The Philosophy of Anxiety Condition

An anxiety condition is the name put to a type of anxiety that makes a person imagine pains and/or concerns.

In the absence of imagined pains or concerns then the anxiety condition is simply another name for anxiety. It cannot be argued that because anxiety is a “condition” that it must be different in kind from any other feeling, as all feelings have physical associations and, likewise, could be called conditions. Nor can the idea that a condition “makes” a person behave mechanically be diagnostically significant, as any feeling that is associated with the physical could be considered in the same way.

I’d say we assess a condition by its cause, control, and extent. If I have anxiety to the extent that it seems a condition of my being, I might call that a “condition”. Of course, anxiety seems to be a condition of everyone’s being, so I’d suppose we judge the condition, in this case, by how often the anxiety becomes debilitating in every day life. Chronic anxiety becomes a condition insofar as it becomes implicated in a person’s physiology. That is to say, a diagnosed condition would seem relatively unaffected by volition.

Anxiety is generally conditional in that it is contextual. It is natural, but finds occasion in context. I know that anxiety is a condition of letting my wife drive, for instance. When context becomes [more] irrelevant, that is when a condition becomes diagnosable.

A condition is constructed from a set of criteria. It isn’t an object that reveals information, but a physical metaphor for a set of values and judgements. It’s significance of meaning can’t be assessed by its cause, unless the cause itself is created as a condition.

Correct, and the criteria in this case would seem to be cause, frequency, and control.

What causes the anxiety?
How often?
Does the subject have the ability to control it?

The cause itself is inherently a condition …of everything. Either way, I’m not sure what you mean by its “significance of meaning”. Its significance of meaning, as far as I can tell, is a diagnosis. A transitory [and reactionary] psychological state can become a protracted ‘condition’ [no longer just reactionary].

(Some) anxiety has a physical mechanism for self-perpetuation. In that case, the cause is a condition. Or not, depending on whether one agrees with you or not.


The criteria for both condition and cause are a set of values and judgements.

This is the idea of chemical possession: things we don’t like, such as “anxiety” possess or control us, but things we like, such as joy, do not. The reason for privileging them in this way is social, not causal. There can be no selective causal reason at work priviliging one chemical state over another on the issue of “control”.

All the feelings can be regarded as physical - if we want to put it that reductionist way. Self-perpetuation is neither physical nor mental, or both. It’s a bit chamaeleonic.

But the idea that some moods are destructive to us can’t be assessed by examining the material substrates. These material substrates are themselves only identified by what we regard as destructive to us.

Perpetuation of the physical form is what we have in common with non-life forms, so perpetuation can’t be employed as a value marker for life-forms.

What? Sure there can. If I smoke PCP, chemical states will change in ways that are well beyond my control. Aside from willful manipulation as such, I’d think the subconscious is that causal reason. We naturally react to things in ways that alter our brain chemistry. Perhaps we can control how we react, but the reactions themselves are inevitable. The subconscious largely becomes a product of habituation. The best we can really do is make a habit conscious in order to change it. Compulsion seems to be a naturally occurring behavioral pattern, whether it’s cause is social or otherwise.

Are you saying that all differences in brain chemistry, and subsequent behavior, from one person to the next are purely psychological, then?

Are you saying that chemical states in your brain are static until they are given drugs?

Listen, sorry, but I don’t acknowledge either chemical states or psychological x’s.

No, I’m saying there are real biological variances in neurochemical production from one person to the next. Some people naturally experience chemical surges, or depletions, that result in real psychological and behavioral changes.

You don’t acknowledge chemical states? I’m curious how you’d explain ice to a toddler.

I get the bit about “chemical possession”, and it is likely true in many cases; but it is absurd to dismiss all “chemical states and psychological x’s” on those grounds. I would like to see you explain your stance to a schizophrenic.

And guess what. It’s an amzing coincidence that people who are different to us have chemical “surges”, and that we know that they are “surges” because these people are different to us.

Don’t appeal to surges, changes, as reasons for x, for they are only identified as surges and reasons on the basis of x.

If you drink a bottle of vodka and go for a drive, certain chemical surges in the brain might be the preponderant reason for you crashing. Or not?

This is an obvious strawman. I never said anything about “people who are different to us”. In fact, I don’t even know what that means. Who is “us”?

No shit. That is how we diagnose anything. Inference can’t be that foreign to you. Without a basis, we have no need for research. The basis is the reason we look for reasons, so to speak. Why/how would we look for reasons to explain something which hasn’t yet been identified in some way?