SIATD would be a better person to discuss Derrida and the like than I, for I agree that such a position is absurd (though I do believe it is somewhat meant to be) and furthermore, I’m gonna go with Ucci on this one and say that it goes against common experience in such an extreme manner as to be unusable as a philosophical statement.
But . . . that is from my perspective. My girlfriend, for example, feels that what Derrida says about this is intuatively true and often feels an inability to vocalize her thoughts. I, personally, fail to see how such a thing could occur. The only time I have had difficulty expressing my thoughts is when I felt the evidence was so overwhelmingly in my favour that all I need do was present the evidence and say, “So, I’d like to investigate this” when my boss wanted a more formal proposal. And even in that case, it had much more to do with my extremely limited experience in the area – I couldn’t write a formal proposal without a lot more digging, which I believe, was the point. So, I tend to think that being unable to express one’s thoughts stems from ignorance rather than their construction.
As someone whose knowledge of Umwelt is still very small, would you mind clarifying how Evolutionary theory goes against it? Merely because the authors didn’t buy it doesn’t mean that it can’t be seamlessly integrated into the philosophy, or?
Well Xunzian, traditional evolutionary theory (neo-darwinism) claims that evolution is propelled purely by random mutations. Umwelt theory (post-darwinism) argues that there is intentionality and self-organization involved in evolution.
Excellent arguments have been made by biosemioticians such as Kaveli Kull and Alexei Sharov that intentionality is evident if biology is viewed from a non-mechanistic perspective. It’s too detailed to get into here, but a good article to read is called “Pragmatism and Umwelt Theory.” It’s available online for free.
Also, self-organization is apparent in biology when one considers that the very existence of the cell is presupposed by the symbiotic relationship between those individual parts of the cell. This point is even more important to consider when discussing multicellular animals, etc.
Either way, a mechanistic, positivistic study of biology has no room for consideration of meaning or purpose. It is not part of the positivistic project which neo-darwinists insist upon supporting. In contrast, post-darwinists argue that meaning is important in considering biology, and it’s working to distance itself from the dated brand of ‘vitalism’ that Uexkull subscribed to about 100 years ago.
I will need to do more research before I can feel competent to address these good posts. All I can say for now is that the gaps appear to be those of consciousness, not those of awareness. There are no gaps in biological processes, only in our interpretations of them.
Why couldn’t someone say that the sign represents reality, thereby bringing semeotics in line with realism?
From what I understand, the best way to work the Umwelt theory in the modern world is to turn it on its head and apply natural selection to it. We filter out those aspects of reality that do not pertain to us as natural selection weeds out variations that are non-selective.
Otherwise it reeks of LaMarkian heresy, which makes it totally non-viable as a theory.
I read the Sharov article and found it interesting. I especially liked Uexkull’s Pythagorian ideas regarding music, harmony, etc. Like Xunzian, if I read correctly, I have problems with Uexkull’s interpretation of Darwinisim as a model for explaining organic change. I can’t quite square up what I’ve read in Dawkins, et. al., with Sharov’s attempts here at some sort of synthesis of Dawinism and pragmatism.
Also, I reacted to Derrida in the wrong way. Upset by the word deconstruction, I had not considered what he thought should be deconstructed. If he wants to deconstruct words and ideas that foster dichotomies, polarities, bifurcations, antinomies, then I’m all for it and would like to hear more!
Umwelt as personal, customized to the structure, subjectivity among organisms does not seem to address the facts that to have subjectivity at all is a common factor among various organisms, as is adaptability. It would appear, to me at least, that a pragmatic survey of organic adaptation processes would look for common elements in such cases. And the idea of common elements, homology, etc. is not a giving in to ideas of logical positivism. Process is activity.
You should have problems with Uexkull’s interpretation of Darwinism - he was off the mark. Uexkull himself sided with Lamarck and the Vitalism that he’s associated with. However, Sharov identifies how, through biosemiotics, that intention is endemic to biological processes.
But, I need to clear up some misconceptions so we are all talking about the same things:
First, Ierrellus I’ll tell you why you can’t square Dawkins and Sharov up - it’s the fact that Dawkins is working within the Neodarwinist framework and Sharov is working within a biosemiotic framework. What’s the difference, you ask? Simple: neodarwinists believe all life processes can be explained mechanistically - like machine functions. Biosemioticians, which for the purposes of this conversation we can call non-mechanists, believe life cannot be explained accurately at that extreme level of abstraction and reduction.
They instead believe that life can be best understood in terms of semiotics - signs. They believe that nature is not a ‘blind watchmaker’, but that organisms are actively interpreting signs in their Umwelts, and, when viewed from the level of lineages( read: not reductionist neodarwinism) that intention and self-organization are evident. From here, the argument extended to incorporate conscious animals, which actively demonstrate intention (self-preservation/decision-making) and self-organization (herds, kinship, etc.).
Perhaps Xunzian may have something to add regarding the genetic aspects of biosemiotics, if he’s interested in reading the article. My understanding of the genetic implications to neodarwinism within biosemiotics is that the genetic code has meaning - and meaning means intention - and this is something that neodarwinism (mechanists) won’t consider.
Xunzian wrote:
You could - with qualifications. “Realism” means a lot of different things to different people, though. Biosemiotics might say that ‘the universe is perfuse with signs’.
Xunzian wrote:
As I understand it, Umwelt Theory need not be ‘turned on its head’ to be considered as a metaphorical natural selection. Could you explain your thinking behind this more?
And finally, as far as I can tell, Deconstruction has little applicability to any aspect of the discussions within any part of this whole post, but particularly with regard to discussions of Umwelt Theory. As I explained in detail in an above post, Deconstruction considers purposeful human language-based applications only. And even then, it has its faults.
I thought it needed to be turned on its head because, from what I understood of the biosesmotics essay, it argues against natural selection acting as a sieve for selection and rather favours system organization as a means of progression. Or at least suggests that such a mechanism is possible. Postdarwinism has no place in the lab, and as such, has no place in thought what-so-ever.
Since language/communcation does eventually boil down to signs (both outside-in and inside-out, I think that Derrida’s conception of language (communication, signs) needs to be discussed and dealt with. Where there is communication, there is that disconnect. Unless, of course, you want to seperate humans from the rest of the animal kingdom.
Ok, I think I see what you’re saying now. Let me try and explain it better. Natural selection is indisputable. Biosemioticians support it as an undeniable reality - natural selection is, quite simply, the process of death. It’s very simple. But natural selection in and of itself does not explain evolution. Neodarwinists claim evolution is driven by random mutations - a mechanistic process, devoid of meaning or significance.
Biosemiotics respects all of these mechanistic processes, such as mutations. But, biosemiotics - instead of only identifying and concerning itself with those mechanistic processes - looks at biological processes from a sign perspective - communication between generations, information passed from parent to offspring represented as a code - a genetic code to be interpreted and implemented with a purpose and intention intrinsic to the meaning of the code, of the communication about what was successful and how best to use those adaptations from past generations.
Further, the world is comprised of patterns of signs that are constantly interpreting each other (ourselves included). In other words, everything is reducible to meaningful signs and not meaningless atoms. If you can imagine things that way, you may see what biosemiotics is all about.
It’s a very different way to imagine the world, but in many areas it offers more clarity about how the world works.
Xunzian wrote:
‘Mechanism’ probably isn’t the right word to use here. Again, Biosemiotics argues against a mechanistic, highly-abstracted view of biology.
Xunzian wrote:
Whoa, watch out Xunzian! And - something that can’t be examined in the lab has no place in thought whatsoever??!! I’ve never heard that before. So you are a radical positivist? I thought the correspondence theory was dead. You seem to be supporting a very peculiar position considering your apparent sympathy for Derrida.
I like the idea of signs very much. It is quite compatible with Yulgok’s cosmology, which I am quite sympathetic towards. Tomorrow I ought be able to give you the title of an essay that relates Yulgok and semiotics quite well, I believe it was by Tucker but I could be wrong.
As for being a radical Positivist, yes, I was born and raised such. I have moderated my beliefs somewhat, but I do still fundamentally believe that anything which claims to science but has no place in the lab has no place in one’s thought. We are either striving towards scientific truth . . . or, recently I’ve added the dimension of moral truths which are much more malleable – but if a supposed moral truth conflicts with a scientific truth I will side with the scientific truth 100% of the time. Moral truths must agree and resonate with scientific truth, not fight against it.
Which brings me to Derrida and why I loathe his philosophy. It reminds me so very, very much of Wangming and his school of the Mind which caused Chinese philosophy to wallow in the dualistic dark ages for far too long. However, personal distaste is not enough to reject a philosophy – one must also be able to say why such a belief is wrong (and potentially dangerous) before one can reject it. Distaste is insufficient to reject something.
Fair enough. I see where you’re coming from. Yes, if you could I’d like to know the title of that Yolgok article - I’d definitely be interested in it.
And I agree with you that merely to loathe a given philosophy is not enough to turn your back on it. Personally, I respect what Derrida has done, but I believe that his premises are wrong. And - unfortunately for him - everything that follows.
That is pretty much my position on Derrida as well, that his premise is simply wrong.
But that doesn’t mean that he oughtn’t be discussed, which is why I brought him up. His ideas are quite pertinant to the discussion of symbols and communication.
Im looking forward to the Yolgok reference, also.
I had wondered whether or not such words as use and intention imply purpose. Much more should be said here about how signs evoke meaning and whether or not meaning and value can be communicated. It is still difficult for me to see how meaning and value, if realized in customized, personal subjectivity in individual organisms can be communicated. Derrida might do well in our realizations of why what is considered mechanical and what is considered intentional are not radical polarities, but are different takes on the same thing. In discussing genetics, one may also have to deal with the myth of progress.
Well, the essay is Young-chan Ro’s “Ecological Implications of Yi Yulgok’s Cosmology”. Unfortunately, I cannot find a copy of it on-line. I’ll see if I can’t scan it in for you guys next week.
I’ll announce when I’ve got it scanned in and you can PM me your e-mail if you want it.
Otherwise, check your library for this book:
Confucianism and Ecology:The Interrelation of Heaven, Earth, and Humans
Edited by Mary Evelyn Tucker and John Berthong
Religions of the World and Ecology
Series Editors: Mary Evelyn Tucker and John Grim
Harvard University Press, 1998
378 pgs
ISBN 0-945454-16-3
Tucker’s essay, following Young-chan’s is also a good one on a similar theme.
Going back to the triangle–umwelt appears to be a valid description of some aspects of information as activity. One can find identity between an organism’s structural chemistry and the chemicals an organism must use for fuel. Identity is sufficient for recognition by organisms of some things that exist beyond their somas. When it come to the rock, there is little or no observable identity between its and Dick’s and Jane’s internal chemical constituencies. Organisms appear to have learned about non-fuel, external chemicals by virtue of being able to manipulate them. Is an organism’s ability to manipulate matter in any way indicative of identity or is it trial and error learning?
I have never been mentioned in a thread that I understood less!
They both see the rock. They don't both see ALL of the rock, since they are only seeing it from one side- that real limitation, based on external, measurable factors mirrors anything that they may see differently as a result of their different experiences with rocks, as well.
I find the concensus question most interesting. If concensus means that they agree totally, then no. Dick and Jane will have different aspects of the rock emphasized, downplayed, or ignored based on their experiences. There may be things about the rock on which they disagree. However, I believe there is concensus insofar as they can know that they are both disagreeing about [i]that[/i] rock.
What makes it possible is that the beliefs formed from observing the rock that tell us it is in a certain spot, of a certain shape, and so on, are those beliefs that rely the least on interpretation after the fact- they are formed for the most part before our divergent experiences get a chance to shape the situation. Thus, you can see Dick and Jane's knowledge of the rock as a Venn diagram. It is where the two circles intersect that let Dick and Jane know that they are talking about the same rock, and it is in that field of intersection in which beliefs most directly brought about by the senses before reflection happen to be.
Duende,
No. I don’t experience or ideate any nurture vs nature. It’s a false dichotomy. They are one thing.
Uccisore,
Thanks for coming aboard. While the consensus idea is still debatable, it is not debatable that all organisms, regardless of their proprietary subjectivities, can and do react to the rock in the same manner–as an object beyond their somas which can or cannot be used to promote their adaptations. Reading this thread, you will find that it asks only if knowing entails some identity of awareness than can include Jane, Dick and the rock. IMHO, if no such identity exists, knowing what is other than the self is impossible. Although we have discussed different apects of this situation, it is difficult for me to comprehend that you cannot understand what’s going on here. Your response shows some understanding; and that is appreciated.
Uccisore,
Dick walks Spot at night. Spot has better night vision than Dick does. So Dick carries a flashlight. In the field of light Dick sees parts of trees, segments of ground and one side of the rock. Dick “knows” that the parts of things he sees are of wholes he cannot see. How does he “know” this? Whenever I walk into my apartment, I observe only one side of my door. In my apartment, I see the other side. This is similar to the poem of the several blind men trying to describe an elephant from their different perspective locations. One claims, by touching the tail, that the elephant is like a rope. Another, touching a leg, claims the elephant is like a tree.
Consensus can resolve errors coming from individual perspectives, as can multiple perspectives from a single observer.
Last try.
This is a forum about philosophy. Anyone who has read even the simplest texts on philosophy knows what the basic philosophical issues are. Epistemology, often referred to as asking the “big questions” such as what can we know ?, how can we know that what we know is an accurate take on reality?, etc. is a major branch of philosophy. I’ve provided a simple model from which such questions can be addressed. The model uses two observors and an object observed to provide the issues of knowing as individual and uncommunicable, knowing as verified by consensus of agreement and knowing as having any take on a supposed thing in itself. I’ve gotten excellent responses from two persons here. Many other claim they can’t comprehend what the thread is about. That, in a forum about philosophy, is to me incomprehensible.
I’m resurrecting this thread coz I’ve thought of something.
The Colourblind Rockness Monster
There’s a red rock and two colourblind men. Man #1 sees a green rock, and man #2 sees a green rock. Men’s conclusion: there exists a green rock.
Because an object is the sum of its properties, and because its properties are evidently “chosen” by the perceiver(s), we can’t attribute an independent existence to it.