Let’s deconstruct the ontological conditions of this proposition, Sauwelios, I think it’ll be fun.
There is a function in the statement that denotes a dichotomy of necessary premises for the proposition to work out. The function is “about” and the two parts of the dichotomy are “sense” and “think,” which presupposes the “you.”
At this point, we have to assume that either “you” is more than sense, and is the “thinking about” sense, or that “you” and “thinking” is another sense.
Either way we cannot have only one sense, because if there was only one sense, there would be no sense in asserting anything. A sense wouldn’t be considering or thinking about its state.
I only show this because it is opposing your idea that everything is “imagination,” and that therefore there is no corporeal.
The mechanics of the proposition are the workings of a dialectical process Hegelean in nature. The only thing that forever remains ontologically true about the “case” of your proposing the above is that it is always either true or false, and a conclusion is a synthesis of this. There must be more than one sense because “sense” is composed of a real object and a conceiving of it in language-- the thinking in words about events.
But since I don’t consider “consciousness” to be a “sense,” and I don’t consider the real to be a case of one sense, I conclude that consciousness is transcendent to the object and that its relationship to the object will always be a conceptual synthesis of the ontological states of “true” and “false” and that the concept, which is not the object, is never either true or false, but a sysnthesis, since a term in language must have an identity, but that identity must also be infinitely reducible to smaller parts and surfaces.
Here, I have reached a triangulational paradox.
We cannot speak of the “consciousness” without its transcendence-transcended, yet we cannot attribute “being” to the nature of “consciousness” so to make it an object of study. It remains a mysterious epistemological entity.
Nor can we speak of the state of the object which we consider sensible, because its nature is definitional and therefore it is eternally deferring.
All we can know for certain is that the states of true and false do exist and indeed must for the possibility of the synthesis of the ontological states which can be “occured by” in the case of a real object.
I believe this is Kantian phenomenology through and through.