We know that there are minimal guidelines for even the simplest of statements. For the statement to “mean” something, it must first possess a certain amount of logical building blocks. In the statement these are the syntaxes and the grammar habits. A statement, for example, that has a subject and a predicate “evokes” a relationship, which is the “meaning”, from the syntactical possibility and the relationship between the two parts of the statement- the subject and the predicate state it is in.
The mind does not “get” meaning from the data as it is in the reading of the statement, in the seeing of these syntactical rules in action. The sense that is made is not determined from the rules…you will note that you don’t “interpret” the relationship between the subject and the predicate (you don’t have to think about the possibility of the “dog” being “brown” before you interpret the statement).
This would be an example of the “objectivity” happening in the exchange of the statement the “dog is brown”, between two language speakers. It is the unspoken agreements beforehand which are not “intentional” in the statement…they are not acknowledged by the two speakers before: “hey, you know that the predicate is brown and the subject is the dog, right?”
If the subject of discussion became the matter of the definition of the predicate itself, the subject would then, in turn, move beyond the objective possibilities for the statements meaning and focus the subject on the meaning of predicate intersubjectively.
What “rules” are “objective” are the occurrences which cannot possibly be by accident in language and communication. People cannot “just happen” to acknowledge in an unspoken way the assumptions about basic anatomy in language use. Imagine that at the first periods of language use involved simple sounds that accompanied referencing behavior (pointing at a rock and grunting to “show” an acquaintance). For many years this was the limits of language…it was no more complicated. Yet the first objective rule in language use which developed was this making of a “context” with language and behavior in unison. The referencing use of the predicate to make a “quality” for an object or a state of affairs was an essential objective structure in language.
The rule that meaning is objective in language, in so far as it at least is a proposition “about” an object of a state of affairs, is evidenced by the consequences of the acts which seemingly correspond with and follow the statements made in discourse.
The language is used such that there must be meanings and these meanings must be the limits to which the statements are used in corresponding speech to acts in the world. The acts and the speech are intersubjective patterns of meaning making…but the rules are implicit in the unspoken formalities- the logical blocks- that allows cognitive sense to be made without focusing on the rules themselves.
Earlier I mentioned the importance of the intentional consciousness. It is the contrary to the Freudian subconsciousness and in fact denies its possibility. That consciousness must be directly consumed by immediate cognizance or it does not qualify any experience or event as “effective” or “signifying” of anything real. So unless in my example the rules of language are the immediate subject of the discourse, they are implicit and unintentional. If they are unintentional they could be objective, but also intersubjectivity could be possible precisely because of the possibility of objectivity in the mere structures of language use. We are using language without intentionally and immediately analyzing how it works each and every time we say something to another person. A kind of hardwiring objectivity which precedes the immediate conscious intentional meanings in what is spoken about, by us.
I can imagine no more “objectivity” than that. Keep in mind that meaning, since it is intersubjective, could be the question in mind about the nature of the unspoken rules in language, as in the case of the brown dog and the simple subject/predicate propositional intent of the statement, and the course of the discourse would turn.
One could always ask the same of the accepted premises that are unspoken or even agreed on, and objectivity again turns to mean only the praxis of the discourse- the language, the acts, the use of the meanings and the correspondence of behavior to statements.