Nietzsche wrote:
Facta! Yes, Facta ficta!— A historian has to do, not with what actually happened, but only with events supposed to have happened: for only the latter have produced an effect. Likewise only with supposed heroes. His theme, so-called world history, is opinions about supposed actions and their supposed motives, which in turn give rise to further opinions and actions, the reality of which is however at once vaporized again and produces an effect only as vapour—a continual generation and pregnancy of phantoms over the impenetrable mist of unfathomable reality. All historians speak of things which have never existed except in imagination. (Daybreak 307).
Now substitute “historian” for “brain” and you get the gist of the argument against determinism. Don’t get me wrong, Nietzsche advocates a version of determinism but it is a localized determinism, exhausted at each moment, but the effectiveness of each cause is questioned and so their strict qualification as “cause” is only a myth. Nietzsche does not object to myths in particular but to their consequences. He is no longer concern with the “Truth” but with “health”. But that is off the subject at hand.
A brain has to piece together an interpretation of physical stimulations to arrange then into what they could be, or what they are “supposed” to be. Everything is mediated, relayed and reconstructed, with the help of the human imagination, into an “effect”. Now interpretation is gradual, meaning that the process of “internalization”, as Nietzsche calls it sometimes, varies in strenght. For example, the stone in a grassy field requires little interpretation and our reaction to it is subject to a low degree of uncertainty. On the other hand you have other subjects that stand as an stimulant, a cause that demand a reaction but which are less objective than a rock sitting on a grassy field. Here he discusses “heroes”, but our brain has to consider other minds.
What physical cause is there for an interpretation of someone’s motive? We can see a rock and so the rock is more justly called the cause of our impression. But in the case of someone’s motives we do not sense them at all, as these are a private experience and so we reach a reaction to something within us: an idea.
This idea is the child of our imagination which projects onto another the same experiences we have of ourselves and determines that which is private as if it was public.
Determinsim has various definitions but let me use the one that I believe is farther from the truth: Causal determinism is the thesis that future events are necessitated by past and present events combined with the laws of nature. This causal determinism has a direct relationship with predictability. Perfect predictability implies strict determinism, but lack of predictability does not necessarily imply lack of determinism. We might have missed factors in our calculations and so find an imperfect prediction while still determined by causality. This type of determinism relies on some presuppositions, such as “laws of nature”, a uniformity of experience and also the idea of consistency, so that even if change is presumed the ratio of change is supposed to be a known variable.
The problem that renders this determinism impossible is the privacy of a motive. Now, a “motive” itself can coincide with a mental state, that is not the issue here. I am not arguing that there is a duality, or mind besides the body or mind besides the brain. No. The brain is the mind, but what affects the mind is not just outside stimuli but internal stimuli as well. Even after all physical conditions have been calculated we cannot predict what one will decide stands as someone’s motive or how we react to what we cannot be certain of. We believe our senses to a fault and so decisions are felt as determined by reality. Here we stand as a link in a perfect causal chain of events. But our behaviour need not be the effect of outside stimuli but an inside one one and because this is caused by imagination there is no law that can predict our fancy, or, better said: There is no law to our fancy.
Which brings us to another type of determinism, one that I believe Nietzsche alluded to, which is completed in the moment, exhausted completely at the moment. This type of determinism does however assist us in calculations because the values, factors, variants, are localized to each moment and cannot be universalized. We calculate, yes, but out of a desire to imposse ourselves into every empty gap of experience.
Though the title of my post speaks of the impossibility of determinism it must be noted that this determinism is a type of determinism and the best tool that the sciences have. But it has limitations. If applied to human behaviour then it reaches it’s negation and we have to say that it is impossible, not because we are special, outside of causal determination, but that the cause sometimes originates in us and the effect, again, is us. We should ask whether we can be as consistent as the entire universe, as uniform as the cosmos to even risk a law of our own fancy (can we say “falsifications”?). The universe gets the benefit of the doubt because it’s speed exceeds our own. In constrast we recognize ourselves (unlike the Universe which does not “play dice”) as “fickle”. This fickleness renders predictions untenable while we still maintain the necessity of the moment.