Theism as a Grounding for Rationality

The most first thing we need to go over for my argument to work is the function of logic and rationality in the world. As I’m sure most of you will agree, logic by itsel fis no guarentor of truth. The process can lead in several directions depending on the facts one uses- and not only facts explicitly brought up in the argument, either. There’s always background knowledge that affects things. For example, suppose a woman of prominence in the town invited me to her home for a dinner party. Suppose sometime between now and then, I see an insect exterminator’s truck pulling into her driveway. There’s any number of things I could conclude, here’s two of them:

“Ew, that lady has a bug problem, maybe I don’t want to eat there after all.”

or

“Ah, Mrs. So-and-so is married to the Orkin Man? This will be fascinating, I’ve always wanted to talk with someone in that line of work.”

Now, clearly I’m not informed enough to decide between the two. But the interesting thing is, if I believe the second statement above, no new evidence will get me to the first. If you tell me the woman isn’t married, I can just conclude that she’s dating the Orkin Man. If you tell me she’s married to someone else, then I’ll be aghast that she’s cheating on her husband with the Orkin man, and so on. Add for the sake of argument that the first statement is the truth, and we see a basic problem that skeptics have been blowing around for ever:

  1. ) Any body of evidence, no matter how complete or compelling, is suited for a infinite number of conclusions.

So in any situation we would care to examine, we are relying on the data we’ve been immediately given, and other things that we know or believe from past situations- not to mention our moods and dispositions. The situation would be utterly hopeless, except that people seem to agree on a lot of the background information- the existence of other minds, the general reliability of the senses, and so on. With all of that in common, we usually agree on the same conclusions when presented with the same evidence- except in the cases of fields which are agreed upon to be very difficult and require special education- like philosophy.

When it comes to philosophy, those commonly agreed upon background beliefs are often the most controversial and hotly examined claims around. The whole point, it seems, is to talk about that stuff, which means not taking it for granted as true. One of the first things we might notice is a sort of inverted application of (1, above. Any philosophy we come up with- the denial of the existence of matter, or the self, or anything but the self- can all be forced to fit the data we all seem to have in common. This person can say there is no such thing as matter, and that person can say there is no such thing as mind, and both of them have perfectly logical explanations for why there seem to be people thinking about mountains. This general predicament leads to a skepticism in one form or another- whether it’s a pessimistic nihilism or a dumbly-optimistic post-modernism.

I think, though, we need to look at why exactly this is problematic a little deeper. OK, so sometimes our beliefs aren’t going to be correct because we have the wrong assumptions. We still basically know what we have to when we have to, right? Not according to the skeptic, and I think the reason why can be best expressed as a little narrative that goes through our heads in one form or another when we contemplate the difference between what we think, and how it is.

The Common Narrative:

What came first (conceptually or chronologically) is the world of non-thinking stuff- knowing and believing are newcomers to it, contained within it, and yet fundamentally seperated from it.  The world of matter goes on as it will regardless of the fruits of these 'ideas' or the developments of these 'concepts'.   Knowing is a completely one way street and a terminal chain- the universe does stuff, that stuff causes you to believe something (true or otherwise)  Top-down like that, it's clear that the universe will be as it is whether human knowledge can capture it all, or is a complete folly. 

~The End~

I think this half-concept of Knowledge as Interloper exists at the bottom of all the skepticism- it justifies why the possibility of doubt of even fundamental things is so problematic. We can be proud of our soundness, but just that and no more. Without any actual truth, rationality is basically just a sort of grammar, and when it comes to deciding what to believe, it’s ultimately no better than irrationality or anti-rationality.

The other thing I notice about Knowledge as Interloper is that it’s very presumptive, and profoundly materialistic. Why presume that knowing is a new thing to the universe at all? Even people who would say they don’t believe that let it creep into their epistemology un-examined, it seems to me. But there is an alternate view.

The Alternate Narrative:

 What came first was a Knower, which to begin with knew Itself. Matter, stuff which doesn't know, is the Interloper- it exists as a substrate in which to perform acts of Will, and the capacity to be known is essential to that. When new knowers come along, they are in the image of the original in the sense that have the capacity to know matter sufficiently to act out their wills on it. 

If knowing came first, and matter was created (knowledgably) to be the object of such an act, then these problems melt away. My basic act of presuming there is a tree when I see one is every bit a part of the original universe as gravity- knowing was in the mix there with the flour and confectionary sugar. The universe can be known because it was created as an essentially knowable thing*, and Knowledge trumps matter both chronologically and metaphysically- it is in all ways prior. It is a function of intentionality.

Obviously this narrative is theistic.  So then, the question that immediately comes up is "Why suppose there is a God in the first place? What's the proof?"  Well, the proof is in the pudding in this case- the product of the narratives.  If the universe is naturally and originally unknown, and unknowable by us due to the problems of skepticism, then I submit that the skeptics win, and even asking for proof of what we believe is sophististry, and ultimately a waste of everybody's time. However, if Knowing happened first, then everything we know is essentially information passed along from one Person to another, which is much more sensible  than wringing knowledge out of the dumb world like blood from a turnip. 

 What's interesting is that the alternate narrative isn't just deistic, it needs to be very particularly theistic- not only was there an original force, but that original force was a Knower.  A Mind. Not just a Mind in some dim that's-the-best-word-we-have-for-it sense, but a Mind similiar enough to ours that it's knowing could justify our own. The knower has to have power to create the world of matter out of it's knowledge, and one could argue the benevolence to put us in a state where our knowledge can apply as we imagine it to do. 

So then, when I say that theism is the only rational option, I don't mean it in the sense that it's the only option that can justify itself rationally (that is, show coherence).  I'm saying theism is the only option that justifies our pre-occupation with reason and coherence in the first place.

The only problem I have with the essay is that it seems to posit a very linear form of thinking (I have thought this, so I will continue to think this) when human thought exists in a more complicated web than that model would suggest. However, since logic is based on linear thinking, this isn’t necessarily a big deal.

However, I would double check against the is-ought problem. I would argue that you made the jump from ‘is’ when describing the alternative narrative to ‘ought’ when you explained the theistic implications thereof. I would at least address that, even if it is only to reject the is-ought problem as a problem.

Good essay, BTW.

The is/ought problem is very important to the whole thing, and I think there’s two main ways to look at it.

First, the classic way to demonstrate the is/ought problem is with a series of questions- each answer taking us halfway there, but never bridging the gap. An interesting thing happens with this exercise. If we suppose a mind, it’s natural to ask how a mind could create the universe, which leads us to omnipotence. It’s then natural to ask why that means WE can expect to know things, just because this other mind does, and that leads us to benevolence in general, and an interest in human kind in particular*. The more we look at it, the closer we get to a very particular understanding of God, and not a general deism. But of course, we never completely bridge the gap from is to ought- that’s precisely the point of my argument after all, that no body of evidence (or presupposition) leads to a precise conclusion.

The only real way to bridge the gap between is/ought is, of course, induction, and my argument relies heavily on that. I think that people who (semi-consciously) adopt the Common Narrative intuit the strength of the problem of connecting our experiences to outside reality. I think this is a very strong, and very understandable intuition, and worst of all, I think materialism does nothing to counter it.

On the other hand, if someone works to incorporate my Alternate Narrative in their world view, then I think this intuition dissolves- if the universe was created by Something that knows it as we understand knowing, our ability to know it ourselves becomes much more plausible to believe- that is to say, it justifies a more optimistic intuition of our state in the world.

*- the idea that the universe was to some extent created for ‘us’ makes theism the most brazen form of humanism.

I have to hand it to you Uccisore…

You’ve made a good case for yourself… however… I do spot a few assumptions which do not reflect “rational thinking” to my mind.

How do you escape the problem of philosophical certainty?

Given that we humans are finite and faulible beings (I’m assuming this is still true given your worldview) how can you rationally lay claim to certainty?

Logic and rationality are not nessisarily valuable to us because they are considered fundemental principles of the universe… or even methods of reaching truth… they are merely the limit of our understanding… no more… if something is not logical… we cannot fathom it… if it irrational… we won’t be able to predict it…

That being said… Logic and rationality cannot be reduced to mere grammer… they demonstrate soundness of mind when one attempts to justify oneself… the lack of 100% certainty does not render all beliefs equally justified or equally “irrational”… beliefs (perhaps not all beliefs) can be altered through evidence and argumentation… they are falsifiable… the only thing to sustain a belief is the reasoning behind it… and of course the evidence.

Mad Man P

I'm glad you spotted this, it was something I was turning over in my head as I was writing the argument- I was worried that my argument might seem like it was making a case for perfect knowledge and certainty in all things, like what God would allegedly have. Obviously, since we don't have that, any argument we make in that direction would fail. 
 My response would be that my proposed system doesn't guarantee us certainty or knowledge in any one field or topic. All it does is defend the connection between the external world and our experience of it- and that connection is absolutely necessary if we're going to know [i]anything[/i].  In other words, I'm arguing here that the universe is the kind of thing that [i]can be known[/i] under theism, and under materialism, it probably isn't.  As you say, our actual achievement of knowledge is often thwarted by our limited human natures. 

I agree with what you say about logic and rationality- the do require the right evidence in order to present something true. That’s kind of what I’m saying- with no reason to believe that we’re ever sticking the right evidence in our premises, what’s the difference between a logical argument and a haiku?

As to a lack of certainty rendering all beliefs equally irrational, it depends. I’m not arguing that the materialist can be 99.9 percent sure of the important stuff, and basing my case on that other 0.1 percent. I’m saying they odds of anything they believe being true is completely up in the air, on materialism.

You propose that the universe is knowable… and that perfection of knowledge is possible… even if our nature does not allow us certainty… And i would agree… but then again… Who ever said that I am a materialist? it’s not the only alternative you know…

All that is required to believe as you do… is to begin with the notion that the universe is uniform… intelligible… logical…

the addition of a creator who made it so is not nessisary… theism is not the only worldview which can offer a reasonable belief in a uniform universe…

inductive paths… given the universe is uniform and our senses somwhat reliable… we would sooner or later achieve perfect knowledge through induction…

if the universe is not uniform… we cannot know anything anyway… and there is no difference…

I’m assuming you say this based on the materialists inability to justify a belief in the uniformaty of the universe… and if so… I agree compleatly…

which is why materialism (as you seem to understand it) cannot account for knowledge…

however… most people will have noticed “the laws of nature” as I would like to call them… as they are self-evident in logic… and re-affirmed by experience. The principle of cause and effect is experienced internally as it is externally… the connection is already made as a priori… which is not so terribly odd since we are part of this world… and it’s rules apply to us as much as anything else…

Your case rests on the premis that no view could account for possibility of knowledge unless they could account for intelligibility… correct?
you assume that theism is the only such view… which hopefully… I have now shown to be wrong…

Mad Man P

  Yes, you certainly can- and we do so reflexively.  This is one of those things that we can't help but believe. However, we can [i]examine[/i] it.  If the only creatures doing the knowing are relatively ignorant, then the case for the universe being intelligible becomes much weaker.  And it's not just me saying so- post-modernists and skeptics capitalize on this weakness in their denials of accessible common truth. 
  The belief that the universe can be known entails the [i]possibility[/i] of a Perfect Knower anyway, though.   Taking it as an actual not only explains why we can trust our intuitions, but it gives us good reason to say that the universe is knowable even if none of [i]us[/i] knows that much about it. 

This is true, but the converse is not. If the universe is uniform, that does not entail that we can know it.

Nope, I’m saying this based on the materialists inability to justify that our experiences refer to anything outside ourselves in a uniform way. I think people who adhere to my Common Narrative picture the universe as a very uniform place, but it is uniformly distant and indifferent to our beliefs about it.

Ahh, this is probably where we differ most strongly. I would say that cause and effect is experienced internally and inferred externally- the notion of an external experience means nothing to me, I’d need you to explain it. I do agree with you that cause and effect in the world is believed a priori practically- that is, we do not happen to base it on previous evidence or argument. However, even a belief taken a priori can be shown incorrect after the fact through a defeater.

No, my argument is that only theism answers the skeptic- without a benevolent, omniscient Creator we have no reason to expect matter to be knowable, we just have to assume it is, and the fact that evidence has no necessary relation to our conclusions about it gives us a great reason to reject that assumption.

ahhh… Uccisore… We’re getting closer to the core of the matter now…

For the above reason to apply you need to escape the problem of philosophical certainty…

I say this because if the problem of philosophical certainty is not overcome, we judge not based on actuality… but practicality… If we do not have philosophical certainty… and in fact admit that such certainty is beyond us… we are then left “guessing”…

but then we must ask how to distinguish a “good” or “reasonable” guess from the irrational ones?

our begining axioms are the first steps we take… Logic is inescapable… it is our limit… so we begin there… logic applies… or we cannot move at all… we cannot think… we cannot be… it becomes self evident in our existence… it applies.

Now we face the truble of defending our presupposition of an external reality… an objective reality… but deceptive as some of the skeptics may be… it’s not truly a problem… this problem is at best a semantic one… rather than actual content… an external reality is inescapable durring experience… (if you disagree i will demonstrate)

So then why assume this external reality is uniform and bound by logic? the defence is simple and to the point… “external reality” or the “objective reality” is our world… we are made from it… we are part of it… we ARE it… Much as you would argue we are made in the image of god… I would argue we are made in the image of the universe… Logical… and subject to it’s laws… like you said:

I would argue… “knowing” is not nessisary… only intelligibility is… and the universe it seems… is uniform… the “laws of nature” could be considered “knowledge” though they might not be contained in a being… they are realized in all matter/energy… and since we are matter/energy… they are realized in us as well…

Your adding “intelligence” to the equation and from that you get “god” rather than “laws of nature”… you get a personal being rather than inanimate immutable laws.

First of all… I’d like to point out that since the problem of philosophical certainty exists regardless of worldview inferrence is the only option… you cannot deduce anything other than what is axiomatic and/or self evident… or taken as truth arbitrarily.

External causes effect us internally… internal causes effects the external world…

I wish it (internal cause)… my arm moves and picks up the rock(external effect)… the rock is hot (external cause)… My desire to hold the rock fades and I drop the rock (internal effect)

connection made… case closed… Inferring from here that the external world is governed by the principle of cause and effect is simple… since an internal cause can effect an external agent. and an external cause can effect us internally… it is not too great a leap to state that the same principle applies in all things known… and then (as any good scientist ought) test it… and attempt to falsify the hypothisis… then hold it true for so long as it is not falsified… :stuck_out_tongue:

anywho… I’ve said enough for one post… I’ll give you time to reply… besides other than what i’ve mentioned i find your reasoning is flawless so far that i can tell…

I’ll just jump in here for one thing.

Moving from a particular to a universal is begging the question, and logically invalid. Now the principle of causality works fine for interpreting experiments, designing technology etc., but when it is brought up against another metaphysical system (assuming universal causality and uniformity is a metaphysical assumption), one that includes the possibility of ruptures in causality (the God metaphysical system), then the only way to decide between the two systems is through a priori arguments.

The way I see Uccisore’s arguments, is that when we are faced with two metaphysical systems, both of which we can never be logically certain about through their transcendental nature away from experience and are therefore in principal equivalent, which one do we choose? The one that allows our immediate impressions of the world to make sense (the initial knower), or the one that causes our immediate impressions of the world to be forever distanced from us logically, reflectively through skepticism (materialism)?

I could be wrong in my interpretation of course…

Ucc,

I need a bit of clarification. In positing a first cause knower, are you suggesting omnicience? Your theory also seems to dismiss the concept of sponteniety and novelty as a force in the universe as well. Is this intentional? I’m also a bit puzzled how one establishes the “personal” relationship with this prime knower which seems to be an accepted notion among the major religions. Even if the idea of the first cause knower is accepted, and we can convincingly accept the idea that humans can (or will at some time) know what the Knowers knows, what is the rational explanation for a personal relationship with this Knower?

Great questions, tent. First one, yes, I am positing a first-cause omniscience. You could call it a sort of a epistemological cosmological argument: In order for us to know anything, there must be a First Knower that establishes the knowledge relationship between matter and concepts. That knower must have sufficient power over the nature of matter to ensure that relationship, as well.

I ignore it for the purposes of this argument, but I think having a willful mind with a personality makes the presence of these things much easier to understand then they are under materialism, as well. I don’t see yet how these forces apply specifically to my argument, though. Can you go into more detail on this?

I don’t think my argument goes far enough to establish the kind of personal relationship with the Knower that Christianity describes. However, an evil, capricious or unconcerned Knower won’t help us any more than materialism will. So I think some level of beneficence and interest in human affairs is required by the system as well- so perhaps this argument points in the direction of a personal God, even if it’s insufficient to get us all the way there.

Mad Man P

The world of the Matrix is logical, uniform, and intelligible, and yet the vast majority of the people in it have no knowledge. A world in which I was the only thing that existed would satisfy that criteria as well. There’s no solid connection between the regularity of the universe and our ability to understand it- and it’s that ability that I’m addressing here. I do agree with you that there’s good reasons to intuit that the universe is logical and uniform, but I don’t think that’s enough to solve the problem I’m talking about. “Knowability” is a quality distinct from these things, and I think it’s an unjustified quality to assume in a universe where nothing knew anything for 15 billion years, and then we came along.

Hi Ucc,

In all seriousness, why? It seems to me that a first cause only has to provide beginning motion and then sit back and see what happens. A pebble tossed into a pond begins a series of ripples,but it isn’t necesary to know the pattern, amplitude, period, or direction of the waves. A knower could have simply tossed the pebble. What is more rational in your perspective than the one I just proposed?

It seems possible that there are two potential answers within your Knowers universe. One, that all is knowable even though we do not know everything as of yet. There is the unknown. Or, one might suggest that what we call the unknown is really novelty and sponteniety and that the universe which seems patterned and uniform by design is really nothing more than the aggregate of spontaneous action-reaction among the constituant ‘things’ within an experience. There is a ‘fixed’ universe on one hand or a processual evolving universe on the other. Even if we accept the concept of Knower, what makes one perspective more likely than the other?

tentative

Nothing, and that’s precisely the problem. Within a materialistic perspective, a first cause that kicks everything into completely unknowable motion is very consistent- in fact, it’s practically the only possibility. That’s why I’m arguing that it falls prey to total skepticism. What my system proposes is that our concepts relate to matter to produce knowledge simply because matter was created according to a concept to begin with.

Again, nothing as far as I know. The way I understand you, both understandings would be consistent with what I’m saying here, and with respect to human actions at least, I would actually lean towards the ‘novelty and spontaneity’ option myself. I’m not making a claim about our ability to know everything in the universe as much as I am about the essential relationship between matter and our concepts that is required for any knowledge at all to occur. If matter was around, and then the act of creating concepts came by some time later by chance, there’s no reason to suppose that connection. If an idea was held first, and matter was created according to that idea, then the connection is part of the system from the beginning.

Then another irritating question:

Then it seems that it is a matter of choosing one of equal sets of apriori assumptions, neither with any greater claim to mirror reality. Is then, first cause or evolution valid? Or are we simply choosing between chocolate or strawberry?

Maybe. I’ve shown my set of assumptions, what’s the alternative? As I said, we can just start with the assumption that our concepts connect with matter (and we have that assumption whether we like it or not). My point is that materialism gives us good reason to be skeptical of it after the fact.

hehe… now begins the risk of going in circles… so let’s cut that bit out… let’s see if we can come to an understanding of our actual positions and put a needle on the difference…

“knowledge” (given the everyday use of the word and not the standards of philosophical certainty) means nothing more to me than “the ability to predict and recall”… I know gravity exists… because if i throw a rock in the air it falls… my knowledge is true… I am capable of predicting… I also know what my mother told me yesterday… I can recall it…

given that definition… The people in the matrix knew as much as we do… they could predict events in thier own world… even if they were unaware of the world beyond thier world.

I would love to hear your difinition before preceeding… becuase it seems “knowledge” is an important concept in your argument… so if you would please define it.

NoelyG

Actually it’s called inductive reasoning… and it’s quite valid logically… what you mean to say is that it does not ensure truth… but then we’ve already established the problem of certainty… deduction is only sound if the premisis are sound… which leaves us in the same pickle… we cannot ensure truth… that’s just the human condition… :frowning:

Mad Man P

No, I meant what I said. Inductive reasoning (in its current format) is only valid in the domain where causality is assumed to be universally true.

I believe that’s the point, i.e. we cannot know which system is true due to their metaphysical nature, however if we wish to make a choice between the two abstractions which we have made, how do we do it “rationally”?

Noel,

From what I’m seeing in this thread and Ucc can correct me, is that having made a choice among apriori sets of assumptions, rationality can then be constructed within that loop of assumptions. If - then may exist internally, but the ‘truth’ or rationality externally requires the famous leap of faith. “Ya’ pays your nickel and ya’ takes your chances.”

The problem seems to be in the necessity of living in duality, which none of us escape. One does not transcend their humaness in any permanent way until death of the human form. Conversely, one cannot deny the presence of that “something” beyond physical reality. I think that the error is in looking for closure in our ‘knowing’. We all want to skip to the end and read the last chapter. We want to know how it ends.

So pick your best set of illusions and go with them. For me, being a constant skeptic is healthy. Running a constant ‘reality check’ forces me to compare my beliefs with what I experience. If there is any form of external rationality, it is in this. Is what I am experiencing matching up with my beliefs? Obviously the margin of error is great, and I suspect that anyone with the luxury of time for introspection finally has to accept themselves as doing the best they can. The concepts of right - wrong, truth - falsity may function rationally within my assumptions, but I should not suffer my rationalizations as complete or somehow grasping the 'Truth."

Mad Man P

 The Matrix was just an example of how the world can be abstracted from experience- don't read too deeply into it.   If you want to call the positions of the people in that sort of simulation 'knowledge', and the objects of their experience 'a world', I can't stop you, but it sounds like sophistry to me. 
 If the example gives us trouble, we should drop the example, I'll stand by my principle- a world that is uniform and follows natural laws is not necessarily connected to our experience in any way that would justify us claiming to have knowledge of it.  The connection between our concepts and matter is one that is not addressed by uniformity alone.  If the only out available to the materialist is that they know the 'world of their own experience', then I'll accept that as a concession, and I think my argument still succeeds perfectly. 
 As far as my definition of knowledge, knowledge is a correct apprehension of an actual state of affairs*.  The ability to predict is common to it, but definitionally irrelevant, since we can know of things that we have only experienced once. Seeing a tree in the Matrix and thinking 'there is a tree' might be true beleif for the youngest children who don't associate the belief with any more than their experience, but someone who has a beliefs about what a tree is (a three dimensional object made of wood, say) would have no knowledge of any such things. 

*- Plus a widget for Gettier. I personally like “In an environment properly conducive to producing true belief”, but there’s others.

tentative

 Yes, that's true as far as it goes.  Some of the a priori assumptions we can't help but start with concern the reality of the outside world, and the reliability of our senses in understanding it. But an assumption can still be challenged and ultimately rejected once more information is acquired.  Philosophical arguments against knowledge, post-modernism and other types of skepticism that point to the subjective nature of interpretation, or the necessary disconnect between evidence and conclusion, I believe [i]defeat [/i] those sorts of assumptions about our ability to understand the universe.  Yes, rationalist still exists within that loop, but with no way to connect it to actual events, rationality becomes a sort of closed system of coherence- like a long novel or other work of fiction. 
In order to say that our rationality is more than good story-telling, we need to have a reason to believe the premises we plug into it are connected to the reality we mean to describe. That they can be true, or at least somewhat approximate truth.  Uniformity and Predictability don't grant this, they only show (as Mad Man P has pointed out) that our experiences themselves can become the objects of our reasoning.