158 yields a number that requires twelve symbols: 2 x 3 x 277 x 2609. One more than this, 4336159, is itself a prime number, and so we find that it can be expressed using only the digits that make it up, requiring only seven symbols. Yet one more than that, 4336160, requires eighteen symbols: 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 x 5 x 41 x 661. We observe, using either lexigraphic system, that the complexity of the natural numbers indeed increases as we count further and further, (most numbers, no matter how they are compressed, cannot be expressed in our universe, even if we wrote their symbols down on individual atoms) but it does not smoothly increase as one moves up the continuum,- a continuum that also reveals to us, even more surprisingly, the existence of very large numbers, that is, numbers further and further along in the natural sequence,- numbers sharing their informational neighborhood with unfathomable sequences of proximal numbers whose complexity ensures that we could never write them down or gain access to them,- that sporadically drop down to a complexity level that we can access, (numbers that we are able to express in our universe) all of this indicating that the informational-content of the natural numbers is not uniformly dense; it explodes non-continuously, heterogeneously, non-hierarchically, and without any definite pattern we have been able to understand. The obvious question would be: why is the informational contents of the continuum, regardless of the lexigraphic scheme we use to enumerate the natural numbers, not uniform in its complexity value? Or further: what is the meaning of the patterns expressed in the distribution of that value, should such patterns exist? Simply altering our notion of proximity, as per the p-adic number system, and so redefining the mathematical congruency whereby we impose some ordering scheme over the rationals, will not allow us to gain any deeper insight into the continuum as it exists outside of all such artificial symbolic conventions, all such entangling schematisms. Interesting and even quite useful patterns emerge from the p-adic ordering scheme, patterns with great import for number-theory in particular,- as well as many monstrous challenges, like fields that are not even locally compact,- but these patterns are still the result of our artificial schematisms, not the continuum itself; whatever true patterns exist involve this distribution of complexity and informational content, about which we know precisely nothing. Answers to things like the Collatz or ABC conjecture require a new mathematics and an understanding of these deeper patterns. }

The ABC conjecture is precisely about this, the relationship of numbers generated by addition and those by multiplication, and it remains unsolved because that relationship, which is really about the operations themselves from which the two classes of number are produced, is not understood; a state of conceptual conflation or what Mochizuki calls an entanglement of “the two underlying combinatorial dimensions of a number field, which may be thought of as corresponding to the additive and multiplicative structures of a ring or, alternatively, to the group of units and value group of a local field associated to the number field”. This is the case for all of the fundamental mathematical operations,- they are conceptually ambiguated. The local structures (viz. the natural numbers) and global structures (things like prime numbers) encoded by the mathematical operations, in other words, exist in an indeterminate, confused state awaiting disentanglement; the contained ‘semantic content’ that exists between the two levels of abstract structure remains latent at the second episteme, unextracted and yet to be reincorporated at a higher abstract level, namely that of the third episteme,- an incorporation at a higher abstract level attempted in IUT, regarding the operations of addition and multiplication, through the construction of Hodge theaters where deformations of objects (distinctions of local structures) translated from one to another model or ‘theater’ are calculated inside a log shell and removed from Qs and number fields, and then gathered into a kind of ‘inter-universal’ container that can be inserted into and removed from multiple theaters in order to measure and equalize the translational variance of objects through a process of strategic deformation of those objects. The integration of latent semantic content will not be achieved until a new model of the continuum is developed, one extended ‘axiologically’ beyond Peano arithmetic. Until then, we will be faced with a never-ending litany of imponderables. As Wittgenstein observed, set-theoretical mathematics has been constructed through a combination of laws, developed from symbolic logic, and axioms, freely chosen programmatically,- two things that have been utilized in parallel, with axioms serving to make up for the conceptual gaps in the laws, and the laws in their turn making up for deficiencies in the axioms, only further entangling semantic layers with each leap toward greater generalization from that convoluted foundation. In other words, the issue is one of circular argumentation; when asked to define a function, the analyst will happily do so in terms of a rule, yet when the same analyst is asked to define a rule, he will define it in terms of a function. The kind of questions created (like the Riemann zeta hypothesis) through this entanglement are not so much questions as they are manifestations of defects in our fundamental concepts. They are the result of an entangled semantics leading us to formulate questions that, appearing to make sense syntactically, or at one level of abstraction, do not actually signify anything, containing no latent semantic content that can be reintegrated. They’re not questions, they are malformed statements semantically entangled in concepts; concepts that, once clarified and reified in higher global structures, will lead to the development of an entirely new system in which questions of this sort are not answered, but simply disappear into the greater horizon opened up by the expansion of the space of representation available to the first episteme, that is, cease to be questions, as those structures about which they have been ventured are themselves reunified, following local differentiation and sublation, into new singularities. [Note that Solomon Feferman similarly proposed a novel theory of mathematical definiteness grounded in a semi-intuitionistic sublogic that applies classical logic only to bounded quantifiers, using intuitionistic logic for unbounded quantifiers, such that any proposition designated ϕ can be said to be ‘definite’, that is, to possess a truth value, only if the semi-intuitionistic sublogic can prove ϕV¬ϕ, such that many famous problems like the continuum hypothesis would simply be malformed statements lacking any truth value one way or another. His use of two logics, one for bounded and one for unbounded quantifiers, again suggests the same semiotic process found in Grothendiek’s use of projective and injective norms and Mochizuki’s Frobenius and etale-like portions of a Frobenioid, though this logical partition is not, in Feferman, later sublated as an arbitrary differentiation on local objects, or re-encoded by a codeterminate form on some higher abstract or ‘global’ structure with which the semantic content of those local objects can be ‘disentangled’ as ‘congruent representations’.

In fact all ‘problems’ in all fields of knowledge, be it mathematics or philosophy or ethics, are the result of an analogous deficiency revealed through an application of Pierce’s semiotics, that is, the very same more fundamental problem related to the existence of concepts entangled at different epistemes. In order to realize a total incorporation of latent semantic content, the distinctions of separate local structures must be clarified, these differences reunified by global structures inside a codeterminate form, and then this codeterminate form must be reencoded in two or more abstract levels between which a congruent representation can be delineated, out of which a new ‘object’ can be defined as a correspondence between multiple abstract levels, fully completing the semiogenetic circuit through the three active epistemes. Returning to mathematics, new axiologies must be introduced, one for each of the operations and foundational concepts, just as addition was grounded in Peano’s axioms, so that models of the operations can be developed in isolation. Once these isolated models are developed, local structures can be mapped from one to another model, a process that will reveal and clarify the distinctions of the local structures inasmuch as the mappings will not be complete and isomorphic; indeterminacies will be created in the attempt to translate local structures across different models, just as there are certain indeterminacies introduced by higher polynomials that violate Helmut Hasse’s local–global principle, that is, higher polynomials whose equations cannot be solved over both the real number system and the p-adic number system for every prime P,- polynomials whose equations cannot be perfectly mapped from one to another model, such that a solution in one model does not secure any determinate value in the other. Once the distinctions of local structures are clarified in this way they can be removed through the ad hoc introduction of an arbitrary ‘artificial differentiation’ that equalizes our results by surjection once it is sublated, to finally be reunified as an ‘anamorphic projection’ by emergent global structures inside codeterminate forms that correlate the different indeterminacies created by a series of translations that can be systematically carried out in a process of intentional disfigurement, much as visual anamorphosis clarifies a distorted image by framing it at multiple arbitrary vantage points, accumulating the differences between those vantage points, and then equalizing them. Only then can such codeterminate forms be reencoded so as to establish a congruent representation between two or more levels of abstraction, (these levels, for Grothendiek, being defined by projective and injective norms; for Mochizuki, who we will briefly consider momentarily, they are defined by the etale-like and Frobenius-like portions of a Frobenioid as related through a Kummer isomorphism arising from cyclotomic rigidity, or more precisely, from a cyclotomic synchronization isomorphism which permits us to establish a more general relationship or ‘global structure’ between the Frobenius-like portions of independent Frobenioids once their etale-like portions are connected, a relationship whose mono-abelian transport introduces the kind of indeterminacies noted here) these new representations signifying a novel class of abstract object. In fact, this is the exact method taken by Mochizuki in his attempt to solve many conjectures like and including ABC through something he calls ‘inter-universal Teichmüller theory’, where the isolated models of operations suggested here, with their independent axiologies, are called ‘mathematical theaters’, and where the distortions and inequalities introduced by the movement across theaters and the translation of structures in one to another is accumulated inside a log shell by the theta function, whose variance is measured within a Hodge theater to the ends of redeploying new global structures and reconstructing the hopefully ‘disentangled’ continuum once the distinctions of the ‘local structures’ and the resulting indeterminacies have been fully clarified and then later sublated or ‘dropped’ from the number-field. We see that there is a single process (a movement through the epistemes) occurring in all fields of thought; philosophy, mathematics, ontology, ethics, semiotics, psychoanalysis, etc. A problem in one field corresponds to a problem in another, even if the corresponding problem has not yet been discovered by those working in its field; and a solution in one, of course, corresponds to a solution in another, even if those in that field have not yet become aware of it. All the better, we can assume the solutions in one field for ourselves, and personally reconstruct them in the field we are working in.

In short, by applying my own extension of Pierce’s semiotics to the question, (ie. the quaternary logic of the three active epistemes) we see that the truths of geometry are a priori and self-evident, while the ‘truths’ of arithmetic require us to adopt synthetic argumentation (via the assumption of the coherency of infinite addition and infinite series,- the assumption that it makes sense to infinitely repeat the operation of adding 1 to a starting number to create the number line, which is not a self-evident truth) that falls back to axiomatics under examination, (namely, the axiom of choice) leading eventually to an ‘entangled semantics’ between the two different levels of abstract structure that has further entangled the fundamental mathematical operations and concepts with one another and so prevented the semiotic chain from fully completing the loop through the three epistemes needed to clarify and extend meaningful representations of objects, a failure resulting in the production of imponderable questions that have no actual signification or ‘semantic content’, lacking any truth-value whatsoever, since such questions, like that involved in the RZF, arise only from a confused semantics. One might be naturally led to group theory in the search for some means of disentangling the confused semantics of the mathematical relations encoded by addition, multiplication, etc., given the fact that the sums of an infinite number of groups require that the constituents always have finite non-zero elements, (for, in keeping with the primary decomposition formula, every finitely generated abelian group is isomorphic to the direct sum of primary and infinite cyclic groups; equally, every Noetherian ring is a Lasker ring, and we can decompose any ideal into an intersection of primary ideals of finite number) whereas direct products of sets are not similarly bounded, and Mochizuki has sought in precisely this domain, attempting to disentangle these relations mainly through some unique extensions of Teichmuller-space and Galois groups. Beyond the ABC conjecture, for whose solution IUT was tentatively conceived, the explication of latent semantic content would give us a deeper understanding of the continuum in far more general ways. All current mathematics is, in essence, simply set-theory, which is to say that it all takes place within a single ‘theater’, a theater whose continuum is based on a model of the fundamental operation of addition. Accordingly, the modern conceptualization of a transcendental number is based on Cantor’s work, a product of set-theoretical proofs. There is some structure analogous to or correspondent with a transcendental number in each of the other theaters. To understand what a transcendental number like PI actually is, [Note. We hardly understand what it ‘actually’ is at present. Within the single theater we use, derived axiomatically, in the wake of Godel, (following the failure of Russell and Whitehead’s Principia, an attempt to ground mathematics in a complete symbolic logic) from Peano and the unary function on which basis we establish the apparent scale invariance, internal consistency, or ‘smoothness’ of the continuum through the operation of addition, it can only be grasped as an irrational number; this is not its true nature, but only the result of a defect in our theory, in just the same way that a singularity results in the mathematics we use to try and decipher what takes place beneath the event-horizon of a black hole,- a singularity that most physicists agree is not actually there, signifying nothing more than a conceptual hole in our understanding.] we would need to correlate the local differences between each of these analogues and then equalize them through an artificial differentiation that permits their global reincorporation into a codeterminate form that we can reencode on multiple independent abstract levels, with congruent representations of that codeterminant form across these levels giving us our deeper, more complete understanding of the continuum and something like transcendental numbers, the primes, etc. The relative meaninglessness of our conceptualization of irrational numbers like PI does not seem to cause us many engineering problems, for most applications only require a few digits of it, yet this issue does cause us major problems when attempting to articulate the foundations of mathematics. We can write down a formula for PI, but we do not know what it means, because we have no framework for performing actual arithmetic with it; if we want to do something like add PI and E, all we can do is say it is ‘PI plus E’ and write a new, even more ambiguous formula for it. These irrational numbers simply do not ‘fit’ in the mathematical theater we are using. However, they might fit better, or perfectly, in another theater. Most importantly, the local distinctions of such numbers, clarified between their appearance in multiple theaters, would bring us closer to the apprehension of global structure and give us the most insight into what an ‘irrational number’ truly is. A transcendental or irrational number might correspond, following this extraction of latent semantic content within the continuum, to what was earlier called a ‘metanumber’, that is, an entirely different class of object,- not a ‘number’ at all, but some object corresponding to a different axiology entirely, just as ‘numbers’ are objects corresponding to the primitive axiology of Peano’s arithmetic, (0), 0+(1)=(2), 2+1=(3), 3+1=(4), and so on. Equally interesting, in a mathematics grounded on the unary function and addition, (set theory) Tarski’s exponential function problem (which asks if the real numbers together with the exponential function is decidable; as noted earlier, the reals are just as much grounded on addition as are the naturals) is undecidable, along with the question as to whether or not the real version of Schanuel’s conjecture is true, (whose proof would confirm the decidability of that problem) for the same reason that no answer to ABC can be found within set-theoretical mathematics, namely the semantics of addition and multiplication are entangled by an improper syntax on local structures (the naturals and reals) that must be decoded into higher abstract levels between which congruent representations of objects related to global structures (exponents, primes, etc.) can be determined.[/size]

The three epistemes roughly correspond to three points in the staging of semiosis expressed in fields as diverse as philosophy, psychoanalysis, mathematics, combinatorics, computer science, etc. These three points can be understood in the following way:

  1. Encoding local and global structures, a ‘syntax’ and latent semantic content.

[size=85]Note Gorard, who has set about on a project inspired by Pierce’s existential graphs aimed at reconciling the various incongruent physical laws, at the macroscopic and quantum scale, by encoding them in hypergraphs that can themselves be transformed into Wolfram models by processing them through a rules-rewriting system that observes the Church-Rosser property, (a ‘syntax’) where a parallel network of diverging and converging lines of evolutionarily generated and simplistic automata guided by these rules give rise to more and more complex structures capable of representing the entire plenitude of quantum-relativistic phenomena,- structures from which the rules driving the system can then be decoded, in the hope that, once extracted and recomposed into abstract forms, (as ‘semantic content’) they might account for the physics observed in our own universe. Latent semantic content remains in the system, until a ‘differend’ is introduced.
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2) Decoding those structures, from an artificial differentiation or ‘differend’ introduced by Lacan’s enonce, which the accelerationists sublate to the primary-process of ‘absolute production’, into what Mazzola calls a bicategory: a codeterminate form obtained through an ‘entrelacs’, freeing semantic content from the structural inherence of the ‘lipogram’ upon any given discourse-network so that ideas might ‘cross-pollinate’ across different domains of knowledge and that semantic content might be reconstructed at the next stage in the semiogenetic loop.

[size=85]This ‘codeterminate form’ suggests the codetermination of functions, once decoded from the computation of a system’s total state-space into probabilistic transition-matrices, as isomorphic feedback and feedforward automata from which hidden symmetries and irreversible structures can be extracted, or more precisely, the isomorphy of the holonomy decomposition elaborated from Krohn–Rhodes theory,- [Nagy & Nehaniv: “Hierarchical coordinate systems for understanding complexity and its evolution, with applications to genetic regulatory networks”.] a theory inhabiting the subtle intersection of computer science, information science, and abstract algebra,- in which the ‘complexity’ of a single-valued variable is extended to a many-valued ‘structural complexity’ that measures, not the total entropy or dynamics of a system globally embedded by feedback mechanisms within an external environment, but the internal changes in complexity between one level of a system and another, namely by decomposing feedback-enabled elements within that system into finite automata and reconstructing them as feed-forward only cascades or wreath products of simpler automata, such that the decomposition, by quantifying what elements in the feedback-enabled system are sensitive to functionally arbitrary labelling schemes (reversible processes) and what are invariant (irreversible processes) under isomorphism with the feedforward system that emulates them, measures θ as the smoothness of change from one level of the cascade to another, the hierarchy of these independent levels (by this hierarchy, one refers to the propagation of irreversible processes through an automaton, as the subsets of the initial state-set induced by decomposition represents reductions in the set of future possible states) being associated to multiple variables in which we quantify complexity as “the inability to decompose a transition probability matrix into two independent processes”. As a feedforward-only system of simple automata can emulate the finite automata of a feedback-enabled system with which it is functionally isomorphic without increasing the size or entropy of the system, (by its size, one indicates the transition-probability matrix associated with its dynamics) so it happens that the changes in size (the state-space) undergone by a system in the evolution of its functions (its dynamics) in feedback with its environment, which we take as one variable, can be related to a variable we take by quantifying the isomorphy of these functions, (A measure of how many hierarchical levels of a cascade are needed to emulate the corresponding function of a feedback-enabled system whose automata they decompose. These levels are understood in more general terms as pseudovarieties of relational morphisms; see Rhodes, “The q-Theory of Finite Semigroups”. ) with the multi-variable complexity of the feedback-enabled system thus realized in the mathematical elaboration of these functions to an equivalence-class of identical state-transition diagrams of a feedforward-only system. Roughly, if the number of those equivalent functions decreases as the size of the feedback-enabled system increases, (The size of its state-space indicates the number of independent processes which constitute its behavior, that is, the flow of computation through its transition from state to state. This computation is understood as a single transition probability matrix, so that one takes account of the isomorphic automata in the cascade needed to emulate the feedback mechanisms they decompose and so perform the same computation.) then its complexity increases, for more feedforward automata are needed to emulate it; if they increase as the size of the feedback enabled system increases, its complexity decreases, for fewer feedforward automata are needed. * The number of functions needed to capture the dynamics of a feedback-enabled system embedded in an environment and model its state-space is related to the number of isomorphic functions of a feed-forward cascade needed to emulate the former system without exhausting that state-space, with this relationship indicating complexity. Another formulation of the relationship is: if the size of the state-space of a finite feedback-enabled system decreases and the number of hierarchical levels of feed-forward automata needed to emulate an isomorphic function of that system has increased, (any function indicating simply a process that leads to a transition from one state to another) then the complexity associated with that function has increased.

Note that reversible processes increase the dynamics of a system because they enlarge its state-space, (Suppressing the expression of a gene is reversible: thus it enlarges the state-space of an organism, with two states being given in the expression of that gene, or in the absence of its expression.) while irreversible ones reduce the number of the possible state-transitions through which a system evolves from one epoch to another and expresses its dynamics, (Overwriting a gene is irreversible; thus it decreases the size of the state-space of an organism, for it has fewer states it can be in after the loss of the gene occurs, as opposed to having two in the former case of suppression. It is difficult to understand how, in classical models of complexity, irreversible processes like this can still lead to increases in apparent complexity or dynamics, despite shrinking the state-space of the system they occur in. Measuring the size of the state-space in response to reversible and irreversible processes, like simply activating genes or adding or subtracting from the information of a genome, does not strongly indicate the complexity of the organism.) thereby limiting the number of states which the simpler automata must emulate and decompose into independent isomorphic feedforward-only processes, such that, if more of these automata are still needed to emulate a system when the size of its state-space has diminished, (if more feedforward hierarchical levels are needed) it can be inferred that it has become more complex, with the hierarchy expressed by these levels within the feedforward cascade revealing a kind of ‘hidden complex structure’ that is not captured by single-variable analysis. (A ‘latent semantic content’.) In essence, we take any phenomenon and model it with some number of finite feedback-enabled automata. We then decompose those automata into simpler automata and measure their isomorphy, that is, the number of functions (state-transitions) of the feedback-enabled automata that can be isomorphically reproduced by processes in the simple feedforward automata, or in other words, the number of levels of these feedforward automata needed to emulate the system or any given function of the finite feedback-enabled automata without increasing the size of its state-space. If the isomorphy decreases, more feedforward levels are needed; if it increases, fewer levels are needed, such that the question is one of taking the isomorphy as a variable and relating it to other variables, like the entropy of a system, the size of the state-space of the feedback-enabled automata constituting the original complex phenomenon, etc. [/size]

  1. Re-encoding that codeterminate form with something analogous to Grothendieck’s projective/injective norms or Mochizuki’s Frobenius-like/etale-like portions of a Frobenioid. [Besides giving us a mathematical example of this semiotic process, the later utilizes stratagems equivalent not only to the Lacanian enonce or ‘artificial differentiation’, but also those equivalent to the metaleptic technique of ‘anamorphosis’, that is, the equalization of local structures accumulated as difference (that is, divergences from that artificial differentiation; these accumulations are made inside of a log-shell, for Mochizuki) through a series of deformational translations from one level of abstraction to another, whose various recompositions can be iterated algorithmically in order to reveal something about the more global structure of those independent levels. More precisely, by using the theta-function to measure the variance of an object through deformational translation across independent ‘theaters’,- (The theta function essentially maps a Frobenioid-like attachment of one theater to another by transporting objects across them via Kummer isomorphisms, ie. a ‘monoabelian transport’ that equips an elliptic curve to the number field by first recovering the information needed for the reconstruction of the elliptic from some ‘extra structure’ inherited in the category of the Frobenioid, much as the Karoubi envelope or idempotent completion of a category over a finite field allows one to obtain a category of homological motives from its correspondences for which the Kunneth decompositions of diagonals are available, if it were possible in the later case to generalize the relative diagonal, as the sufficiently transverse degeneracy locus of a vector bundle, to other families like that of projective curves; much as the decomposition results of certain classes of bands into semilattices with higher arities or of semigroups into more general structures with additional properties admit various composition schemes on these structures that reveal something about an initial complexity understood in terms of an underlying combinatorial symmetry irreducible to group-theoretic conceptualizations of order. The theta-function, in so many words, generalizes to the number-field itself the kind of canonical deformations made on the holomorphic structure of a finite-type hyperbolic Riemann surface characterizing the p-adic liftings of Teichmuller theory, where one of the two dimensions of the Riemann surface are dilated while the other is left undisturbed, such that Frobenioids can be understood to similarly allow one to deform the more general arithmetic holomorphic structure of the number field by dilating one of the two underlying combinatorial dimensions of a ring arising as a localization of its multiplicative and additive properties, 1 namely through those operations involving the multiplicative monoids that are incompatible with the additive properties of that field.) each theater modelling in its turn a fundamental ring-theoretic or scheme-theoretic arithmetical operation in isolation, eg. addition and multiplication, collectively representing a nested hierarchy of mathematical universes,- and storing that variance (the result of operations involving these monoids, quantified more precisely as a series of indeterminacies 2) inside a log-shell that can later be dropped from the number field,- that is, sublated (precisely as an ‘artificial differentiation’) in order to expose the etale-like rigidities of certain Galois groups that pass freely and without distortion between theaters and in this way produce a splitting of the nested mathematical universes they encode such that the positive algebraic geometries corresponding to them (these geometries themselves correspond more generally to the Teichmuller representatives of a Witt ring) become visible (in terms of these rigidities) and can be read sequentially,-- much as the ‘non-Schurian association scheme’ that can be obtained by dilating skew-Hadamard matrices * renders visible a certain combinatorial symmetry irreducible to the group-theoretic language or transitive permutations in which the geometrical object used to generate any such scheme by a sequence of mergings on the Bose-Mesner or Terwilliger algebra ** can only be indexed by posets arising from the commutative-associative crossing operator corresponding to a 2-element antichain and the associative nesting operator,- *** an irreducible combinatorial symmetry understood, for example, as corresponding to a biaffine coherent configuration obtained via the intransitive action of the Heisenberg group,-- **** so the more general inequality of those theaters themselves is obtained via this splitting, (much as one obtains, from the Souriau theorem or barycentric splitting of the primary space by a Heisenberg group, an ‘extra structure’ that is encoded on a fiber by the hamiltonian action normalizing it, permitting the symplectic translation of the Mackey obstruction and thus an extension of representation theory to geometry, as well as the recovery of information on that special fiber through the use of more scheme-theoretic techniques and log structures, like the log-shells utilized by Mochizuki to recover his reconstruction results) ***** which can be used to readdress other inequalities like that about which the ABC conjecture is ventured, namely the unequal distribution of primes. The fact that the same strategy is employed in pure mathematics as we have found employed in semiotics, psychoanalysis, philosophy, etc. should not be too surprising, for once again, the metaphilosophy of the epistemes is intended to reveal all forms of knowledge, in all fields of discourse, as perfectly reconciled to each other; to inter-relate all fields of discourse with all other fields through a grand process occurring within all of them,- a metalepsis from psychoanalysis to ontology, from ethics to abstract math, from economics to aesthetics, from Heyting algebra to hermetic alchemy.] The legitimacy of representation (‘meaning’) is established as a representational congruence, a correspondence or ‘ectype’ of semantic content across multiple levels of abstraction; (much as Galois groups, resisting the distortion of the number-field, serve as an ectype or stable representation moved across multiple theaters) phenomenologically conceived, we have two levels of abstraction that ultimately refer to an intrinsic and extrinsic reality, a subjective consciousness and objective world, a phenomenologically enclosed and coherent experience included by the Sign, and all that is excluded from the ‘dominion of the Sign’ viz the universe. It is important to note that the Lacanian psychoanalytic does not reach that point in the semiotic chain where the ‘artificial differentiation’ (understood in that context as Lacan’s enonce) is sublated in order to reframe the legitimacy of representation and ground anything analogous to what we call here the ‘ectype’, such that all representation, for Lacan,- no matter how metaphysically edified and seemingly ennobled by the pretension to philosophy,- amounts only to variations of the object petit a, (a series of inflationary ego-ideals) that is, a mechanism by which the subject sustains its ‘primary fantasy’ through an endless deferral of the Other, mobilizing, in place of any true mode of representation, an endless chain of metonyms that forever prohibits the admission of the truth of thanatos and thereby conceals the Real within the impermeable symbolic core given by the ‘nonsignifying sign’ that stabilizes the endless discourse of the psychic registers in which the Real participates only as a shadow.
    [size=85]1. Concerning this localization of the structure of a ring from the internal combinatorics of the number-field, note Ryba, in “Stable Grothendieck Rings of Wreath Product Categories”. Just as one can, from the category of finite-dimensional modules of a Hopf algebra over an algebraically closed field, form the categories whose Grothendieck groups inherit the structure of a ring via their wreath products, so one can form the category of Frobenioids over an algebraically closed field whose multiplicative monoids inherit the structure of a ring via the theta-function, thereby isolating the multiplicative properties of that field, in keeping with the main aim of IUT,- that aim being the disentanglement of these properties and the formation of a ‘theater’ in which to conduct operations involving one or another property alone. Likewise, from the finite-dimensional modules of a Terwilliger algebra over a closed field, one can form the category whose Heisenberg groups inherit the structure of a ring (specifically, the structure of a non-Schurian S-ring) via their intransitive permutations, isolating certain cyclic properties of the field (Indeed, S-rings have been utilized to obtain deep results on circulant graphs: see Johnson, “Group Matrices, Group Determinants and Representation Theory; the Mathematical Legacy of Frobenius”; “S-Rings, Gelfand Pairs, and Association schemes.”) whose topological extension possesses these rings for all of its open sets.

A note on this final example concerning the abstract category of certain Terwilliger -modules noted above and a possible use for it. Once the last proton decays and entropy reaches its maximum value, the actual structure of time itself collapses; saying that a moment came before that final instant is as meaningless as saying a moment comes after it. There is no difference between going forward and going backward in time when entropy has reached its maximum. It makes as much sense to say the beginning of the universe is after that point as it does to say the end of the universe is beyond that point; it makes as much sense, in other words, however seemingly paradoxically, to call that moment of maximum entropy, at which point the universe ends, the moment of the big bang, when the universe is created, for they are identical. The beginning and end are entangled in that moment. That moment of final, culminating entropy is identical to the first instant of creation, from the vantage of any particle rocked upon the homogenously distributed quantum foam left behind with the wreckage of eternity, for which the flow of time has been twisted into an intransitive structure. It may be possible to mathematically describe this bizarre temporal structure through the use of a mathematics which permits one to isolate certain properties of the number-field related to these intransitive permutations.

  1. A note concerning the role of these indeterminacies, or local structures accumulated as difference, as it relates to what we have discussed earlier regarding Mazzola and the hyperdialectic. The logic of Lacanian predication, when viewed through the lens of the Piercean semiotic, allows the interpretant of one sign to become the object of another sign and vice versa, enclosing signs in concatenative strings analogous to the enclosure of a simplicial set for a topological space obtained from gluings of the simplices that make it up, such that the bicategory discussed earlier in this text would serve as a generalization of those simplicial sets which possess composition operations obtained by first reversing them sequentially and then sending their non-degenerate objects to the bicategory, (by these non-degenerate objects one means to indicate the pairs of signs within a given sequence that are not nullified by the reversal of predication) where a further operation on the object of that bicategory would decode their coverings and yield new corresponding elements as their extensions in a process corresponding to the liberation of new tertiary identities at the third episteme from the chain of predications viz. metalepsis. Note that in both Piercean semiotics and Grothendieck’s theory of higher-categories the uniqueness-quantifier of such extensions on bicategories is not obtained, and so neither is the uniqueness-quantifier of the composition on these bicategories; here, continuity itself is the result of indeterminacies introduced by composite structures which, when mapped homotopically to determinate composites, much as Mochizuki maps the Frobenioid-like attachment of independent theaters, produce the continuum through a ‘projective normalization’ as the ‘general category’ of a ‘relation’, (much as the Frobenioid is the general category of its monoids) that is, a dialectical movement between the two members of a relation for which an equivalence is obtained, in Grothendieck’s account, by continuously deforming one member of the relation into the other through the action of some object of the bicategory which decodes its coverings and so recovers a normal category we can associate it to viz. its homotopy category, (as the Galois group decodes the attachments it passes over into an etale-like rigidity that splits independent theaters and isolates their inequalities, for such rigidities are intransitive, that is, they do not conform to the ordering-scheme imposed on them by the theater through which they continuously extend) or a process of ‘injective normalization’ which extracts the intrinsic content of the relation, (much as the intrinsic content of the epistemes is extracted through continuous trichotomous iteration, or what Pierce calls a meditative ‘phaneroscopy’) or, in Mazzola’s account, by means of an infinite factorization of the ‘exponential factors’ belonging to the object of the bicategory which constitutes it also as the object of a hypergesture,- a hypergesture for which the intrinsic content indexed (in Grothendieck’s approach) by a codomain into which this object’s morphisms biject cannot be maintained.

    Thus, if a sign’s status as interpretant or object of another sign is encoded as 0 or 1, and we reverse a string of signs 011101, we obtain the string 101110, such that redundant terms nullify each other or cancel out (a process we can notate with elements of an inner product space defining vectors or binary relations) and produce the final string as the reversal: 1010. These cancelations represent the sublation of the differend or non-signifying signs that serve the discourse network lipogramatically, for the purposes of stabilization. The four signs in the final string would then be sent as non-degenerate objects a,b,c,d (collectively noted as i, the codomain into which the morphisms of a bicategory biject) to a bicategory α in order to define a function on an object of that bicategory n (a function formally defined as αn/i and regarded as the subfunctor of αn) as an extension to its simplice composition from s1 to s2, these representing the final reversed string and another simplicial set it is being mapped to. The maps assigned to this composition in s1 to s2 are indeterminate, and the homotypy category of α permits a continuous function from s2 to h2, from that second set to the homotype, representing the dialectic whereby intrinsic knowledge is gradually extracted from the codomain i and indeterminate forms are made determinate through continuous iteration, viz. Pierce’s tinctures, or a ‘phaneroscopy’.

    Knowledge is, in a word, developed from such indeterminacies or ‘ethical tears’. There is a quite simple arrangement to be found for a new ethic, an ethic of exigency and indeterminacy-- the philosopher points out these symbolic tears, and the saint endures them. To point them out is one thing, but to endure them may perhaps require us to conceive of the relationship between the tear or gap and the whole in dynamic terms, as a dunamis; the relation between gap and whole, between tear and solid, when carefully conducted, can become, instead of a kind of disintegration, instead of aorgic rupture or ‘dying’, a relationship more like that between the sponge, filled with holes, and the water that passes through it to nutrify it, or lungs contracting while breath passes through them to animate the living organism, etc., that is, a kind of organicism that allows the whole and the solid to integrate the gap and evolve, to plastify and reshape themselves through the kind of interpolating dialectic detailed in this essay, and finally venture new forms of life that defy the dominating influence of Totality which Levinas calls ‘eternal war’. In fact this potentiality or dunamis for new forms of life torn from the fury of the elements, the potential for life itself inside of an otherwise sterile and barren universe whose entropic bent defies all movement toward organization: that potential, somehow inherent to Being, is the secret impulse buried in the ‘night of the world’ that all true philosophy seeks to incorporate and vitalize, to un-bury, to spread from star to star throughout all the universe in Schelling’s words, such that Thought, identifying itself with this very potential and indeterminacy, might spread itself to all Creation, and so convert all of matter into Thought, into Consciousness, into determinate form. That is why I have called my new ethics a ‘speculative ethic’, for the venturing of such new forms is the task. Not all of these new forms of life will be able to achieve self-regulation, (what I would, departing from bio-physiological language, call a level of daemonicism) they will die, but they die in service of the divine Mind they would bring forth, more and more into the dregs of material existence; thus the saints, who must bear their ‘ethical tears’. What both the philosopher and saint share is what I call, taking Giordano Bruno’s term from the philosophy of the daemon, a ‘mens heroici’, or heroic mind- the prerequisite for becoming either of the two. Thus, as I have elsewhere written, this speculative ethic, opening itself up to venture new forms of life against the Totality, distinguishes itself from both Heidegger and Marx’s approaches, insofar as these ‘new forms’ are more concrete than the fully abstracted ‘das Man’ of Heidegger which is impermeable to all sociological critique, yet not so concrete that they make themselves vulnerable to the same kinds of phenomenological critique as Marx’s ‘species-essence’.
  • Hanaki, “Association schemes obtained by doubling of skew-Hadamard matrices are non-schurian”.
    ** Matsumoto & Ogawa, “Wreath products and projective system of non Schurian association schemes”.
    *** Bailey, “Generalized wreath products of association schemes”.
    **** Gyurki & Klin, “Some new non-Schurian association schemes on 2p2 points, p an odd prime, and related combinatorial structures”.
    ***** For more on the ‘splitting’ obtained via extra structure on the primary-space, see Ziegler & Iglesias-Zemmour, “Primary Spaces, Mackey’s Obstruction, and the Generalized Barycentric Decomposition.” Note also: Ziegler & Ratiu, “Symplectic Induction, Prequantum Induction, and Prequantum Multiplicities”; Zogyi Li, “The Mackey Obstruction and the Coadjoint Orbits”.[/size]

Symbolic interruption, whereby the force of opposition is reasserted as unabsorbed negativity, then enlarges the representational space available to local and global structures, initiating an endless feedback loop of semiotic production through these three stages by liberating the site of exception’s ‘missing third identity’ as a new axiology through an interpolating dialectic supervening upon its own object. For Lacan this cannot occur and instead we get an ‘endless deferral’ eg. of the Other to the object petit a. For accelerationists, (taking the dialectic itself as the object of the dialectic) the process of dialectical interpolation is self-sublimed and consequently all representation reduced to a single vocity, a singular intensity of production obliterating all conceptual distinctions and returning us to the first episteme, an irrecoverable ontological ground-zero, an ultimately decoded syntax.

These stages roughly follow this order of logical form:

  1. The nomological/metaphorical. The Sign cleaves, axiologically, the space of representation; a space within which a rudimentary nomos (a subdomain of the domain of the Sign in which any particular semiotic network functions as a discourse) is deployed through a ‘connective form’ [Concerning these concepts appropriated from biosemiotics and connective modelling, refer to Sebeok & Danesi: “The Forms of Meaning”, P. 38: 1.6.1., “The Metaform”.] representing an abstraction with a concrete,- (An example of such a ‘metaform’ would be “Just look at her theory; it is really something!” Ibid. Here the concept of ‘someone’s theory’ is represented by the concrete concept of seeing something; ‘understanding’ is represented by the concept of sight.) a rudimentary metaphorical construct containing two parts, that is, two domains, namely the domain of the Sign, in which the abstraction is grounded, (‘her theory’) and the domain of the subset of the domain of the sign or nomos, (‘just look’) a ‘target domain’ belonging to the abstraction on the one hand, and a source domain belonging to the concrete that we take as the ‘source’ of the metaphorical concept on the other “because it enfolds the class of vehicles” (forms with concrete signifieds) that deliver the meaning of the metaform". [Ibid.]
  2. The allegorical/metonymic. Within a more highly developed nomos, multiple concrete signifieds will become enfolded by the same source domain: the ‘allegory’ clarifies and unfolds these conceptual entanglements into a single abstraction, utilizing for its representation some concrete process staged within time to incorporate multiple sources as metonyms and ‘alchemically’ decrypt’ or ‘decode’ abstractions whose meanings have become more and more deeply concealed by the discourse network, (viz. impermeable to analytically reductive metaforms) requiring hermeneutical excavation. This is done by taking each metonym as a part representing the same whole, this whole referring to precisely that singular concrete process from which the meaning of the ambiguated abstraction is unearthed.
  3. The tautegorical/mnematic. The nomos, as a subdomain of the domain of the Sign, can become so ‘decoded’ as to represent its own insufficiency to the Sign, that is, the fact that it is a partition of a larger domain it cannot circumscribe. This representation is a tautegory. In the tautegory, we see that the ‘enfolding’ and ‘unfolding’ of signifieds and abstractions represents the very ‘tension’ of opposing forces that give rise to it as a representation that is its own object, an object that is its own representation, or what Walter Benjamin called a ‘dialectical image’ that freezes in itself the very process of dialectical transformation that produced it, ‘imaging’ or ‘crystallizing’ difference in a unity of contrasting elements while revealing unity in those different elements as a ‘historico-epistemological’ constellation; a concrete that is its own target domain, and an abstraction that is its own source domain. For Schelling, this self-generating symbolic loop introduces us to the Mythos, from whose mysterious depths the entire host of a culture’s greatest symbolisms are derived,- their pantheon; a mythos that, in Vico’s analysis, intercedes upon the Logos (as a mytho-logos, a mythology) and propagates the ‘circulus’ of History within it, a hypomnematic form (appropriating Stiegler’s terminology) that both enables a people to pass down their history as a vital cultural transmission and conditions the representation of that history, latently inscribing a secret ‘fatum’ through the underlying ‘techne’ of the representation that it must follow in a repetition of successive dramatic epochs or ‘ages’ through which the narrative of the hypomneme is developed. As the allegorical narrative (following Benjamin’s analysis of the Trauerspiel) deciphers abstractions from the nomos by leveraging the concrete and particular, so the mnematic form enciphers concretes in the logos (producing a self-replicating or mimetic symbolic loop) by leveraging abstractions and the universal.

The ‘interpolating dialectic’ activates metalepsis, fulfilling the dream of the zairja,- namely the production of an unlimited semiosis and a kind of ‘ars’, as Bruno would have it: an ars for the generation of novel ideas, a kind of metaphilosophy; an ars which, encapsulating the fundamental movement of Mind as a mode of inter-relationship interpolated upon its object, teaches us how to philosophize by philosophizing. Beginning with any random permutation of three of the nine typological constructs we have used to model the dialectical triads, (what, for the zairja, would be an aleatory input,- a randomization event; though one can of course deliberately permute constructs as they will, just as we did when developing, following Pierce’s existential graphs, the ten permutations that specifically designated the entermeshings of the outer dialectic) namely ‘prohodos, epistrophe, mone, comparatio, remotio, excess, lepsis, methexis, and mone’, one works this sequence through the three epistemes and the processes outlined in this essay corresponding to them,- processes during which the permutation gradually self-clarifies itself over a series of new permutations taking it as an initial state to be iterated upon, generating new informational content and higher-resolution determinate forms. I prefer to call this dialectic ‘cyclognomic’ and its practice ‘spirognomy’. The classification of knowledge as a triadic typology correspondent with the three faculties of the soul is a more antique prefiguration of Pierce’s semiotic strategy and the three active epistemes, outlined by Gemma as something he called the ‘cyclognomic art’ or ars cyclognomia, further prefiguring the development of Yeats’ Gyraldian spirograms by a radical system he claimed could reconcile Aristotle with Plato, and Plato with Galen. The reconciliation he aimed at is much the same as that recapitulated by the wielders of the zairja and Schelling,- a reconciliation of all forms of knowledge,- the great Renaissance ideal of a ‘universal science’ championed by Ficino, following his rediscovery of the Neoplatonists, by the Hermetic philosophers, etc.

The ‘entangled semantics’ characterizing modern maths (a mathematics which boils down collectively to set-theory, riddled as it is with unresolved paradoxes that mathematicians, because they couldn’t solve them in the 19th century, simply threw their hands up at in the 20th, falling back to defending themselves through arbitrary axioms) has led to a blockage of the semiogenetic loop, and the same problem is at work in essentially every single human discipline: philosophy, ethics, semiotics, math, even the natural sciences, etc. Through the metaphilosophy of the epistemes, I have sought to bring the underlying process being blocked, and through which all meaning is produced, into the light as itself a new object of thought; it is simultaneously what philosophy is, how philosophy philosophizes, and that about which philosophy philosophizes; the essential form of all thought interpolated upon its own object. Through it,- through this ‘metaphilosophy’, for lack of a better word,- all human knowledge can be reconciled to and integrated with all other human knowledge, just as that very reconciliation has been obtained here with regard to Schelling’s transcendental idealism, economics, Arabic zairja mysticism, Peircean semiotics, Lacanian psychoanalysis, pure maths and group theory, M. Ponty’s phenomenology, Bataille, etc. The epistemes doubly serve as a methodology for learning; it is by actually using the semiogenetic loop and iterating the trichotomies that one can convert one field of discourse into another, such that one might then teach themselves something like pure math by simply translating it into a discourse they already know like psychoanalysis- or, if that discourse is not known to them, transcendental idealism, and if not that, then any other arbitrary discourse for which they already boast some mastery. This method and the techniques elaborated here dramatically accelerate learning itself, allowing one to rapidly gain access to any field of study they want. This is, however, only a practical application of the epistemes, a praxis whose personal import must be subordinated to the theoretical, for in this grand integration of all human knowledge, so all the “problems” in the disparate fields of discourse are revealed to be expressions of the one fundamental problem the epistemes address; so it happens, that a solution in one field of discourse can be translated to a problem in another, and the problems within any one of them, translated to any and all others.

[size=85]<!> Incipit ossiae. After having read this essay, it would serve us well to very explicitly enumerate the appearances of certain concepts across multiple fields of knowledge. The “artificial differentiation” implies the occluded semantics of local and global structure on the first episteme. Local structures are, most fundamentally, simply those derived from the same axiology, while objects derived from extraneous, extended axiologies are to be considered global structures. Like the fire of Prometheus, which defines the essence of human nature in the non-human, this ‘artifice’ stabilizes the system of knowledge in what Bataille calls ‘non-knowledge’, whose origin is not merely ignorance, or the lack of knowledge, but an empty place-holder through which the dialectical force of differentiation is maintained by a sign that functions solely through the instrumentalization of a ‘pharmakon’ which, precisely as an artifice of differentiation, can be later sublated by the very process that has generated it as an epistasis so as to reverse the predication of a sign and transform a cause into an effect, a subject into an object, or vice versa, appropriating it to the semiotic network ‘auto-inductively’, codifying it as another member of language’s ‘organon’, and so traducing it for the regime under which any given nomological proscription has defined the space of representation legitimized by a discourse,- reconciling difference and returning (‘epistrophe’) particularity to the universal, multiplicity to unity, signified to signifier; this artifice serves, in a word, to stabilize the chain of signifiers and signifieds in a kind of ‘non-signifying sign’, or what Lytoard calls the differend. Like Lacan, Lyotard believes, even more forcefully, that the non-signifier will eventually crash the system of discourse in an irrecoverable symbolic gap,- (much as Bataille’s ‘accursed share’, accumulated by entropic stresses created by such gaps, must finally crash System from within, liberating the ‘missing third’ through the erotic sacrifice of an excess that is cast aside in the attempt to recalibrate the economics of reserve and prevent catastrophe,- until that catastrophe is inevitably reached and the ‘third identity’ returns the ‘truth of the first’) a more potent silence than that haunting the narrow circumscription of human understanding, from which no further knowledge can, even in principle, be ‘differentiated’; a silence from which no further word can possibly be drawn out of the abyss, like the speechlessness in which human ethics is left in the face of genocides or the indifference of universal law. This pessimism has already been addressed and overcome through the formulation of symbolic interruption, something prefigured in Levinas’ post-metaphysical metaphysics and new ethics viz., the foundation of Ethics rediscovered in Infinity instead of Being, reasserting the force of opposition as the ground for a higher mode of differentiation.

For examples of this ‘artificial differentiation’:

In Lacanian psychoanalysis, we have the enonce, the occluded truth of the lipogram. (serves to differentiate signifier and signified)
In Heidegger we have ‘das Man’, the occluded truth of Dasein. (serves to differentiate the phenomenological and sociological self, key to his dismantling of historicity, freeing a supposedly ahistorical self-consciousness from the ruination of decadent sociopolitical forces exerted upon the atomized individual and driven by techne)
In Schelling we have the Will, the occluded truth of the Remainder. (serves to differentiate the conscious and unconscious, organic and aorgic)
In Mochizuki we have the theta function, which quantifies the indeterminacies produced by an improper semantics encoded by the fundamental arithmetical operations, (serves to differentiate the additive and multiplicative aspects of the number field) that is, the movement across independent mathematical theaters, where local objects cannot be isomorphically mapped from one to another universe; the occluded truth given in the variance of independent models or mathematical theaters.

This artificial differentiation serves to reversibly encapsulate an entrelacs of local structures on the second episteme, initiating a feedback loop (a metalepsis) between local and global structure:

For Lacan this feedback is between the object petit a and the Other, in a process that leaves the Other inaccessible. It drives the endless ‘discourse of the Other’ within the symbolic registers through a series of libidinous circulations, metonyms, and deferrals.
For Grothendiek, the feedback is between projective/injective norms.
For Mochizuki, it occurs between the etale/Frobenius-like portions of a Frobenioid.
For Land, the feedback is between pure intensity/pure difference.

A codeterminate form embeds multiple local structures whose syntax has been unraveled from an entrelacs (their distinctions clarified) in a global structure at whose level of abstraction the artificial differentiation is sublated or ‘removed’ from discourse, ‘anamorphically’ projecting the codetermination from the third episteme.

Lacan: admits no codeterminate form. Absence (the Other) is permanently banned from discourse.
For accelerationists, pure productivity codetermines (quantitative) intensity and (qualitative) difference, sublating the artificial differentiation, as a secondary-process driving the development of symbolic constructs, cultures, psychological individuation, etc., to the primary-process.
For Mochizuki, the Hodge theater offers the space in which to codetermine the etale-like and frobenius-like portions of the frobenioid (roughly, the transitive and intransitive components of the frobenioid, respectively) through a series of linkages (log-link, theta-link) after the artificial differentiation,- a value generated by the theta function and stored in the corresponding log shell,- is dropped from the number field or, in semiotic-psychoanalytic terms, ‘sublated’.

This codeterminate form must be re-encoded by two or more abstract levels in which to unpack semantic content as a representational congruence of an object on those levels:

Accelerationists admit no such re-encoding.
Grothendiek attempted to reencode his projective/injective norms on the tensor space.
Mochizuki attempted to reencode his codeterminate forms as mono-abelian geometries on certain topological groups, specifically on Galois groups.

These objects, once reencoded, enlarge the space of representation, (the space for semantic content, signification) making way for the insertion of new axiologies in a continuous process of semiogenetic production, fully realizing the potential of metalepsis. [/size]

SUM FINIS

Very interesting historical analysis, on multiples level sources, and the secondary irony, beside the first one offered , specially that of the changing content between the various signs that the signifiers change into, especially These objects, once reencoded, enlarge the space of representation, (the space for semantic content, signification) making way for the insertion of new axiologies in a continuous process of semiogenetic production, fully realizing the potential of metalepsis.”

The second tier irony is which my narrative flows in an unresourceful progression.

Thanks for wohatever that’s worth.

What I have obtained is a kind of universal science, in which all fields of discourse, from abstract math to semiotics, from psychoanalysis to metaphysics to aesthetics, can all be reconciled… the epistemes allow knowledge from one field, say algebraic cohomology, to be translated to knowledge in a completely unrelated field, say Lacanian psychoanalysis. But the deeper insight is that ‘unrelated’ bit; there is nothing unrelated. Everything is related to everything else in a single semiogenetic loop from which all meaning is generated. And so I have followed that semiogenetic loop, attempting to absorb and unify all knowledge from every field, until I’ve driven myself to near insanity. Because this plenitude of relationships, this excess of knowledge, the semiogenetic loop itself, which is infinitely productive, is too much to bear perhaps for a human.

Concerning a passage near the middle of the essay, namely this one

[size=85]" This unmediated space is that in which the law of predication, that is, the Zusammenhang or inter-relationship of Nature, is suspended, such that a radical unphilosophie emerges, using Jacobi’s phrase, or a pure Negativity,- a philosophy that escapes the fate of all other philosophy in which the beginning of Reason is discovered in this original mediation of Nature,- all other philosophy in which an all-encompassing principle formalizing this inter-relationship like the Spinozist substantia is used to ground a geometrical series of fatalistic analysis as Reason pours forth its own potency into a form from which it cannot itself ever truly emerge,- into a series unfolded from this original relation through endless conditioned conditionals, determinate determinations, and what we call here predications, in which Reason enchains itself in its own productions …"
[/size]
This escape from the mediation of Nature is referring to the ‘loss’ which is irreducible to any dialectical exchange (any mediation, predication, and series of ‘conditioned conditionals’) in the very first passage in the essay, where there is described

[size=85]" … the Lossagung, [the originary ‘Loss’ of mortality] that differentiates this identity from that toward which it might be projected outwardly, in the service of whichever aim, be it good or evil,- though ultimately toward that which it might be projected infinitely, namely God, deriving for us an infinite differentiation irreducible to any series of synthetic dialectical exchanges, whose force still lies trapped, beyond the lesser differentiation of the Kantian schematism, in the ‘Unconscious of the World’. "
[/size]

Philosophy must locate its beginning in that Loss, in pure negativity, and not in the substantia or Zusammenhang of Nature.

Everything connects to everything else but I felt like pointing out this connection.

Grounding philosophy in the Lossagung, in that Negativity, speaks to the logic of predication and the logic of reversal detailed in the essay. The ‘original mediation of Nature’ corresponds to the Fall, the Sin of Knowledge, the mediation of all discourse through a differend, to which all meaning is bound in this chain of predications, of ‘conditioned conditionals’, etc., imposed with the first refusal of Negativity:

That you chose the title Epistemes, shows your motivations.
do you remember me?
I’m the one you got banned when he exposed your ignorance of Greek.
Pretentiousness conceals insecurity.
When you go out of your way to appear deeper than you are, more complex than what you are…it how did the man put it?
Muddies the water to make it seem deep.

You see ghosts in your head…you communicate with the dead.
That’s who you are.
The rest is a smokescreen.
A way to keep others at a distance so that they will not discover you…and reject you, again.
It’s a known method.
An individuals makes himself so unattractive, so difficult, as to make himself intolerable…so that he will not be hurt.

Once more…
Those who are truly complex simplify…because they understand and can express the exact same ideas with no references and no unnecessary jargon.
Those who are simple attempt to conceal their simplicity - like when you had to let me know you have experienced carnal pleasure - so that they will not be rejected…desperate to stand apart so as to explain why they do not participate.

I agree, mediocrity is fatiguing but a sophisticated man, like yourself, can learn to appreciate simplicity…like playing with your dog, or cat…even if for a little while.
Seek solitude when you tire…but show us that your mind is flexible enough to relate to what you consider beneath you.
Otherwise your reluctance exposes an inadequacy.

Again…the greats did not use lingo that was obscure…but simple. Nobody had to read tomes of books to understand them.
They reduced their insights to approachable relatable concepts…because they spoke of a shared world…not a world through another’s eyes.
Their references were not to other thinkers, but mostly to a shared world.
Thinking about thinking is not the entirety of philosophy.
One thinks of the world, directly, and then uses references to support or chalenge.

This cannot be simplified. Some things can’t. There’s no other way for me to talk about homotypy theory or Lacanian psychoanalysis. Sorry. I have no further comment.

I am curious what ‘greats’ you’re talking about? It’s not a novella it’s an academic paper dude. How else am I supposed to explain something like Mochizuki?

Qui non intelligit, aut taceat, aut discat.

Basically, just that. ^ It’s what John Dee said when people didn’t understand his Monas Hieroglyphica. It means if you don’t understand, then be silent and listen. If you are not willing to do that (to study it so that you can eventually understand it) then there is literally zero point in us interacting.

Who would bother wading through those mountains of text?

You haven’t shown any quality that would inspire them to do so.

Why do I need to read Mochizuki to understand what you are saying?
What if I bother and discover you did not understand him yourself?

You don’t know the greats
Well, you aren’t one of them…and never will.

So, basically you are interpreting someone else’s interpretation of reality…or of a subject.
An academic mind…always talks about another’s art, claiming he understood him better than anyone.

Of all the places in the world to share your perspective on Mochizuki or Lacan - who the fuck gives a shit about anything he says, the only Frenchman of modern times worth shit is Baudrillard, the rest are fags - of all the places, you chose ILP.
Why?
Because here, pretentious twat, you knew the odds of anyone having read these authors would be minimal, so nobody could call you out no matter what you claimed using them as your reference.
You came her to posture and express your disdain…
Who would bother even going through your word-walls, moron?
Why not go somewhere where they’ve read Mochizuki or Lacan to test your understanding, your interpretation of them?
But you wont, because you know you are a needy man-child.
Here you can get away with it…not elsewhere.
Here you can then display your neediness in other ways…like bragging about how brilliant and unique you are…showing off your ten-pack…talking about seeing ghosts and speaking to them.

You remind me of shit-Stain…he once claimed that he read only some obscure philosophers hoping nobody here would have read them, because the conventional philosophers were known and his idiocy would be exposed, through his motives.
Well, man-child, your motives are clear.
You seek immortality among the herd.
you seek greatness…because life has not been so great for you.

Like an artist who seeks fame and fortune, you fail…because your motives are needy and expose weakness.
You seek acknowledgment…appreciation…to compensate for how you’ve been treated in your real life.

Lol, fucking Baudrillard? Fuck off. My French fucks are better than your French fucks.

Uh huh. I come here to share philosophy because the name of the place is “I love philosophy” and I’ve been here for more than a decade, so it is quite sentimental to me. There’s not anywhere else to go really to talk about the kinds of things I am writing about or I would. There isn’t anywhere where this material is widely known or discussed. Even if there was, maybe I wouldn’t go there, as academia is full of those with whom I share, let us say, little political affinity. I think of myself as an anti-academic academic. Or maybe a rebel academic? An academic without a school? Whatever sounds cooler. In the meantime while I prepare my multi-volume work, which is now nearly 15,000 pages in length, I share bits and pieces I am actively writing here. Parenthetically, you ought to study Lacan; he is fundamental. And I’m not a Lacanian, you don’t have to champion or agree with a work in order to draw use from it. Same with Marx, I despise Marxism and yet I recognize that Marxist theory is fundamental, so I studied it as eagerly as I did anything else.

Anyways I wrote more, isolating the fundamental formalism of what I elsewhere call ‘symbolic interruption’. If you have no interest in the subject, it is not hard to not read it. It also isn’t hard to simply not interact with me. I’m not sure what you want. But if you’ve got that much of an erection and you’ve got your nutsack that wound up over the idea of me hitting back at you, I’ll humor you and give you one line: I think you’re a needy belligerent fucking idiot who for some reason has an unhealthy obsession with me and stalks me all over the place, not to engage in conversation, but to get a rise out of me. I hope that satisfies you, sexually I mean.

I wonder, are you still mad that I got you banned all those years ago? You got yourself banned by doing exactly what you do these days, it wasn’t my fault. Other than that, what else do you want me to say?

Also all this about me seeking greatness or whatever because my life was unpleasant. Eh. I have a woman, a beautiful one at that. I have known this:

I have love and plenty of drugs. I’m not really unsatisfied with life. I don’t want anything. I’ve experienced beauty. As for greatness, uh. It’s not really something I think about. Greatness names its own measure. My only goal is to advance the subjects about which I write. You may perhaps be unaware of it, but every single thing that is happening in our world, the entire political machine, is driven by this material I am writing about; theory is the substratum of the entire political machine, and no real change can come from attacking the visible surface. By writing, by working at the level of theory, I hope to create changes in the world.

Nothing else is of account.

I am nobody’s champion; the only use I have for the other works I cite, is to manipulate them as pieces to articulate my own original vision. You might notice that every single philosopher or work I cite, I am actually surreptitiously deconstructing them, playing them against one another to unmake them, and in their absence, assert my presence; the strength of my own philosophy, which levels and absorbs all others into itself. And if you engaged in my philosophy, you also would be absorbed, because there is no other philosophy but my philosophy. The epistemes are self-determining. They articulate themselves noematically, that is, by being projected on the object they are made to analyze, reconfiguring that object as part of their own emergence. Everything is part of their apparition, and they are the ground of everything. They interact with one another to create a matrix of potentials, what Pierce calls the phaneron, in which the entire plenitude of man’s cognitive order is made accessible. They are the form of thought itself interpolated upon the thinker. If you bothered to actually learn my works, you would become the zombie of their self-inductive logic. I am the prophet of a final philosophy. A philosophy that cannot be surpassed by any other, for it includes all others. I am the end of philosophy, and it is only fitting that I should know the name of every other before me, because there can be no other after me. I have found the final philosophy, a philosophy whose structure is completely self-embedded, and thus a structure into which all other possible philosophies can themselves be embedded. That self-embedded structure is what the epistemes actually are. And so I have exercised that structure to encapsulate all other works, all history, all knowledge in a single reconciled vision. A universal science that cannot be overcome.
-----------------

^ Basically I identified a self-cancellation that occurs when you combine the two main programs of speculative realism/accelerationism (Land, Bataille, etc.) and mathematical ontology. (Lacan, Badiou.)

I have no misgivings though. It will take teams of people and a century to begin to understand my work. That is why I am in no rush to be understood now. I already gave that up. I just drop pieces here when I feel sociable. I will leave behind a tome. 15,000 pages now and growing. And this work is given with

And so my philosophy distinguishes itself as life and produces its own determinate form.

Unfortunate, but as I began this post- there isn’t anywhere for me to go to discuss this material. Where do I go where there’s other experts of both semiotics and homotypy theory? Where do I go where there’s an intersection of fellow experts in all these different fields? It doesn’t exist. There’s not many who are equal to me in knowledge of even one of these fields, let alone all of them. And the whole point of my philosophy of the epistemes is this intersection, the unity and reconciliation of all forms of knowledge, all fields of discourse. Because nobody else exists that is able to combine all these fields, I require teams of specialists in them to work together to understand me. I’m not going to find that anywhere. So I gave up the desire to be understood now. I’m just going to leave my work behind after I die. In time, greater time than is afforded to my lifespan, in the future- understanding will come. I’ll be dead when that happens. And like I said, when I feel sociable, I come here to drop little pieces I feel are pretty self-contained.

Important things are in the shadows, and apparently, not many people are aware of this material. For example, this video should have 100 million views: youtube.com/watch?v=e0YBslmNCZg

But it’s got like 5 comments. Mochizuki’s work should have been expanded into an entirely new mathematics, but nobody understands it and they complain about the texts being too long. His work is like 3000-4000 pages. Pretty beafy. And my own work, sitting at 15,000 pages? Forget the idea of it being understood in this century. But that is both the curse and boon of philosophers. We live beyond our time. We live after our own deaths. That’s the way. As Seneca says, what is beyond us shapes our ends, but could we stand to bear the ends of things.

What was only an ossia is now developing into an appendix to the essay,

This is long and deserves a proper reading , the only comment I can make presents my deal or no deal choice albeit made under duress.

for me that choice comes down to the next dealt card,
the stakes raised, the affordability of going in with it and the underlying motive which can not quit, making the illusion of free choice in the matter null and void.