I’m going to tear this argument down, but I’m not going to use the traditional approach, which is to attack line 3. Indeed, it is a good argument to say that existence doesn’t equal perfection (or being better), and indeed Anselm’s argument falls if this argument is made, but I don’t think it’s necessary. I think the flaw in Anselm’s argument goes deeper than that.
I’m going to focus my attack on 5. I don’t think 1 and 2 contradict each other. What 2 shows is that in order to conceive of the GCB, one must attribute existence to it (this holds, of course, only by granting 3 - but let’s do so). In attributing existence to such a being, one necessarily ends up believing in such a being. This, I think, is all the argument proves. It is certainly impossible, therefore, to conceive the CGB while at the same time grant that it doesn’t exist as 1 urges us to. But here’s the clincher: 1 is not asking us to conceive the GCB; it is asking us to suppose we are wrong to believing in the GCB. Of course, if the conception of the GCB requires belief, then what 1 asks of us is impossible. We can’t suppose that the GCB doesn’t exist. But it doesn’t follow from this that our belief in it establishes itself as fact - that would be to go beyond what is proven. The only thing Anselm’s argument proves (if we grant 3) is that to conceive of the GCB is to believe in it.
A simple way to see this is to imagine someone other than yourself conceiving the GCB. Conceiving it, he believes it. Now can’t you imagine that he’s wrong? Pretty simple, eh?
“The greatest among you must become like the youngest, and the leader like one who serves. For who is greater, the one who is at the table or the one who serves? Is it not the one at the table? But I am among you as one who serves.” (From the Gospel according to Luke.)
Passages such as this don’t break Anselm’s, or your, arguments, but they do shock us in their depiction of what true greatness is…
Interesting post. Well now, suppose Jones claims to have the idea of the GCB. He argues that having this idea entails the real existence of the GCB, or its instantiation. He then claims that if he acknowledges the real existence of the GCB, then this entails (or means) he believes in the real existence of the GCB. Where has he gone wrong? Here’s a little argument for amusement:
It is possible to entertain the idea of the GCB.
If it is possible to entertain the idea of the GCB, it is possible to know that the idea of the GCB is being entertained.
The idea of the GCB entails the real existence of the GCB.
Therefore, it is possible to know that entertaining the idea of the GCB entails knowing that the idea of the GCB entails the real existence of the GCB.
If it is possible to know that entertaining the idea of the GCB entails knowing that the idea of the GCB entails the real existence of the GCB, then (a fortiori) it is possible to believe that entertaining the idea of the GCB entails believing that the idea of the GCB entails the real existence.
Therefore, entertaining the idea of the GCB entails (minimally) believing that the GCB has real existence.
The idea of the GCB entails the real existence of the GCB.
This doesn’t follow. The idea of the GCB (possibly) entails belief in the GCB.
Therefore, it is possible to know that entertaining the idea of the GCB entails knowing that the idea of the GCB entails the real existence of the GCB.
If it is possible to know that entertaining the idea of the GCB entails knowing that the idea of the GCB entails the real existence of the GCB, then (a fortiori) it is possible to believe that entertaining the idea of the GCB entails believing that the idea of the GCB entails the real existence.
This just confuses me to hell
Therefore, entertaining the idea of the GCB entails (minimally) believing that the GCB has real existence.
This I’ll agree with, but keep in mind it depends on the notion that existence=perfection, which we are always free to reject. It also depends on our being scrupulous with our rationality and adherence to logic, which we are also free not to do.
I like your use of blue (guess I should infer either (a) you now have a total of six degrees, and/or (b) you’ve recently discovered you’re a member of a royal family, and/or (c) you know how to get blue and I don’t!).
‘The idea of the GCB entails the real existence of the GCB’ is what the ontological argument tries to establish via the notions (a) that it is better to exist than not; (b) that existence is a property of a thing; and (c) that existence is a perfection.
There’s a lot of talk about (b). Nowadays, existence is not thought of as a property (since, e.g., Kant). But it seems natural for us to suppose that it is; after all, we speak as if it is. ‘Does Bigfoot actually have existence?’ ‘Does Santa?’ ‘Both Bigfoot and Santa would be more interesting if they did have existence’ etc.
Frege believed that existence is a characteristic (namely, instantiation) of a concept. E.g., if our concept of Bigfoot had an instance then Bigfoot could be said to exist.
Well, it follows (I think) that if there were no concepts, there could be no existence. But isn’t there a possible world in which things exist (e.g., grains of sand, rocks, etc.) but no concepts (or suitable things to have them)? If so, would anything exist?
Just a few thoughts that possibly advance the thread not at all. Speaking of that, could you run by me again what it is you’re attacking in the ontological argument? From your OP I’m not at all clear.
There should be a color palette to the right of the text box when you want to compose a post.
Oh, I get what you’re saying now. I read you differently as saying that the existence of the concept of the GCB in someone’s head entails that the GCB exists. But you mean to say that the GCB having existence entails that it exists, right?
Yes, in one sense, existence is seen in everything we look at, yet at the same time it is elusive to ostension. What’s even more bizarre is that it would seem all visible properties have the property of existence (the color of a ball is real, so is its roundness, so is its size, etc.). Can properties have properties?
You’re bringing up idealism again, aren’t you (you sneaky bugger )?
I’ll try:
I’m trying to attack 5 which says that 1 and 2 contradict each other (or that 2 with the help of 3 contradicts 1, as shown in 4). I don’t think it’s a contradiction to say that the concept of the GCB exists in the mind only whereas entertaining the GCB entails believing in it (which is what 2 amounts to). Neither the GCB being a concept nor a belief entails that there exists a GCB. What the argument shows is that to entertain the GCB is necessarily to believe in it (granting 3 and being true to reason and logic), which means that if one does entertain it, one will be convinced of its existence, but being so convinced is not quite the same as saying the argument proves that conviction true. It proves something about our psychology, not the ontology of God… and really, we can always reject 3 or logic, so it doesn’t really prove anything about our psychology .
First, to apaosha: the ontological argument, as gib has explained, has it that in being perfect, God must exist. This is what gib is questioning, however. In any case, the argument might be invalid or unsound, but not ‘stupid’. Only minds can exhibit stupidity (and I don’t think for a moment that gib’s does). Anyway, keep thinking, and best wishes. Look forward to reading more of your thoughts.
Now gib: As you know, the argument tries to show that so long as the idea of the GCB exists in the mind, then it follows that the GCB exists in reality also. Perhaps you think this is too strong a claim. But you do appear to suppose (or grant) that the mere act of entertaining the idea of the GCB leads inexorably to a ‘belief in’ the GCB, where ‘belief in’ is equivalent (in meaning) to ‘assent to the existence of’ or ‘the belief that the proposition “the GCB exists in reality” is true’ or some such. And you appear to suppose, further, that this belief could be false; that its falsity is consistent with a complete description of the GCB, or its idea.
Well, yeh. I guess you’re right.
I can imagine someone thinking about the argument for the first time agreeing with its premises yet failing to be convinced about its conclusion, if they were not aware of the difficulties of defining something into existence. For if they were ‘convinced’, then their belief would be unshakable. But that might be what you mean by some trick of psychology, or its triumph over reason.
Personally, I think there’s more oomph in certain other arguments for God’s existence that are empirical rather than a priori. E.g., the argument from design and the causal argument.
Well, sort of. It depends on how you put it. I’d say that the idea that the GCB doesn’t exist is not consistent with the idea that existence is one of its essential (i.e. necessary) properties. But it is consistent to say that the GCB doesn’t exist even though one may necessarily belief it does.
I’d say that if A knew that existence was an essential attribute of the GCB (or anything else), then it would be only on pain of inconsistency that A could claim that the GCB (or something else) lacks existence.
On the other hand, it is (or sounds) consistent for A to say that the GCB lacks existence because his belief in the GCB’s existence is false.
I’m not sure what, in general, it might mean to say that A necessarily believes that p. To be sure, if A knows that p (on the standard definition of ‘knowledge’), then, necessarily, A believes that p. But, even then, there are exceptions: A might know, for example, that something remarkable has occurred, like A has won the lottery, and yet A does not believe he has (it’s too remarkable a fact for him to believe). Perhaps this is more of psychological interest than philosophical.
It could be that (using your phraseology) A necessarily believes that p and that p is false (as I say). But I’d need an account of what would render it necessary for A to believe that p. The force of the argument, perhaps. A accepts the premises and so, of necessity, A believes that the conclusion is true . . ?
From the idea of the GCB, A concludes that existence is an attribute of the GCB. Unless A is wrong about the inference, his belief that existence is indeed part of the GCB must be correct. Yes? No?
Yes, the force of the argument, but not the whole argument - that is, not the conclusion of the argument (which says God exists). Lines 1 through 4 really do the trick. They show that in order to conceive of the GCB properly, one must attribute existence to it (and I just rephrase this as ‘one must believe in it’). If one buys into this, then one find that if he wants to conceive the GCB properly, he has no choice but to believe. The rest of the argument simply takes advantage of this forced belief.
No. Let’s look at this carefully. You say “Unless A is wrong about the inference”. What inference? The inference is that in order to conceive the GCB properly, A must attribute existence to it. The conclusion that is drawn from this is one about how to conceive the GCB properly. Is A right in his inference? I suppose we could grant him that (assuming we grant 3), so let’s say he’s right. What is he right about? That in order to conceive the GCB properly, one must attribute existence to it - NOT that the GCB actually exists. You say “his belief that existence is indeed part of the GCB must be correct”. If I can paraphrase that as “his belief that existence is indeed part of the proper way to conceive of the GCB must be correct” then I’ll agree.
That A ends up believing in the GCB is simply a psychological effect of the proper way to conceive it. I’m assuming that the act of attributing existence to any concept is more or less synonymous with believing. But A hasn’t been shown that the GCB exists - not by the argument - he has been asked to conceive it, and as it turns out, a proper conception requires believing (according to the argument). So he is asked to believe first and then is persuaded, now that he believes, that the GCB exists. It is a sleight of hand. A is rendered into a psychological state where he can’t dinstinguish between a proper conception and a belief. The argument persuades him that because he now has a proper conception, then his belief in it must be true - which is obviously absurd when you step back and think about it (i.e. proper conceptions and truth of beliefs are not the same).
Isn’t perfection a human valuation applied upon the external?
Either something is or it isn’t. What is perfection in being?
Isn’t this just valuation; wordplay?
It has to be perfect and according to human valuation being is more perfect in contrast to non-being; both of which are also human ideas. So, it’s own description requires it to exist.
Yeah, I get it now.
But this idea is only an idea, based upon words. It reminds me of the nature of “nothingness” shambles was talking about.
What is perfection in this context? Isn’t this a relative term as well?
Isn’t something absolutely perfect an absolute being? And isn’t an absolute being unconstrained in every manner and thus incapable of interaction with anything else; interactions require constraints, give and take etc. Yet this being is also constrained in that it, presumably, has an intellect as well as desires and motivations. Both of which mean that it is in an incomplete state of becoming. Imperfection.
If its perfect it doesn’t need to change; anything that changes it takes from its perfection. Which means its absolutely inert.
You’re absolutely right about the whole perfection issue. Most critics who have leveled arguments against Anselm have targetted this point. I don’t refute these critics at all. They’re perfectly justified. I just wanted to attack the argument from a different angle (which means tentatively granting the existence=perfection premise for the sake of the argument).
“It is easier to feel convinced that it must be fallacious than it is to find out precisely where the fallacy lies.”
Burtrand Russell said this, and I think he’s right. Like most people, my bull shit detector goes off every time I hear the argument, but I’ve never been able to satisfactorily find the flaw. It wasn’t hard for me to notice the existence=perfection premise to be ungrounded, but even after stopping there, my bull shit detector was still going off. It was telling me that’s not where the most profound flaw lies (even though it is indeed a flaw).
Is it so that I must believe X, in an algebraic equation, is a specific real number (let’s say the number 1), just for me to be allowed to theoretically test any real number (let’s say 3 or 4)?
That seems somewhat flawed considering that many formula’s use all variables as sliding values:
For instance:
Area:
A=lw
This simple formula supposes what the values can be in relation to each other, but doesn’t require that if A is a given number, that l must therefore be a specific value.
Instead, l and w are equally capable of being interchanged ideas of possible numbers that produce A.
In fact, there is nothing preventing l or w from containing further formulas inside of themselves to produce this same outcome.
What was just said by the previous posts, if I read them correctly, was:
If X is considered, and 1 exists as a reality, then the one considering X therefore must believe X = 1.
Therefore, if 1, then X must be 1.
Kind of a redundant thought process that doesn’t allow for theoretical physics very well.
So, if A properly conceives the idea of the GCB, part of that idea (which he apprehends and so believes to be the case) is that existence appertains to the nature of the GCB. However, A could be mistaken about the existential part. How so?
If A properly conceives the idea of a triangle, part of that idea (which he apprehends and so believes to be the case) is that the sum of its internal angles is equal to two right-angles. Could A could be mistaken about the angle-sum part? No, that’s not what you’re suggesting at all. You are taking about actual existence, and belief about (in) actual existence.
Regarding the idea of the GCB, it might be said that if anything has the properties associated with that idea, then it also has existence. (The idea of the GCB is of something that possesses all perfections, and since existence is a perfection, the idea is of something that exists).
But it can be denied (without absurdity) that there is something to which the idea corresponds, despite what A believes to be the case. After all, A merely entertains an idea, not a thing, and nothing can be gleaned about actual existence from an idea. In entertaining (properly, even) the idea of a triangle, nothing can be gleaned about the actual existence of triangles, even though the idea contains every property possessed by triangles. That is, it can be denied (without absurdity) that there is something to which the idea corresponds.
That’s my take on what you are suggesting.
Regards,
R
PS Blue and now green? I believe this latest tendency is colouring your views!
He can be mistaken about his belief in it, but not his conception. This is why it is important to keep the distinction between the conception and the belief, even though the one seems to compell the other. If the GCB is, by definition, existent, then A can’t be wrong to attribute existence to it insofar as he tries to conceive of it properly, but he can be wrong insofar as he believes in it based on its having existence.
Perhaps this might be difficult to understand because of how ‘existence’ is being treated as a property and the liberties we’re taking with definitions. If existence is a property and we have the liberty to define our terms however we want, then it seem we should be able to define anything we want into existence simply by defining it as bearing existence as a property. So I could say that ‘exi-unicorns’ are unicorns that necessarily exist. If that’s my definition, and definitions hold regardless of anything (because we get to make them up any way we want and therefore they can’t be wrong), then why doesn’t my definition of ‘exi-unicorns’ have the power to bring them into existence?
My answer to this has always been that although we certainly have the liberty to define our terms how we want, they can still be incoherent. For example, if I define a ‘squircle’ as a square circle, my definition will be incoherent because it’s impossible for a square to be circle or visa-versa. This is what we might call intrinsic incoherence, meaning that the incoherence comes from something intrinsic to the definition itself (i.e. the terms ‘square’ and ‘circle’). Extrinsic incoherence might be defining something that de facto doesn’t exist as existing. The property of existence is intrinsic to the definition itself, but the fact that it doesn’t exist is extrinsic. Thus the definition conflicts with the facts and so we get “Exi-unicorns exist by definition even though they don’t exist by fact. They exist and they don’t exist at the same time,” which is clearly incoherent. A definition must first be coherent before it has any power over reality.
This is something new I’m adding - it’s not part of my argument about why Anselm is wrong (although it might help).
Close enough.
The power to color text lies within all of us - you too, Remark, you too
The triangle example is interesting. The ability to conceive a triangle is enough to prove it’s existence. A triangle is self evident. Every triangle drawn in space is an instantiation.
If our conception of God is self-evident, the mere ability to achieve that conception would prove God’s existence. If God is conceived of as as being itself, then every manifestation of being is an instantiation of God.
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