The Imaginary Burden Of Atheism

Philosophy Forums Religion and Spirituality
1

Two men and a woman are seated behind a small coffee table in a well-lit waiting room.

Sam: “Excuse me, but is there an apple in that fruit bowl?”

Ned: “Um, huh, what? What fruit bowl, where?”

Sam: “That one there, the one right in the middle of the table. The one directly in front of you.”

Ned [now staring intently at the table]: “There’s nothing on the table that I see – no fruit bowl, no fruit, no nothin’ – what are you talking about? [turning to the woman] Do you see anything on the table?”

Agnes: “No.”

Ned under his breath: “Whew! So I haven’t lost my mind after all.” [smiling, jokingly to Sam] “Nope, sorry mister, but there is no apple in your invisible bowl unless of course it is invisible, too!”

Sam serious: “OK, quit kidding around. Just hand me the bowl and I’ll look take a look for myself.”

Ned puzzled: “So you mean you’re serious? Really? Look, there is no fruit bowl on this table. I’m not sure what game you’re playing here, mister, but if you don’t believe me, just ask this lady and she will tell you the same thing that I . . .”

Agnes interrupting: "Well, no, I can’t go that far. I can only say that I don’t see anything on the table. I can’t say that there is no fruit bowl on the table. There very well may be one there.

"I mean, it’s possible that we’ve both lost our minds. Or maybe we’re dreaming or hallucinating. Maybe some sort of neurotransmitter/chemical agent was, unbeknownst to us, slipped into our morning coffee and this prevents our brains from ‘seeing’ anything on the table. Maybe the fruit bowl is perfectly camouflaged to blend in with the table. Maybe an evil demon exists who prevents us from seeing the fruit bowl. Maybe we lack the necessary faith that is required to believe that the bowl is there.

“Unless you can provide evidence that all these possibilities and a vast number of others are false, then it is just as likely that a fruit bowl is there as it is that it is not.”

Ned: "Now, wait a minute. That’s a non sequitur. Your argument does prove a conclusion but it doesn’t prove the conclusion that you believes it proves. Of course, it’s always possible that we can be wrong about any observation that we make. But no one is arguing that point. The point is, is that the mere metaphysical possibility of error does not justify epistemic disbelief; that it is no reason in itself to doubt the general reliability of our senses.

“To believe that any particular observation we make is false, we need a reason to believe that the observation is false. Sure, any of the possibilities that you mentioned may actually be the case – perhaps we were drugged, perhaps we are hallucinating, perhaps an evil demon is deceiving us, and so on – but do we have a reason to believe that any of these possibilities are probable? Unless or until we do, we have no good reason to seriously doubt the reliability of our senses.”

Ned continuing, turning to Sam: "Since neither she nor I see a fruit bowl on the table, can you tell me what it is precisely that you see on the table that you are calling a fruit bowl? Can you point out its precise location on the table? . . . describe its size, shape, color, contents? . . . do you have any other sort of evidence of the fruit bowl’s existence . . . I mean, of course, beyond your own insistence that it exists? Do you . . . "

Agnes interrupting and indignant now: “Why should he have to provide you or anyone else with evidence that the bowl exists? Clearly, he believes that it exists, so that is enough to prove that, for him, it exists. Let’s put the shoe on the other foot: Do you have any evidence that it does not exist?”

Ned: “Well, no, not exactly. I mean, I have no more evidence to support my belief that the alleged fruit bowl doesn’t exist than that for which I have to support my belief in the nonexistence of any other nonexistent thing; which is to say that it cannot be observed and that there is no convincing evidence for its existence.”

Agnes: “Well then it’s settled. Since there is no evidence that the fruit bowl exists and none that it does not, we should be honest and admit that we do not know whether or not the bowl exists.”

Ned incredulous: “What?!?! There . . . is . . . no . . . bowl . . . there! Nothing could be more obvious!”

Agnes: “Correction: It only appears not to be there. It might be there.”

Ned: “Sure, it might be there. But it isn’t!”

Agnes: “You don’t know that. You just said that you have no evidence for your belief.”

Ned: "Look, my ‘belief’ that an unobservable, unevidenced fruit bowl doesn’t exist is not really even properly described as a belief. The word ‘belief’ is used in this sort of context only as a matter of convention. It is probably more accurately described as an assumption – an assumption that we all make. Things which are unobservable and for which no evidence exists are assumed to be nonexistent. In a practical sense, that’s all ‘nonexistence’ is. This doesn’t mean that that which we say is nonexistent cannot exist because we’re not talking about that kind of ‘nonexistence’ here, which is to say we’re not talking logical contradiction. It simply means that the nonexistent thing doesn’t exist only as far as we know.

“Every existent thing exists in external reality as something in particular. In theory, we can find evidence for these particular ‘somethings’ because they all have attributes of some sort which allow us to distinguish them from other existent things. Nonexistent things, on the other hand, are all identical. They have no attributes. A nonexistent bunny rabbit looks exactly the same as a nonexistent big, bad wolf or as a nonexistent-anthing-else. They are all of the same non-color, non-shape, and non-size; they all make the same non-sounds and they all emit the same non-odors. A nonexistent slice of chocolate pie tastes exactly like a non-steaming hot pile of nonexistence feces tastes. Believe me, I’ve tasted them both. I can even taste them both now just like I can taste every other nonexistent thing. Point to an empty space and say ‘There is nothing there’ and you will be pointing to all nonexistent things simultaneously. Point to an existent thing and you will be pointing only to the particular existent thing at which you point. This is why we can ‘prove’ or find evidence for what exists in external reality and cannot for what doesn’t exist.”

2

Whether God exists is not really comparable to whether a invisible fruit bowl exists because the fruit bowl does not play any specific role in the world view of those who believe in it ie. it makes no difference whether it exists or not. When talking about God we are not talking about the existence of an invisible dude, we are talking about the existence of the creator of the universe, bestower of meaning to the world etc. God fills several blanks in the theists world view. When targeting the idea of God you really need to consider the whole world view around it. You need to provide alternative stuff to add to those blanks.

When talking about the existence of black holes, we also need to talk about science itself. In the same way, attacking theism also means attacking theology. And doing so in a meaningful way requires comparing the theology in question to another world view that supposedly makes more sense.

3

I’m not sure how to explain what kind of fallacy this reasoning is, but the meaning we assign the object whose existence is in question is irrelevant. Whether the invisible fruit bowl has magical powers or not doesn’t change the discussion.

The meaning we assign the object in question isn’t related to the object’s existence.

4

Let me re-iterate my same argument from the other thread, since it applies as well here as it did there.

 Agnes thought that there may have been an apple and a bowl, despite that fact that she couldn't see it. Apparently she thought Sam's say so and credulity was enough evidence to believe in something, or at least withhold disbelief.  Ned, on the other hand, didn't think there was a bowl or apple there, and furthermore, had a desire for some reason to convince Agnes of the same- I mean, he could have said "Whatever" and walked away, but he didn't.   What he [i]did do[/i] was lay out his arguments and reasons for why it was reasonable not to believe in the bowl and apple, in an attempt to convince Agnes.  If he wouldn't have done so, likely Agnes wouldn't have changed her mind. 
 In other words, Ned had a burden of proof brought on him by his desire to convince Agnes of something.  You can see in the example that it makes precisely no difference whether what you desire is to convince somebody that something does exist, or that it doesn't exist, or that we ought not believe one way or the other.  If Sam had a greater role in the conversation, and wanted to convince Ned, he would have needed to lay out arguments much as Ned did, or perhaps do something empirical to prove the bowl was there.  Even Agnes, who thought uncertainty was the proper approach, had to argue, raise points, and defend her position precisely because she wanted Ned to see things here way- no more and no less. 

 We notice that Sam disappears from the conversation.  We can imagine, perhaps, that Sam is no philosopher, and no pundit- it doesn't really bother him that Ned and Agnes don't see the bowl, and he's not terribly interested in convincing them that it's there.  Perhaps he has other things to do. The moment Sam decides that, for whatever reason, changing the minds of these two is not one of his aims, he [i]loses[/i] his burden of proof- even though he's the positive claimant!  Now, his position may be justified or unjustified, and his may have a defeater for his position on the basis of some of the things he heard Ned say. However, his job is to either change his mind, synthesize Ned's point of view with his own, or else defeat Ned's point of view to [i]his own satisfaction[/i], such his belief remains plausible.  At no point, is saying anything to Ned, presenting anything to Ned, or changing Ned's mind about anything a requirement in Sam's ongoing belief in the presence of the bowl+apple.   You can see a parallel to this if you consider that the justification of Ned's position did not seem to rely on him presenting his case [i]to Sam[/i].  Presenting it to Agnes was enough- and in fact, simply thinking through the points he raised without addressing Agnes at all would have been sufficient as well. We could imagine Agnes and Ned being the same person, running through a mental dialog to try to examine the situation. If that were the case, his conclusions would be no less justified.
5

Whether a belief is true or not – be that belief theism or any other – is a separate question that this post really doesn’t touch on. This thread is not intended to be about belief in gods, per se. It’s meant to be about who has the burden in proving that a belief – any belief, not just theism – is true.

Still, while hoping this doesn’t change the focus of the thread after only one response, I have to say that I disagree with your point that atheism is under some sort of obligation to replace theism with some other worldview. Atheism does not present itself as a alternative worldview to theism. Atheism is merely the rejection of theism. It says only that theism is false. It does not say what is true.

To say that something is a lie is not to say that anything else is true.

6

If we didn’t have the problem of a medium for light to pass through we would have never had to come up with the concept of Aether. Now, we know Aether doesn’t exist. But we had to come up with a way it was possible for light to move through a vacuum in order to do away with the concept of Ether. Just saying “Aether doesn’t exist! it’s a dumb idea!” might be true, but some alternative theory needs to be suggested in order to be taken seriously by other scientists.

In the same way we need to come up with a way the world makes sense without God. Many have done so, or attempted to, with different rates of success. We can talk about these world views in a fruitful way, but not just about God/No God.

7

Ok, sorry for diverting the thread somewhat.

True, you can just say: “theism is a bad idea because of these reasons” and leave it at that. But you need to realize that others won’t if you present it as truth, and that they will be justified in doing so. They can similarly say “atheism is a bad idea because of these reasons”. Your situation then is no different.

Also, I still maintain that beliefs can only be examined in context of their respective belief systems and that taking a belief out of context can make it seem ludicrous although it necessarily isn’t.

8

We already have ways the world makes sense without God. Whether or not it makes sense to the individual is the key.

9

But what is Ned’s argument? What are the reasons that he lays out?

Essentially, Ned says only “Our senses do not detect anything there and we have been given no reason, other than Sam’s naked assertion, to believe that anything is there. Therefore, since we have no reason to believe that anything is there and since our senses do not tell us that something is there, we should believe that there is not anything there.”

And that’s it.

Well, these are precisely the same reasons that atheists cite for the initial presumption of atheism! Yet, to some folks, this isn’t enough. The production of even more evidence is demanded of the atheist, as if that were possible. This is what I argue against.

I argue that the lack of evidence provided by our senses and the lack of a convincing argument from the theist that a god exists, is more than enough initially to place the burden of proof on the theist.

The theist by claiming that a god exists in external reality asks us to disregard the fact that our senses do not substantiate his claim. In effect, the theist is asking us to believe that our senses have failed us BUT not given us any reason to believe that they have failed us.

Actually, Ned’s argument (such argument that it was) was a response to an earlier argument from Agnes. Agnes first laid out her reasons why she neither believed nor disbelieved Sam’s claim. Ned then responded to that argument.

I agree with you. Sam’s belief in the scenario is not credible. For Sam’s claim to be believed by anyone else it is necessary for Sam to produce an argument that overcomes the presumption created by the senses that his claim is false. Clearly, the burden of proof is on Sam to prove his claim.

Right. The conversation in the imagined scenario is supposed to be a parallel of sorts between an atheist and a particular type of agnostic who are discussing the burden of proof in the theist/atheist debate.

Correct. We know nothing about the reasons that Sam holds the belief about the fruit bowl that he holds except that he seems to be sincere in his belief it exists.

The argument between Agnes and Ned is actually about who has the initial burden of proof in a case where one person makes an unevidenced claim that an undetectable entity exists in external reality simply on the basis of assertion and another person disputes that claim.

Agnes believes, like some on this board believe, that the mere facts that A) a putative entity cannot be observed and B) that no evidence is offered to substantiate the putative entity’s existence are not reason enough to establish an initial presumption of nonexistence. Thus, she says, incredibly, that she will neither believe the invisible fruit bowl exists nor disbelieve that it exists because she doesn’t have enough evidence to establish a belief either way.

Ned takes a different view. He says that reasons A and B are the only reasons, short of logical contradiction, that we EVER have to believe a putative entity to be nonexistent; thus, if those facts cannot establish even an initial presumption of nonexistence in a person’s mind, then that person cannot be convinced that anything besides logical contradictions are nonexistent. That person has to believe that the evidence isn’t in yet on the existence of Santa, the ether, the Tooth Fairy, the phlogiston, Nessie, tachyons, ghosts, invisible fruit bowls, etc., either. That person, if he’s consistent, has to take the same fence-straddling positions on the existences of those putative entities as he takes on the existences of gods.

It is clearly an absurd position to hold which is why none of us hold it – except sometimes in the case of our favorite god.

10

I agree.

11

No problem. All threads evolve and I don’t mind a bit since many times, especially in threads I start, the side discussions in the thread turn out to be more interesting than the original topic of the thread. :wink:

It is different in this way: Atheism isn’t an idea. Atheism is the claim that the idea given expression by theism is false.

I don’t dispute the existence of the idea of theism. I firmly believe that that exists. I dispute that the content of the idea of theism (i.e., that a god exists) is true.

The content of the idea of atheism, OTOH, if atheism can be categorized as an ‘idea,’ is that theism is false . . . and nothing more than that. So from this standpoint, to say that “Atheism is a bad idea” amounts to saying that “To disbelieve that gods exist is a bad idea.”

Do you believe that ideas of “belief,” “knowledge,” “burden of proof,” etc., can be discussed productively in the abstract without necessarily discussing any particular belief? That’s what is attempted in this thread, although obviously any conclusions that are reached will have ramifications for all or certainly for most particular beliefs.

12

Comparing god to an apple in a bowl while ignoring the vast differences between them only to point out that if you can’t see one or the other that it must not exist is like…terrible. That’s just bad reasoning man. There’s alot more that differs between god and an apple than there is that they have in common. And you can’t tell me that you base all your knowledge off visual experience. Come on…

13

No, that’s not what happened at all. What happened was an experiment was set up (a rather famous experiment in the history of science, the Michelsen-Morley experiment) to discover evidence for the ether’s existence. IOW, if the theory of the ether were true, then this experiment’s results would almost surely reflect certain effects that could be attributed to the presence of the ether. When the experiment did not yield those results, the theory of the ether was for all practical purposes abandoned.

It was only some years later that Einstein explained how light actually propagates through a vacuum.

So first the idea of the ether was shown to be false and was abandoned and then only later did a new theory come along to explain what was purported to be explained by the ether.

Once a hypothesis or a theory is falsified (and the falsification is independently confirmed) then the theory will be largely abandoned regardless of whether any other theory explains the data. This doesn’t mean that the abandoned theory is absolutely false, but it means that science will believe that it is highly probably false and will begin to look for new theories that better explain the data.

Science will not to continue to believe in a theory that it knows to be false just because it does not know that some other theory is true.

We can discuss whether god exists just like we discussed whether the ether exists in a bygone era unless we arbitrarily decide to give “god” some special status for no good reason.

14

I disagree. I could conjure two completely imaginary creatures in my mind, then make them different in every way…Their one similarity? They are both imaginary.

15

But doesn’t calling God imaginary in that first premise sort of beg the question?

16

OK then, I’ll bite. What are the differences in a nonexistent god and a nonexistent apple?

Are they different colors or shapes? Do they taste differently? Do they emit different odors?

Besides, I never said that I believed only in the existence of things that are sensible. That is a complete and unwarranted distortion of my argument which is very, very uncharitable of you, Smears. But in fairness, perhaps you didn’t read the OP and merely guessed at its contents.

I said only that an initial presumption of belief or disbelief in the existence of a putative entity can be established by the senses. If I see a bear, then I have a basis for a presumption that the bear I am looking at exists in external reality even though the bear may not actually exist in external reality.

If I see no bear, then I have a basis for an initial presumption that no bear is there even though bear there, there may be. :slight_smile:

17

True. But that idea is still debatable, as small as it is. I know I’m repeating myself but what needs to accepted on both sides of the debate has to be “What the other person believes is consistent with his world view and cannot be shown to be wrong in the context of that view and could thus be right”. I mean, what do we really know? We don’t know squat.

Comparing God to an invisible fruit bowl proves nothing. However, believing in general can be discussed. Sufficient grounds to believe or disbelieve something should be determined before even trying to determine ones beliefs.

I think consistency is key in this. What do you think?

18

Worldviews are irrelevant to what actually exists. Worldviews are relevant only in regard to that which people believe exist. The worldview that included the existences of witches, did not entail the reality of witches. The worldview that included the ether, did not entail the reality of the ether.

Comparing God to an invisible fruit bowl proves nothing. However, believing in general can be discussed. Sufficient grounds to believe or disbelieve something should be determined before even trying to determine ones beliefs.

I think consistency is key in this. What do you think?
[/quote]

Absolutely.

BTW, the important comparison in the OP is not between god and an invisible fruit bowl. Instead it’s between our initial presumption about whether an invisible god exists and our initial presumption about whether an invisible fruit bowl exists. Invisibility is invisibility in regard to the presumption of nonexistence whether it’s an invisible god or an invisible fruit bowl or an invisible electron. We should initially believe that something for which we nor anyone else has evidence for doesn’t exist. This initial presumption, of course, an be overcome but it must be overcome by either evidence or convincing argument.

Our senses do establish a presumption for either the existence of a putative entity or for its nonexistence. I don’t see how it’s defensible to claim that they do not.

19

True, believing something does not make it appear. The world view that included ether however made a good case for ether. It was the best world view around and thus it was a good idea to believe it. I’m not saying that any of the many flavors theism would be the best world view but this is what must be examined, not the existence or non-existence of a single entity.

Presumptions are irrelevant to what actually exists. Presumptions are relevant only in regard to that which people believe to exist.

Person A presumes God. Person B doesn’t. Is person A doomed to believe in God? Does person B have to conclusively prove to person A that God does not exist? Person A has many reasons to believe what he does and the world makes sense around this belief.

Now, if you want to say that everyone is like person B, well… it doesn’t matter because perhaps God nevertheless exists. Perhaps invisible pink unicorns exist, although the idea in itself makes little sense to us. But it might make sense in some other framework. Maybe someone believes that everything imaginable exists somewhere. Not the brightest idea IMO but I’ve seen it happen. So there, pink unicorns! It’s not the idea of pink unicorns itself you must debate then, it’s their theory of all imaginable things existing. The idea of pink unicorns just sounds untrue to you because you are looking at the matter from within your own world view where the existence of pink invisible unicorns is impossible or extremely unlikely.

20

Uccisore, I think you make a good point. If we’re asking for enough justification for Sam to hold an isolated belief, and not convince anyone or act on it in any way, then he is justified by anything he chooses to hold as justification. But does that mean that he has justification enough to act? Could he, say, vote against legislation to provide people with fruit bowls because there’s already one on the table? Could he decide to take one day a week off, and tell his family that they are to eat only of the fruit bowl that day?
My point is that the belief that is entirely divorced from a consequence for others is rare, if it exists at all. As soon as you let your belief influence an action that affects someone else, you have increased the standard of justification, and to some degree accepted the burden of proof.