THE FAITH OF THE ATHEIST AND THE CULT OF MOTHER NATURE

[size=90][b] “It’s a shot in the dark.”

—Ozzy Osbourne[/b][/size]

[size=130]Atheist philosopher[/size] Victor J. Stenger provides a concise summary of the history of the universe in the article: Intelligent Design–Humans, Cockroaches, And The Laws Of Physics:

Without the laws of physics as we know them, life on earth as we know it would not have evolved in the short span of six billion years. The nuclear force was needed to bind protons and neutrons in the nuclei of atoms;

electromagnetism was needed to keep atoms and molecules together; and gravity was needed to keep the resulting ingredients for life stuck to the surface of the earth.

These forces must have been in operation within seconds of the start of the big bang, 10-15 billion years ago, to allow for the formation of protons and neutrons out of quarks and their storage in stable hydrogen and deuterium atoms. Free neutrons disintegrate in minutes. To be able to hang around for billions of years so that they could later join with protons in making chemical elements in stars, neutrons had to be bound in deuterons and other light nuclei where energetics prevented their decay.

Gravity was needed to gather atoms together into stars

and to compress stellar cores, raising the core temperatures to tens of millions of degrees.

These high temperatures made nuclear reactions possible, and over billions of years the elements of the chemical periodic table were synthesized as the by-product. .

When the nuclear fuel in the more massive, faster-burning stars was spent, the laws of physics called for them to explode as supernovae,

sending into space the elements manufactured in their cores. In space, gravity could gather these elements into planets circling the smaller, longer-lived stars.

Finally, after about ten billion years, the carbon, oxygen, nitrogen and other elements on a small planet attached to a small, stable star could begin the process of evolution toward the complex structures we call life.

(Stenger, Victor J: Intelligent Design: Humans, Cockroaches, And The Laws Of Physics, talkorigins.org/faqs/cosmo.html)

[b]Stenger is kind enough to describe a cosmic hierarchy of origin and cause and effect, in which concepts known to science and everyday observation (i.e. stars, planets, or self-replicating cells) are descendants emerging from pre-existing physical “ancestors”, previous states of matter holding the potential for the emergent formation of new phenomena (i.e. the chemicals of the periodic table descend from supernovae; planets descend from interstellar dust and gas, etc.).

The evolution of atoms into stars, periodic table elements, and biological cells does not rely solely upon electromagnetic combinations of specific chemical elements (as opposed to chemical elements having nothing to do with the formation of living organisms) but also upon random chance, given the astronomically vast number of atoms taking up every point in space and time.[/b]

Atoms are not indivisible but have smaller particles present within them. Startling discoveries indeed, considering the infinitesimal size of atoms. One hundred million of them lined up would measure barely an inch. Is your imagination powerful enough to visualize a particle less than a 100 millionth of an inch across, consisting mostly of space? And having still smaller particles present in it?

(Thibodeau, Gary A: Anatomy And Physiology (pg. 33), Times Mirror/Mosby College Publishing, St. Louis Toronto Santa Clara 1987)

The creation of a macroscopic object requires atoms of different elements to “ride” the force fields of other atoms (which chemical elements will arrive at the crucial place to form what chemical bonds that in turn forms what macroscopic object?). If random chance is out of the question, what ensures that only the “right” chemicals will combine to form the “right” macrosystem at the crucial time and place? What guarantees that certain chemicals will have another “go at it” in trial-and-error formation of relevant macrosystems (i.e. self-replicating cells) the second time around?

Consider the calculation by astronomer Fred Hoyle, often referred to by creationists, that the odds against DNA assembling by chance are 10^40,000 to one (Hoyle, 1981). This is true, but highly misleading. DNA did not assemble purely by chance. It assembled by a combination of chance and the laws of physics.

(Stenger, Victor J: Intelligent Design: Humans, Cockroaches, And The Laws Of Physics, talkorigins.org/faqs/cosmo.html)

(Note: Stenger is unnecessarily splitting hairs. Surely Hoyle implied that physical laws factor in the formation of DNA by chance (in the accidental formation of DNA from lifeless chemicals). Hoyle’s ultimate statement is that the laws of physics, such as they are, guarantees only the possibility—NOT the inevitability—of DNA before the fact.)

Reliance upon such continuous atomic coincidence requires a powerful leap of faith:

[size=90]Ain’t got no distractions
Can’t hear those buzzers and bells
Don’t see lights a flashin’
Plays by sense of smell
Always gets a replay
Never tilts at all—

That deaf, dumb and blind kid
sure plays a mean pinball

-The Who[/size]

Non-teleological explanation for the world typically implies random chance in the form of Gouldian Indeterminism:

Gouldian Indeterminism is derived from the philosophical observations of Stephen J. Gould in the article: The Evolution Of Life On Earth:

"Homo sapiens did not appear on the earth, just a geologic second ago, because evolutionary theory predicts such an outcome based on themes of progress and increasing neural complexity. Humans arose, rather, as a fortuitous and contingent outcome of thousands of linked events, any one of which could have occurred differently and sent history on an alternative pathway that would not have led to consciousness. Therefore, to understand the events and generalities of life’s pathway, we must go beyond principles of evolutionary theory to a paleontological examination of the contingent pattern of life’s history on our planet - the single actualized version among millions of plausible alternatives that happened not to occur.

This point needs some belaboring as a central yet widely misunderstood aspect of the world’s complexity. Webs and chains of historical events are so intricate, so imbued with random and chaotic elements, so unrepeatable in encompassing such a multitude of unique (and uniquely interacting) objects, that standard models of simple prediction and replication do not apply.

History can be explained, with satisfying rigor if evidence be adequate, after a sequence of events unfolds, but it cannot be predicted with any precision beforehand. Pierre-Simon Laplace, echoing the growing and confident determinism of the late 18th century, once said that he could specify all future states if he could know the position and motion of all particles in the cosmos at any moment, but the nature of universal complexity shatters this chimerical dream. History includes too much chaos, or extremely sensitive dependence on minute and unmeasurable differences in initial conditions, leading to massively divergent outcomes based on tiny and unknowable disparities in starting points."

(Gould, Stephen J: The Evolution Of Life On Earth, geocities.com/CapeCanaveral/ … gould.html)

[b]In other words, an interaction between two atoms must worry about the force fields of other atoms and their residual effect upon the relevant interaction. The perturbances that may take place, no matter how minute, may lead to massively divergent outcomes from that which might have occurred had the two atoms mingled in isolation. There is an uncertainty (before the fact) of that which may or may not arise from atomic chaos.

Thus Gouldian Indeterminism insists that:[/b]

  1. A future state of the cosmos is not a guaranteed inevitability before the fact

  2. The inevitability of the future existence of particular macroscopic objects (such as brains or cells) is certainly not guaranteed by the nature of subatomic particles themselves, or in the lawful and predictable interactions between those particles (the stable particles of the Standard Model). Basic physical laws dictate only how two or more particles will tend to interact in close proximity; they do not predict the inevitable existence of a particular macroscopic entity.

Opposing Gould’s notion of “fortuitous and contingent outcome” is the determinism of Simon-Pierre Laplace (1749-1827):

Laplace’s determinism predicts that certain atoms, if arranged in a particular pattern with and distance from other atoms, will infallibly yield only one possible wavefunction collapse for each particle (the collective wavefunction collapses are unique to the emerging macrosystem). System x follows from atomic arrangement y, and there is no possible system that can emerge save x: the predictable chain of single possibility goes back to the Big Bang and flows forward toward the end of time.

The specificity of wavefunction collapse, and infallible reproduction of wavefunction collapse, if the universe were rewound to the starting point for the second or even the millionth time around, is a property of a universal mechanism that constrains causal interactions between all the particles in the universe–deriving a completely predictable arrow of time in which every future state emerging from every previous state is the only possible emergent state. This constraint of the future to only one possible form goes back to the Big Bang, granting merit to Laplace’s boast that he could "specify all future states if he could know the position and motion of all particles in the cosmos at any moment”

If Laplacean determinism is true, the death of John Lennon at the hands of Mark David Chapman, for example, was the result of predictable (and the only possible) atomic interactions initiated by the Big Bang. If for every atomic interaction x there can only be a resulting atomic interaction y, the birth, growth, and eventual death of Lennon is the only possible future for Lennon even before the existence of the Earth.

The Defeat Of Gouldian Indeterminism Requires Quantum Physical Repetition

[b]The truth or falsity of Gouldian Indeterminism depends upon whether or not atoms occupying a particular space at a particular time are capable of combining in more ways than one, given sufficient perturbation between fields of uninvolved atoms that may move atomic interaction of the relevant particles in a direction leading away from the formation of a given macrosystem.

For example, given the conceivable state-of-affairs that ultimately produced the first molecular entity no longer qualifying as “non-living”, if the universe were “rewound” like a recording from the Big Bang to the instant in which non-living matter first transforms into living matter—would the same living entity emerge as it did the first time, or would atomic circumstances send history on an alternate pathway that would not lead to the existence of life?

This is hugely important, as the formation of a macroscopic object may be determined by: [/b]

  1. Deterministic forces following a natural law that predicts only one possible outcome of atomic change from a previous atomic or chemical state, such that a group of atoms in space A at time B can only form macrosystem X, and not macrosystems Z,D,C, or E. If the universe were rewound to the Big Bang, this principle ensures that the same atoms will find themselves, the second or even the billionth time around, in space A at time B to form (only) macrosystem X. (Laplace)

  2. The same group of atoms, if brought into the same collective proximity and relative position may find themselves affected by the fields of other atoms in such a way that the second time around fails to re-create the macrosystem emerging the first time around (Gould).


[size=130]Pre-Conclusion[/size]

[b]Laplacean determinism is useful if one wishes to narrow the odds against non-teleological formation of the natural world (thus negating Fred Hoyle’s calculation of the odds against DNA forming by chance). The Many Worlds Interpretation, The Anthropic Principle (Secular version), and the Monkeys On Typewriters (applying to biological natural selection) Hypotheses are attempts to escape the incredible coincidences underlying atheistic explanation.

One could argue that attempts to narrow, for example, Hoyle’s calculation from 10^40,000 to one to 1:1 implies willful ignorance or denial of the role random chance plays in a godless world. Unless one subscribes to Laplacean determinism, a special, powerful faith is necessary to accept that we happen to live in a world in which Hoyle’s calculations happened to achieve unity (given that, under Gouldian indeterminism, something might have “gone wrong” at the crucial time and place, and continued to “go wrong” thereafter, leading to an alternate Earth in which there is no DNA).[/b]

In a calculation similar to Hoyle’s, mathematician Roger Penrose has estimated that the probability of a universe with our particular set of physical properties is one part in 10^10^123 (Penrose 1989: 343).

(Stenger, Victor J: Intelligent Design: Humans, Cockroaches, And The Laws Of Physics, talkorigins.org/faqs/cosmo.html)

[b]Nevertheless, criticism of atheism consisting solely of finger pointing and tongue-wagging at the astronomically vast role random chance plays in non-teleological explanation travels only so far in persuasion by argument; beyond making the salient point it leads only to circular argument and infinite regress.

Fortunately, criticism of atheistic explanation does not exhaust with random chance. There remains a cognitive abyss so wide that to traverse it requires the most powerful leap of faith. The abyss is widened by logical disconnect and philosophical amnesia concerning the most obvious aspect of reality—a reality begging the question of rational belief in the existence of an external world that supports the logic of non-teleological explanation.[/b]

[size=180]Over The Yawning Abyss Of Facsimile Realism: The Atheist’s Greatest Leap Of Faith[/size]

[size=130]Dreaming provides[/size] a springboard for those who question whether waking reality may be an illusion. The ability of the brain to trick itself into believing a neuronally generated world is the “real world” means one variety of simulation is a common, even nightly event.

This could be seen as a challenge to those who claim a simulated reality requires highly advanced scientific technology, since the only apparatus needed to construct a simulated reality capable of fooling the unconscious mind is a human brain. However, this observation is of little relevance to most versions of the simulated reality claim, which maintain that waking reality is what is being simulated.

[size=120]Occam’s Razor[/size]

The dream argument eliminates Occam’s Razor as a valid defense against our own reality being simulated. Occam’s Razor generally states that “all things being equal, the simpler explanation is preferable.” Although this is not a natural law, many skeptics defer to Occam’s Razor as a means of avoiding the simulation hypothesis.

However, since we regularly create simulated realities in the form of dreams that fool those dreaming, the simple explanation could be that we’re always being tricked by our brain or an outside mechanism. The existence of dreams must be accounted for when examining the equality requirement of Occam’s Razor.

For example, in a world in which we never dreamt and were never fooled into believing a simulated reality was the “real world” then Occam’s Razor could be a valid defense, since all things being equal it could be logical to assume we’re not in a simulated reality.

(Wikipedia: The Dream Argument, en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dream_argument)

The statement above (while a valiant defense of the Dream Hypothesis) inadvertently makes a cognitive mistake. The error lies in the final half of the last sentence:

“since all things being equal it could be logical to assume we’re not in a simulated reality”

Vagueness aside (If we are not in a simulated reality, is the simulated reality of which we are not a part generated by computer? By an artificial intelligence in a spaceship hurtling through deep space?), the author of the Wikipedia entry failed to realize (or to remember) that we indeed reside within a simulated reality: consciousness itself is a simulated reality (Consciousness is “Nature’s Matrix”).

[b]It’s ironic the Wiki-author states that the brain “regularly creates simulated realities”. The most common simulation program generated by the brain is waking reality itself.

To the human being, reality is known to exist only in the form of the subjective experience of a conscious being (in the modalities of visual, tactile, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, emotional, and cognitive experience), which “disappears" when the subject falls asleep or dies. If the universe does not cease to exist when a subject dies or falls into a state of dreamless sleep (solipsism), there is a reality that continues to exist irrespective of the existence of consciousness.[/b]

Godless explanation for the world (theistic explanation is no exception) habitually makes the cognitive mistake of naïve realism—the view that objects within human perception are the very things-in-themselves rather than neuronally-generated ‘virtual reality’ simulations of their ‘real’ counterparts (existing beyond the pale of human consciousness).

“Naive realism is a common sense theory of perception. Most people, until they start reflecting philosophically, are naive realists.The most common theory of perception is naive realism in which people believe that what they perceive is things in themselves (interjection: that is, that what one perceives is the thing itself). Children develop this theory as a working hypothesis of how to deal with the world. Many people who have not studied biology carry this theory into adult life and regard their perception to be the world itself rather than a (virtual reality) pattern that overlays the form of the world.”

(Wikipedia: Philosophy Of Perception, en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Naive_realism)

[b]Unfortunately, secular philosophy and tautology continues to speak in the language of naïve realism, performing conceptual sleights-of-hand in which, for example, tales of brain function coinciding with a subject’s verbal report of a conscious experience (with the verbal report “verified” by MRI imaging) “forgets” that the brain under observation is a ‘virtual’ brain; the MRI and it’s imaging of the cortex is a ‘virtual’ MRI projecting ‘virtual’ maps of the cortex.

One must “take it on faith” that in the hypothetical example above, the external world contains a mind-independent counterpart of the subject and the subject’s brain, a counterpart of the doctor performing tests upon the subject, and a counterpart of the MRI and other medical equipment used in the examination.[/b]

If one denies solipsism (the view that there exists only one conscious being, with the universe and other people existing only as figments of the imagination) and if one philosophically transcends naive realism, there remains Facsimile Realism.

[b]Facsimile Realism (for those who have moved beyond naive realism) is the most common view of reality. It is the view that the subjective experience of a subject (at least the visual perception of the subject) mimics the appearance and behavior of an isomorphic ˜external world"—a world composed of an unknown mind-independent substance distinct from the “substance” constituting subjective experience.

Facsimile Realism is considered the most rational, simple, and plausible view of reality—it presupposes a deep unity and connection between the experience of the subject and the outer world (the experience of the subject is believed to represent). If Facsimile Realism is false, the subject cannot rationally rely upon her experiences to indicate what is going on in the external world.

Facsimile Realism happens to be hugely important for another reason. Non-teleological explanation for the natural world loses it’s realism and moral gravity if in the end “everything’s virtual”. What is the essential value of science and scientific discovery if there is no correspondence between human experience and the external world?[/b]

"Matter, if it is to be known to exist at all, must be known through some a priori principle assuring us that our sensations in some way ‘correspond’ with things which can exist without our sensations.” (Russell 1912a, p. 92)

(Russell, Bertrand: Our Knowledge of the External World, Open Court Publishing, La Salle, IL 1912. Reprinted Routledge, London and New York, 2000.)

The greatest leap of faith for the atheist, then, is not necessarily belief in the existence of the external world and Facsimile Realism, but belief in the existence of an inscrutable a priori principle that ensures that the contents of (visual) perception infallibly correspond to the appearance and behavior of the external world.

[b] There exists philosophical consensus that insists that Facsimile Realism is necessarily true. One can choose to fall in line behind the Pied Piper, blindly conceding that Facsimile Realism is irrefutable without further rational reflection, but one can refuse to “drink the Facsimile Realism Kool-aid” and critically analyze the “truism” that there exists an a priori principle ensuring correspondence between consciousness and the external world.

Irem Kurstal Steen in his paper: Russell On Matter And Our Knowledge Of The External World, proposes that this a priori principle is inference:[/b]

Matter is to be understood as that which physics is about. So, matter must be such that the physicist can know its existence. In other words, what physical science is concerned with and makes discoveries about must be a function of the physicist’s sense-data. What could that function be? There are only two ways in which we can know the existence of something. “(1) immediate acquaintance, which assures us of the existence of our thoughts, feelings, and sense-data, (2) general principles according to which the existence of one thing can be inferred from that of another.” (Russell 1912a, p. 80)

The bridge which relates the physicist’s sense-data to matter must correspond to one of these ways of knowing that something exists. If our knowledge of matter can be reduced to what we know by acquaintance, then matter should be understood as a logical construction out of sense-data. Otherwise, it must be by inference that we know the existence of matter. So, according to Russell, the bridge between sense-data and matter is either inference or logical construction. (Russell 1912a, pp. 84-85)

[b]Steen’s entire premise, however, rests entirely upon blind faith in the existence of ‘non-virtual’ matter. He takes the existence of ‘matter’ for granted in the same way the Bible takes the existence of God as a given. Steen even goes so far as to assert that matter must have a quality that is capable of “clueing us in” on the fact that it exists(!) But it is not clear why human consciousness should have a property that communicates with the external world.

When Steen (or Russell) speaks of ‘matter’, they are referring to something that they, and all humans, have never experienced. Thus, as Steen notes above, one is forced to appeal to a mental faculty that substitutes for direct experience. Moving beyond the simple logic of this fact, Steen then asserts that this substitutional faculty—inference —by itself infallibly establishes a line of communication between consciousness and the external world.

But inference is logical imagination at its foundation, a logical imagination accompanied by powerful conviction of the actual truth of something inaccessible to human perception. Inference, it should be reminded, is also an output of the physical brain.[/b] Should we then believe that there are a priori principles that assure us that the brain, if and when the brain forms, will come prepared (“batteries included”) with a cognitive radar that inexplicably provides information about that which exists beyond the simulated realities created by the brain?

[b]Inference can be demonstrated by the example of a (hypothetical) husband inferring the existence of an extramarital affair through the guilty behavior of his wife:

Dave:[/b] Martha, you’re cheating on me, aren’t you?

(Martha, upon hearing this, suddenly drops her dinner fork. Her eyes well with tears and she begins to sob uncontrollably, stating: “Oh Dave I’m sorry, I’m sorry…”)

[b]Without having direct access to or experience of the affair (photos of Martha with the “other man”, etc.), Dave is nevertheless able to infer it’s existence through Martha’s remorse. The inference succeeds because Martha’s show of remorse is irrational if Dave’s accusation is false.*

[*Be careful now: the inference is reliable but not infallible: Martha may secretly be an Interpol spy or terrorist, and her pretense of extramarital guilt conceals the truth behind her constant absence and lack of intimacy]

Does this example of inference work between consciousness and the external world?[/b] No. Why? The husband’s inference of marital infidelity through his wife’s guilty behavior is an example of empirical inference: knowledge gained independent of experience, yet knowledge of concepts accessible to direct experience in principle. Steen and Russell’s notion of external-world “inference” are examples of non-empirical inference: a state of mind claiming to “sense” that which exists beyond the reach of human perception.

“So, matter must be such that the physicist can know its existence. In other words, what physical science is concerned with and makes discoveries about must be a function of the physicist’s sense-data…general principles according to which the existence of one thing can be inferred from that of another.” (Russell 1912a, p. 80)

[b]But these “general principles” of direct realism fail to explain the essential distinction between consciousness and the external world (logically inferred through the existence of dreamless sleep and the proposed non-subjectivity of death). Such an explanatory gap establishes the reality of the a priori principle only within a stubborn imagination, as one can argue that this “external-world indicator” cannot rationally be claimed to necessarily exist.

(There exists an interesting parallel between the belief that we possess minds gifted with “certain knowledge” of the external world and religious belief in supernatural revelation from God.)

To see the logical opaqueness in the notion that there is “an a priori principle assuring us that our sensations in some way ‘correspond’ with things which can exist without our sensations.”, consider the notion that the external world existed long before consciousness (according to atheism). That is, the external world was whatever it was for an eternity before the formation of cerebral cortices.[/b]

It’s this simple paradox. The Universe is very old and very large. Humankind, by comparison, is only a tiny disturbance in one small corner of it - and a very recent one. Yet the universe is only very large and very old because we are here to say it is… And yet, of course, we all know perfectly well that it is what it is whether we are here or not.

(Frayn, Michael: The Human Touch, Faber & Faber Publishing 2006)

Unless one proposes consciousness to have always existed alongside the physical from the very beginning (i.e David Chalmer’s panprotopsychism), one is going a step beyond logic to insist that an ‘external-world-revealing’ natural principle secretly exists, which in the pre-Earth past waited patiently for a consciousness that may or may not exist. One must be willing to believe that the a priori principle twiddled it’s thumbs, hoping against hope that a googleplex of atoms:

One hundred million of them lined up would measure barely an inch (Thibodeau, 1987).

[b]—would somehow “win the atomic lottery” and accidentally form cerebral cortices (over time through trial-and-error) that just happen to be capable of producing the right kinds of simulated realities that satisfying the principle—giving it “a reason for being”.

In addition to the explanatory gaps in the mind/body relation itself (which cannot reconcile how consciousness—believed only to come into existence if there are such things as cerebral cortices and is believed to cease to exist upon cessation of electrical activity in the cortex—comes to exist simply by flowing electrons through neurons making up the neocortex), one must go a step further beyond logic to insist that:[/b]

  1. Cerebral cortices are the (a priori) objects of choice to function as telescopes into the external world

  2. Late-arriving cerebral cortices (given the pre-existence of the external world before the existence of consciousness) give rise to simulated realities that must mimic the appearance and behavior of the external world

  3. The external world exerts forces against the external world counterpart of the brain (through the medium of the external world counterpart of the body), playing perfect games of “pool” upon the “pool table” of the brain (by the transmission of force through the brain) to produce synaptic firings that generate accurate portrayals of the external world.

[size=150]Conclusion[/size]

[b]It takes the greatest leap of faith to accept that humans utilize non-empirical inference that verifies it’s coincidence with objective reality simply by reason of it’s existence (independent of corroborative evidence). This “because I said so” inference fails rational justification.

Nevertheless, the wisest strategy of the atheist is to cling to Facsimile Realism with all it’s might and insist that there exists an a priori principle ensuring that our perception reveals the nature of the external world—despite the fact that the external world forever exists beyond the reach of the simulated realities generated by blindly-functioning cerebral cortices.

At the end of the day, the cost in logical and explanatory transparency is astronomically high; after consideration of the aforementioned facts one might conclude that there remains no good reason to believe in an a priori connection of consciousness to the external world.

To paraphrase David Chalmers:[/b]

If an opponent wishes to hold on to the possibility of [an external world indicating property of the human mind] she can still do so, but the thought-experiments [above] show that the cost is higher than one might have expected.

(Chalmers, David J: Absent Qualia, Fading Qualia, Dancing Qualia, consc.net/papers/qualia.html)

[size=130]Final Thoughts[/size]

[b]To be fair, one cannot rule out atheism and its Cult of Mother Nature any more than one can rule out theism (if the explicable characteristics of a God or gods is logically coherent and possible). However, this does not alter the fact that godless (or any non-teleological) explanation for the world relies heavily upon random chance (given the blindness of the universe in its accidental creation of stars, planets, life, etc.). Atheistic explanation also seems to rely upon ad hoc conjurations of ‘principles’ or ‘laws’ (that we have no good reason to believe in).

Upon deep rational reflection, chance-denying hypotheses such as Laplace’s determinism, The Multiple Worlds Interpretation, and the “monkeys on typewriters” heuristic notwithstanding, explanation that the currently experienced world is a creation of non-teleological forces necessitates coincidence so staggering as to make such explanation harder to swallow.[/b]

[size=130]And now, a moment of Zen: [/size]

We conclude with a scene from the FX television series: Rescue Me[b], starring Dennis Leary as firefighter Tommy Gavin. The Season 2 episode "Justice” entails the aftermath of the death of Tommy’s young son, Conner—struck by a drunk driver while riding his bicycle in the street (against his father’s half-hearted and distracted warnings).

Following Connor’s funeral in the Gavin house, firefighters Mike Silletti (Mike Lombardi) and Sean Garrity (Steven Pasquale), friends of Tommy, attempt to console Gavin’s young daughter Katy (Olivia Crocicchia).

Katy, however, ignores their condolence to express a disturbing insight that nearly shatters the faith of one of the men.[/b]

Katy: I miss my brother.

Sean: Yeah, I’ll bet. But you know what, Katy? You just uh… just gotta remember that you’re gonna see him again someday, you know, up in heaven.

(Katy is silent. Sean whispers to Mike.)

(Sean To Mike): You gonna help me out here? Say somethin’. Say somethin’!

Mike: Um, see, Katy, um where he is right now, there’s no pain. He’s happy and he, um, doesn’t remember anything about the accident. God makes that go away.

Sean: Is that true?

Mike: That’s what I heard.

Sean: Wow. Wow.

(They turn their attention back to Katy)

Listen, Katy, you just gotta remember that Connor’s fine and you’re gonna see him again.

Katy: No, I won’t.

Sean: Yes, you will, sweetie. I promise.

Katy: No, I won’t, because there’s no heaven.

Mike: Of course there’s a heaven, honey.

Katy: Prove it.

(Mike and Sean glance at each other and whisper)

Sean: You see, y-you just have to…believe.

Katy: I do believe. I believe there’s no heaven, just like there’s no God. Human beings made those things up so we could feel special. More special than animals, or bugs. Because we’re scared. We need to think there’s someone out there protecting us, watching over us. We’re nothing. We come from dirt. We go back into the dirt.*

[b]Point taken. A theist, however, can rebut Katy’s conclusions by an appeal to:

  1. Uncertainty in the nature of the external world beyond the virtual reality of human consciousness

  2. The realization that greater faith is needed for atheism than theism (upon deep rational reflection)

  3. Skepticism of the undeniable truth of Facsimile Realism and the falsity of the Matrix Hypothesis

  4. Skepticism of the truth of an a priori principle assuring us that our neuronally-generated sensations must in some way ‘correspond’ with things which exist independent of those sensations.

Armed with a philosophical skepticism that effectively criticizes and challenges the epistemology of the atheist (unfortunately lost to the minds of the Mike and Sean characters above), a theist might respond to Katy, and be reasonably justified in doing so, in the way psychiatrist Sean Maguire (Robin Williams) responds to protagonist Will Hunting (Matt Damon) in the film:[/b] Good Will Hunting, 1997:

Sean: Thought about what you said to me the other day. Stayed up half the night thinking about it. Then something occurred to me… and afterwards I fell into a deep peaceful sleep and haven’t thought about you since. Do you know what occurred to me?

Will: No.

Sean: You’re just a kid, you don’t have the faintest idea what you’re talking about.

[size=200]End[/size]

[b]Intelligence or lack thereof is subjective, I suppose. Although there’s something to be said for the points presented within the article.

As for actual conversation, a chat room would work best.[/b]

I believe that you can, despite the appearance and behavior of the natural world–which is, after all, only a simulated reality.

Jay
blog.myspace.com/superchristianity

Churro the Viscous:

[b]Depends on what you mean by “should”.

  1. “Should” you believe in God in the way that one “should” pay taxes, take care of one’s family, or go to church?

  2. “Should” you believe in God as a logical necessity?

My answer is that it is not my belief that one “should” believe in God in the sense of 1 or 2 above. I simply exercise the freedom to offer epistemological criticism of atheism and to explicitly or implicitly propose the existence of God as a logical and metaphysical possibility. Whether you choose to believe in God or not is totally up to you.[/b]

Why should one go to church?

Churro The Viscious:

[b]If we assume that one “should” believe in that which is objectively true—let’s append this to say that which is known to be objectively true—then one should believe only in the existence of one’s first-person subjective experience.

Following this line of reasoning, one “should” not believe in:

  1. God

2.The consciousness of other people

3.The existence of other universes

  1. The existence of the physical itself.

If we “should” believe only in the existence of that which is objectively true, then it is madness to believe in the existences of 1-4 above. However, people will give themselves over to madness by “wanting” to believe that which they “shouldn’t”.

Definitions of God are flexible, depending upon who’s doing the defining (in which case whether or not one “should” or “should not” believe in God will vary according to differing definition). For example, if I were to say that God is subjective experience itself, then according to your assumption one “should” believe in God. If I were to say that God is physical substance itself, then by the logic of the assumption one “should not” believe in God.

However, if I were to define God as a “universe-controlling nonembodied anthropormorphic mind existing eternally by random chance analogous to the random eternal existence of physical substance”, then you could respond that this is a God that I, you, or anyone else should not believe in, as this God cannot be known to be an objective truth.
However, if we assume that a person in his or her right mind “should” only believe in that which is objectively true, then one can argue that almost everyone believes in things that they shouldn’t, as almost everyone believes that other people are conscious, an external physical world exists, and that other universes exist.

Nuff said.

Jay

blog.myspace.com/superchristianity

[/b]

RebelEpsilon

I asked Churro if he meant that I believed that he “should” believe in God in the way that one “should” go to church—in the sense of the cultural or social “should”—a social pressure to go to church imposed upon others by certain Christian groups. It’s a cultural thing. Perhaps not in yours, but definitely in mine. I still get the “poke in the ribs” by family members to attend church.

Hope this helps,

Jay
blog.myspace.com/superchristianity

As far as I can see it completely defeats the purpose of doing something like church just because you’ve been told to. Like being told to apologise, there is never any sincerity in a forced apology :unamused: I couldn’t handle going to church every week because I was pressurized into it, Christmas is bad enough and thats once a year.

Churro The Viscious:

[b]Really? It seems that if something is logically necessary, it is not that it is necessary for it to be logical (save only in an a posteriori sense) but that it is logical for the concept to be necessary (real). But 2 and 4 cannot be experienced (just like God) and thus we cannot know that they logically necessary. One can only believe that they are.

“Know” is too high a standard? Why, isn’t “knowing” the whole basis of science itself? If we go about stating things that are “absolutely, positively, and undeniably true” purely on the basis of logical consistency, then we’re making unscientific statements that we then ask others to accept simply because we think that they’re true. AND, we’d have to throw in the possible existence of God with these “undeniably true” logical consistencies, as there are descriptions of God that are logically consistent.[/b]

RebelEpsilon:

Yep. It defeats the purpose, but for church-cultures who apply the pressure (to go to church), there’s the hope that the individual will one day look around and see that it’s worth it. At least that’s their theory, anyway. But they’re not bad people: in their minds they’re trying to save your (after)life. It’s noble, but irritating :slight_smile:

Churro The Viscious:

Just because something is probable enough to believe does not make it undeniably true. It is probably enough to believe in the existence of the physical, but despite our “reason” and “common sense” the physical may not truly exist. Our “knowledge” of the physical, then, is purely psychological…and if psychophysicalism is true (in an atheistic universe, for the sake of argument), then our “reason” is ultimately only a random output of neurons that may or may not accurately read the true nature of the external world.

[b]It’s only pragmatic to believe in the existence of the physical because there is a powerfully persuasive belief that the physical exists—that’s all. There’s nothing in our ‘virtual’ experience that supports it.

If I don’t believe that the physical exists, this does not mean that I can’t logically believe in anything. In fact, from an empirical standpoint…a disbelief in the existence of the physical is MORE logical than a belief in a mind-independent physical reality beyond perception.

Does the nonexistence of the physical mean that WE don’t really exist? Of course not. It just means that the world is purely phenomenal, in the sense that science, etc. is only ‘virtual’ science. Thus there’s every reason in the world to believe that things exist without physical reality. After all, we exist (in terms of first-person subjective experience).[/b]

J.

Churro The Viscious:

Fair enough. But that’s the usual implication.

i didn’t read all of your opening post j but i think i get the drift; that there is simply far too much order for it all to be random chance ~ to which i of course agree.

however i don’t think we need a god to explain it all, moreover the current wave of christian thought, which in one way or another makes god increasingly more ‘occult’ respective to arguments put against it, is incorrect. that doesn’t mean there is no god, its just that we can’t just keep pushing the idea out of reach.

i have a theory to prove that such a god cannot exist [or not ‘exist’ even] which i will be posting towards the end of the week. i’ll link to it when done. :slight_smile:

quetz

To Topic Creator:

I would like to know whether or not you agree with me that the argument you presented in your initial post is only an argument for some kind of creating superintelligence or else infinitely prescient first cause about which we can know nothing (in this context I found some of your points compelling). By that I mean that it doesn’t justify the framework of Christianity or any other specific conception of God. I only mention this because many Christians deliberately fail to make such distinctions and advance arguments such as yours as though implying that they justified very much more specific beliefs about divine sources of morality, the divinely inspired nature of the bible, the veracity of the Gospel accounts of Jesus’s miracles and myriad other beliefs. So basically I’m just asking for more clarity about what you think you can reasonably conclude about God on the basis of your arguments.

At the risk of making this post too long I’d also like to point out that while it may take faith to believe there definitely isn’t a God, it doesn’t take to faith to merely regard it as an unlikely hypothesis.

Cheers,
Jack.

Nietzsche_Is_Dead

Sorry I took so long to respond. Anyway, here goes…

[b]The initial post above is a peripheral argument for the Judeo-Christian God, but it applies to any creating intelligence of sentient first cause. At the bottom level, the post is a criticism of the epistemology of godless belief, pointing out “in case you didn’t knows” to the ontology that reveals that there’s too much taken for granted in entailments of the ‘godless’ nature of the world. When you stop to think about all the explanatory gaps, non-teleological views become incredibly hard to swallow.

The framework of Christianity and any specific conception of God, as long as the framework and the conception of God remains within the bounds of logical and metaphysical possibility, are negatively justified. That is, they are justified in the sense that while nothing in our experience unquestionably proves their existence, nothing undeniably rules them out.[/b]

[b] Many Christians have no professional, educational or even “arm-chair” (such as myself) knowledge of philosophical modality (knowing or admitting that something is either possible, impossible, or necessary, etc.) Thus, to most Christians, the Judeo-Christian God, the miracles of Jesus, and divine source of morality are unequivocably metaphysical necessities (things that are necessarily true in any possible world).

What I reasonably conclude about God from my arguments is that, while God is not a metaphysical necessity (as far as we know), he is nevertheless logically and metaphysically possible (as long as God is described in such a way that he does not outstrip the bounds of logical possibility).[/b]

You’re right. It doesn’t take faith to regard the existence of God as an unlikely hypothesis, but then what kind of “unlikelihood” votes against the existence of God? There are two types of likelihood and probability:

  1. Empirical likelihood and probability

  2. Psychological likelihood and probability

[b]When someone states that something is “unlikely” or “improbable” and imply empirical probability and likelihood, they understand that their statement can be refuted by experience. That is, they can be proven right or wrong by observing a situation that they think is unlikely and waiting to see if it happens.

Psychological ‘likelihood’ or ‘probability’ on the other hand, is usually invoked when dealing with things, such as God, which are inaccessible to our perceptions. Here, we rely on whether or not something “feels” true" or “rings” true. If something doesn’t sound as if it could be true, we assume that it isn’t true,[/b] despite the fact that if what we are claiming is psychologically unlikely is nevertheless metaphysically and logically possible and ACTUAL behind our backs.

Too many people confuse psychological likelihood with empirical likelihood, or have an epistemological prejudice that treats psychological likelihood as if it were empirical. One can argue that, upon further reflection, we have no good reason to wholeheartedly believe in psychological likelihood and probability, as it is merely an individual’s “sense” that something is true or false regardless of the fact that objective reality may belie such “spider-sense”. One can argue that our brains do not, beyond sensory perception and the things that are available to sensory perception, give us telescopes into the world beyond our conscious experience.

Good questions, by the way.

J.

Quetzalcoatl:

Couldn’t agree more. In fact, I distinguish between a “Logically possible Judeo-Christian God” and a “Logically impossible JC-God”.

Thanks. I look forward to it. However, I think that proving that a supernatural God does not exist will rely heavily upon a presupposition of the presence or absence of supernatural “spirit”—and an assumption that our consciousness isn’t it.

Till next time,

J.

hi j, long time for me to reply too, i have been very hard at work trying to beat the recession and it makes it hard to attain clarity of mind.

agreed.

indeed, i hope the link below will put forwards an argument along those very lines. i didn’t get around to making formulas for the idea, and perhaps it is better to leave these things open.

viewtopic.php?f=5&t=165922

…hope you can join me on one of my threads eh!

btw i will get around to answering older posts on other threads, or perhaps the train will take us there anyway.

nice speaking again. :slight_smile:

quetz

To Quetzalcoatl:

Understood. But at time philosophy is the best medicine to forget things for awhile (or it’s excellent background music while you’re working things out).

Will do. :sunglasses:

Same here, and my sentiments exactly.

J

hi j

i am trying to keep up with my philosophy, currently most of it is to do with infinity and very much influenced by your ideas [schism removed of course]. for example, an antithesis to the all p’s are p rule, which denotes there can be nothing that is omnipresent, relies upon the rather vague idea of ‘presence’. i don’t know if you would agree, but it seams that things don’t really have presence as such, the more we look into things then the more empty they are.

if we follow this through, we end up in a position where reality can only rightly be considered as god/infinity and everything else are abstract expressions of that. so this is similar to a matrix god yet inclusive and universal, the soul is literally one with god and god is not a separate entity to reality.

to be more on topic, perhaps all the things you mention in the op denote infinite intellect and by extension a real and living ‘god’. as i see it, all the way down the line there is a simple mechanistic function of infinite being by which all things arise, most important is the idea that; remember the infinite monkeys thing, well it just needs a mechanism [the typewriter] and an operator [the monkeys] in order to write all knowledge.

…so what is the operator? [god!] and is omnipresence the result achieved instantly. here i think we can describe a god that is not separate from everything but absolutely the fundamental nature of everything! i used to think this was how laws came about, now i don’t think laws exist as such, they represent the shape of gods transformations, thence change accordingly.

food for thought eh. :slight_smile: