the spatiotemporal properties of universals

[gib]

I’ve been thinking of the metaphysics of universals lately and what that implies about their spatiotemporal qualities. By ‘universals’ I mean principles such as “all bachelors are male” or “all circles are round” or “Socrates is mortal if he is a man and men are mortal”, etc. Classically, these are said to be timeless and spaceless, meaning that they don’t take particular positions in space or time. You can’t point to a particular point in space and say “There it is - the principle of all circles being round!” Likewise, you can’t say “the principle of all circles being round is true only between 2:00 and 3:00 on Tuesdays and Thursdays”. Thus, they are said to bear no such spatiotemporal properties.

This has lead to a certain conundrum for me, stemming mainly from the fact that I take such universals to be projections of thought, and although I take thought to be spaceless (damned be the physicalists! ), I have trouble calling it timeless. Thoughts come and go in time, do they not? But if thoughts are time bound, and if universals are projections of thought, wouldn’t that make universals time bound as well? But how does one understand “all circles are round” to be true only at those times when one thinks it? What do we say of the principle at all other times?

Of course, I would expect one to immediately say that the principle holds true simply in virtue of the fact that there are circles in the world and they are round, and that these circles and their roundness are sustained independently of our thoughts. But this clings to an objectivist framework, and I’m a subjectivist. I say that things acquire their realness or truth from the experience of them - that is, that their realness or truth is constituted by the experience of them.

So, you may say, that’s just your problem. Give up your subjectivism and adopt objectivism. All your problems will be over. This may be true of this particular problem (although I would acquire a whole slew of other problems with objectivism), but why should I do that when I have a particular solution to the one I’m grappling with.

My solution is as follows. I see no reason to suppose that, metaphysical as they may be, universals can’t be time bound. I think the whole meaning of what it is for a thing to be ‘metaphysical’ would break down if such things could be space bound, but I think we might be making a mistake if we insisted in the same vein that they also be timeless. Maybe some metaphysical things can be time bound.

In particular, universals would be true only in those moments when one thinks them. At all other times, they wouldn’t be false, of course, but their truth would be indeterminate, and their existence would be nill. What would make them universal is not so much that they are always true but that they would never project from thought as falsehoods (but there would be times when they simply don’t project).

I believe the notion that universals are timeless originates from taking metaphysics to be an objective science, the consequence being that, as Plato demonstrates, universals are taken to have an objective existence independent from the mind, and since we always come to apprehend them as true, we conclude that they are always true even when we aren’t apprehending them. This gives them the allure of being true independently of time - that is, that their truth depends in no way on one particular time or another, and are therefore, in some sense, “outside” time.

But if we grant that universals are projections of thought, then this difficulty (with apprehending them in any way other than true) can be reduced to the fact that we don’t ever have the opportunity to apprehend them at times when we aren’t thinking them (even in our thought experiments).

I would further conclude that the spatial properties of universals not only differ from their temporal ones, but are directly opposed to them by the very nature of universals. That is to say, whereas universals are such that they necessarily can’t take on spatial positions, they necessarily must take on temporal ones. This would even be true in an objectivist metaphysics. Plato must say that such universals hold true necessarily in time, and at every point in time, not that they are somehow “outside” time.

I’m probably going to receive a lot of flack from the physicalists and positivists, but to them I say (depending precisely on what their responses are) that an attack on my metaphysical position in virtue solely that it is metaphysics is to miss the point by miles. My concern in this thread is purely analytic - I wish to determine what follows from the meaning of my initial terms and assumptions - the positivists should appreciate that.

[The_Last_Man]

Well first off, space and time are not divisible from each other, you cant have one or the other. So if youre going to posit universals as existent in time, you have to do it in space as well.

Secondly, “universals” are a human concept, a fiction. There is no “out there” reality to “all bachelors are males”. Its a human definition, a concept which we define a word as meaning necessarily some other combination of words and meanings. Definitions are just, well, definitions. Yes they cannot be otherwise, but that is only based on the arbitrary human construct of language and meaning. Outside of the human sphere, there are no “universals”.

What metaphysicians foolishly call universals are nothing more than a type of human perception, a condition upon which human thinking and cognizing functions. This condition is always a part of the human organism, be it our sensations, feelings, reasoning mind or structure of language. No human concept, observation, idea, meaning or logic exists “out there” “in reality”, its all subjectively constructed in our human brains. To call these constructs “universal” is to fundamentally misunderstand what they are, to anthropomorphize reality itself as if it were subject to the whimsical and arbitrary designations of the human brain.

Reality exists, as a collective flux and flow of force, pure energy of motion. Space and time are the actualization of this energy-as-potential, when it encounters other energetic states which force it to assume a spatiotemporally fixed state itself. As humans, we are an energetic state ourselves, a form which is capable of absorbing very minute and subtle energetic vibrations from around ourselves, and forming these into our own internal representation. This representation is wholly subjective to us, and is based on our organic constitution and the requirements of this constitution. Nothing about human feelings, thoughts, observations or languages attains to “reality” “itself”, its all a subjective creation in the human mind. Nothing more.

To say that “universals” exist “on their own” in some a-temporal or a-spatial manner is just nonsense. The human does not exist outside of the human - thats pretty much a given, to anyone who is capable of thinking rationally. Any human construct or observation, which is to say, every single thing we ever experience or think or feel, does not exist without that human elements as its precondition. Universals are not “universal”, there are merely a type of human mental construct and perceptual precondition, nothing more.

We could also sum it up as: metaphysicians are fucking morons. Thats the simplest way to express it, I guess.

[xzc]

@gib

I’ve been thinking of the metaphysics of universals lately and what that implies about their spatiotemporal qualities. By ‘universals’ I mean principles such as “all bachelors are male” or “all circles are round” or “Socrates is mortal if he is a man and men are mortal”, etc.

Gib, I just have a quibble with this quoted part.

These don’t really seem like universals. They look like simple analytic truths, where the truth of the predicates, round and male, are already contained and implied by the subjects, bachelor and circle.

A universal as I understand it, is a entity assumed to exist so as to solve the problem of attribute agreement, or ‘problem of universals’ as it’s commonly called. It goes like this, your shirt is blue, and maybe the chair your sitting on is blue, too. What is it that inheres in both objects that makes them both blue? What do we mean when we say they’re both blue? What of this “blue”? What is it’s nature if it seems to exist in two places at the same time?

In response to these questions, or problems, some say that there exist some sort of universal-out-there-thing which unlike material objects can exist in two places at the same time, and blueness is one such thing.

A universal enters the picture anytime you have two things have are alike in some way, and as I said above, the universals are proposed entities in that some say without these entities the way we normally speak about the world is rendered meaningless.

[gib]

@The Last Man

Well first off, space and time are not divisible from each other, you cant have one or the other. So if youre going to posit universals as existent in time, you have to do it in space as well.

I’m basing my claims on an analysis of meanings and subjective experience. Universals (as thoughts) seem to imply, and feel as though, they exist in time. They don’t for space.

I think what you say is true for things in time and space (and I would think that implies such things are physical), and I may have given the impression that I think universals are “in” time (or that they have some kind of existence akin to physical objects), but one should interpret me as saying that universals are true at all points in time (and again, this is only a desription of their meaning and the way they feel subjectively).

@The Last Man

Secondly, “universals” are a human concept, a fiction. There is no “out there” reality to “all bachelors are males”. Its a human definition, a concept which we define a word as meaning necessarily some other combination of words and meanings. Definitions are just, well, definitions. Yes they cannot be otherwise, but that is only based on the arbitrary human construct of language and meaning. Outside of the human sphere, there are no “universals”.

I concur wholeheartedly. I’m not your classic type of metaphysicist. I’m more like an idealist who believes that if anything is to exist or be true, it must be so within a mind. However, I will contend with your claim that that makes them any less real or true. There is indeed a reality consisting of universals and that reality just is the human subjective world.

@The Last Man

We could also sum it up as: metaphysicians are fucking morons. Thats the simplest way to express it, I guess.

And you wonder why I get insulted by you.

[gib]

@xzc

@gib

I’ve been thinking of the metaphysics of universals lately and what that implies about their spatiotemporal qualities. By ‘universals’ I mean principles such as “all bachelors are male” or “all circles are round” or “Socrates is mortal if he is a man and men are mortal”, etc.

Gib, I just have a quibble with this quoted part.

These don’t really seem like universals. They look like simple analytic truths, where the truth of the predicates, round and male, are already contained and implied by the subjects, bachelor and circle.

A universal as I understand it, is a entity assumed to exist so as to solve the problem of attribute agreement, or ‘problem of universals’ as it’s commonly called. It goes like this, your shirt is blue, and maybe the chair your sitting on is blue, too. What is it that inheres in both objects that makes them both blue? What do we mean when we say they’re both blue? What of this “blue”? What is it’s nature if it seems to exist in two places at the same time?

In response to these questions, or problems, some say that there exist some sort of universal-out-there-thing which unlike material objects can exist in two places at the same time, and blueness is one such thing.

A universal enters the picture anytime you have two things have are alike in some way, and as I said above, the universals are proposed entities in that some say without these entities the way we normally speak about the world is rendered meaningless.

Well, you learn something new every day, I guess. What I’m talking about are analytic truths.

[Only_Humean]

@gib

Of course, I would expect one to immediately say that the principle holds true simply in virtue of the fact that there are circles in the world and they are round, and that these circles and their roundness are sustained independently of our thoughts.

There are? I’ve not seen any. Not perfect ones.

@gib

In particular, universals would be true only in those moments when one thinks them. At all other times, they wouldn’t be false, of course, but their truth would be indeterminate, and their existence would be nill. What would make them universal is not so much that they are always true but that they would never project from thought as falsehoods (but there would be times when they simply don’t project).

Think of a circle. The fact that you can must mean that it exists as a concept for you to call upon, even if you’re not thinking about it until I mention it. A word doesn’t cease to exist just because no-one’s speaking it; it remains in your vocabulary, available for use. You know how to play chess; not just when you’re playing chess, but whenever someone decides to ask you the rules. It’s an ability, not a possession.

If universals are projections of thought, how do we know they stay the same? How do we know other people have the same apprehension? The whole purpose of universals is surely objectivity - why do you need them as a concept if you’re a subjectivist?

[xzc]

Analytic truths are true in virtue of meaning alone. You don’t need to look at the world for every instance of a bachelor to see that all bachelors are indeed male. So if time is something out there in the world, and not merely a mental construct, then little if anything can be said about the relationship between specific instances of analytic truths and time…because analytic truths are true or false not because they say something about the world but because they say something about words and their meaning.

[gib]

@Only_Humean

There are? I’ve not seen any. Not perfect ones.

It don’t mean this as though they had to be perfect circles. It’s the same as saying “Jim lives in Spain”. It could be said that this remains true even when no one is thinking it or aware of it because there is a man named Jim and he does live in Spain. In other words, the objectivist card being played here holds truth as conditioned by the states of things in the world.

@Only_Humean

Think of a circle. The fact that you can must mean that it exists as a concept for you to call upon, even if you’re not thinking about it until I mention it. A word doesn’t cease to exist just because no-one’s speaking it; it remains in your vocabulary, available for use. You know how to play chess; not just when you’re playing chess, but whenever someone decides to ask you the rules. It’s an ability, not a possession.

In what state does the concept exist in when it’s not being consciously experienced? In order for a concept to project as a principle or universal, it must first be experienced. Are you suggesting all mental content that is capable of being experienced consciously goes on to be unconsciously experienced at all times?

@Only_Humean

If universals are projections of thought, how do we know they stay the same? How do we know other people have the same apprehension? The whole purpose of universals is surely objectivity - why do you need them as a concept if you’re a subjectivist?

There is room for objectivity in a subjectivist framework, just as there is room for subjectivity in an objectivist framework. What my subjectivism means is that the world is, first and foremost, a projection of my subjective experiences, and therefore my world. Others, naturally, have their own self-generated subjective worlds. Using this language, I can tie it into the the language of “possible worlds”. There are certain propositions that must be true in all possible worlds - such as the “universals” under consideration here - and that is what a subjectivist like me calls objective truths. It’s true that I have no idea whether some might experience some of these supposed objective/universal truths in ways that would seem paradoxical to me - for example, some circles are square - but I don’t require that they actually hold true in every possible world (i.e. in everyone’s subjective reality), only that this is what seems to follow from my own understanding of the proposition (i.e. the proposition seems to me that it couldn’t be false in anyone’s world).

xzc - I’ll have to respond to you later. I have to run.

[gib]

@xzc

Analytic truths are true in virtue of meaning alone. You don’t need to look at the world for every instance of a bachelor to see that all bachelors are indeed male. So if time is something out there in the world, and not merely a mental construct, then little if anything can be said about the relationship between specific instances of analytic truths and time…because analytic truths are true or false not because they say something about the world but because they say something about words and their meaning.

A statement doesn’t have to be about time in order to be true in time. It makes sense to me to say that all bachelors are male at 2:00PM on Thursday (because, trivially, they are male at any time) whereas it doesn’t make sense to me to say that all bachelors are male over there.

[The_Last_Man]

@gib

@The Last Man

Well first off, space and time are not divisible from each other, you cant have one or the other. So if youre going to posit universals as existent in time, you have to do it in space as well.

I’m basing my claims on an analysis of meanings and subjective experience. Universals (as thoughts) seem to imply, and feel as though, they exist in time. They don’t for space.

I think what you say is true for things in time and space (and I would think that implies such things are physical), and I may have given the impression that I think universals are “in” time (or that they have some kind of existence akin to physical objects), but one should interpret me as saying that universals are true at all points in time (and again, this is only a desription of their meaning and the way they feel subjectively).

@The Last Man

Secondly, “universals” are a human concept, a fiction. There is no “out there” reality to “all bachelors are males”. Its a human definition, a concept which we define a word as meaning necessarily some other combination of words and meanings. Definitions are just, well, definitions. Yes they cannot be otherwise, but that is only based on the arbitrary human construct of language and meaning. Outside of the human sphere, there are no “universals”.

I concur wholeheartedly. I’m not your classic type of metaphysicist. I’m more like an idealist who believes that if anything is to exist or be true, it must be so within a mind. However, I will contend with your claim that that makes them any less real or true. There is indeed a reality consisting of universals and that reality just is the human subjective world.

So you agree that human statements and meanings are not “universal” in the sense of extra-human, or that they attain to “reality itself”. . . then why employ universality at all? There is nothing universal to anything human, even from within only the human sphere. Everything human is conditional and subjective, and what applies to one human will not apply to all humans. So we can dispense with the notion of universals completely. Propositions like “all bachelors are male” or “a triangle has three sides” are relative to human concepts and notions - if no humans existed to makes these judgments, then they would not be “true”. They would not even exist at all.

And yes, we do experience our thoughts and feelings as in time, but not as in space - but this is because we are the material structure upon which these thoughts and feelings exist. We do not experience ourselves in total or completeness, we experience an intermediary, i.e. thoughts and feelings. These we experience as ‘in time’ because time is nothing more than relative change in energetic motions. Time is the means by which we experience the movements of energies that constitute our mental activities - we are the material essence of these activities, and the activities movements relative to each other creates the feeling of time passing, which is analogous to our subjective experience itself.

@The Last Man

We could also sum it up as: metaphysicians are fucking morons. Thats the simplest way to express it, I guess.

And you wonder why I get insulted by you.

Yes, I do wonder why you get insulted. It is highly un-philosophical of you.

And I dont remember calling you a fucking moron. I was referring to metaphysicians in general, and from within the context of my prior statements showing how metaphysicians are, well, fucking morons. At least those who think that “all bachelors are male” is some fact of reality itself which is extra-human in nature, which exists somehow “on its own” and is true or false regardless of human contingency and constructed meaning.

[gib]

@The Last Man

@gib

I concur wholeheartedly. I’m not your classic type of metaphysicist. I’m more like an idealist who believes that if anything is to exist or be true, it must be so within a mind. However, I will contend with your claim that that makes them any less real or true. There is indeed a reality consisting of universals and that reality just is the human subjective world.

So you agree that human statements and meanings are not “universal” in the sense of extra-human, or that they attain to “reality itself”. . . then why employ universality at all? There is nothing universal to anything human, even from within only the human sphere. Everything human is conditional and subjective, and what applies to one human will not apply to all humans. So we can dispense with the notion of universals completely. Propositions like “all bachelors are male” or “a triangle has three sides” are relative to human concepts and notions - if no humans existed to makes these judgments, then they would not be “true”. They would not even exist at all.

My replies to xzc and OH will probably clear this up for you (unless you’ve read them already, in which case I’m prompted to ask what still troubles you about them). In particular, see my agreement with xzc about my misuse of the word ‘universal’ where ‘analytic truths’ would have been better. In regards to OH, see my comment about what ‘universals’ - or rather, ‘objective truths’ - means in a subjectivist framework like mine.

@The Last Man

@gib

@The Last Man

We could also sum it up as: metaphysicians are fucking morons. Thats the simplest way to express it, I guess.

And you wonder why I get insulted by you.

Yes, I do wonder why you get insulted. It is highly un-philosophical of you.

And I dont remember calling you a fucking moron. I was referring to metaphysicians in general, and from within the context of my prior statements showing how metaphysicians are, well, fucking morons. At least those who think that “all bachelors are male” is some fact of reality itself which is extra-human in nature, which exists somehow “on its own” and is true or false regardless of human contingency and constructed meaning.

But you assumed that this was my position at first. I pity you if you really don’t see the logic that follows from this (think syllogisms).

[xzc]

@gib

@xzc

Analytic truths are true in virtue of meaning alone. You don’t need to look at the world for every instance of a bachelor to see that all bachelors are indeed male. So if time is something out there in the world, and not merely a mental construct, then little if anything can be said about the relationship between specific instances of analytic truths and time…because analytic truths are true or false not because they say something about the world but because they say something about words and their meaning.

A statement doesn’t have to be about time in order to be true in time.

Well, if a statements truth value doesn’t in the least bit depend on time, then it seems it’s only superficially interesting to say when the statement is true it’s true in time, and this is all assuming time is necessary fact about the world (such that there could be no possible world without it/all possible worlds contain time). If time is a contingent fact about the world, then because analytic truths are true in all possible worlds, they would be true in those possible worlds without time, and your quoted response would not be necessarily true. It could and would be false in all those worlds without time.

Basically, if time is necessary, then the fact that all that can be true must be true in time follows, but it doesn’t seem very significant. If time is congingent, what you say doesn’t follow necessarily (it’s true only in some occasions, but false in others.)

It makes sense to me to say that all bachelors are male at 2:00PM on Thursday (because, trivially, they are male at any time) whereas it doesn’t make sense to me to say that all bachelors are male over there.

Interesting. It appears true that that analytic statement would be true anytime in all possible worlds that have time, but as I said above if time is a contingent fact about the world and if analytic statements are true in all possible words, then it would make some general sense to say all bachelors are male over there, whereby “over there” you mean those worlds with time. I know I’m stretching it, but…I don’t really know.

There’s also this metaphysical theory that plays off the notion that space and time are analogous, meaning anything that can be meaningfully said about time can be said about space and vice versa, to describe change. It’s called ‘temporal parts theory.’ Says that just like it’s true that anything in space has many parts that make it up, so it is true that everything has parts in time.

[gib]

xzc,

I will have to get back to you on this. I’m now having some changes of thought.

I’m now thinking whether I should say that these principles don’t depend on time for their truth but only for being projected (from thought). I remember going over this before in my mind but coming to certain problems. I forget what those problems are the moment, but my notes are at home and I’ll get back to you after I’ve had a chance to review them.

[xzc]

No problem. Meanwhile let me elaborate an interesting tid bit from this theory that takes for granted that time and space are analogous. It says objects, and lets just take a person specifically as an example, are never whole in any particular point.

you’re born|----------------(you now)-----------|death

Your whole self is never you at any point during your timeline from birth to death. ‘You’ is the entire time line, much like you are not your arm or your leg, but the combination of your entire body parts. You now are just a temporal part of your entire self.

[Only_Humean]

@gib

@Only_Humean

Think of a circle. The fact that you can must mean that it exists as a concept for you to call upon, even if you’re not thinking about it until I mention it. A word doesn’t cease to exist just because no-one’s speaking it; it remains in your vocabulary, available for use. You know how to play chess; not just when you’re playing chess, but whenever someone decides to ask you the rules. It’s an ability, not a possession.

In what state does the concept exist in when it’s not being consciously experienced? In order for a concept to project as a principle or universal, it must first be experienced. Are you suggesting all mental content that is capable of being experienced consciously goes on to be unconsciously experienced at all times?

No, but I don’t hold that all existence is only what is being experienced. But for those who do; any time you’re using a language, you’re not just creating a few words and stringing them together in the hope you’ll be understood. A language is a set of conventions and concepts and structures.

Do you believe that the only room that exists is the one you’re consciously experiencing, or that the building you’re consciously experiencing also exists to support it? I appreciate you may believe the former, but in that case I’ll withdraw myself from the discussion. The room next door, the foundations and the roof - like the concept you’re not thinking of at the moment - reliably remain there for you to avail yourself of. That we’re talking at all shows that.

[gib]

@Only_Humean

Do you believe that the only room that exists is the one you’re consciously experiencing, or that the building you’re consciously experiencing also exists to support it? I appreciate you may believe the former, but in that case I’ll withdraw myself from the discussion. The room next door, the foundations and the roof - like the concept you’re not thinking of at the moment - reliably remain there for you to avail yourself of. That we’re talking at all shows that.

Experience, for me, encompasses more than mere sensory experience - much more. Thought and emotion are experiences. The room next door does exist because it is projected from thought, from the belief that it exists.

[Only_Humean]

@gib

@Only_Humean

Do you believe that the only room that exists is the one you’re consciously experiencing, or that the building you’re consciously experiencing also exists to support it? I appreciate you may believe the former, but in that case I’ll withdraw myself from the discussion. The room next door, the foundations and the roof - like the concept you’re not thinking of at the moment - reliably remain there for you to avail yourself of. That we’re talking at all shows that.

Experience, for me, encompasses more than mere sensory experience - much more. Thought and emotion are experiences. The room next door does exist because it is projected from thought, from the belief that it exists.

OK… what about the disused mine shaft below the foundations, that no-one living has any inkling of? How can it collapse and bring down the side of your house, if it doesn’t exist? I think there are a lot of problems with defining “existence” synonymously with “what people believe exists”.

[gib]

@Only_Humean

@gib

@Only_Humean

Do you believe that the only room that exists is the one you’re consciously experiencing, or that the building you’re consciously experiencing also exists to support it? I appreciate you may believe the former, but in that case I’ll withdraw myself from the discussion. The room next door, the foundations and the roof - like the concept you’re not thinking of at the moment - reliably remain there for you to avail yourself of. That we’re talking at all shows that.

Experience, for me, encompasses more than mere sensory experience - much more. Thought and emotion are experiences. The room next door does exist because it is projected from thought, from the belief that it exists.

OK… what about the disused mine shaft below the foundations, that no-one living has any inkling of? How can it collapse and bring down the side of your house, if it doesn’t exist? I think there are a lot of problems with defining “existence” synonymously with “what people believe exists”.

A subjective reality, as I would have it, is not a closed box - complete and self-sufficient as the beholder experiences it - rather everything determined within it is determined by one’s experiences, but there is still room for the undetermined and it projects from the fact that the vast majority of reality is experienced as unkown. That is to say, because we don’t experience reality as a totality - that is, as being all-present in our experience - our minds make room for the unknown such that the totality of reality consists in the known (or experienced) plus the unknown.

This makes room for things to enter in unannounced and unexpected - like your disused mine shaft that, all of a sudden, caused the whole building to collapse. When it enters in, I would describe that as a change to one’s subjective reality. A portion of the unknown in one’s reality suddenly and unexpectedly became a known (and thus acquired determined qualities and states and such). So although I maintain that reality is determined or constituted by our experiences, I didn’t say that entails that reality as such can’t change in unexpected and surprising ways.

[gib]

@xzc

No problem. Meanwhile let me elaborate an interesting tid bit from this theory that takes for granted that time and space are analogous. It says objects, and lets just take a person specifically as an example, are never whole in any particular point.

you’re born|----------------(you now)-----------|death

Your whole self is never you at any point during your timeline from birth to death. ‘You’ is the entire time line, much like you are not your arm or your leg, but the combination of your entire body parts. You now are just a temporal part of your entire self.

Yeah, I’ve come across that idea before. I believe they call them ‘world lines’ or something like that, don’t they?

Anyway, I’ve reviewed my notes and I’m satisfied that my latest position on this topic - that the truth of an analytic statement is atemporal but its projection isn’t - bears no immediate or obvious problems. The problems I had with this position before were conditioned by the fact that, in my notes, I was trying to defend an atemporal conception of analytic truths. Encountering these problems, I considered switching my position to defending a temporal conception, and this is what you see here.

The problem was this: if I can say that the atemporal status of its truth value entails the atemporal status of the analytic statement itself, then I should say the same of anything for which the truths pertaining to it are atemporal. For example, the fact that water’s wet doesn’t depend on time. Does that make water atemporal?

But if I separate the temporal status of their truth values from the analytic statements themselves (i.e. that their truth value is atemporal but the statements themselves temporal), then this problem dissappears. Of course, I’m not really saying the statements are atemporal, but rather that their being projected (from thought) is, but the projection of a thing is, for me, the closest we can get to the existence of the thing, or the thing itself - so go figure.

I think I’m going to meditate on this relation between time and space that you brought up - that whatever is said of one should be sayable of the other (is ‘sayable’ a word? ). The first thing that comes to mind is that if thought can be said to exist in time but not space, this might count as evidence against it. I can also think of one thing that is true of time and not of space - namely, that everything seems to move forward uniformly and unstoppably through time, but not so for space (i.e. things seem to have the freedom, or the possibility, of moving at any rate and in any direction through space, and to change that rate and direction at any time). I’m also considering what my subjectivist theories would have to say about the properties of thought that space represents, for although my theories say that thought doesn’t exist in space, they can still take on spatial and physical representations - namely neuro-chemical events - and the spatial properties of these do represent certain things about the thoughts themselves. Maybe what is said about thought in terms of time does have an analogue in terms of, not so much space, but what space represents vis-a-vis certain aspects of thought. The trouble with this is that, in my theory, the account I give for space and what it represents becomes very complex and abstract, and it becomes difficult to wrap my head around it sometimes. Hence, the need to meditate on it

[Only_Humean]

@gib

@Only_Humean

@gib

Experience, for me, encompasses more than mere sensory experience - much more. Thought and emotion are experiences. The room next door does exist because it is projected from thought, from the belief that it exists.

OK… what about the disused mine shaft below the foundations, that no-one living has any inkling of? How can it collapse and bring down the side of your house, if it doesn’t exist? I think there are a lot of problems with defining “existence” synonymously with “what people believe exists”.

A subjective reality, as I would have it, is not a closed box - complete and self-sufficient as the beholder experiences it - rather everything determined within it is determined by one’s experiences, but there is still room for the undetermined and it projects from the fact that the vast majority of reality is experienced as unkown. That is to say, because we don’t experience reality as a totality - that is, as being all-present in our experience - our minds make room for the unknown such that the totality of reality consists in the known (or experienced) plus the unknown.

I’m afraid you’ve lost me; existence is what is experience plus what is knowledge/belief plus what is unknown?