The Free Will/Determinism Issue

It is said that everything we do is determined by the laws of nature, and therefore we aren’t really free. But defying this very idea is the sense of freedom we all feel on a daily basis. If we are not really free, how do we explain this sense?

Now, I know some might want to point out that QM offers us a possible way out of this paradox, and it goes by the name of Quantum Consciousness. As much as this theory may or may not bear credibility, I’d like to propose a solution to the problem that doesn’t appeal to QM.

First, what does it mean to say we are determined by the laws of nature? Is there some separate body of laws beyond the universe controlling everything that happens therein, including our actions? Or does it simply mean that all things in the universe, all participants in the events that go on therein, are enforcing the laws of nature from within themselves and onto all others? In other words, as much as everything in the universe is controlled by the laws of nature, each thing in turns becomes the controller, passing on the law to all other things it comes in contact with.

This, essentially, is a cyclical model of determinism, which means that every component in the universe controls, and is controlled by, every other component. This is to be contrasted with a hierarchical model, which means that every component in the universe is controlled by a separate body of laws that stand above them and overpower them.

If a cyclical model is correct, then maybe the reason we feel free, despite the deterministic picture of the universe, is because as much as we are controlled by other things in the universe, we in turn control still other things. We are not just law abiders but law enforcers as well. The feeling of freedom is the feeling of being a law enforcer.

I don’t think being a law abider is even something we can ‘feel’. I think that insofar as the law controls us, it only does so in giving us the mental states that drive us to be law enforcers - mental states such as desire, intentions, plans, drive, emotions, pains, pleasures - all the things that make us want to enforce the law upon the world in one manner or another. So it doesn’t end up feeling like being controlled but just having desires, intentions, plans, etc.

Of course, one draw back to this argument is that we really aren’t ultimately free from the laws of nature since obviously we’re still being controlled by everything that precedes us in the chain of cause-and-effect. But what I wanted to account for was not that we actually are free, but why we feel free. In a sense, I guess this is just a different rendition of compatibilism, but I think it’s a unique rendition that I personally don’t remember ever coming across.

Thoughts? Comments? Objections?

Since you seem always to approach philosophical issues with some common sense, I’ll jump in on a subject I usually don’t.

This is a sort of foreground estimate of one way in which this issue is often framed. What of this analogy? Trains keep to their tracks (hopefully) but the engineer decides when and where it stops and how fast it goes. The train is limited - bound, as we are - two legs, no wings, only five senses - but not determined in every regard by the fact that it travels along tracks, has only so much horsepower, etc.

Is this what we mean by determinism? That we are bound, limited, does not mean that we have no choices to make. It’s not an all-or-nothing proposition. In fact, the debate has been ruined from the start if we take this stance, in my view.

Not if we take this stance, we have taken this stance - at least, those who are in the thick of the whole debate, which I agree is ruined because of this stance. Those who understand the debate inside and out usual express the same sentiment - the whole thing seems hopelessly insoluble.

I’m not so much trying to argue in favor of this radical determinism myself, but showing how there is a way of accounting for the feeling of freedom even if it were true.

There are reasons for taking a more flexible view, but those reasons don’t seem to span far beyond those offered by QM and QC (quantum consciousness). QM tells us that some things, some times, behave non-deterministically, whereas QC tells us that neurons sometimes behave non-deterministically. Without these doctrines, we’re left with Newtonian mechanics, which I’m sure you know is rigidly deterministic, right down to simple acts like blinking or scratching one’s ass.

Yeah, well I think it’s insoluble because it’s a bad question and a bad model.

But I agree - if this is consistent with what you say here, that since we must live as though we make choices, that the point is moot - but this is for determinism as framed by physics. In the end, I still think this is a religious debate.

Religious? How so? Is it in that we’re trying to work out whether one can be held accountable for his actions or not? This can be religious if you consider the consequences of how this problem gets resolved - i.e. whether we can deserve Hell (or Heaven) in the afterlife.

Not exactly.

If our actions are determined, as the result of an infinite (or very very long) chain of causation, then that ol’ question of the First Cause seems to come up.

In other words, if the Universe itself is physically determined, then there is a nonphysical Determiner.

Ah. So if the free will proponents are right, it’s possible for a chain of causes and effects to have a first cause. If the determinists are right, one couldn’t posit this necessarily.

I don’t see an alternative to determinism other than “random chance”… neither of which give us free will, so to speak.

Everything that happens is either caused by something… or caused by nothing…

If an effect is caused by something then it is either the only possible effect of it’s cause or one of more possibilities…

If it were one of more possibilities, than what determined that it should be this particular effect and not another is either something… or nothing…

If nothing… than it was determined by “random chance” as it were…

Everything else leads to determinism…

In the end we’re left either being controlled entirely by previous events or controlled by a mix of previous events and random chance… Neither of which give us “free will”… the sense of freedom is doe to us identifying ourselves with our will… it’s hard to say this will is not my own… even if it were determined by something else… it’s still MY will… how could it be otherwise?

Also Faust… I don’t think material determinism suggests a non-material “first cause”… nor even any first cause… events might very well loop at finite intervals…

Gib - I think not - it’s the determinists that must explain determinism. And so what does the determining.

There is a third view, by the way - the perspectivist view - that will is not free - that we do not use our will to choose - that we do not possess a will, but that it is the seat of motive - that (figuratively) uses us - and that therefore the question is badly framed from the start. That the Free Will/Determinism dichotomy is meaningless to begin with - that it is religious, false and empty. We are as limited by our will as we are by “the universe” - or even this - that we are limited by our will - and that this - and the rest of our physicality, for will is bilological - is all that limits us.

Mad Man - I find this even more fantastic than that there is a God. There seems more evidence that there is a God than that we’re in a loop of events. Could as easily be that we’re brains-in-vats or a gnome’s dream.

Isn’t free will the ability to choose?

Just because the universe constrains a choice between A and B doesn’t take away my freedom to choose A or B based on whatver merits I also choose. So I would say that we are constrained by cause and effect but not slaves to it. There’s always a choice regardless of which events preceded that choice, however limited.

Is there a such thing as unconstrained freedom? There doesn’t seem to be. I could choose for the world to end tomorrow but it would be unlikely that I could initiate the sequence of events necessary for that to happen. I operate within a limited framework of choices, but within that framework, I am free.

(Please pardon my ignorance in advance as I’m new here, and I’m an engineer and not a philosopher)

How does that work? I mean, you are born with a type of brain you didn’t choose, you are fed things and experience things which affect you brain in a way that you can’t control, then at 35 you are faced with the decision of either having a quarter pounder with cheese or a double whopper. Your brain determines what you choose, and your brain is determined by the causal flow of nature. You may be determined to choose the whopper, but have problems getting it because you’re out of money or something, or you may be able to get it depending on your situation. But this has nothing to do with free will. Free will means a person is a causing agent but not a caused agent, because a caused agent’s causes are also effects, and as an effects they are determined by the laws of nature to take one course and not another. If a person is in fact caused, then s/he doesn’t have before them at least two real paths whichin the universe can unveil.

In the end, after your contemplation you’ll pick the whopper because it’s superior, but this contemplation and decision happened in the brain as a result of chemical reactions. In effect, you are no freer than a free falling rock.

Playdoh - it is almost as if someone who is not familiar with philosophy has the best chance of understanding this issue.

Myself - I think you are on the right track.

xzc - I think you suffer from philosopheritis - that there are causes does not necessarily ential that everything has one. There are dogs, but not everyone has one.

That’s one way of putting it, but it’s the most problematic kind.

Another way of defining free will is simply to be a cause. More specifically, for one’s intentions and desires to be a cause, and for the effect to be the satisfaction of those intentions and desires. Whether there were prior causes to bring about those intentions and desires doesn’t figure into the picture for this definition. That’s compatibilism.

I think it’s safe to assume people are caused, and thus are effects. That and that there exist causal laws (safe assumption) is all that’s necessary for determinism to be unavoidable.

It doesn’t figure? Hah! But it can’t help but be in the figure. At best this redefines free will into existence by watering it down to the point that it’s barely recognizable, and at worst it ignores the evidence (that is plain to see) that makes free will incompatible.

But it’s supposed to be watered down; that’s the point. The point of compatibilism isn’t to defend the notion of an uncaused cause, but to reorient us back to the original meaning of the words “freedom” and “will”. What we actually mean when we talk about our freedom and our will is not that we act from a void, not that there are no prior causes, but that our actions come from us and they have the effects we intend or desire. The idea that free will is an uncaused cause is something that came later in philosophical debates. Compatibilism aims to reverse that.

I was going to say the same thing but it didn’t sound right at first. The more I think about it, the more I’m inclined to believe that choice is the driving force behind most cause and effect. A sequence of events can continue without it, but at some point it seems like at the very least, choice is the catalyst.

Sure there’s cause and effect in nature which is independent of human choice. An asteroid can strike the earth and set off a chain reaction of events (although we choose how to respond to those events, that is if we survive.) But most of the cause and effect I’ve observed in daily life seems to be the result of choices. In fact, I look around any populated area and it just reeks of free will.

Not to get ahead of the discussion, but there’s something that’s been on my mind quite a while. Not whether free will exists - I’m already “sold” on it - but where the dividing line is. Does my chihuahua have free will? Certainly seems like it. Does a rose bush have free will? How about a cell in my pinky? How about an atom?

Hey gib,
The problem of free will, as I presented it, exists because it is an essential assumption of most moral systems. Lacking free will one is left absent culpability and guilt, and thus the foundations upon which morality as it has up till now been known is founded.

It seems to me compatibilism is an antiphilosophical movement. It recreates a well-founded philosophical doctrine that doesn’t align with pleb understanding of the world so that in the end it does. Cognitive dissonance averted!

And morality as it has up till now been known has been in large part religious.

That explains the passionate dogmatism with which determinism, i.e., reality, is met.

And what’s wrong with that? If we knew beforehand that free will was an uncaused cause, I’d agree with you - it would seem, in that case, that they’re fudging the whole issue so as to make it virtually compatible. But as I understand things, the world is pretty deterministic (except for a few quantum fluctuations). What the compatilists want to do is accept this deterministic view but still account for what we call the will. There is something we call the will, and there is a state of being we call free. If these aren’t uncaused, then what are these things we’ve identified and called “freedom” and “will”? The compatibilists are just trying to answer this question. They don’t want to say there is no such thing as freedom and willing, but simply that we’ve misunderstood these things to be uncaused.