Thing in itself is an extrapolation of the human sense of self.
So you think, Ierr (and perhaps Statik), that it’s some sort of anthropomorphisation of the universe?
Maybe.
I just thought that Kant merely pulled it out of his ass. Not that he invented the idea. But he made it ridiculous enough allow his readers to do what he could not - to move beyond Plato and Aristotle.
Anything a human speaks of can be considered anthopomorphic. My cat is felineomorophic. How we see what is out there (environment) does have a direct correspondence with what is in here (brain-mind interactions). It’s called structural and functional recognition from our experience with structure and function. It is not a falsification; it is a recognition. Thing in itself has no relational value or meaning.
It’s an interesting thing. According to the Mahayana Buddhist approach, enlightenment consists of the full realization (i.e. not just an intellectual belief) of both the selflessness of persons and the selflessness of all phenomena (i.e. objects). Not surprisingly, this is called two-fold selflessness. 
Only_Humean
Why does faith and common sense have to enter into it? 
Anyway, I have a friend who absolutely loves olives and mushrooms and I absolutely find the taste of olives and mushrooms utterly disgusting and gross. I didn’t quite catch your meaning of your words which I bolded so I might be missing something here.
And I absolutely love chicken - but does this mean that the taste of snake is going to be pleasing to me? And does it mean that the taste of chicken or snake will be pleasing to someone else?
Anyway, there is no accounting for taste buds, O_H. 
Well there may be but I don’t have that knowledge.
I see your point, Ierr. I even accept it. Except that there is a difference between the thing-in-itself and the thing perceived, if we accept the thing-in-itself as legitimate. If they are both the product of anthropomorphisation, then what is that difference? Does one have a relational value and the other, not? Is that the salient difference?
I get ya, and I think we are mostly in agreement. Of course, your statements are much more concise, whereas I tend to ramble and confuse my point.
I was thinking of the thing-in-itself like an entity and it’s properties existing physically, or objectively, independent of perception. Like a rock is a rock because that is exactly what it physically and structurally is, so perception of that rock will always hold its innate properties - subjectivity cannot remove those properties from existence, only from perception. Hope that makes sense.
That is actually a bit of a relief to read because I am in the same boat. I think I kind of understand why though…
I think we are both stuck thinking on a functional level. I’m not sure if there is another way I should be considering the concept, but I can’t seem to get past the thought that human beings operate and communicate based on an assumption of universal properties (relative to the ‘thing’ being observed). So, in my mind, the question of the thing-in-itself is not functionally productive at this point. Even if an object truly isn’t a thing-in-itself, we’d still still perceive it and communicate it as if it were. Without that assumption we couldn’t relate to one another on an experiential/observational level.
This gets me as well. I get that we may not, and likely don’t, perceive everything exactly as it is in its entirety. I think “incomplete” was a good choice of words; there is always the possibility that there is more to something than we perceive (or less). But, as you said, an elephant is an elephant – we’ve defined what we perceive as a particular, object set of properties that [can] exist independent of observation. The elephant and its properties are treated like a thing-in-itself because some core set of properties seem universally observable; even though subjectivity may affect how we perceive said properties.
Exactly! We can observe more or less about the ass, but the definitive qualities - the core properties - of that ass make it an “ass”. It won’t be perceived as something other than an ass because those definitive qualities are, in essence, an assumption of thing-in-itself. Regardless of perception, an “ass” (relative to the subject of course) is defined by a certain set of physical, chemical, etc. properties.
This is where you basically make me look like an asshole for spending a hour writing out some convoluded version of the same thought. My question was not only “why would we think otherwise?”, but also what is the point in attempting to think otherwise? Exercise for the mind I suppose, but there doesn’t seem any functional benefit to assuming our perceptions are flawed – even if that is what you truly believe.
Shit, I did derail – Apologies Dan; I think I lost track of your original point while formulating my own. Not a foreign concept to me…
I think the thing-in-itself is a function of language – it is as we define it. Otherwise, it seems to me that we have sufficient evidence that–
- Some object ‘things’ do exist in/of themselves (if I am even interpreting the concept correctly).
- We could never really determine if anything exists free of perception. We can analyze a new discovery to find that it has existed long before we observed it, but subjective beliefs would seem to determine whether or not one would accept that.
- The thing-in-itself is a physical (and chemical, I suppose) set of properties that we define based on arrangement, or appearance. Our definition of the ‘thing’ makes it a thing-in-itself. (ex. you see an ass because you perceive the basic properties of an “ass”)
To take away perception is to take away our definitive properties we use to recognize ‘things’. So, I’d think the only true thing-in-itself - totally regardless and/or oblivious to perception - is nature.
I think our perceptions fall under that characterization a majority of the time. I don’t know if I’d say all the time; would have to ponder that’n. That was an excellent way of putting it by the way…
The thing-in-itself is only different in the assumption that the same properties being perceived remain as such in the absence of perception, or universally to all perception.
Otherwise, ‘things’ as we define them are products of perception, which is largely a result of some manner of anthropomorphism.
What clouded the issue of direct experience was Kant’s noumena-phenomena distinction. No such distinction exists in our experience of what is other than ourself. About rocks–I found one I liked and brought it home. For me it had a certain aesthetic value. My cat sniffed it and found nothing there to engage further attention. I do not believe it took some evolution of cats trying to eat rocks and failing for my cat to decide that this thing was not food. We need to get deeper into the given resources of our ability to think, resources such as instinct, evaluation and intention. While this may sound like a phenomenologist’s interpretation of experience, I must admit that I do not regard phenomenology as providing an adequate description of the I’s relationship with the it. We humans rely on relationships for understanding. Consequently, some thing in itself, if devoid of any relationship with us, is, maybe not nonexistent, but is irrelevant. When I hit a rock with a hammer, I often discover interiors that, for me, are quite spectacular. I can also do chemical analyses on the rock to find out what its composition is. I can read up on geological history and can separate rocks into pebbles, goonies and boulders. This adds nothing to the fact that both a cat and I “know” we cannot eat one. Relationships between I and it are only problematic in certain descriptions.
The above reads to me as a claim that ‘thing-in-itself’ is dependent upon our perception. How then, can it be ‘thing-in-itself’? In order to be, things rely on their causes and parts, and that aspect of their interdependence is pretty easy to understand, because it’s more objectively obvious. But the subtler point you raise is that in order to be, things also rely on imputation by our minds.
I must be unusually dense, but for anything to be named, it requires an observer (or inventor). The act of naming invokes relationship which from my understanding, denies thing-in-itself. Conceptually, there are many things in the universe not named and function quite nicely as thing-in-itself, but that is only conjecture on my part. This seems to be one of those concepts that, in the defining, destroys itself.
Of course the concept of the thing-in-itself is/was dependent upon our perception. We created the concept, and perspectives have shaped it up to this point. Now, on the other hand, and actual entity to be considered may well be independent from perception – that is the question being posed.
In short, the definition is a product of perception, but that which is being defined may not be, in this context.
I will hold to my thought that you picked up on though – something can only be considered as a thing-in-itself after it has been distinguished from other ‘things’ by perception. So, to posit something as a thing-in-itself is more or less to make it a thing-in-itself (unless that object being referenced is intangible or overtly and obviously a product of perception alone). I believe the role of perception - in this context - is to destinguish and define; I do not believe perception alone creates object entities.
Yup, indeed.
IMHO, best response yet!
Faust,
Other than relationships, what can we know? Pragmatism is just a way of seeing things as things affect us or as we affect them. Yet, my problem with pragmatism is that it may beg teleological support.
Well geez, Ierrellus. It seems that to know a relation, you gotta know the relata. I mean, you gotta know something about them.
What are you calling pragmatism, here? The idea that we can know something about the stuff of the Universe?
Thanks for your response. The relata is a human biological constant, I (self) interacting with it (other). What I know about the other is that we inhabit the same universe, we are subject to the same physical laws and contraints, and that we can experience an it. As for pragmatism, I use the word to describe the what ifs of mental projections that work for humans and seem to work for my cat, perhaps not as explanations, but as profitable, to us, as proofs that we must be doing or thinking something right.
The this and other distinctions appear as pronouns in our language. It may be necessary for us to examine the structure of language in order to arrive at some consensus of agreement about the I-it relationship.
Things are defined by relationship though. What something is is defined by, or contained by, what it isn’t. Things are relationships, which is why things “in themselves” is nonsensical.
Okay - got it.
Relationships to what though? What is the base of comparison being used?
By now, at this point in our lives, we have built these relationships in our minds. But, what of a first experience, or discovery of some new ‘property’? For instance, the first time an infant experiences rigidity, it doesn’t hold a relation to a rock or table (for example); so, where do these relationships begin? That would seem to me our foundation for an evolving base of comparison. But that foundation – your first experience in distinguishing a ‘thing’ without prior knowledge of common, definitive properties comes from where?
The very fact that we associate properties to seemingly independent, distinguishable objects almost suggests the reality of the thing-in-itself. The relationships we form for functional purposes are generally comparison, or differentiation, among material objects. So, to say “a rock is hard”, is to identify that rock as a thing-in-itself, holding seemingly universal, object properties.
I think it may be more accurate to say ‘thing’, as we perceive them, are relationships. But does perception necessarily dictate the actual nature of a thing?
I think the “relata” involved doesn’t necessarily have to move beyond a realization that some material, object entity seems to exists independent from yourself. A majority of the time, or most fundamental base of comparison is simply ourselves. Things exist as relationships to us, but are those relationships responsible for that object’s existence altogether or just the recognition of that existence?