What’s your reflections by reading this text? Any response would be appreciated!
Below I will post a link to a pdf of this text. I think it might be of interest to check out as the text is rather long and in the original version I use a lot of italics and indentations, which get lost when I paste it here.
Just because we call ourselves philosophers and say that we are interested in philosophy, others have already made a hundred assumptions of us. For example that we are interested in discussions about God and higher powers, freedom of will, morality, eternity etc, and that we are searching for ”truth” in those issues. That we are fascinated over life and the nature. That we are looking up to outer space and get amazed of the long, long distance between us and the stars. That we’ve got fan pictures of Socrates, Kant and Dalai Lama pinned on our walls at home. That we at least to some extent share the same ideals of whats important and of value in life. Some might expect us to be rational, honest and consequent, and judge that as all positive attributes of a philosopher. But why would the philosopher restrict herself to that?
One another perspective is brought by Jostein Gaarder who describes the philosopher as the joker in a card-game. The joker confuses all the other cards, because it doesn’t have any determined amount of dots or colour. Instead it can be anything, low as high, dark as light. It can be childish as three of diamonds, ordinary as eight of clubs, lovely as queen of hearts, snobbish as ace of spades. The joker is simply emancipated.
So a philosopher is a person who confuses, are unpredictable and untrustworthy? But why would the philosopher restrict herself to be unpredictable, and why confuse other people when you can be consequent and straight on. Why should the philosopher restrict herself? Or, why should the philosopher deny the possibility to restrict herself? Why just not lay down on the bare ground and never go up? Maybe look up at the stars and get fascinated over the far distance between the stars and us.
What I am intending to discuss in this text is the philosophy’s and the philosophers role and function.
A person who writes a text may have different intentions about it. The poets collection of poems or the historians synopsis of the world history or the professor in mathematics manual in algebra, don’t have the same purposes. Different claims we notice here is, the aesthetic intended to appeal (f. ex poetry), the empirical, or the empirical claims of truth, that includes all information, memories and experiences (f. ex writing of history), and the logics who sorts and arranges for the understanding (f ex mathematics). Just looking at written texts, one may also divide into many additional categories, for example the rhetorical intended to convince, the ethic that is judging and valuing, the autobiographical that is suppose to express how oneself have experienced something, the sarcastic that shall express one thing but indicate something else, the insulting that is intended to upset, the pornographic that should be sexually arousing, the comical that should be funny, the exemplifying that is suppose to give examples of the implications of a statement etc.
The writer of a text can make claims within many of these categories, and the reader may also interpret it in many different ways. Take a statement like ”I wish that all old ladies wore a wig so that I’d be spared to see their sickly grizzling hair”. That may simply be read as an autobiographical testimony, that the one who writes it only wants to express what she herself feels about something. The statement may also be interpreted politically as if the writer is trying be some moulder of public opinion, or it may be interpreted as irony. One may read the statement as an insult and get upset, the other may find it comical and laugh. In the context that it actually was written most would probably find it reasonable to interpret it to the ”exemplifying” category, that it was shown as an example of how one may interpret a text in several different ways. But one interpretation doesn’t exclude the other, one reader may for example agree on the it was written to be exemplifying – but still interpret it autobiographical, that the writer also expresses what she herself really thinks about old ladies with gray hair.
The writers intention may not determine the actual importance of a text, it is interpretations that is and will remain the central part – even when the writers intentions is discussed. The text is dedicated the reader, and the reader is the one who interprets.
Before I stressed that the subject of the historiographer is within the empirical, but just because of that, it doesn’t mean it’s the only aspect he needs to take in his regards. If his only task is to mediate that Hitler didn’t like Jews, he may for example just write ”Hitler didn’t like Jews” or he could write ”Lemme tell you a thing… bout a man who wass completly ding… Hitler was his name… he dont deserve no fame… I tell you this truth… he did not like Jews…” The same ”empirical claim of truth” is mediated in both of the texts so regarding only that aspect the texts are equal. It is first when we bring other aspects into regard that we can make any difference between them. For example, regarding whether it should be spelled correctly, be well formulated, funny, valuing or strive after being free from standpoints.
It ain’t always easy to determine which aspects should be of importance, and how great importance they should have. Even if we accept that the essence of historiography is within the empirical, it’s not plausible to focus only at that aspect when judging which work of historiography is to prefer. A Norwegian history teacher may for example prefer to use a work written in Norwegian in his education rather than an English one that is more “truthful”, reliable and detailed. Also, if it’s a history book for children it may attract more readers if it’s with humour and rhymes, and make it more easily for them to remember what was written. And one may argue that a historian should show some moralistic responsibility to these children, and not talk neutrally of a person like Hitler.
So what I wanted to point out in this part is that even though the subject of historiography essentially is about making claims of empirical truth, it may be way more complicated than so to determine which work of historiography is to be preferred. When we then consider philosophy, and which work of philosophy is to be preferred, I say it’s getting even more complex. There ain’t even any agreement of what philosophy really is about. In this text I will rely on an assumption that the essence of the claims of philosophy is within the logical category, just as the mathematics, that sorts and arranges for the understanding. Many probably are skeptic of such an assumption, but I believe that this skepticism is in many cases because of that they interpret too much into it. My purpose in this work is not to narrow perspectives, but to widen them.
Below I will discuss the relations between the logical and the empirical aspect.
In computer terms we may say that the empirical is the memory/hard-drive, while the logics is the processor. The empirical is the collected information, while the logics is the sorting of it. The claims with an empirical basis is always tied to our natural senses. For example something we’ve heard, read or seen. Like that Hitler didn’t like Jews (probably something you’ve read and heard), or that if you drop a stone in open air it falls to the ground (probably something you’ve seen). The logic however is not tied to these “natural senses”, instead it’s about the sense of reason. Something that we can find out only by reasoning. Like that the area of a rectangle may be calculated my multiplying the base and the height. Or according to the premises that (1) “if all cones are yellow” and (2) “if Charles is a cone” one may make the logical conclusion (3) “thus Charles is yellow”.
What differs the logical claims from the empirical ones, is that we cannot imagine it to be any other way. How much we even twist and turn with our imagination we cannot picture a rectangle with an area that is not solved by multiplying base and height. The geometrical figure with an area that is not solved by base multiplied by height is conceptually, or by definition, not a rectangle. Same is for the example with the cones – now if all cones are yellow and Charles is a cone, we cannot picture a situation where Charles is anything else but yellow (it’s not out of interest whether the premises makes sense or not, logics as all about focusing on the conclusion). In case Charles is a cone and not yellow, it wouldn’t make sense that all cones are yellow. That would cause a conceptual contradiction, a paradox.
The claims with an empirical basis don’t have the same demands of necessity. We may for example imagine that Hitler did like Jews (those who’ve claimed he didn’t, might have lied or been mistaken). And it’s not impossible to imagine a stone going up-wards when dropped into open space.
There are different ways to achieve what we call “knowledge”. It may (1) by personal observation – that one self sees or hears it or (2) be by information from someone else. One may also (3) achieve the knowledge by reasoning, making conclusions about other information achieved. The two first methods belongs to the empirical aspect, while third method belongs mainly to the logical. The third method however is usually also dependent to the empirical since it’s premises (and often also the conclusion) is somehow tied to either method 1 or method 2.
Most knowledge is not tied to only one of these methods, but a mix of them. One have probably experienced that a stone falls to the ground by personal observation (method 1), and also have read and heard about it (method 2). Further one surely understands it by conclusion from other things one read and phenomenons one observed – for example by studying physics, learning about the theory of gravity etc (method 3). Most people haven’t seen or heard themselves Hitler expressing that he didn’t like Jews, but many sure have achieved that information by others mediating it. Some though may not have achieved the information by either of these two methods, but can still consider themselves to understand it by reason – for example they may have achieved the information that (1) Hitler was the leader of the Nazis, and (2) the Nazis wanted to kill off the Jews, and then they make the conclusion (3) Hitler did not like Jews. That is however not an actual logical conclusion because it has no conceptual necessity (one may for example imagine that the Nazis wanted to kill off the Jews because they loved them so much, and thought they deserved better than living in a cruel world like this). The valuing of this conclusion is a mix of empirical and logical aspects, just as the valuing of both of the premises may be seen as a mix of these aspects.
I’m inclined to say that all our knowledge is more or less heavily tied to method 3.
In most science (natural sciences, social sciences) one uses and is dependent in both the empirical and logical aspect. The empirical methods includes such as experiments, surveys and investigations, whilst the logical method is all about reason and making conclusions. The keyword in empirical studies is probability, or ”considered probability” if one wants to be picky (case of exception may be information collected by method 1, but that doesn’t have any real scientific interest – because as soon it’s mediated to others it turns into method 2 for them). At some arbitrary point we may consider the probability to be so reliable that there ain’t no reason to doubt it, and then we may say it’s proved, or that we ”know it as true”, and it becomes a part of our knowledge. The actual borders however 0% (impossible, false) and 100% (necessary, true) belongs only to the logical, such as conclusions with conceptual necessity (100%) and conclusions with conceptual contradictions (0%).
Many tend to not understand this, and mix things up – considering it’s actual 100% chance that the stone will fall to the ground and actual 100% chance that Hitler didn’t like the Jews, and fail to see the difference of these claims and the pure logical claims. I’m writing this in order to clear out such mis-assumptions.
In sciences one often performs experiments in order to increase the considered probability, and to convince oneself and others, ”prove”, different phenomenons. If for example you drop a lump of sugar into a hot glass of water, you may notice it dissolves. If you do it tenfold, you may observe that the same phenomenon repeats. Then you have good reasons to believe it’ll repeat if you do it again, one eleventh time. That assumption may be closer tied if you also can relate it to other experiences, for example other empirical investigations performed. A well updated chemist, who’ve studied many years in the melt- and boiling points of matters, might consider the chance that the lump of sugar not melts when she puts it in the glass of hot water is less than one in billions of billions. That chance is so tiny it may be neglected. The studies of these things may be so reliable that they may considered to be proving, and she may consider herself to know it’ll melt.
Bringing another example; A person rolls a dice, the dice drops down and presents six dots. Then the person rolls the dice nine more times and each time it presents six dots. Would one, according to the same logics as in the lump of sugar example, have just as good reasons to believe it’ll show six also the eleventh time the dice is rolled? Yes, of course! Disregarding all other aspects, imagining that we would not have any other information to rely on, the given examples would be equal. But in fact we always have external information to rely on. When we turned to other sciences in the lump of sugar example it gave us reasons to better believe that all lumps of sugar will melt in hot water henceforth. Maybe even so sure that we could sweep away the slightest doubt that they won’t. When we turn to other sciences in the dice example however, the result will turn to the opposite. A physician well knowing mechanics in motion, just as any person who’ve lived and studied the world, would with good confidence be able to say that even if a dice rolls six ten times in row, the possibility it’ll roll six also an eleventh time is most likely not more than 1/6.
But in case this dice-roller continues to roll the dice a hundred times additionally thereafter, and the dice continues to present six dots all the time, should we then continue to believe it’ll roll six also the one hundred and eleventh time? Well, our rational scientist would here consider the possibility that something suspicious is going on, and speculate in alternative possibilities why the dice rolls six so often. For example a piece of lead may have been placed under the side with one dot, causing that side a lot more likely to go bottom down, and thus the side showing six dots will turn on top. Or it can be a mini-computer planted into the dice, simulating how the dice will drop and rearranges the dots after it, so it all of the time shows six at the top. In case the physician get to study the dice in his laboratory and still finds nothing strange about it, and at the same time he rolls it time and time again at it always shows six, he may feel urged to consider the possibility that ones mistaken of certain fundamental physical laws, or that it may be a greater mind from outer space controlling the dice and plays a trick with him.
There’s nothing unscientific about speculating in the possibility of an intervening of God or such, like some seem to think would be a contradiction to science. It is however unscientific to not take learning of empirical investigations, since these investigations are the fundamentals that all science is based on. In another world with other conditions it may be so obvious that a dice rolls six when dropped that it’s considered as an undisputed law of physics. And if that sounds absurd to us, it may sound just as absurd to them when they get to hear our consideration that a stone always drops down when dropped into empty air. They may consider it’s not more than 1/6 chance, pointing out that the stone may as well go up as down, as north as south, as east as west.
We’ve given the logics the privilege to impossibly be refuted, but at the cost of that it may not teach us anything about reality and the world we live in. And for the empirical the situation is the opposite – it teaches us something about the world we live in, but slightest conclusion we try to make of it may be torn down and falsified.
One interesting conclusion is that the logical is immune to lies, whilst the empirical is dependent of honesty (unless bound to method 1). The logical claims may be poured in a strainer and then all the illogic, all the ”lies”, will sift away, but if you pour the empirical claims into a strainer everything will pass by just as happily as it came, the true claims just as the false. The logics tells us for example two parallel lines may not cross each other. Then you cannot falsify a picture of two parallel lines which does, and you cannot refute the conclusion that Charles necessarily is yellow from the earlier example, by saying you met him the other day and he wasn’t yellow. Attempts like that get stuck in our strainer. However, a group of physicians may lie about that they performed many experiments that all have given results in line with a thesis they’ve had. Maybe they write a thesis concerning dice-rolling, where they circumstantially reports how they rolled a dice twelve billion times and that it constantly showed six dots, but that actually were only made up and false, because they never cared to roll the dice more than once, and then it presented only one dot. Or a historiographer may spread false information about Hitler being a Man of Peace, who never wanted the Jews anything bad – except some of them who were liars, ugly and petty and really deserved it.
Consider that the knowledge you collect are blueberries. The empirical blueberry-picker has to be careful and make sure nothing else but blueberries gets in the bucket, each berry must carefully be polished and maybe even peeled (oi oi) before they may be placed there, in order for one to make a fine jam of it. The logical blueberry-picker however, may confidentially just sweep the wires with a picking machine that certainly will include some leaves, insects and twigs, but else reaps the berries in a enormously quicker speed. Before the jam is cooked, the logical blueberry-picker has, as I stressed before, the possibility to strain away all the scrap.
Within the scientific works one have developed advanced systems, with loads of formal and informal rules, that is a lot about for keeping the reliance – in order for no scrap to get into the blueberry-bucket/blueberry-jam. For example it’s important with criticism of sources, to know from where ones information is collected, who says what, and what reason that person has to say it. The more informal rules I want to stress things such as correct spelling, well formulated sentences, stringency, accuracy, unequivocalness. Things that gives a well-behaved and serious expression, indirectly increases the considered reliability. It is foremost important that everything written should be correct and make sense. It case it doesn’t it should certainly not be written at all, or at least be re-formulated so that it may turn correct. The only excuse to write something that doesn’t match, is if it clear that it’s irony, sarcasm or metaphorical. But oh well, nothing of that has any room in the scientific work anyway, so it won’t come to question.
All these formal and informal rules are not necessarily as important within philosophy, since it makes no empirical claims of truth. That’s the main essence of what differs philosophy from most sciences. And when not noticed it may turn very unfortunate if the works of philosophy are judged according to the same criteria as these empirically based sciences. The one who doesn’t understand that the philosopher who is a completely different type of blueberry-picker may outburst “NO! What do you think you are doing? You cannot bring leaves and twigs into your bucket. We don’t eat that kind of stuff here in Sweden. You not understood when I told you to pick only blueberries? You’re incompetent, useless! I will never employ you again! Run home to Poland! Or wherever ye are from…”. And she throws all fine blueberries in the trash because she thinks she can’t have any use of it. She doesn’t know how perfectly well they can be separated from all scrap.
But now, don’t let me fool you that philosophy would be diametrically differed from other sciences. In fact I’m inclined to say that the borders between may be arbitrary, and in some aspects completely irrelevant. A standard model for the scientific work, is that you have one part of “reporting of results” and one part for “analysis”. The reporting of results is usually strongly tied to the empirical, whilst the analysis mainly stresses the logical. In the analysis one processes the information collected in the reporting of results. So what differs the analysis in the scientific work, that stresses the logical aspect, from philosophy that also stresses the logical aspect?
Earlier I stressed that what is of actual interest is the interpretation of the reader of a text and not the intention by the writer. Thus I’m inclined to say that a text turns philosophical when it is interpreted philosophically, that is – when the readers attention is somehow drawn to the logical aspect. A definition like that may feel a bit spaced out since it makes no objective difference between different texts. In case we want a more tangible definition we may say it’s philosophy when (1) the reader is “exhorted” to dedicate his attention to the logical aspect – for example by that the writer makes logical claims, and requests such interpretations by the reader, or (2) when the reader de facto is struck by interesting thoughts and insights by reading it, that is the reader is hit by logical connections who she had forgotten or never reflected before. These definitions I will discuss more later on.
So reconnecting the question I asked; the analysis in the scientific work stresses the logical aspect, exhorts the reader to dedicate hers attention to it, and may thus be considered philosophic (according to definition 1). But at the same time the logical discussions, and conclusions in the scientific work is often strongly dependent on the probability in the empirical basis. Mainly the ones with a lot of “expert knowledge” within the subject have the possibility to value the thesis reasonableness and come with interesting contributions. A major part of the attention is then easily gets turned away from the logical to the expert knowledge. And when the “expert knowledge” appears somewhat unsure, vague and equivocal, the attention easily moves onward to other aspects. One may for example interpret valuations, meaning the writer is dishonest and trying to get a result that matches her personal view etc (this is especially common in works of social sciences which is often is leaning on an unstable empirical basis. Many people are in these issues also involved by personal opinions and personal prejudices). The one who’s not well updated may not be able to judge neither the reasonableness of the premises nor the reasonableness of the conclusions. The text turn into a confusing mess and the poor reader gets a head-ache.
A text may suggestively be more philosophic if one lets the empirical basis and the conclusions concern things that almost everyone can relate to, that aren’t required any particular previous knowledge to accept. You may also stress that you make no actual claims concerning the empirical basis. The well educated people with a lot of expert knowledge and the other “normal” people, are then at the same level. Then the readers’ attention will by “natural” reasons get directed to the logical aspect.
In mathematics the empirical aspect is completely set off, and all conclusions are of conceptual necessity. But there one sticks to arithmetics (concerning numbers) and geometry (concerning figures), which we usually not associate to philosophy. The expressions of philosophy is by words, not numbers and figures.
Now I’ve discussed the relations between the empirical and the logical. But as I earlier stressed it is only two out of many aspects. Another “classic” is when the logical claim is mixed up with a valuing/moralistic. A philosopher whom for example says “there is no true altruism”, may cause upset feelings among people who thinks it means the philosopher is taking distance of things that got to do with people’s self-sacrificing. That the philosopher disregards the one who donates money to the Red Cross, meaning that person makes a stupid and irrational action, or that the reason for him to donate money is with the intention to impress on other people in the neighbourhood and to advertise oneself as a good person. That the philosopher doesn’t believe in love or God and his endless compassion etc etc. But if we want to interpret the philosopher as a philosopher (I’m not saying that we should), her statement means nothing else than she finds a conceptual contradiction in the statement of that an action may be altruistic, the same way she finds a conceptual contradiction in talking about a rectangle with circled corners. That’s a logical conclusion, which is not dependent on what we’ve seen and experienced in this world, and thus cannot be falsified by such “empirical claims of truth”. Not even the most extreme imagination of a self-sacrificing action, like a person who anonymously gives up everything she owns to charity and never lets anyone else know about it, may get the statement to stagger. The philosopher nor judges to what extent that kind of people exist. Suggestively she passes that question on to the scientist with expert knowledge within the subject.
Many associates morality to philosophy, and then considers the essence of philosopher to be some kind of judge, claiming how it should be. This is unfortunate. The philosopher may somehow be an expert in making (logical) conclusions, but in order to be a good judge of how it should be one also need to be well updated with the empirical aspect – which is within the area of the ones with expert knowledge. The better judges are suggestively the ones who listens both to the expert conclusion-makers and the ones with expert knowledge (those who’ve done and is well updated by empirical studies). Nowadays the philosophers tend to grasp for everything, and get nothing.
Well that was a side-track, now back to the altruism. In case the philosopher is right that there is no altruism, does it mean it’s just as pointless and not understandable to talk about altruism as it is to talk about a rectangle with rounded corners? Of course, or by the way, we may also say it’s just as meaningful and understandable. Suppose that at a restaurant there are both circular table-pads and table-pads with a shape that reminds of a rectangle but with rounded corners. If a waiter asks the head waiter whether he should take the round or the rectangular pads, the head waiter doesn’t reply that she doesn’t understand the question since there are no rectangular pads. Instead she replies, ‘take the rectangular ones because thats the custom in our country!’. It may therefore be meaningful to talk about a rectangle with rounded corners, because one can make oneself understood by it. At the same way one may reason about the word altruism, for example say that the person who donates money to charity without any certain thought of self-gain of it is altruistic, unlike the company that also donates money to charity but who does it from a careful calculation of that it will be repaid later on, even if one considers it’s not a question of actual altruism in any of the cases.
We may understand it as if one works with different languages. In the strictly logical language it’s not okay to call what has rounded corners a rectangle, but in another language that may be acceptable. I’ve considered that the philosophy’s basis is within the logical, but because of that the method of the philosopher doesn’t need to be logical in all senses (maybe philosophy never actually is quite logical). In the case with the rectangle the philosopher may take part in both of the languages, accepting both the necessity of a rectangle to have squared, 90 degreed-corners, and yet permit herself to talk about rectangles with round corners like their existence would be completely natural and obvious. The same is of course also for the altruism. The philosopher who wanted to claim that altruism doesn’t exist, may in the next sentence call her self-sacrificial friend a true altruist without meaning any sarcastic/ironic about it (or well, she may also say it and actually be sarcastic/ironic). A word may have different meanings in different situations, considering different aspects. The one who believes that the philosopher always strives to be logical and rational are mistaken. It would be “unphilosophical” of the philosopher to restrict herself to that. I tell you, a philosopher who only accepts and understands a strictly logical use of language, is almost like a juggler who only understands juggling with one ball.
Basically there is nothing more advanced in making a logical conclusion, than it is to knit a stitch I’d claim. Consider the philosopher is one who knits. The yarn is the empirical, the ability to knit is the logical. What is of matters is not which yarns they have accessed since they get to choose from the same endless storage (anything within their imagination), and what matters is nor the ability to knit – because that is something all of them already are able to. However what they choose to knit, which yarn and colour they choose, in what combination they are put, and what shape the creation gets, that’s of interest, that’s where the art is to be found!
The skilled knitter has to know the people in order to know what may be of use for them. It is for example not likely that someone with knit a cardigan, in case he has no apprehension of the world we live in. However it’s not the shapes of the human body that’s of interest, instead it’s the shapes of their thoughts and ideas we need to know, and adapt our models to. And by the way, it’s not the philosopher who knits. The knitting is made by the reader, the interpretor, of the philosophical text. The philosopher is only the pedagogue of the knitter.
Before I gave two suggestions of how to define philosophical texts, that it’s philosophy (1) “when the reader is “exhorted” to dedicate his attention to the logical aspect – for example by that the writer makes logical claims, and requests such interpretations by the reader” and a text is philosophical (2) “when the reader de facto is struck by interesting thoughts and insights by reading it”. As I see there are the two opposite points among philosophical texts, one is what could be called the “strictly scientific philosophy”, which is mainly tied to the first definition, and the other is the “completely free philosophy”, which is mainly tied to the second definition.
We may imagine the strictly scientific philosopher as a knitting pedagogue who has to write down his knitting manuals into details, stating exactly what to yarns and colours to choose etc, so that they are clear and may only be interpreted one way. The knitters are suppose to be able to create something by following the manual, and all get a result which is exactly in line with what the pedagogue had in mind (this is for example how it usually works in maths). The “free philosopher” however, doesn’t need to be bothered by such. He doesn’t need to be able to knit well, he may go on and write manuals full of inconsistencies, equivocalness and contradictions, as long as it actually makes his students activate their minds and understand things better. When the students reads his “instructions”, they may only use it as inspiration and create something new which the pedagogue hadn’t expected at all (this is for example how it often work within art, and art-critics). In the strictly scientific philosophy the intention of the writer is suppose to be in line with what’s actually written (according to some “objective”/“logical”/“scientific correct” interpretation – this is vague, but we don’t need to understand it perfectly) and what’s actually written is suppose to be in line with the interpretation by the reader. The strictly scientific interpretor is only suppose care about the actual writing, and only do what he is told by the writer. The completely free philosophy may however have an intention that’s got nothing to do with what’s actually written, and the reader’s “interpretation” (I’m writing it cited here, because in these cases it’s more an issue of “inspiration”) may be way different from both the intention and the “actual writing”.
Most philosophic texts is however best understood as a mix of these aspects. The scientific philosopher is more of an instructor and the free philosopher is more of an inspirer, but I claimed the philosopher to be a pedagogue – and the pedagogue is (often at the same time) both instructing and inspiring. Quite often the goal in philosophy is to get an interpretation that is somehow in line with the intention of a text, but the aspect of what’s “actually written” is more or less set aside. In the satirical text for example, the intention and the interpretation may be perfect in line, but what’s actually written doesn’t match at all – then the interpretor has managed to find a way to understanding without the ”scientific language”. The writer may encourage the reader see things from different perspectives, both by telling them (scientific method) and showing them (free method). He may for example tell “I am not always to be trusted”, and may also show it by intentionally telling things that obviously doesn’t make sense (one problem of using the first method may be that the readers don’t activate their own minds and make no conclusions by themselves, the problems of the second method may be that the readers ignores it, don’t notice it or misunderstands it). But the reader may also see things from different perspectives without being obviously “provoked” by the writer to do it, for example by having in mind the humaneness of the writer and his possible difficulties to really express what he thinks, and having in mind also the humaneness of herself as an interpretor.
Both the scientific and the free philosophers may be useful in different situations, and they can find help and inspiration from each other. Someone may for example read a text by a free philosopher, and then translate hers (logical) impressions of it into a scientific acceptable language. And a work of “scientific philosophy” may also be more helpful and better understood when interpreted not only by scientific conventions of interpretation but also by free methods.
Even if the understanding is the only thing that brings philosophy onwards, the writer doesn’t need to express logical in order for the reader to find sense. Some would say, after all we are humans and not computers, so let’s utilize our humanity! The one who expresses herself logical, clear and free from contradictions, that even a computer may understand it, is not blameworthy for what she states, but she may get in troubles. It may go stumbling.
Imagine a cross-country-skier in the classical way just punting forward, even uphills, and then imagine a free-style skier passing by using the skating-technique. The free-style skier is only half-logical because she is not only going forward but also to the right and to the left. Forward is the only way for the sense and understanding, so going right and left is then completely irrational. Still she moves forward in a quicker speed than the one who punts, because she gets better rhythm in her skiing, she uses more of her muscles and more effectively. The one who carefully examine each single skate with the ski, will notice each of them are directing straight into the woods – but it’s not worth bothering about that, because all the time new perspectives is brought, new skates which point out new directions. And by the way, maybe all this parable with the skiers might only be a obliqued skate with the ski, not pointing out any actual direction to follow. One need to get along in the curves also.
A philosophic text may not be a complete product, but only a tool to outwork a product. And one text may not either be a tool, but a set of loose pieces in order to make a tool. Or a manual which describes how to set these loose pieces into a tool. Another text may be a key for a locker where the manual is to be found. A philosophic text may also be just a half-made product, which may not come to any use until someone completes it.
A narrow-minded person may not notice all these nuances. Oh, was it a marionette that was going to be built she states, and takes the manual for it and starts to file a piece of wood with it. Blah, this was a useless tool she says and throws away the manual. Then she picks up a knife to carve out two arms, but soon she notices that it doesn’t work either. She complains over that the knife is too blunt, and puts I in the trash. But what if she’d understood that the manual was intended to be read, there it actually said that one has to pull out the knife from the sheath before using it.
Just as the joker in the card-game switches roles, the philosopher all the time need to be ready to see things from a new perspective and find new ways of confronting issues (both the writer of a text and the interpretor of it). Before I had the impression that as a philosopher one has to express in a certain way, follow certain conventions etc. When I had some courses in philosophy at the university that impression got stronger tied. It was first when I started to take interest in literature and fiction, I got some serious new perspectives, and could find new ways of confronting issues and ways of expressing myself that felt better. We may say that the Gaarder joker, who is an obviously literary figure, helped me to break up with the philosophical cliché. But the one who by coincidence have read Gaarder’s book “Solitaire Mystery” would surely have things to object at my interpretation of his joker, because I didn’t describe the joker as Gaarder did in his book. We may say that my joker stepped out from the Gaarder joker and poked its tongue at him. And then I took distance from the joker I created myself, by questioning it’s unpredictableness and its confuting effect on other people, wondered why it couldn’t be consequent and straight on. And I wrote a long text where I really tried to be consequent and straight on. It was like I stepped out of my definition of the joker as a philosopher, and poked my tongue at it. But all this thing about taking distance from, emancipate, deny and poke tongue at, doesn’t it sound like a jokerish action by a jokerish joker? Me, I don’t know, and I’m not going to bother myself about trying to find out.