[size=90][b] “It’s a shot in the dark.”
—Ozzy Osbourne[/b][/size]
[size=130]Atheist philosopher[/size] Victor J. Stenger provides a concise summary of the history of the universe in the article: Intelligent Design–Humans, Cockroaches, And The Laws Of Physics:
Without the laws of physics as we know them, life on earth as we know it would not have evolved in the short span of six billion years. The nuclear force was needed to bind protons and neutrons in the nuclei of atoms;
electromagnetism was needed to keep atoms and molecules together; and gravity was needed to keep the resulting ingredients for life stuck to the surface of the earth.
These forces must have been in operation within seconds of the start of the big bang, 10-15 billion years ago, to allow for the formation of protons and neutrons out of quarks and their storage in stable hydrogen and deuterium atoms. Free neutrons disintegrate in minutes. To be able to hang around for billions of years so that they could later join with protons in making chemical elements in stars, neutrons had to be bound in deuterons and other light nuclei where energetics prevented their decay.
Gravity was needed to gather atoms together into stars
and to compress stellar cores, raising the core temperatures to tens of millions of degrees.
These high temperatures made nuclear reactions possible, and over billions of years the elements of the chemical periodic table were synthesized as the by-product. .
When the nuclear fuel in the more massive, faster-burning stars was spent, the laws of physics called for them to explode as supernovae,
sending into space the elements manufactured in their cores. In space, gravity could gather these elements into planets circling the smaller, longer-lived stars.
Finally, after about ten billion years, the carbon, oxygen, nitrogen and other elements on a small planet attached to a small, stable star could begin the process of evolution toward the complex structures we call life.
(Stenger, Victor J: Intelligent Design: Humans, Cockroaches, And The Laws Of Physics, talkorigins.org/faqs/cosmo.html)
[b]Stenger is kind enough to describe a cosmic hierarchy of origin and cause and effect, in which concepts known to science and everyday observation (i.e. stars, planets, or self-replicating cells) are descendants emerging from pre-existing physical “ancestors”, previous states of matter holding the potential for the emergent formation of new phenomena (i.e. the chemicals of the periodic table descend from supernovae; planets descend from interstellar dust and gas, etc.).
The evolution of atoms into stars, periodic table elements, and biological cells does not rely solely upon electromagnetic combinations of specific chemical elements (as opposed to chemical elements having nothing to do with the formation of living organisms) but also upon random chance, given the astronomically vast number of atoms taking up every point in space and time.[/b]
Atoms are not indivisible but have smaller particles present within them. Startling discoveries indeed, considering the infinitesimal size of atoms. One hundred million of them lined up would measure barely an inch. Is your imagination powerful enough to visualize a particle less than a 100 millionth of an inch across, consisting mostly of space? And having still smaller particles present in it?
(Thibodeau, Gary A: Anatomy And Physiology (pg. 33), Times Mirror/Mosby College Publishing, St. Louis Toronto Santa Clara 1987)
The creation of a macroscopic object requires atoms of different elements to “ride” the force fields of other atoms (which chemical elements will arrive at the crucial place to form what chemical bonds that in turn forms what macroscopic object?). If random chance is out of the question, what ensures that only the “right” chemicals will combine to form the “right” macrosystem at the crucial time and place? What guarantees that certain chemicals will have another “go at it” in trial-and-error formation of relevant macrosystems (i.e. self-replicating cells) the second time around?
Consider the calculation by astronomer Fred Hoyle, often referred to by creationists, that the odds against DNA assembling by chance are 10^40,000 to one (Hoyle, 1981). This is true, but highly misleading. DNA did not assemble purely by chance. It assembled by a combination of chance and the laws of physics.
(Stenger, Victor J: Intelligent Design: Humans, Cockroaches, And The Laws Of Physics, talkorigins.org/faqs/cosmo.html)
(Note: Stenger is unnecessarily splitting hairs. Surely Hoyle implied that physical laws factor in the formation of DNA by chance (in the accidental formation of DNA from lifeless chemicals). Hoyle’s ultimate statement is that the laws of physics, such as they are, guarantees only the possibility—NOT the inevitability—of DNA before the fact.)
Reliance upon such continuous atomic coincidence requires a powerful leap of faith:
[size=90]Ain’t got no distractions
Can’t hear those buzzers and bells
Don’t see lights a flashin’
Plays by sense of smell
Always gets a replay
Never tilts at all—
That deaf, dumb and blind kid
sure plays a mean pinball
-The Who[/size]
Non-teleological explanation for the world typically implies random chance in the form of Gouldian Indeterminism:
Gouldian Indeterminism is derived from the philosophical observations of Stephen J. Gould in the article: The Evolution Of Life On Earth:
"Homo sapiens did not appear on the earth, just a geologic second ago, because evolutionary theory predicts such an outcome based on themes of progress and increasing neural complexity. Humans arose, rather, as a fortuitous and contingent outcome of thousands of linked events, any one of which could have occurred differently and sent history on an alternative pathway that would not have led to consciousness. Therefore, to understand the events and generalities of life’s pathway, we must go beyond principles of evolutionary theory to a paleontological examination of the contingent pattern of life’s history on our planet - the single actualized version among millions of plausible alternatives that happened not to occur.
This point needs some belaboring as a central yet widely misunderstood aspect of the world’s complexity. Webs and chains of historical events are so intricate, so imbued with random and chaotic elements, so unrepeatable in encompassing such a multitude of unique (and uniquely interacting) objects, that standard models of simple prediction and replication do not apply.
History can be explained, with satisfying rigor if evidence be adequate, after a sequence of events unfolds, but it cannot be predicted with any precision beforehand. Pierre-Simon Laplace, echoing the growing and confident determinism of the late 18th century, once said that he could specify all future states if he could know the position and motion of all particles in the cosmos at any moment, but the nature of universal complexity shatters this chimerical dream. History includes too much chaos, or extremely sensitive dependence on minute and unmeasurable differences in initial conditions, leading to massively divergent outcomes based on tiny and unknowable disparities in starting points."
(Gould, Stephen J: The Evolution Of Life On Earth, geocities.com/CapeCanaveral/ … gould.html)
[b]In other words, an interaction between two atoms must worry about the force fields of other atoms and their residual effect upon the relevant interaction. The perturbances that may take place, no matter how minute, may lead to massively divergent outcomes from that which might have occurred had the two atoms mingled in isolation. There is an uncertainty (before the fact) of that which may or may not arise from atomic chaos.
Thus Gouldian Indeterminism insists that:[/b]
-
A future state of the cosmos is not a guaranteed inevitability before the fact
-
The inevitability of the future existence of particular macroscopic objects (such as brains or cells) is certainly not guaranteed by the nature of subatomic particles themselves, or in the lawful and predictable interactions between those particles (the stable particles of the Standard Model). Basic physical laws dictate only how two or more particles will tend to interact in close proximity; they do not predict the inevitable existence of a particular macroscopic entity.
Opposing Gould’s notion of “fortuitous and contingent outcome” is the determinism of Simon-Pierre Laplace (1749-1827):
Laplace’s determinism predicts that certain atoms, if arranged in a particular pattern with and distance from other atoms, will infallibly yield only one possible wavefunction collapse for each particle (the collective wavefunction collapses are unique to the emerging macrosystem). System x follows from atomic arrangement y, and there is no possible system that can emerge save x: the predictable chain of single possibility goes back to the Big Bang and flows forward toward the end of time.
The specificity of wavefunction collapse, and infallible reproduction of wavefunction collapse, if the universe were rewound to the starting point for the second or even the millionth time around, is a property of a universal mechanism that constrains causal interactions between all the particles in the universe–deriving a completely predictable arrow of time in which every future state emerging from every previous state is the only possible emergent state. This constraint of the future to only one possible form goes back to the Big Bang, granting merit to Laplace’s boast that he could "specify all future states if he could know the position and motion of all particles in the cosmos at any moment”
If Laplacean determinism is true, the death of John Lennon at the hands of Mark David Chapman, for example, was the result of predictable (and the only possible) atomic interactions initiated by the Big Bang. If for every atomic interaction x there can only be a resulting atomic interaction y, the birth, growth, and eventual death of Lennon is the only possible future for Lennon even before the existence of the Earth.
The Defeat Of Gouldian Indeterminism Requires Quantum Physical Repetition
[b]The truth or falsity of Gouldian Indeterminism depends upon whether or not atoms occupying a particular space at a particular time are capable of combining in more ways than one, given sufficient perturbation between fields of uninvolved atoms that may move atomic interaction of the relevant particles in a direction leading away from the formation of a given macrosystem.
For example, given the conceivable state-of-affairs that ultimately produced the first molecular entity no longer qualifying as “non-living”, if the universe were “rewound” like a recording from the Big Bang to the instant in which non-living matter first transforms into living matter—would the same living entity emerge as it did the first time, or would atomic circumstances send history on an alternate pathway that would not lead to the existence of life?
This is hugely important, as the formation of a macroscopic object may be determined by: [/b]
-
Deterministic forces following a natural law that predicts only one possible outcome of atomic change from a previous atomic or chemical state, such that a group of atoms in space A at time B can only form macrosystem X, and not macrosystems Z,D,C, or E. If the universe were rewound to the Big Bang, this principle ensures that the same atoms will find themselves, the second or even the billionth time around, in space A at time B to form (only) macrosystem X. (Laplace)
-
The same group of atoms, if brought into the same collective proximity and relative position may find themselves affected by the fields of other atoms in such a way that the second time around fails to re-create the macrosystem emerging the first time around (Gould).
[size=130]Pre-Conclusion[/size]
[b]Laplacean determinism is useful if one wishes to narrow the odds against non-teleological formation of the natural world (thus negating Fred Hoyle’s calculation of the odds against DNA forming by chance). The Many Worlds Interpretation, The Anthropic Principle (Secular version), and the Monkeys On Typewriters (applying to biological natural selection) Hypotheses are attempts to escape the incredible coincidences underlying atheistic explanation.
One could argue that attempts to narrow, for example, Hoyle’s calculation from 10^40,000 to one to 1:1 implies willful ignorance or denial of the role random chance plays in a godless world. Unless one subscribes to Laplacean determinism, a special, powerful faith is necessary to accept that we happen to live in a world in which Hoyle’s calculations happened to achieve unity (given that, under Gouldian indeterminism, something might have “gone wrong” at the crucial time and place, and continued to “go wrong” thereafter, leading to an alternate Earth in which there is no DNA).[/b]
In a calculation similar to Hoyle’s, mathematician Roger Penrose has estimated that the probability of a universe with our particular set of physical properties is one part in 10^10^123 (Penrose 1989: 343).
(Stenger, Victor J: Intelligent Design: Humans, Cockroaches, And The Laws Of Physics, talkorigins.org/faqs/cosmo.html)
[b]Nevertheless, criticism of atheism consisting solely of finger pointing and tongue-wagging at the astronomically vast role random chance plays in non-teleological explanation travels only so far in persuasion by argument; beyond making the salient point it leads only to circular argument and infinite regress.
Fortunately, criticism of atheistic explanation does not exhaust with random chance. There remains a cognitive abyss so wide that to traverse it requires the most powerful leap of faith. The abyss is widened by logical disconnect and philosophical amnesia concerning the most obvious aspect of reality—a reality begging the question of rational belief in the existence of an external world that supports the logic of non-teleological explanation.[/b]
[size=180]Over The Yawning Abyss Of Facsimile Realism: The Atheist’s Greatest Leap Of Faith[/size]
[size=130]Dreaming provides[/size] a springboard for those who question whether waking reality may be an illusion. The ability of the brain to trick itself into believing a neuronally generated world is the “real world” means one variety of simulation is a common, even nightly event.
This could be seen as a challenge to those who claim a simulated reality requires highly advanced scientific technology, since the only apparatus needed to construct a simulated reality capable of fooling the unconscious mind is a human brain. However, this observation is of little relevance to most versions of the simulated reality claim, which maintain that waking reality is what is being simulated.
[size=120]Occam’s Razor[/size]
The dream argument eliminates Occam’s Razor as a valid defense against our own reality being simulated. Occam’s Razor generally states that “all things being equal, the simpler explanation is preferable.” Although this is not a natural law, many skeptics defer to Occam’s Razor as a means of avoiding the simulation hypothesis.
However, since we regularly create simulated realities in the form of dreams that fool those dreaming, the simple explanation could be that we’re always being tricked by our brain or an outside mechanism. The existence of dreams must be accounted for when examining the equality requirement of Occam’s Razor.
For example, in a world in which we never dreamt and were never fooled into believing a simulated reality was the “real world” then Occam’s Razor could be a valid defense, since all things being equal it could be logical to assume we’re not in a simulated reality.
(Wikipedia: The Dream Argument, en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dream_argument)
The statement above (while a valiant defense of the Dream Hypothesis) inadvertently makes a cognitive mistake. The error lies in the final half of the last sentence:
“since all things being equal it could be logical to assume we’re not in a simulated reality”
Vagueness aside (If we are not in a simulated reality, is the simulated reality of which we are not a part generated by computer? By an artificial intelligence in a spaceship hurtling through deep space?), the author of the Wikipedia entry failed to realize (or to remember) that we indeed reside within a simulated reality: consciousness itself is a simulated reality (Consciousness is “Nature’s Matrix”).
[b]It’s ironic the Wiki-author states that the brain “regularly creates simulated realities”. The most common simulation program generated by the brain is waking reality itself.
To the human being, reality is known to exist only in the form of the subjective experience of a conscious being (in the modalities of visual, tactile, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, emotional, and cognitive experience), which “disappears" when the subject falls asleep or dies. If the universe does not cease to exist when a subject dies or falls into a state of dreamless sleep (solipsism), there is a reality that continues to exist irrespective of the existence of consciousness.[/b]
Godless explanation for the world (theistic explanation is no exception) habitually makes the cognitive mistake of naïve realism—the view that objects within human perception are the very things-in-themselves rather than neuronally-generated ‘virtual reality’ simulations of their ‘real’ counterparts (existing beyond the pale of human consciousness).
“Naive realism is a common sense theory of perception. Most people, until they start reflecting philosophically, are naive realists.The most common theory of perception is naive realism in which people believe that what they perceive is things in themselves (interjection: that is, that what one perceives is the thing itself). Children develop this theory as a working hypothesis of how to deal with the world. Many people who have not studied biology carry this theory into adult life and regard their perception to be the world itself rather than a (virtual reality) pattern that overlays the form of the world.”
(Wikipedia: Philosophy Of Perception, en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Naive_realism)
[b]Unfortunately, secular philosophy and tautology continues to speak in the language of naïve realism, performing conceptual sleights-of-hand in which, for example, tales of brain function coinciding with a subject’s verbal report of a conscious experience (with the verbal report “verified” by MRI imaging) “forgets” that the brain under observation is a ‘virtual’ brain; the MRI and it’s imaging of the cortex is a ‘virtual’ MRI projecting ‘virtual’ maps of the cortex.
One must “take it on faith” that in the hypothetical example above, the external world contains a mind-independent counterpart of the subject and the subject’s brain, a counterpart of the doctor performing tests upon the subject, and a counterpart of the MRI and other medical equipment used in the examination.[/b]
If one denies solipsism (the view that there exists only one conscious being, with the universe and other people existing only as figments of the imagination) and if one philosophically transcends naive realism, there remains Facsimile Realism.
[b]Facsimile Realism (for those who have moved beyond naive realism) is the most common view of reality. It is the view that the subjective experience of a subject (at least the visual perception of the subject) mimics the appearance and behavior of an isomorphic ˜external world"—a world composed of an unknown mind-independent substance distinct from the “substance” constituting subjective experience.
Facsimile Realism is considered the most rational, simple, and plausible view of reality—it presupposes a deep unity and connection between the experience of the subject and the outer world (the experience of the subject is believed to represent). If Facsimile Realism is false, the subject cannot rationally rely upon her experiences to indicate what is going on in the external world.
Facsimile Realism happens to be hugely important for another reason. Non-teleological explanation for the natural world loses it’s realism and moral gravity if in the end “everything’s virtual”. What is the essential value of science and scientific discovery if there is no correspondence between human experience and the external world?[/b]
"Matter, if it is to be known to exist at all, must be known through some a priori principle assuring us that our sensations in some way ‘correspond’ with things which can exist without our sensations.” (Russell 1912a, p. 92)
(Russell, Bertrand: Our Knowledge of the External World, Open Court Publishing, La Salle, IL 1912. Reprinted Routledge, London and New York, 2000.)
The greatest leap of faith for the atheist, then, is not necessarily belief in the existence of the external world and Facsimile Realism, but belief in the existence of an inscrutable a priori principle that ensures that the contents of (visual) perception infallibly correspond to the appearance and behavior of the external world.
[b] There exists philosophical consensus that insists that Facsimile Realism is necessarily true. One can choose to fall in line behind the Pied Piper, blindly conceding that Facsimile Realism is irrefutable without further rational reflection, but one can refuse to “drink the Facsimile Realism Kool-aid” and critically analyze the “truism” that there exists an a priori principle ensuring correspondence between consciousness and the external world.
Irem Kurstal Steen in his paper: Russell On Matter And Our Knowledge Of The External World, proposes that this a priori principle is inference:[/b]
Matter is to be understood as that which physics is about. So, matter must be such that the physicist can know its existence. In other words, what physical science is concerned with and makes discoveries about must be a function of the physicist’s sense-data. What could that function be? There are only two ways in which we can know the existence of something. “(1) immediate acquaintance, which assures us of the existence of our thoughts, feelings, and sense-data, (2) general principles according to which the existence of one thing can be inferred from that of another.” (Russell 1912a, p. 80)
The bridge which relates the physicist’s sense-data to matter must correspond to one of these ways of knowing that something exists. If our knowledge of matter can be reduced to what we know by acquaintance, then matter should be understood as a logical construction out of sense-data. Otherwise, it must be by inference that we know the existence of matter. So, according to Russell, the bridge between sense-data and matter is either inference or logical construction. (Russell 1912a, pp. 84-85)
[b]Steen’s entire premise, however, rests entirely upon blind faith in the existence of ‘non-virtual’ matter. He takes the existence of ‘matter’ for granted in the same way the Bible takes the existence of God as a given. Steen even goes so far as to assert that matter must have a quality that is capable of “clueing us in” on the fact that it exists(!) But it is not clear why human consciousness should have a property that communicates with the external world.
When Steen (or Russell) speaks of ‘matter’, they are referring to something that they, and all humans, have never experienced. Thus, as Steen notes above, one is forced to appeal to a mental faculty that substitutes for direct experience. Moving beyond the simple logic of this fact, Steen then asserts that this substitutional faculty—inference —by itself infallibly establishes a line of communication between consciousness and the external world.
But inference is logical imagination at its foundation, a logical imagination accompanied by powerful conviction of the actual truth of something inaccessible to human perception. Inference, it should be reminded, is also an output of the physical brain.[/b] Should we then believe that there are a priori principles that assure us that the brain, if and when the brain forms, will come prepared (“batteries included”) with a cognitive radar that inexplicably provides information about that which exists beyond the simulated realities created by the brain?
[b]Inference can be demonstrated by the example of a (hypothetical) husband inferring the existence of an extramarital affair through the guilty behavior of his wife:
Dave:[/b] Martha, you’re cheating on me, aren’t you?
(Martha, upon hearing this, suddenly drops her dinner fork. Her eyes well with tears and she begins to sob uncontrollably, stating: “Oh Dave I’m sorry, I’m sorry…”)
[b]Without having direct access to or experience of the affair (photos of Martha with the “other man”, etc.), Dave is nevertheless able to infer it’s existence through Martha’s remorse. The inference succeeds because Martha’s show of remorse is irrational if Dave’s accusation is false.*
[*Be careful now: the inference is reliable but not infallible: Martha may secretly be an Interpol spy or terrorist, and her pretense of extramarital guilt conceals the truth behind her constant absence and lack of intimacy]
Does this example of inference work between consciousness and the external world?[/b] No. Why? The husband’s inference of marital infidelity through his wife’s guilty behavior is an example of empirical inference: knowledge gained independent of experience, yet knowledge of concepts accessible to direct experience in principle. Steen and Russell’s notion of external-world “inference” are examples of non-empirical inference: a state of mind claiming to “sense” that which exists beyond the reach of human perception.
“So, matter must be such that the physicist can know its existence. In other words, what physical science is concerned with and makes discoveries about must be a function of the physicist’s sense-data…general principles according to which the existence of one thing can be inferred from that of another.” (Russell 1912a, p. 80)
[b]But these “general principles” of direct realism fail to explain the essential distinction between consciousness and the external world (logically inferred through the existence of dreamless sleep and the proposed non-subjectivity of death). Such an explanatory gap establishes the reality of the a priori principle only within a stubborn imagination, as one can argue that this “external-world indicator” cannot rationally be claimed to necessarily exist.
(There exists an interesting parallel between the belief that we possess minds gifted with “certain knowledge” of the external world and religious belief in supernatural revelation from God.)
To see the logical opaqueness in the notion that there is “an a priori principle assuring us that our sensations in some way ‘correspond’ with things which can exist without our sensations.”, consider the notion that the external world existed long before consciousness (according to atheism). That is, the external world was whatever it was for an eternity before the formation of cerebral cortices.[/b]
It’s this simple paradox. The Universe is very old and very large. Humankind, by comparison, is only a tiny disturbance in one small corner of it - and a very recent one. Yet the universe is only very large and very old because we are here to say it is… And yet, of course, we all know perfectly well that it is what it is whether we are here or not.
(Frayn, Michael: The Human Touch, Faber & Faber Publishing 2006)
Unless one proposes consciousness to have always existed alongside the physical from the very beginning (i.e David Chalmer’s panprotopsychism), one is going a step beyond logic to insist that an ‘external-world-revealing’ natural principle secretly exists, which in the pre-Earth past waited patiently for a consciousness that may or may not exist. One must be willing to believe that the a priori principle twiddled it’s thumbs, hoping against hope that a googleplex of atoms:
One hundred million of them lined up would measure barely an inch (Thibodeau, 1987).
[b]—would somehow “win the atomic lottery” and accidentally form cerebral cortices (over time through trial-and-error) that just happen to be capable of producing the right kinds of simulated realities that satisfying the principle—giving it “a reason for being”.
In addition to the explanatory gaps in the mind/body relation itself (which cannot reconcile how consciousness—believed only to come into existence if there are such things as cerebral cortices and is believed to cease to exist upon cessation of electrical activity in the cortex—comes to exist simply by flowing electrons through neurons making up the neocortex), one must go a step further beyond logic to insist that:[/b]
-
Cerebral cortices are the (a priori) objects of choice to function as telescopes into the external world
-
Late-arriving cerebral cortices (given the pre-existence of the external world before the existence of consciousness) give rise to simulated realities that must mimic the appearance and behavior of the external world
-
The external world exerts forces against the external world counterpart of the brain (through the medium of the external world counterpart of the body), playing perfect games of “pool” upon the “pool table” of the brain (by the transmission of force through the brain) to produce synaptic firings that generate accurate portrayals of the external world.
[size=150]Conclusion[/size]
[b]It takes the greatest leap of faith to accept that humans utilize non-empirical inference that verifies it’s coincidence with objective reality simply by reason of it’s existence (independent of corroborative evidence). This “because I said so” inference fails rational justification.
Nevertheless, the wisest strategy of the atheist is to cling to Facsimile Realism with all it’s might and insist that there exists an a priori principle ensuring that our perception reveals the nature of the external world—despite the fact that the external world forever exists beyond the reach of the simulated realities generated by blindly-functioning cerebral cortices.
At the end of the day, the cost in logical and explanatory transparency is astronomically high; after consideration of the aforementioned facts one might conclude that there remains no good reason to believe in an a priori connection of consciousness to the external world.
To paraphrase David Chalmers:[/b]
If an opponent wishes to hold on to the possibility of [an external world indicating property of the human mind] she can still do so, but the thought-experiments [above] show that the cost is higher than one might have expected.
(Chalmers, David J: Absent Qualia, Fading Qualia, Dancing Qualia, consc.net/papers/qualia.html)
[size=130]Final Thoughts[/size]
[b]To be fair, one cannot rule out atheism and its Cult of Mother Nature any more than one can rule out theism (if the explicable characteristics of a God or gods is logically coherent and possible). However, this does not alter the fact that godless (or any non-teleological) explanation for the world relies heavily upon random chance (given the blindness of the universe in its accidental creation of stars, planets, life, etc.). Atheistic explanation also seems to rely upon ad hoc conjurations of ‘principles’ or ‘laws’ (that we have no good reason to believe in).
Upon deep rational reflection, chance-denying hypotheses such as Laplace’s determinism, The Multiple Worlds Interpretation, and the “monkeys on typewriters” heuristic notwithstanding, explanation that the currently experienced world is a creation of non-teleological forces necessitates coincidence so staggering as to make such explanation harder to swallow.[/b]
[size=130]And now, a moment of Zen: [/size]
We conclude with a scene from the FX television series: Rescue Me[b], starring Dennis Leary as firefighter Tommy Gavin. The Season 2 episode "Justice” entails the aftermath of the death of Tommy’s young son, Conner—struck by a drunk driver while riding his bicycle in the street (against his father’s half-hearted and distracted warnings).
Following Connor’s funeral in the Gavin house, firefighters Mike Silletti (Mike Lombardi) and Sean Garrity (Steven Pasquale), friends of Tommy, attempt to console Gavin’s young daughter Katy (Olivia Crocicchia).
Katy, however, ignores their condolence to express a disturbing insight that nearly shatters the faith of one of the men.[/b]
Katy: I miss my brother.
Sean: Yeah, I’ll bet. But you know what, Katy? You just uh… just gotta remember that you’re gonna see him again someday, you know, up in heaven.
(Katy is silent. Sean whispers to Mike.)
(Sean To Mike): You gonna help me out here? Say somethin’. Say somethin’!
Mike: Um, see, Katy, um where he is right now, there’s no pain. He’s happy and he, um, doesn’t remember anything about the accident. God makes that go away.
Sean: Is that true?
Mike: That’s what I heard.
Sean: Wow. Wow.
(They turn their attention back to Katy)
Listen, Katy, you just gotta remember that Connor’s fine and you’re gonna see him again.
Katy: No, I won’t.
Sean: Yes, you will, sweetie. I promise.
Katy: No, I won’t, because there’s no heaven.
Mike: Of course there’s a heaven, honey.
Katy: Prove it.
(Mike and Sean glance at each other and whisper)
Sean: You see, y-you just have to…believe.
Katy: I do believe. I believe there’s no heaven, just like there’s no God. Human beings made those things up so we could feel special. More special than animals, or bugs. Because we’re scared. We need to think there’s someone out there protecting us, watching over us. We’re nothing. We come from dirt. We go back into the dirt.*
[b]Point taken. A theist, however, can rebut Katy’s conclusions by an appeal to:
-
Uncertainty in the nature of the external world beyond the virtual reality of human consciousness
-
The realization that greater faith is needed for atheism than theism (upon deep rational reflection)
-
Skepticism of the undeniable truth of Facsimile Realism and the falsity of the Matrix Hypothesis
-
Skepticism of the truth of an a priori principle assuring us that our neuronally-generated sensations must in some way ‘correspond’ with things which exist independent of those sensations.
Armed with a philosophical skepticism that effectively criticizes and challenges the epistemology of the atheist (unfortunately lost to the minds of the Mike and Sean characters above), a theist might respond to Katy, and be reasonably justified in doing so, in the way psychiatrist Sean Maguire (Robin Williams) responds to protagonist Will Hunting (Matt Damon) in the film:[/b] Good Will Hunting, 1997:
Sean: Thought about what you said to me the other day. Stayed up half the night thinking about it. Then something occurred to me… and afterwards I fell into a deep peaceful sleep and haven’t thought about you since. Do you know what occurred to me?
Will: No.
Sean: You’re just a kid, you don’t have the faintest idea what you’re talking about.
[size=200]End[/size]