Yes, because the unknown is, in a sense, an experience itself. It’s a belief at any rate. When I ask you if reality consist of anything unknown, wouldn’t you say ‘yes’? Therefore, the concept of the unknown, the belief in it, is part of your mind, and it too projects as much as any other experience therein. And by ‘project’, I mean something like “becomes real” (but don’t hold me to that definition; it isn’t formal ). In other words, the belief that there are unknowns becomes the fact that there are unknown in reality. These unknowns, by their very nature, have the potential to become knowns, to become direct experiences, and so one can experience unexpected intrusions into his subjective reality.
Well, I’d be hard pressed to account for how anyone could experience or cogitate their reality without admitting unknowns, but for the sake of argument, let’s say yours is such a reality. In that case, experiences of the house coming down could still intrude on your subjective reality. After the fact, I’m sure you’d interject some kind of mechanism responsible for the disaster and reflect back on your prior state of mind as one that was indeed oblivious to certain unknowns.
But I think this misses the point which was that I was merely trying to address how unknown variables could exist in one’s subjective reality without there being a direct experience of it (whether sensory, cognitive, or something else). For all things which we don’t have any direct sensory experience of, there is belief in those things, and where belief is lacking (because of a blatant oblivion to absolutely everything that exists in the universe), there is always the unknown (in which I’m assuming we all believe in one way or another).
But, of course, this leaves something to be desired - namely, that I haven’t yet accounted for how there can be intrusions into one’s subjective reality if all that constitutes reality is already there in that subjective reality. That gets into some complicated “reality dynamics” as we might call it. Let me begin by saying that I’m going to take this in steps and we’ll see where we go from there (to really get a full account of this, you’ll need to read my theories at mm-theory.com). The first step I’ll take is to account for intrusions into a subject’s reality from the point of view of my subjective reality (which is more or less defined by my subjectivist views after all). Falling back on my subjective reality, on my subjectivist theories, I would say that something indeed exists outside the subject’s mind which then gives rise to an intrusion of some kind of experience (the house falling down in your case), but that something is still a projection of experience. It’s simply not his experience - or mine for that matter (except merely in the sense that I believe in it, but that still only functions as a cognitive representation of the thing which is outside both our minds). In my theory, the universe consists of nothing but mental entities and experiences. The dynamics of this mental universe give rise, and are reflected by, the physical dynamics we end up experiencing as the physical universe. The house falling is one such physical dynamic, and it is prompted by a mental dynamic occuring outside the subject’s mind, outside in the greater mental universe.
I’ll let that be digested a bit before turning to the subject’s own reality and how intrusions can be accounted for with respect to that reality alone.
That’s a succinct way of explaining my confusion, thanks
There are all sorts of mechanisms by which we can and do back-engineer stories to explain the unexpected (economics, it could be argued, is little else), and I think the brain is resilient enough that it could do so in a collapsed house. But the “real” that we talk about and experience and share with others is different from the “real” we mean when we say “it’s real to him”. Not just metaphysically, but functionally. One of the gaping holes in western metaphysics is the Cartesian conceit of the isolated brain. We’re social creatures, language is a social activity, private language doesn’t exist.
Indeed it is, but the difference isn’t really an ontological one (at least not in my view). The “real” we talk about, as opposed to the “real for him”, is simply the “real for us”. Everyone judges what is real by means of their own perspectives, beliefs, perceptions, experiences, and consciousness overall. We typically construct two categories of the “real” - the one being the subjectively real (into which falls the “real for him”, “real for her”, “real according to a certain religion”, “real within the framework of a certain story”, etc.), the other being the objectively real (into which fall everything that is real for us - i.e. real as judged by our perspectives, beliefs, perceptions, etc.). But we typically don’t take stock of the fact that the latter category is judged real by these psychological standards. We disregard that, so to speak, in order that we can regard the category as truly objective. But I can’t accept this disregard of the psychological standards by which the reality of things is judged as constituting a genuine severence from such standards. In the end, I recognize an equivalence between “objectively real” and “real for me/us”.
I think I can hop on board with that (depending on what’s entailed in the details), which is one of the reasons I think it’s unrealistic to suppose one could ever assume there are no unknowns. I’d still have to say, however, that any awareness or “connection” to the minds of other’s depends on inferences or indirect measures (otherwise I’d have to say that such connections constitute a form of telepathy).
I think we do take account of this difference; that’s why we have the concepts of objective and subjective. Most (or at least, most educated and thoughtful) people are quite aware that not all of their beliefs are objective facts, that’s why they put effort into rationally justifying their subjectivities. By philosophising, arguing about politics and morality, and so on.
Of course. But the nature of language and the way we think makes those inferences far stronger than any “logical” arguments that other minds don’t exist.
Sometimes we do, sometimes we don’t. We are always capable of acknowledging the psychological roots of what we believe or experience to be true/real, and sometimes that requires drawing one’s attention to this fact, but there are a great many times when we don’t. How many times have you heard, or even said, statements describing the way reality “really is”? We say things like “Jupiter has 63 moons” as though this were an objective fact independent of our experiences and knowledge, and we mean for it to be taken as such. But really, what we should be saying is “Jupiter has 63 moons according to our observations (or theories)”. But this means something different to an objectivist who yearns to get beyond this psychological talk and say something of reality independently of mind, and when he does this, he is not taking into account the psychological basis on which such statements can be said. To a subjectivist like me, however, there is no significant difference, and they mean the same thing.