Ichthus77
(Ichthus77 (formerly She™))
October 21, 2008, 5:10am
1
The Sword and the Sacrifice Philosophy
The following paper was inspired by and written in reply to “The Knife and the Wound Philosophy,” published by my friend, Wolfgang Carstens. Constructive criticism, questions and discussion is always welcome.
http://TheSwordandtheSacrificePhilosophy.blogspot.com
http://www.ichthus.yuku.com/topic/46/t/The-Sword-and-the-Sacrifice-Philosophy-full-text
Sections include:
Why Ethics?
A Natural Capacity for Intuiting the Supernatural Standard
Character, Conduct, and Consequences
Greek Virtue Theory
Deontology
Morality and Legal Justice
Utilitarianism
Free to Be or Not to Be…
Existentialism
Weeding out Egoism
Weeding out Relativism
The Sword and the Sacrifice Philosophy
REFERENCES
TO DO
Ichthus77
(Ichthus77 (formerly She™))
December 31, 2008, 6:51am
2
Xunzian and The Paineful Truth seemed to express interest in this paper, thought I’d bump it for easier access. A quote relevant to both:
Heraclitus (late 6th century B.C.) and Cratylus (late 5th century B.C.), before evolution was a theory, said that everything is in a state of flux, which would imply “there are no unchanging absolutes, ethical or otherwise,” (1; 400) except that Heraclitus believed in “an unchanging logos [(28)] beneath all change and by which the change itself is measured. …that all men should live by this absolute law in the midst of the flux of life” and “Cratylus carried change so far that he destroyed the idea of change itself. When everything is changing and nothing is constant, then there is no way to measure the change,” (1; 400). Some philosophical naturalists (46) claim there are objective, yet evolving, absolutes not anchored in the unchanging (the constant, the Logos), that came into being with humans and will evolve as humans evolve and cease existing when humans cease existing. Such adaptable, anchorless standards cannot reasonably be considered absolute. This ‘anchor’ concept will come up again in the section Existentialism.
Among philosophical naturalists, some justify a particular morality by suggesting that it merely serves evolutionary purpose [does it make sense to you that all of nature “thrives on violence and predation, survival of the fittest” (2; 151) – but it is grounded in nature that humans should treat others as ends and not merely means (which we will soon discuss)?]. This is to move from “is” to “ought” (evolutionary, is; purpose, ought). Hume’s (1711-1776) is-to-ought fallacy, or the naturalistic fallacy, explains why it is illogical to go from is-statements to ought-statements, to derive prescriptions from descriptions (12). That nature, even human nature, is a certain way does not require that it should be that way – nature cannot prescribe (which is why human essentialism is 'created' and only divine essentialism is 'discovered') (human essence is patterned after divine essence) (litmus, part 3). Neither can nature give us purpose. It only provides the [i]capacity[/i] for creating man-made purpose or seeking out supernatural, essential purpose. Again, in nature we have the capacity (“ought implies can”) for moral behavior (including enforcing human rights), but nature, regardless its ‘selectivity,’ cannot tell us whether empathy and selflessness, or brutality and selfishness (“might makes right”), is morally superior (and so it cannot tell us how we ought to be or behave, or to count the self and the other interchangeably) (litmus, parts 1 and 2). So, answering that [b]how and why we should be and behave with others and ourselves[/b] is to fulfill evolutionary purpose—isn’t saying anything meaningful (is a fuel tank full of air) (unless you grant that God can use evolution with the purpose of forming us into His image, but even then, it would be divine purpose, not evolutionary purpose).
blackrose
(blackrose)
September 16, 2010, 1:09pm
7
Guys, the link you gave is very informative. Thanks!