Evolution of ethical emotion: Compassion and empathy
For those who are unfamiliar with my terminology (i.e. everyone), let me provide a background. Orka refers to metaphysics, or what I call nihilophysics, and means ‘free energy’ in the Icelandic. Rafmagn refers to the physical realm and means ‘electrical energy’ in the Icelandic. “Oreindfauthi” refers to my redefinition of metaphysics, to spirit, and means high energy in the Icelandic. I am thinking about writing a book - I have an ethics outlined, a philosophy of aesthetics, of music especially, philosophy of psychology, etc. etc., a metaphysics which is almost in line with the occult). I am not sure whether I am going to go through with it or not; don’t know whether it is worth the time and energy. Any one have any thoughts? If I were to write it, are there even publishing companies out there that publish novel philosophy books? I am between this and writing a novel. Any response to this, or comments on the essay, would really be great. Thanks.
This is just a quick sketch I typed up a few days ago, a draft.
Before we begin to discuss the emotions - the distinction between emotions - let us first discuss evolution in terms of psychic development. In the realm of nihilophysis, emotions are understood as the constitutive part in the whole of the psyche, (which in its totality is the self in Jungian terminology), with the other half as somatic feeling, which I refer to as the mirror psyche (that which receives, or experiences, the psyche). In the philosophy of Schopenhauer, the former refers to will and the other to representation. For how would the organism even know of emotion without the empirical feeling in the somatic membrane? Knowledge of will is impossible without physical representation to begin with. Emotion is never devoid of feeling and feeling never devoid of emotion so long as there is a lack of centered synthesis in oreindfauthi. To begin with, the evolution of a psyche cannot possibly take place without the intellectual recognition, or a self-consciousness, of a distinction of emotion as experienced in somatic feeling. The expansion of a vocabulary, or any other sort of representation - in art perhaps - is representative of the evolution of the human mental activity as a response to certain phenomena. Evolution, if it has anything to do with the development of the psyche (or perhaps just a more subtle recognition of the psyche) would trace an evolution of the emotions – or rather, a particularization. More precise emotions would begin to be represented by new words. Sharp distinctions would be made as in compassion and empathy. In the philosophy-mathematique of Archimedes, an infinite number of symbolic combinations would be the resultant of a finite set of symbols. Take two symbols for instance: C & E. We could go on indefinitely in symbolic combinations: CE, EC, ECECE, CEEEECEE, ECEEEC, etc. Well, in the case of language, this would obviously get out of hand without an etymology. To stray away from the origin of words would most assuredly lead to crisis; but so long as language regresses towards a singular unified Idea, and the singularity leads to an infinite multiplicity, crisis may be averted. In Plato, this Idea is the Good.
As in the case when someone says they have mixed feelings, this mixture of feeling as representative of emotion, or vice versa, can work to an infinite degree when we take this subtle combination of feelings into account, to its degree as quantitative, and consequently, its quality. So long as this chemistry of feeling refers to quantity and quality, there are only a finite number of colors, but an infinite number of shades based on their mixture; as there are only a finite number of elements in the periodic table, but an infinite number of molecular combinations. There is finite matter, but infinite form. For example, to transcribe this science (wissenschaft) to human emotional experience, compassion would be particularized to a specific instance. In the German, compassion is [i]mitleit[/i] = suffering-with. In the case of [i]mitleit[/i], there must be an ego which recognizes the suffering of the Other. For how would one even suffer with another if the one did not see thyself in the suffering of the Other? There must be a recognition, a nihilophysical response in perception as a response to stimuli in somatic perception, or in resultant experience of prime [i]rafmagn[/i]. So long as intuition is prior to sense perception, or sense perception to intuition, the primordial cause as either [i]rafmagn[/i] or [i]orka[/i] remains open or in question. So long as one or the other sees that one is in a state of distress or displeasure (sight is not limited to sight of [i]ragmagn[/i]or [i]orka[/i], mind you), and is engaged with thine suffering in one way or another, compassion takes place. Well, what of particularization? Well, we could invent new words to represent particular kinds of suffering, as that which is recognized by one. For example, my friend loses his wife in a car accident. Would imagining the situation be sufficient to allow the Other compassion for his widowed friend? Here, we would have to draw a line. There is imagined compassion and real compassion. That which requires a certain degree of imagination refers to compassion itself; that which is a genuine understanding, which takes place upon the basis of which lies real authenticity, is empathy. In the case of empathy as a more realistic case of compassion, for instance, it works in both qualitative and quantitative degrees. When we say it is quantitative, we refer to the degree of its reality. If the other has suffered the exact instance in which he or she has lost a beloved, then we say the recognition is more real, and the compassion is thus, more genuine. When we say it is qualitative, we refer back to the dependence on quantity, for there is no quality without quantity (Chernyshevsky). A qualitative analysis would then refer to the degree of engagement that Dasein chooses to participate in with the Other, based on the reality of authenticity at hand. Here, authenticity refers to the reality with regard to lack of imagination required in participation (not in Heidegger's sense exclusively). For the loss of a beloved in combination with the recognition of this suffering, by two at a loss from their betrothed, we would have to invent a new word in order to particularize it further. To create this word, we refer to etymology. A simple combination ----- love loss + compassion. Love loss is reduced to widowed and compassion reduced to mitleit, which is reduced to 'suffer-with.' For the sake of convenience, we refer to the etymological signification of compassion and the advanced signification of ‘love-loss’ to make a combination. Well, let us say this : Here, we refer to this particular instance as [i]em-widowed[/i] in the case of empathy, [i]widowed-with[/i] in the case of compassion (com-widowed is avoided for the sake of awkwardness; the ‘com’ is implied with the ‘with’). Because the etymology of empathy refers back to compassion, we leave ‘empathy’ as it is, as a regression would not lead to particularization. But of course, this is still vague.
But in this particular instance, if the Other has gone through the same instance in which his or her betrothed was taken from thy self, then compassion is particularized into empathy, for compassion is an inappropriate representation when there is not a genuine understanding of emotion. Empathy implies an understanding. And what of understanding? Well, there simply is no understanding without experience. Compassion exists at the point in which imagination makes it possible to bridge a number of connections until the point where a minute point of understanding and thus, a recognition, is reached. The other feels with him or her, not because he or she has experienced the event himself, but because they can imagine to the point where they actually feel the suffering of the Other. But which is more genuine in this case if empathy implies the existence of a stronger ego? In the case of empathy, the Other is empathetic because he or she has lost a beloved as well. But is this not egoistic in itself; is it not more self-involved? I think not. For in both cases, the ego still plays a part, it is just a little shaded in the case of compassion. The ego is not in dissolution, it is simply modified to the circumstance at hand. Therefore, if there always is the presences of an ego – for there would not be the Other if there were not an ego – empathy refers to a more genuine case of compassion.
Any thoughts?