Of all the God arguments being put forth by theistic philosophers, the ontological argument stands out to me as being the most fascinating. The argument is unique and salient among its class insofar that its existential conclusion, i.e., God has real existence, is inferred without recourse to empirical observation. For many, such an a priori argument is a paradigm example of sophistry and chicanery; after all, how can we acquire new knowledge about the cosmos without first examining its state of affairs? This basic conviction has led many people to not take the argument seriously. At the same time, it is difficult to pinpoint exactly where the argument goes wrong, since, without further justification, the proposition that knowledge can only come from experience seems to be a case of simple prejudice, or more specifically, an exemplary case of question begging. Evidently, refuting the argument requires more than just a mere hand wave; it requires the practice of some good philosophy.
My principal goal in writing this essay will consist in providing a greater understanding of the argument’s place in the discourse of metaphysics. First, I shall discuss an early formulation of the argument along with the various critiques that it would eventually become subject to. Secondly, I will attempt to do the same with the more contemporary formulations of the argument. Finally, I shall attempt to argue that, in spite of the dialectical stalemate that is inevitably encountered with regard to the argument’s soundness, the argument can still be perceived as valuable when considered in light of the very reason for which it was originally put forth in the eleventh century: for the believer to better understand his or her own religious convictions.
One of the earliest known versions of the argument can be traced back to St. Anselm of Canterbury. Anselm does not present the argument in any formalized way, but instead lays it out in an interpersonal dialogue with God. The dialogue occurs in Chapter 2 of Proslogion, where Anselm states that he understands God to be that than which nothing greater can be conceived. In other words, Anselm, following St. Augustine, understands God to be the exemplar of the fullness of being, the concept of which applies to all that is but which can only apply to God infinitely. Thus, while worldly entities such as humans enjoy the greatness of being in limited instances, such as in the instances of possessing limited knowledge or having a limited presence on some region of this planet, it is only God who enjoys being in its plenitude, i.e., possessing unlimited knowledge, unlimited power, omnipresence, etc. As such, it is not metaphysically possible for one to even conceive of a being greater than God.
Continuing the dialogue, Anselm makes the following argument: If the atheist (or "Fool“, as it states in the Psalms) accepts that the utterance, “that than which nothing greater can be conceived“, constitutes an accurate and perspicuous description of God, then s/he inexorably adheres to a worldview based upon a contradictory postulate. For in granting the consistency of the description, the atheist has accepted that God exists as an abstract object in his or her mind. Furthermore, the atheist must, in order to successfully maintain his or her position, believe that God exists solely in his or her mind. But clearly, the premise that God is not anything more than a thought object is inconsistent with the aforementioned Augustinian conception of God, which, presumably, the atheist has just accepted. For it is, according to Anselm‘s representation of Augustine, greater to exist in reality than it is to exist solely in the mind. Moreover, even as the atheist steadfastly denies that God exists in reality in addition to the mind, s/he will not be hard pressed to acknowledge that God could be thought to exist in reality in addition to the mind. Thus, it becomes clear that the atheist is unable to deny the real existence of God without self-contradiction; in this case, a denial of God's real existence would amount to an affirmation that the being than which nothing greater can be conceived is such that it could be conceived to be greater.
The argument is a reductio ad absurdum argument, which is an argument that proves its conclusion by demonstrating that the contrary postulate leads to a logical contradiction. As it appears in Chapter 2 of Proslogion, Anselm's argument, albeit not formalized by Anselm himself, may be formalized here in the following way:
(1) God is the greatest conceivable being [definition of “God“].
(2) Either the greatest conceivable being is only a thought object or it exists in reality [premise].
(3) Anything which is only a thought object is less great than it would be if it existed in reality [premise].
(4) The greatest conceivable being is only a thought object [assumed premise].
(5) The greatest conceivable being is less great than it would be if it existed in reality [from 3 and 4].
(6) It is not the case that the greatest conceivable being is only a thought object [indirect proof from 4 and 5] .
::. The greatest conceivable being exists in reality [from 2 and 6].
Ironically, one of the first critics of Anselm’s argument was not an atheist, but a Christian monk by the name of Gaunilo. In his letter On Behalf of the Fool, Gaunilo argues that simply because we can conceive of something does not mean that we can infer that it exists in reality, no matter how great we conceive it to be. As an example, Gaunilo conceives of an island which can be described as that island than which no greater island can be conceived. By Anselm’s logic, this island must exist in reality because any island which exists solely in the mind is less great than it would be if it existed in reality. However, given that this is clearly absurd, Anselm’s argument must be absurd as well.
At first glance, it appears to be a thoughtful argument on the part of Gaunilo. However, Anselm is alacritous to retort that Gaunilo’s analogical comparison between God and an island is unwarrantable because, while it may be conceivable that there be an island which happens to be greater than all other existing islands, it is utterly inconceivable that there be an island which is such that no greater island can be conceived. For no matter how great one conceives an island to be, s/he can always conceive of one that is greater, simply because the greatness of an island is based upon things which have no intrinsic maximum, e.g., trees, weather, riches, size, and the like. In essence, Gaunilo’s rebuttal lacks any cogency because a greatest conceivable island is logically impossible; islands are imperfect by their very nature, from which it follows that to conceive of an island than which no greater island can be conceived would be to contradictorily conceive of something that is both perfect and imperfect. By contrast, God has a degree of greatness which is based upon the category of being, which itself does have an intrinsic maximum. As such, God is not merely the greatest being, but He is the greatest conceivable being.
From all of this, it is clear that Gaunilo’s objection fails. But this does not mean that Anselm’s argument is sound. For it was Immanuel Kant who delivered what many take to be the staunchest objection to the argument. (As an interesting footnote, Kant was actually the first person (as far as we know) to refer to the argument as the "ontological argument“; additionally, even though many philosophers consistently invoke Kant as being one of Anselm‘s chief detractors, it is not altogether clear that Kant himself had ever actually read Proslogion insofar that his rebuttal was actually directed towards the version of the argument put forth by Rene Descartes in the Fifth Meditation.) According to Kant, the central flaw in the inference to God’s real existence from the contents of the idea is the treatment of existence as being something which a subject possesses, i.e., a predicate. To Kant, existence itself is not anything which is added to a concept; it is merely the is of a judgment, which serves to connect a subject to its predicate. As such, the statement "God is“, from the perspective of the opposing interlocutor, says nothing meaningful about the idea which it attempts to put forth. And from the perspective of the religious advocate uttering the statement, “God is” merely posits the object, including all of its predicates, in relation to his or her conception, which may be demonstrative of the possibility of the object, but not of its actuality. As a result, argues Kant, the argument figuratively builds a bridge between the possible and the actual, which, attesting to its pragmatic futility and logical impermissibility, would allow us to grant that the currency of a hundred possible dollars would be equal to that of a hundred actual dollars. Therefore, according to Kantians, Anselm’s argument, inasmuch that it can only go so far as to support the mere possibility of God’s existence, is futile.
For many, it is taken for granted that Kant soundly defeated Anselm. But is it true? In order for Kant’s objection to work against Anselm, it must be established that Anselm somehow had a misconception about the idea of existence. The problem, however, is that it is not so clear that this actually applies to Anselm’s argument. Kantians would probably point specifically to the third premise, which states that something existing solely in the mind is less great than it would be if it existed in reality. But it can be argued that what Anselm treats as a predicate here is not existence, but concreteness and/or abstractness. As such, it does not appear that Anselm has any difficulty operating in accordance with Kant’s semantic guideposts; given the set of all that is contained in the concept, concreteness or abstractness would contribute to the cardinality. Thus, once the atheist grants that God is the greatest conceivable being, s/he becomes caught in a self-contradiction, inevitably adhering to the idea that the greatest conceivable being can be, insofar that it is greater to be concrete than it is to be abstract, conceived to be greater than He is. This is true, even if existence is not a predicate. Therefore, Kant’s objection fails against Anselm.
The failure of Kant’s objection notwithstanding, there still remains something unsatisfactory about this formulation of the argument. For it inevitably raises the question: In what sense can we say that a real being is greater than an abstract entity? Thus far, we’ve only been appealing to intuition–where it seems obvious, for instance, that sexual intercourse in reality is greater than a sexual fantasy. However, there are other scenarios in which this idea becomes counterintuitive. For example, are we equally justified in arguing that the Pythagorean Theorem is qualitatively less great than an amoeba simply on the grounds that the amoeba exists in reality as opposed to the Pythagorean Theorem which is only in the mind? If so, what heuristic not trading upon personal whim could we possibly have implemented in order to arrive at such a conclusion? Even if one argues that the aforementioned measurement of greatness applies only to situations where the greatness of a concrete entity is measured against that of its own concept (for example, if one says that while it is not necessarily true that the Pythagorean Theorem is less great than an amoeba, the real issue is whether or not an abstract Pythagorean Theorem would be less great than a concrete Pythagorean Theorem), the general problem still remains.
However, some philosophers believe that Anselm, in the very next chapter of Proslogion, succeeds in overcoming this objection with a modification to his original argument. Here, it is believed that Anselm’s metric of greatness–instead of relying upon the distinction between concreteness and abstractness–trades upon the more tractable distinction between the modalities of existence, particularly contingency and necessity. In this case, the justification of greatness becomes far less opaque and much more discursive: Contingent beings are limited by their dependence upon other things, while necessary beings depend on nothing. Hence, it would be, insofar that no effect can be greater than its cause, unbecoming of a greatest conceivable being to have the property of contingency.
In essence, the argument itself becomes a practice in what is known as "modal logic“. Modal logic, in this sense, is a formal system of logic which provides a systematic methodology for logicians to formalize arguments using modal operators such as possibly, contingently, and necessarily. More specifically, modal logical systems are useful in providing a body of axioms and theorems directing the usage of such terms–allowing one to formulate arguments, such as Anselm’s ontological argument, more rigorously. Under the employment of modal logic, it could be stated that something is possible if and only if there is a possible world where it is instantiated, necessary if and only if it is instantiated in every possible world, and contingent if and only if it is instantiated in one or more possible worlds but not every possible world. #
Applying the aforementioned principles, contemporary philosophers have taken to representing Anselm’s argument in modal terms–an argument which has come to be known as the “modal ontological argument“. There are two main versions of this argument whose relative ubiquity shall render them the primary focus of the ensuing discussion. The first version was formalized by Charles Hartshorne and Norman Malcolm. Although Hartshorne and Malcolm did not work together, their respective arguments are quite similar, in which case I shall, in the interest of brevity, discuss both of their arguments in the context of one formulation. The second version of the argument was formalized by Alvin Plantinga. Plantinga’s version is more or less a refinement of Hartshorne and Malcolm’s argument but nonetheless unique in its own right.
As previously noted, the argument formalized by Charles Hartshorne and Norman Malcolm largely reflects what Anselm wrote in Chapter 3 of Proslogion. In it, Anselm puts forward a premise which, for Hartshorne and Malcolm, utilizes the fashionable metaphysical understanding of “necessary” and “contingent”: An individual whose nonexistence is logically inconceivable is qualitatively greater than one whose nonexistence is logically conceivable. Thus, in the May 1944 issue of The Philosophical Review, Hartshorne interprets Anselm to be arguing that God, the greatest conceivable being, must be a necessary being because it is greater to be necessary than it is to be contingent. Norman Malcolm, in the January 1960 issue of the very same journal, echoes Hartshorne’s sentiments by positing that if God is understood properly as the greatest conceivable being, then He cannot be understood as having begun to exist nor can He be understood as existing whilst having the potential to perish because anything which begins to exist or stops existing must be an effect of some cause to which it cannot comparatively be greater. Hence, according to the analyses of both Hartshorne and Malcolm, the notion that God is instantiated in some possible world but not in the actual world is tantamount to the contradictory assertion that the possible world where God exists contains something qualitatively greater than He is, namely, whatever it is that accounts for His existence in that world instead of some other. Thus having precluded the application of contingency to God, the structure of the argument gives way to the following exclusive disjunction: Either the existential proposition of God is analytically true or it is logically contradictory. Purportedly, this should lead to one of the argument’s principal triumphs, which is that the mere possibility of God‘s existence entails His actual existence here. Therefore, inasmuch that there seems to be no reason to deny the possibility of God, we have good reason to believe that He actually exists. Hartshorne and Malcolm’s argument can be formalized in the following way:
(1) God is the greatest conceivable being [definition of “God”].
(2) Necessarily, if the greatest conceivable being exists, then it is necessary that the greatest conceivable being exists [premise].
(3) If (2), then the possible existence of the greatest conceivable being strictly implies its actual existence [premise].
(4) Necessarily, if it is possible that the greatest conceivable being exists, then the greatest conceivable being exists [from 2 and 3].
(5) Possibly, the greatest conceivable being exists [premise].
::. God exists [from 1, 4, and 5].
Alvin Plantinga formalized what many take to be the most famous modal version of the argument. The principal weakness that Plantinga found in Hartshorne and Malcolm’s formalization of the argument was that it was not made clear in any of their premises that God’s existence in the actual world included all of His great-making properties. In other words, Plantinga argues that even if we were able to infer via the previous argument that God existed in every possible world including our own, we are still open to the possibility that, for example, He is omnipotent in possible world W’ but less potent in actual world W, omniscient in W‘ but less intelligent in W, and so on. As Plantinga states:
“It doesn’t follow that the being in question has the degree of greatness in question in Kronos, the actual world. For all the argument shows, this being might exist in the actual world but be pretty insignificant here. In some world or other it has maximal greatness; how does this show that it has such greatness in Kronos (Plantinga, 1968).”
Plantinga thus revised the argument to say that God, as understood by Anselm, possesses His great-making properties in every possible world. Plantinga refers to the instantiation of God’s great-making properties (omnipotence, omniscience, omnipresence, moral perfection, etc.) in every possible world as "maximal greatness“, whereas the instantiation of such properties in one world is called "maximal excellence“. Plantinga reformulates the argument as follows:
(1) There is a possible world in which maximal greatness is instantiated [premise].
(2) Necessarily, a being is maximally great if and only if it has maximal excellence in every possible world [definition of “maximal greatness”].
(3) Necessarily, a being has maximal excellence in every possible world if and only if it is omniscient, omnipotent, omnipresent, morally perfect, etc. in every possible world [definition of “maximal excellence”].
::. A being instantiates omniscience, omnipotence, omnipresence, moral perfection, etc. in the actual world [from 1 to 3].
One objection to the newly formed modal versions of the argument centers on the question of whether necessary existence can properly be regarded as great-making. According to the objection, the modal qualification of “existence” does not add or subtract from the concept; for given the actual existence of a contingent being and that of a necessary being, their respective existences do not appear to possess any tangible differences. It would seem, then, that the indiscernibility between the actual existence of a supposedly perfect necessary being and that of a supposedly imperfect contingent being undermines the greatness of the former. After all, if “existence” means the same thing for a necessary being as it does for a contingent being, and contingent beings are imperfect, then wouldn’t that entail that necessary beings are also imperfect? What follows is that if this objection is successful, then the modal ontological argument at best produces an admittedly uninteresting conclusion for the theist, namely, that an imperfect necessary being exists.
In response, the theist can respectfully point out that the modal predicate “necessary”, with its inability to positively superimpose upon “existence“, nonetheless maintains its force through what it expresses about the potency of the subject to whom “existence” is applied. Thus, in this case the univocality of “existence” is inconsequential. For both sides can agree that the meaning of “existence” is no different for some contingent being than it is for God, anymore than “male” means something different for Barack Obama than it does for some bachelor to whom the predicate would belong to necessarily. What’s pertinent, though, is the term “necessary” itself, which, if applied strictly to a being by virtue of its being, calls for something so awesome and majestic insofar that this being would have to pervade itself throughout reality so as to be a necessary presupposition of it or, more specifically, its grounds; such a being would be causally and ontologically dependent upon nothing, so powerful that it sustains its own existence, and timelessly eternal such that it cannot be destroyed. On the other hand, this modality cannot be applied to concrete contingents such as males because modal necessity, when applied to concrete substances, applies only to what has an intrinsic maximum; thus, it is inapplicable to dogs, cats, humans, islands, and so on. Hence, bachelors are necessarily male but, for the reasons just stated, they cannot be necessary males. So, just in case this entire rebuttal seems recondite, consider the following useful but imperfect analogy: “Win” means the same thing for a football team victorious by fifty points as it does for a team victorious by one point. But, the sheer dominance of the former, while not adding to or subtracting from the concept of “win”, says something different about this team, namely, that “win” applies to this team decisively by virtue of this team’s speed, coordination, strength, and the like. # Similarly, “being” applies to God infinitely by virtue of His maximal greatness.
Another objection focuses instead on the possibility premise. For this counterargument, the atheist assertively declares that the sense in which the argument–and more generally, the entire system–applies “possibility” is dialectically useless and bears no relevance to the term in its colloquial usage. Therefore, the atheist concludes, the argument, inasmuch that its modal notions are used exceedingly beyond their scale of application, is a stunning failure. The counterargument proceeds from the premise that, colloquially speaking, “possibility” is epistemic, which is to say that statements regarding possibilities are little more than statements regarding that which is not known. To say, for example, “It is possible that there is gold buried underneath the Alamo“, is to say, “I cannot deny that there is gold buried underneath the Alamo because I do not know“. In the same way, the atheist argues that the theist’s incantation of God’s possible existence essentially amounts to a declaration of ignorance with regard to God’s existence in any world, possible or otherwise. What follows, then, is that there is no reasonable way that one can make the inference to actuality from possibility, or else we are open to absurdities such as the following: (1) It is possible (epistemically) that the one billionth digit of Pi is 8; (2) All mathematical truths are necessary; (3) Therefore, the actual one billionth digit of Pi is 8.
Responsively, the theist can charge that this counterargument is just begging the question with regard to the modal logical system; what does it matter that the colloquial usage of “possible” is epistemic, and how would this appeal to the majority discredit the modal system? Furthermore, if we apply elsewhere the tenet of this counterargument, it gradually unravels. For example, an essential teaching in any introductory logic course is the notion of deductive invalidity, according to which an argument is deductively invalid if it is possible for all of its premises to be true and its conclusion false. To claim–as the proponent of the counterargument must–that it is epistemic possibility which is applied to the notion of deductive invalidity seems paradoxical, especially when one considers that the aforementioned introductory logic course is–in the very same session–apt to touch upon the various tests of invalidity by which one can speak of possibility in no uncertain terms. Clearly, the functionality of “possibility” extends beyond mere epistemic assertion; it is a cognizable predicate of real things. This alone is enough to refute the previous counterargument, but it is still not strong enough for the theist since an actual metric whereby the modal notion is applied to God–or, for that matter, any concrete entity–is yet to be established. To accomplish this, the theist, following Descartes, may rely on the supposed concomitancy between modal possibility and logical conceivability, i.e., the plausible but nonetheless controversial belief that wherever there is logical consistency, there is also modal possibility. Hence, it is argued that “possible” applies to God because the existential proposition of God does not violate the law of non-contradiction.
But then the atheist may further his objection by raising the following question: Even if I grant that logical conceivability is a reliable guide to possibility, how can we know for sure that “God” is a logically consistent idea? For the concept itself may contain a hidden contradiction which we are unaware of. Thus, it may in fact be the nonexistence of God which is logically necessary. In fact, one can point out that it is possible for us to affirm the real existence of contradictory ideas if we fail to realize that such things are contradictory. The contention that “God” is a contradictory idea is referred to by Hartshorne as “positivism“.
Understandably, theists may ask the following question in response: What exactly does this position do for the atheist? Does the alleged possibility of “God” being a contradictory term vindicate his or her position? If anything, it would place the burden of proof on his or her shoulders. Moreover, the tactic itself seems to be an ad hoc maneuver on the part of the atheist if s/he normally argues against God from the standpoint that a world where God exists would be entirely different from the one that we happen to occupy (e.g., the Problem of Evil argues that the existence of evil is inconsistent with the existence of God, which would show that the atheist grants the coherency of the idea of God insofar that s/he is speaking of worlds where God exists). Thus, it would appear that, at least to the theist, positivism is an untenable position.
But though it may be clear that atheists will have their own burden of proof with respect to the positivist position, isn’t it just as well that God’s conceivability requires further justification on the part of the theist? In fairness, the lack of prima facie contradictions in the proposition “God exists in reality” seems to apply equally to the proposition “God does not exist in reality“. At this stage, then, it seems to be the case that the tenability of the ontological argument is, in any one of its formalizations, contingent upon one’s worldview. Hence, while the argument itself will work for those whose set of presuppositions allows that there be something than which nothing can conceivably be greater, it will have not even a modicum of currency for the atheist interlocutors who deny that “God“ is even meaningful. Thus, the ontological argument does not appear to stand on its own two feet, as it requires us to make additional arguments in support of the set of presuppositions under which it is sound. Given these facts, the atheist does not seem to be fully blameworthy for his or her skepticism. For it holds true that if an entire worldview is not justified, then arguments which are defended only under its auspices cannot be justifiably accepted.
St. Thomas Aquinas had argued along similar lines, claiming that the existence of God, while self-evident, is not necessarily self-evident to us. God is self-evident in Himself, as it is clear to Him, in His omniscience, that nonexistence is not an option for Him. But, as Aquinas would probably have argued, in order for the truth of this existential proposition to be clear to us, we will need intellectual assent provided from beyond the mere utterance of the word "God“. Thus, according to Aquinas’ reasoning, it seems that the ontological argument, even if we grant its validity, cannot provide us with grounds for saying that the atheist’s tendency toward doubt is without excuse. It appears, then, that the greatest charge someone can make against the ontological argument is that it’s superfluous; for it seems that it only works once the truth of the proposition “God has real existence” is established a posteriori, at which point God’s real existence is already proven. #
One possible counterargument is as follows: If we follow Charles Hartshorne‘s understanding of God‘s nature, then it is inconceivable that positivism be true. Hartshorne states that unlike regular abstractions such as “human” or “cat”, the abstraction “perfect” cannot be shared by many beings. As such, God’s existence does not occur in place of other things which could have shared in His divine category. The essence of God is, in fact, noncompetitive. This means that there is no moment at which God’s existence competes with His nonexistence or with the existence of others because such dichotomous relationships are predicated only of contingent things. Taking this one step further, we can argue (as philosopher Eugene Peters does) that God, in His divine essence, constitutes the ground for possibility itself, since the ultimate source of any contingent thing would consist in something that’s necessary. Hence, one may argue that God cannot be modally impossible because the very notion of possibility presupposes God. Therefore, so the argument goes, the ontological argument can work without recourse to a posteriori arguments.
The problem with this proposed solution is that if the positivist is right and “God” is not meaningful, then the term, regardless of what the theist intends for it to signify, does not actually signify anything, anymore than does “squared circle” actually signify a four sided figure that contains only closed curves. What follows is that in putting forth this objection against the atheist, the theist is making an accusation of self-contradiction whilst unwittingly presupposing that the atheist grants the coherency of the term, which cannot be the case in positivism. The only recourse for the theist, then, would be to put forth another argument justifying the coherency of "God“, which, as previously mentioned, would make the ontological argument superfluous.
So, the question remains: What place does the ontological argument have in the ongoing dialectic between theists and atheists? One could argue that it could be useful in explicating the theistic position, given that the argumentative modus operandi of the atheist may be based on a misunderstanding of what “God” means. Furthermore, as Alvin Plantinga notes, even if the argument does not establish its conclusion incontrovertibly, it may still lend credence to the rational acceptability of theism, given its deductive validity and the fact that its central premise, i.e., God is possible, contains no prima facie contradiction. One could also argue that the argument is a useful tool for engaging philosophy novices (especially those who are atheists, given their antipathy towards the argument’s conclusion) in the contemplation of metaphysical issues, since, as Plantinga mentions, many of the central issues in metaphysics meet in this argument, such as the nature of existence, the possibility of knowledge without experience, the relationship between concepts and objects, and so on.
However, philosopher Graham Oppy believes that while the argument may be of historical interest, it is completely worthless as a dialectical tool. According to Oppy, aside from the argument’s lack of persuasiveness, it neither serves as an expository tool for the theistic position nor does it demonstrate that theism is rationally acceptable. It is inadequate in explaining the theistic position because it only begins with the assumption that God is possible or logically conceived and not with the assumption that God exists. And it is inadequate in demonstrating the rational acceptability of theism because it only goes so far as to show that the argument is sound only if one adopts a particular set of presuppositions, which themselves may or may not be justified.
I myself would agree that the efficacy of the argument depends strongly upon one’s set of presuppositions. Yet, is it possible to adopt, with no prima facie contradictions, any other worldview where one’s set of presuppositions allows s/he to infer the real existence of an object a priori? I do not believe that there is. This alone makes the argument unique and can help us understand that God, if conceivable at all, would be like nothing else that we can conceive. In essence, I find worth in the argument not as a dialectical device, but as a means of personal reflection. First, as I have just demonstrated, it sheds greater light on the nature of unbelief, showing that the epistemic chasm that exists between unbelievers and God is, indeed, an overall issue of one‘s own universe of discourse, itself not established within the parameters of Humean empiricism. Secondly, despite what Oppy says, it does help us gain a greater understanding of God’s nature, so long as we treat it as I’ve just specified. Then we are not simply proceeding from the premise that God is possible, but also from the conclusion that God has real existence, which, in conjunction with the premises and the encompassing worldview, would somewhat elucidate to us just how excellent God really is. Thus, while the argument does not prove anything to anybody, I can still find worth in it.
Personal reflections aside, it is equally important to consider that St. Anselm, widely considered to be the pioneer of the argument, did not posit the argument for the purposes of apologetics. Indeed, Anselm does not pretend to operate from a position of neutrality; he makes it very clear from the outset that Christianity is his worldview. This is evident from the very first chapter of Proslogion, where Anselm pleads with God for His self-revelation. As Anselm states:
“When will you look upon us, and hear us? When will you enlighten our eyes, and show us your face? When will you restore yourself to us? Look upon us, Lord; hear us, enlighten us, reveal yourself to us (Proslogion, Chapter 1).”
As can be seen, it is not Anselm’s thesis that God’s existence can be proven, at least in such a way that an unbeliever may be persuaded. Though Anselm felt obliged to defend his position publicly (as seen in his discussions with Gaunilo), the chief reason for which Anselm wrote Proslogion was to continue seeking the goal which he sought out initially in Monologion: Honoring God faithfully with the application of reason, for Anselm believed that reason is a reflection of God and therefore the basis on which God must be understood by his disciples. Anselm goes on to state:
“The believer does not seek to understand, that he may believe, but he believes that he may understand: for unless he believed he would not understand (Proslogion, Chapter 1).”
In other words, Anselm submitted to the fundamental Christian tenet that belief in God is only achieved through God’s divine grace. Thus, he did not adhere to a quasi-rationalist viewpoint according to which human beings, when left to their own devices, can come to know God from a blank slate (tabula rasa). However, Anselm does not strictly view the belief in God to be a matter of faith alone, but also as something which can be justified intellectually. And this can be regarded as equally, if not more, important for the believer as it is for the atheist.
REFERENCES
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Oppy, G. (1995): ‘Ontological Arguments and Belief in God’, New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
Peters, E. (1984): ‘Charles Hartshorne and Ontological Arguments’, in Process Studies vol. 14, no. 1, Spring 1984, pp. 11-20.
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