What is a heroic claim of mine?
On Person A and Person B. Are they dying? IF so A would be reasonable.
Anyways, you’re assuming way too much about what little I’ve said, and running it laughing maniacally with your wild inferences. It’s really weird, like you are just dying to make up strawman after strawman and run with it. One of the reasons why, you’re not very reasonable.
You basically said as much in regards to epistemology in your knowledge and belief thread. (You understand the nature of knowledge and belief better than academics who have studied philosophy.)
In this thread, you say that you can understand what experts with years of experience are saying and you can make a better decision than they can. (You can make a decision about which medical diagnosis is better and which treatment is better in spite of not being a qualified doctor.)
If that is not what you have said, then WTF have you said??
]
This is a conversation about logical fallacies, in case you forgotten. On a philosophy forum, in case you’ve forgotten. So yes, when the subject of logical fallacies comes up on a philosophy forum, you can expect the ‘cogency’ to be the sort used when philosophers are talking about logical arguments. If you’re unable or uninterested in comprehending what inductive cogency is, I can’t see why anybody would take your claims about logical fallacies seriously or what there is to be gained form discussing it with you- you don’t know what you’re speaking of.
Understand is a broad term. Understand what exactly? Anything? I’m not sure what you are referring to as what you may think I claim to understand better, you’d have to be more specific. Here, and in the other thread. There are many reasons I stated to question authority already - so I’m not sure why you decided to take it as, utilize your ignorance to think for yourself and decide while ruling out the opinion or understanding of when someone obviously knows more, or something along those lines. Please look at what I wrote and what it means, and point it out where this led you to infer this, so I could clarify for you.
One might disagree because one understands the issue better than those philosophers. Or one might disagree because one does not understand the issue as well as those philosophers.
So how does one know which it is?
That would require a study of the issue at least as deep as was done by the philosopher.
I have not done such in-depth studies. Therefore, it is entirely possible that my evaluations are based on my own ignorance. I understand that.
Have you studied that deeply?
Fair enough, Uccisore - but you’ll have to understand I barely visited this forum for months because the posts were becoming very rudimentary as well as using typical layman terms I wouldn’t expect nay change when I came back more recently.
I don’t know where you get “that I don’t know what I’m speaking of”. Where is that coming from exactly?
You throw the word ‘understand’ around a lot. Now you don’t know what it means?
And what have the last two pages of posts been about? Did you not comprehend anything that I wrote about the limited knowledge of a layman compared to the knowledge of a trained doctor?
Ok - let me rephrase the question for you. Where did you get the inference that I claim to understand better than PHd’s. Is it just from everything I wrote? Or something specific?
Without a good grasp of induction and philosophic cogency, you’ve no grounds to make claims about the appropriateness of fallacies.
You’re the one that brought up induction. Sorry, where was I making an inductive argument again, or where was talking about an inductive argument and “philosophic” cogency and didn’t know what I was talking about? Now keep in mind, philosophic is very broad for cogency. You might do it better justice by referring to your particularly use of cogency as “inductive cogency” or better yet, argumentative cogency, I think.
I linked you to a detailed paper, written by me, specifically on the subject of the mis-use of fallacies in internet discussions, days before it got to this point. It was called “On the MISATRIBUTION OF FALLACY”, it discusses this exact situation in detail, and the reason I linked you to it is because you asked me to.
That being said, Is there even more than that I could do to make it clear to somebody on a philosophy forum that I’m using basic philosophic vernacular? Sure. But that wouldn’t change the fact that without this knowledge, your opinions on appeals to authority are about as valuable on my opinions on conjugating verbs in Mandarin.
Why are you bringing up your link again that I already said I didn’t read? I was planning on reading it.
An inductive argument is different than what I was referring to in my discussion here. I misunderstood your use of cogency and what your inductive argument even was. I don’t know why you would bring up a link again that I already told you I didn’t read, and why you would assume that I would have understood what you were saying when I clearly didn’t.
And what’s that James? Where did I misuse any terms that I stated?
Ok what words am I using in the wrong manner? What definitions do I not understand that I used? Or are you assuming that I used logic in some other bizarre way just because you didn’t grasp what I stated when I said “logic is shaped by reality”. Is grasp too strong of a word? Should I say something else to smooth over your ego?
Where am I telling others how to think? Is stop following and thinking for themselves this? What capacity am I lacking here? How is this wrong for those who are capable? Your vague generalizations are amiss, somethings amiss here and I think it has something to do with your bias rooted from another thread.
Capacity for what James? Who’s they? Too vague here.
Most people don’t know how to get other people to think? In what way James? Because asking a question causes someone else to think.
What is more important James? You tell me. Because I don’t think you’re understanding what’s going on here… If you want to hold on to a misunderstanding about Uccisore’s inductive cogency ( I now see he did call it inductive cogency) - that was already resolved - and if you would look elsewhere in the thread you would see that I agree that its cogent to choose based on authority alone - but that doesn’t mean it would be the right choice, necessarily, as such, it is a choice on probability. So what? I already stated I can’t think of any reason why a choice would have to be made in that is our only factor.
I never said my evaluations aren’t based on my own ignorance, nor would I ever. I already stated ignorance is everywhere. But one shouldn’t assume they are wrong just because you disagree with an authority. That’s dangerous. It depends how much you understand, yes. How much you know you don’t know. But then it can be difficult to not know, what you don’t know. But then again, there’s this:
"When you grow up you tend to get told the world is the way it is and you’re life is just to live your life inside the world.
Try not to bash into the walls too much. Try to have a nice family, have fun, save a little money.
That’s a very limited life.
Life can be much broader once you discover one simple fact: Everything around you that you call life was made up by people that were no smarter than you and you can change it, you can influence it, you can build your own things that other people can use.
Once you learn that, you’ll never be the same again. "
-Steve Jobs
Which is a quote to live by. Even if you’re wrong or not smart enough. People and their systems and categorizations are flawed and or very subjective, or very easily improved upon, for one. People’s philosophies are flawed. Nobody spouted off a perfect philosophy and the more you spout off the more errors, and inaccuracies that will occur. But that doesn’t stop people like Kant, or anyone. It shouldn’t stop anyone. Unless they’re afraid of being perceived to be wrong, well, so what? That doesn’t matter, as long as you get things right along the way. Or perhaps you were right, and just misunderstood. Or perhaps you were wrong - but got more important things right. It’s just the way it is, there can always be improvement. There always should be improvement.
In the field of philosophy there is much room for improvement. Always was. It continues constantly. There’s disagreements constantly. There’s different view points constantly. Authorities in philosophy are not people, its reason and logic… and if it fits your values great. Philosophy isn’t a science, but it led to science. Where it didn’t lead to science, it tries to answer questions where we can only provide the most reasonable answer. Things are thought constantly that might be new, or different. There’s philosophers now writing things that don’t get much attention, because it can take time for people to get around to them, to appreciate them. I really think a mindset that wants to just bow down to the presumed authorities as probably right because they’re the authorities, as a slavish mentality. People shouldn’t be that way. I guess they can - but what good does it to do, if they not only don’t understand authorities, they just agree because they think they’re authorities. Maybe for a majority of the population they ought to be under control. Maybe. I don’t know. But if you’re here in this forum reading and philosophizing - why would you do such a thing. Doesn’t it say something to even be here, that you’re capable more so than others of thinking deeper, or at least desire to more than others? Maybe not… but that would be unfortunate considering the depth of philosophy and what it encompasses.
If one goes into a doctor and has the understanding that they might be wrong regardless of their degree, or reputation, or what have you, would you not question them? Should you not question them? Do you just make an inductive argument when you have to pick? No you don’t. You can simply have hope that you did the right choice. So I don’t see a problem here, why an inductive argument is necessary or why it was brought up. I thought I already addressed that previously anyway, both the pro and con of it.
Anyways, the problem of induction:
plato.stanford.edu/entries/induction-problem/
The original problem of induction can be simply put. It concerns the support or justification of inductive methods; methods that predict or infer, in Hume’s words, that “instances of which we have had no experience resemble those of which we have had experience” (THN, 89). Such methods are clearly essential in scientific reasoning as well as in the conduct of our everyday affairs. The problem is how to support or justify them and it leads to a dilemma: the principle cannot be proved deductively, for it is contingent, and only necessary truths can be proved deductively. Nor can it be supported inductively—by arguing that it has always or usually been reliable in the past—for that would beg the question by assuming just what is to be proved.
A century after Hume first put the problem, and argued that it is insoluble, J. S. Mill gave a more specific formulation of an important class of inductive problems: “Why,” he wrote, “is a single instance, in some cases, sufficient for a complete induction, while in others myriads of concurring instances, without a single exception known or presumed, go such a little way towards establishing an universal proposition?” (Mill 1843, Bk III, Ch. III). (Compare: (i) Everyone seated on the bus is moving northward. (ii) Everyone seated on the bus was born on a prime numbered day of the month.)
In recent times inductive methods have fissioned and multiplied, to an extent that attempting to define induction would be more difficult than rewarding. It is however instructive to contrast induction with deduction: Deductive logic, at least as concerns first-order logic, is demonstrably complete. The premises of an argument constructed according to the rules of this logic imply the argument’s conclusion. Not so for induction: There is no comprehensive theory of sound induction, no set of agreed upon rules that license good or sound inductive inference, nor is there a serious prospect of such a theory. Further, induction differs from deductive proof or demonstration (in first-order logic, at least) not only in induction’s failure to preserve truth (true premises may lead inductively to false conclusions) but also in failing of monotonicity: adding true premises to a sound induction may make it unsound.
The characterization of good or sound inductions might be called the characterization problem: What distinguishes good from bad inductions? The question seems to have no rewarding general answer, but there are nevertheless interesting partial characterizations, some of which are explored in this entry.
An interesting read here:
Another interesting read here, which would be an allusion to Uccisore’s response here, but I’m pointing it out nonetheless… but which seemed to salivate at my misunderstanding of his use of cogency when referring to an inductive argument that I don’t think anyone made or was relevant to the thread.
"… for American philosophers by and large see themselves, accurately enough, as cultivating one academic specialty in contrast to others–as technicians working in the realm of ideas. This means that they generally write for an audience of their fellow academics and have little interest in (or prospect of) addressing a wider public of intelligent readers. (This is another significant difference between the philosophical situation in North America and in continental Europe. American philosophy is oriented to academia and academics. By contrast, European–and especially French–philosophy is oriented to the wider culture-complex of an intelligent readership through its concern with currently controverted issues.) Moreover, “political correctness,” which has become a point of controversy on various American campuses, has made comparatively little impact among philosophers–in contrast to practitioners of such fields as legal or literary theory. Outside of rather limited circles, philosophers in America are still expected to give reasons for their contentions, rather than to paint those who dissent with the brush of fashionably attuned disapproval–let alone to resort to name calling. The high degree of its technical professionalism has tended to countervail the politicization of the field.
The prominence of specialization gives a more professional and technical cast to contemporary American philosophizing in comparison to that of other times and places. It endows the enterprise with something of that can-do spirit that one encounters in other aspects of American life. There is something of a confidence in the power of technique to resolve the problems of the field. In this respect American philosophizing has little use for a pessimism that contents itself with a melancholic resignation to human inadequacies. Confined to the precints of higher education, contemporary American philosophy cannot easily afford sending messages that the young are not prepared to hear.
All the same, its increasing specialization has impelled philosophy toward the ivory tower. The most recent years have accordingly seen something of a fall from grace of philosophy in American culture–not that there was ever all that much grace to fall from. For many years, the Encyclopedia Britannica published an annual supplement entitled the Book of the Year, dealing with the events of the year under such rubrics as world politics, health, music, and so forth. Until the 1977 volume’s coverage of the preceding year’s developments, a section of philosophy was always included in this annual series. Thereafter, however, philosophy vanished–without so much as a word of explanation. The year of America’s bicentennial seemingly saw the disappearance of philosophy from the domain of things that interest Americans. At approximately the same time, Who’s Who in America drastically curtailed its coverage of philosophers and academics generally. During this same time period, various vehicles of public opinion–ranging from Time to The New York Times–voiced laments over the irrelevance of contemporary philosophy to the problems of the human condition, and the narcissistic absorption of philosophers in logical and linguistic technicalities that render the discipline irrelevant to the problems and interests of nonspecialists.(21) It is remarkable that this outburst indicating popular alienation from philosophy’s ivory tower came at just the time when philosophers in the United States were beginning to turn with relish to the problems on the agenda of public policy and personal concern. The flowering of applied ethics (medical ethics, business ethics, environmental ethics, and the like), of virtue ethics (trust, hope, neighborliness, and so forth), of social ethics (distributive justice, privacy, individual rights, and so forth), and of such philosophical hyphenations as philosophy-and-society–and even philosophy-and-agriculture–can also be dated from just this period. By one of those ironies not uncommon in the pages of history, philosophy returned to the issues of the day at almost the very moment when the wider public gave up thinking of the discipline as relevant to its concerns. "
I think you’ve conflated authority with "trained, reliable, educated, peer reviewed, knowledgeable, etc) here. Please note “authority” does not have the necessarily have the requirements of being trained, reliable, educated, peer reviewed.
On my statement - logic is shaped by reality.
Currently we understand IF 1+1 THEN 2
Pretty simple logic. In reality, if we have 1 apple, get another apple, we now have two apples. So this logic of math, also applies to our physical reality.
Consider this hypothetical, which we would see as extreme.
A parallel universe in which a god may or may not exist in which the laws of physics are not like ours at all. Suppose whenever a person (not necessarily like a person we know in this universe, mind you) has one “apple” - or whatever it may be in that universe, gets another apple, and suddenly due to the laws of physics in this parallel universe - an additional apple always manifests. So essentially, IF 1+1 THEN 3, would be logical. That being, “people” of this universe has no conceptualization of any type of physical reality that we know of. It is second nature that this happens and they think it not odd at all. It is natural. It is a reality that we would have a hard time imaging possible of course, but it is a hypothetical and of course the conditions of this reality are very vague and open to many other things we see as impossible, or nonsensical, or illogical. But there, it it makes sense to these beings. Their math is entirely bizarre to us, but they discovered fundamental rules to the math that are consistent.
Thus, logic is shaped by reality
I’m surprised nobody picked this apart or at least tried to yet. This goes against Kant’s categorization as synthetic a priori. No takers?