The following is a construction of the Richard Paradox found in the book "Godel"s Proof by Ernest Nagel and James R. Newman with editing and forward by Douglas Hofstadter.
I am posting this paradox for two reasons.
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This paradox is the lynch pin for Godel’s Incompleteness Theorem, which dealt huge blows to Russell’s and Hilbert’s drive for Formalism in the construction of an axiomatic theory of arithmetic.
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The concept of mapping true sets of sequences of sentences to the counting numbers was a new concept to me. And this is one of the great joys in my life. I hope it will be that way for you.
I should also say that there is a logical flaw in this paradox. Maybe you will find some joy in trying to find it.
Consider a language e.g. English in which the purely arithmetical properties of the cardinal numbers can be formulated and defined. Let us examine the definitions that can be stated in the language. It is clear that, on pain of circularity or infinite regress, some terms referring to arithmetical properties can not be defined explicitly - for we can not define everything and must start somewhere- though they can be understood in some other way. For our purposes it does not matter which are the undefined or “primitive” terms; we may assume, for example, that we understand what is meant by “an integer is divisible by another”, “an integer is the product of two integers” and so on. The property of being a prime number may then be defined by “not divisible by any number other than 1 and itself”; the property of being a perfect square maybe defined by “being the product of some square and itself”; and so on.
We can readily see that each such definition will contain only a finite number of words, and therefore a finite number of letters of the alphabet. This being the case, the definitions can be placed in a serial order: a definition will proceed another if the number of letters in the first is smaller than the number of letters in the second; and, if two definitions have the same number of letters, one of them will precede the other on the basis of alphabetical order of the letters in each. On the basis of this order, a unique integer will correspond to each definition and will represent the number of the place that the definition occupies in the series. For example, the definition with the smallest number of letters will correspond to the number 1, the next definition in the series will correspond to the number 2, and so on.
Since each definition is associated with a unique integer, it may turn out in certain cases that an integer will possess the very property designated by the definition with which the integer is correlated. Suppose, for instance, the defining expression “not divisible by any integer other than 1 and itself” happens to be correlated with the number 17; obviously 17 itself has the property designated by that expression. On the other hand, suppose the defining expression “being the product of some integer by itself” were correlated with the order number 15; 15 clearly does not have the property designated by the expression. We shall describe the state of affairs in the second example by saying that the number 15 has the property of being Richardian ; and in the first example, by saying that the number 17 does not have the property of being Richardian. More generally, we define “x is Richardian” as a shorthand way of saying “x does not have the property designated by the defining expression with which x is correlated in the serially ordered set of definitions”.
We come now to a curious but characteristic turn in the statement of the Richard Paradox. The defining expression for the property of being Richardian ostensibly describes a numerical property of integers. The expression itself therefore belongs to the series of definitions proposed above. It follows that the expression is correlated with a position-fixing integer or number. Suppose this number is n. Now we pose the question, reminiscent of Russell’s antimony: Is n Richardian? The reader can doubtless anticipate the fatal contradiction that now threatens. For n is Richardian if, and only if, n does not have the property designated by the defining expression with which n is correlated (i.e., it does not have the property of being Richardian). In short n is Richardian if, and only if n is not Richardian; so that the statement n is Richardian is both true and false.