Where did she say her argument wasn’t wholly determined? How did you decide she believed that? Where is it in her text? She seems to be a determinist. I see nothing in what you quoted that says she thinks determinism does not apply to her, to her judgments, to her arguments, to her brain cells…etc. But maybe I missed it or it is entailed by something Could you show how you reached this conclusion.
1 Like
I’ll bet it keeps going either way. In one scenerio - determinism - unfolding inevitably. In another…actually I’m not sure what the other one is like. By saying I’m not sure what the other one is like, I’m not saying that I know free will is not the case, but regardless it seems like people would be doing philosophy. I
The beginning of philosophy is a state of aporia, where you realize that you don’t have the answer to a question that you thought you knew. Free will vs. determinism is like that for me. The arguments for scientific determinism makes the most sense. Nevertheless, I walk around under the illusion that I am choosing most of the time. I haven’t seen a compatiblist (spelling?) argument that works for me, including Daniel Dennett’s argument. He surprised me. I figured he’d be a hard determinist. But, in an argument with Sampolsky, his view seemed to be that we need both freedom and determinism to operate society so end of question. Dennett to me was the most unphilosophical of philosophers. He solved all philosophical problems to his own satisfaction. But, I didnt find his solutions helpful.
The “illusion of free will”, as hard determinists call it, is just the feeling that you’re considering options and using your mind to figure out which option you’d prefer.
Compatibilists just say, that’s not an illusion, that’s what your brain is really doing. Your brain is a machine that really does try to make projections of the future under various counterfactual possibilities, and really does choose the one it prefers, and really does result in your body doing that thing that your brain chose.
It’s not illusory, it’s emergent - like the functioning of any other machine is emergent.
It can be difficult to walk that philosophical line between ‘illusion’ and ‘emergent’, it’s a real tricky subject.
So, our thoughts and actions are emergent but determined. And they seem to be free because of our ignorance of their causes from moment to moment? That’s still an illusion. Doesn’t emergent just mean that a new phenomena supervenes on a previous set of conditions?
it really depends on what you mean by ‘free’ when you say ‘seem to be free’.
You are free to do the thing you chose to do, in those moments. If I choose, say, chocolate ice cream, and then I ask for chocolate ice cream, and then I’m handed chocolate ice cream, I REALLY WAS free to choose that. And it really is true that if, counterfactually, I had chosen a different flavor, I really could have asked for a different flavor, and they really would have handed me one. There’s nothing illusory about that.
But that’s scenario doesn’t really account for all the conditions at play when a person takes an action like that.
I don’t know what you mean by that.
Think of the last time you went to a store and bought something. You thought about the thing you wanted, picked the thing you wanted, bought the thing you wanted and left the store with the thing you wanted. Now if we rewind time and made a slight change - say, you wanted pepperoni pizza the first time, but we reach in with our god-hands and rearrange your brain slightly such that you want cheese pizza instead - is it not true that, in that counterfactual universe where you want cheese instead of pepperoni, you could have then put the cheese pizza in your cart, purchased it, and left the store with it?
In other words, at that moment in time, whatever pizza it was that you wanted, you could have had (as long as they were selling it, of course). Your actions were detremined by your wants. That’s compatibilist freedom.
That’s nice. That’s how it seems. But I can suppose that on a deeper level that I’m not aware of what seemed like choice was determined by the bio psycho social mechanism that I am, but my finite mind is unaware of it.
That’s just what it means to make a choice. That doesn’t make your choice an illusion, that’s literally you making a choice.
A determined choice— I guess that’s compatiblism in a nutshell.
1 Like
Nurana Rajabova is wary of an attempt to dismiss determinism to keep free will
The Metaphysical Assumption of Free Agency
Now I’d like to turn to Strawson’s second point, where he dismisses the importance of the influence of metaphysical views on our ascription of moral responsibility.
Think of the experience of watching a movie with a strong emotional content, where some great tragedy or injustice unfolds. While watching this movie, sitting indifferently is not usually possible. Just like in real life, we feel emotions, and the emotions we feel towards these movie characters are similar to the emotional reactions we experience in our daily lives. We feel anger towards the bad guys, and sympathize with the good guys. We wish we could help them.
Of course, we explain these reactions to ourselves as appropriate given that the movie depicts sets of circumstances that we can very well imagine unfolding “in reality”. And the more we can imagine ourselves in sync with or not in sync with the characters on the screen the more intense the reactions can be.
For me, dreams are relevant here as well. It just gets that much more surreal because these intense reactions are “manufactured” by my brain.
However ridiculous [or scary] it is for many, some determinists argue that we are no less “actors” responding to cues that nature “somehow” installed in our brains when conscious matter became us.
None of this crap means anything out of context. Replying to it piecemeal like this is nonsense. You’re not even trying to engage with the arguments when you do this.
Who are you in this model? Are we not part of nature? Conscious matter became us? So, there was conscious matter…and then it became us?
The intense reactions are ‘manufactured’ by your brain? Are you not at least in part, your brain? Are the reactions not the brain or self itself?
Is it really manufacturing things or are different facets of the self encountered?
Free Will and Moral Responsibility
Chelsea Haramia
Unless, of course, everything that is being suggested here is no less but one more inherent manifestations of the only possible reality.
In other words, someone noting we should not steal but only because they were never able not to note this.
Someone steals because she was never able not to. We react as we do [both as individuals and in society] because we were never able to react otherwise. Then Nature “somehow” kicked into gear all of the other players as the circumstances unfold only as they ever could have.
That depends I suppose on – click – how someone understands the meaning of control here. If she literally cannot control her behavior then why might it not be the same that we literally cannot control who we blame or do not blame?
This is the part where some will insist human psychology evolved in such a way that our desires, emotions, intuitions and other “internal components” of “I” just somehow acquired autonomy. It’s only a matter of time before science confirms this. In the interim nature has created a human psychology that is able to delude us into thinking that we really do have free will.
Again, the assumption being that psychological problems themselves are just illusions.
[iambiguous]
Chelsea HaramiaYou probably shouldn’t steal. Common sense tells us that stealing is wrong. But sometimes stealing seems less wrong, or not wrong at all, after we discover the cause of the stealing behavior. For example, if the fact that your family is starving causes you to steal a loaf of bread, many would say that you are not as blameworthy as someone who steals out of greed or spite.
Unless, of course, everything that is being suggested here is no less but one more inherent manifestations of the only possible reality.
As usual the use of these disagreeing words - here ‘unless’ - doesn’t fit. Even if it is the manifestation of the only possible reality, it is more likely the attitude towards you would be different if people understood these different situations - inevitable or not. Just as one can study animals in a deterministic universe and note that the blue birds don’t eat mushrooms, but the red ones do. We can still note patterns, determined or not. And that people have more sympathy for certain criminals is a pattern that can be noticed, regardless of the metaphysics. And if the urge is to now say but you may well be compelled by determinism to think that 1) you just undermined your objection and 2) you have to then demonstrate that in determinism we cannot have, for example, experts who are usually correct vs. lay guessers who are usually wrong. You haven’t justified what you think is obvious.
In other words, someone noting we should not steal but only because they were never able not to note this.
And still most likely correct.
Someone steals because she was never able not to. We react as we do [both as individuals and in society] because we were never able to react otherwise. Then Nature “somehow” kicked into gear all of the other players as the circumstances unfold only as they ever could have.
And yet your knowledge that this might be the case does not affect how you would react to someone saying they could eat the Moon and so morals are objective differently from how you would react to someone who argues what you just argued. In other words, it is not clear you believe what you are saying. The knowledge does not affect you, since you, here mount an argument of sorts.
And imagine a kleptomaniac who cannot control her stealing behavior. We probably shouldn’t blame her for those actions (though we might encourage her to consult a therapist about her condition). But why shouldn’t we blame the kleptomaniac? That is to say, how are we justified in holding the kleptomaniac morally responsible?
That depends I suppose on – click – how someone understands the meaning of control here. If she literally cannot control her behavior then why might it not be the same that we literally cannot control who we blame or do not blame?
Did the writer assert that the blamers are free? Or is the writer, in a deterministic system, trying to convince people of a certain position, inevitably, and driven by their desires for how we might think about something? and considering all parties doing what they were always going to do? You keep assuming people are asserting exceptiosn for brains or exceptions for people reacting - that these are not governed by determinism - despite their not saying this.
But why shouldn’t we blame the kleptomaniac? That is to say, how are we justified in holding the kleptomaniac morally responsible? One good reason not to blame the kleptomaniac is that she cannot help her behavior. She possesses a psychological problem that is out of her control. That’s why some defendants are acquitted on grounds of insanity. If you are not in control of your actions, you are not responsible for those actions.
This is the part where some will insist human psychology evolved in such a way that our desires, emotions, intuitions and other “internal components” of “I” just somehow acquired autonomy.
Some might, but so far this person has not.
It’s only a matter of time before science confirms this. In the interim nature has created a human psychology that is able to delude us into thinking that we really do have free will.
One good reason not to blame the kleptomaniac is that she cannot help her behavior. She possesses a psychological problem that is out of her control. That’s why some defendants are acquitted on grounds of insanity. If you are not in control of your actions, you are not responsible for those actions.
Again, the assumption being that psychological problems themselves are just illusions.
Could you explain where your find that assumption. It seems clear that the person is driven to act in a certain way by their psychological problem in the passage your quoted. What aspect of something having affects on behavior means that it is unreal?
Compatibilism: How does it allow for moral responsibility?
r/askphilosophy at reddit
I’ve always struggled to understand how compatibilism is morally different from any type of hard determinism.
From what I understand, compatibilism states that there’s a moral difference between an action that is caused by some internal cause (the subject’s motivation) or some external cause (environmental causation).
On the other hand, that may not be the way I or you or others understand it at all. For some, internal and external components are six of one, half a dozen of the other. Then those who are actually able to convince themselves that compatiblism can be defined into existence. Its meaning can be grasped objectively such that we are all obligated to share the One True Definition in our exchanges here.
This encompasses what may well be the most problematic component of our discussions here. The fact [and “here and now” it certainly seems to be one] of the gap between our own “world of words” philosophical assessments and what brain scientists have been able sustain empirically as the most likely explanation. On the other hand, both philosopherss and scientists have the same brains. It’s just that this doesn’t seem to make much of a difference given all of the conflicting assessments we are still bombarded with centuries later.
The same would apply regarding external causes. E.g., someone jumps into the pool because they were pushed.
In the first case, the heat being unbearable is completely out of the subject’s influence, just as being pushed is.
So, why do compatibilists seem to attribute moral responsibility to the subject’s action in the first case but not on the second one?
Click.
You tell me.
Well, if you are going to be critical of a position, then it should be that position you are critical of, not one that someone else has. Unless you think people pointing out that you are misinterpreting something is, as a rule, wrong headed and some kind of domination move. Wouldn’t telling someone they believe, for example, that brain cells are autonomous and not determned, when they don’t believe this also be a domination move, then?
Does this mean, if you interpret someone’s post or an article in one way, we have to just accept that interpretation? I mean, it seems that way. To question your interpretation is being judged here means we think everyone is obligated to interpret it our way. But when you interpret it your way…it’s not like that at all. How come?
Further, it’s as if a disagreement over interpretation can never be resolved. It’s simply not possible for you, for example, to go back to what you quoted and say ‘Look, right here [quote] he says brain cells are autonomous’ or perhaps there’s a syllable or perhaps you can show what entails your interpretation. It’s seems like it is simply impossible and thus never worth justifying interpretations.
I mean I could interpret you reaction here as meaning
No one should dare question my interpretations
-Iambiguous
If you disagree does that mean you think I am obligated to agree with you? Is it wrong to point out misinterpretations? Based on what?
So, if someone writes a compatibilist position that does not say that brain cells are not determined and are thus autonomousy, then criticizing them for saying their are autonomous would be confused. But I’m open to seeing how you drew the conclusion, as one example that has come up in compatibilism discussions.
It is a discussion forum. There is always the blog option.
The assumption here in that article is that the compatabilist assigns morality based on freedom. They don’t. They are not arguing that the person pushed is determined and the person who decides to jump in the pool is not determined. And it’s odd that the author, not Iambiguous, chose a non-moral situation to focus on. So, let’s move it to a situation often viewed as raising moral issues. We have a guy at the pool who is tripped by a friend and stumbles into a child who falls in the pool and gets really scared. We wouldn’t hold him - the one who got tripped - morally responsible for his action. He was tripped. Then we contrast him with someone who doesn’t like kids, and from this atittude goes and pushes a kid into the pool and the kid gets scared. The compatibilist would say that both people who impacted with the child are utterly determined. In the first case, the guy who was tripped, he is not someone who pushes kids into the pool. He does not have the attitude, nor does he have the tendency to violence or the pattern of violence. We have no reason to worry about him based on what happened. He’s not someone, for example, that we would want to ban from the pool. He’s not someone, for example, we would want to send to court-enforced anger-management training or prison. The first man’s impact with the kid was determined by the trip and the trajectories of his stumbling’. The second man who pushed the kid was driven deterministically by his anger and attitudes towards children and noise and other humans in general, we do want to hold responsible. He is dangerous. This particular act was highly determined by internal causes that indicate things about his future activities. This does not make him an exception to determinism, however it does show he is of a violent nature and is aligned with doing violence. So, a compatibilist holds him responsible for his action and not the other person for two reasons: 1) The compatibilist wants to prevent future actions of that type 2) the person is a person who wants to do violence to children. His brain cells are as determined as anyone else’s. He is not an exception to determinsm. But he is a specific guy with a specific threat to children. So, we hold him responsible. The guy who was tripped his friend. No. However his friend!!! He could be held responsible because he shows a lack of care. As far as we know that friend did not intend the child or even his friend any harm. But still he shows a lack of care and he might be held responsible and banned from the pool, for example. We wouldn’t ban the guy on the pool chair next to him who didn’t trip or push anyone. We hold the tripper and the guy who wanted to push the child responsible. Because their actions are connected to who they are, not because they are exceptions to determinism. We wouldn’t ban someone with the same name as the person who intentionally pushed the kid. We hold the person who wanted to push the child like that, even if his wants are determined. But he is someone who wants to do this, we don’t like this, we hold him and not others responsible. The action is determined in all cases. But we hold certain people responsible for both practical and moral reasons.
I’d be surprised both the author and Iambiguous wouldn’t hold people responsible for their acts, even if determinism is the case. I would guess they would dislike the guy who got up to push the child and not feel animosity towards the one who got tripped, and that both the author of the article and Iambiguous would support taking steps to remove the pool priviledges from the one who got up to push the kid, even if his attitude and action are determined. But I could be wrong. Perhaps if someone shot one of their family members because of an argument in a shopping aisle they would argue, on the grounds of determinism, that the guy should not be held responsible. They would go so far to demand the prosecutor and the judge drop the case based on determinism. But I think that’s rare. I think most reasonable people, even if it could be demonstrated to them so they had no doubt we were in a deterministic universe, would still want to keep people who like to push children out of the pools where children are. They would take steps to hold those people responsible for the pushing and either punish them or restrict their priviledges for practical reasons. And most reasonable people would probably dislike the pushers. The complete certainty that determinism is the case might lead to greater empathy for people that we neverthess hold responsible for their actions.
And this cuts the other way also for acts we like. Someone who, for example, protected out kid from a rabid pit bull, we would be grateful to and perhaps even try to reward, even if their actions were utterly determined. I can’t imagine any determinist even the hard ones simply ignoring saying anything to them like ‘thank you so much’.
Why didn’t you thank that guy, honey?
I’m a hard determinist. I don’t consider him responsible for his actions.
But, honey, he’s the guy who put himself at risk for our child. He is that person and that was his action. I got him a 100 buck gift certificate for the mall.
Further it’s important to ask why free will adds responsbility. This may seem obvious, but actually it’s not.
If someone has free will in the libertarian sense - they can do anything physically possible and neither internal nor external causes stop them from doing anything nor do they lead to their actions - why would we punish anyone or hold anyone responsible. This would mean, the guy who shot your relative did not do it because of their desires, intentions, goals, attitudes. They just randomly chose based on NOTHING in their nature. The action is not caused by their personality, tendencies, attitudes NOTHING. This would mean that everyone is as likely to shoot random people as anyone else. We are not in the least guided in our actions by our nature or nurture. There’s certainly no practical reason to put anyone in prison. We’d all be equally likely to do anything. Further the action would have nothing to do with us.
But no one seems to look at this aspect of libertarian free will. They just assume things about what it entails. Most people who believe in free will are actually compatiblists: they just don’t realize it.
In any case, I’d like to see an argument based on determinism that says it is wrong or confused to hold people responsible for their actions in the ways we do. What is wrong with holding the person who pushes kids around responsible for his actions and what do you recommend we do, given your philosophy?
Not mere incredulity and questions, but an actual attempt to demonstrate why holding people responsible would be wrong or confused, with concrete examples, so not just up in the clouds as you would say. What’s wrong with holding people responsible in the concrete and attitudinal ways I mentioned about the kid pusher? And would you not hold him responsible in a determinist universe? What would that entail in concrete terms, not in up in the clouds terms?
Free Will Is Only an Illusion if You Are, Too
New research findings, combined with philosophy, suggest free will is real but may not operate in the ways people expect
By Alessandra Buccella & Tomáš Dominik
More to the point, perhaps, are those who, when confronted with the possibility that literally everything they do is beyond their control, go ballistic. They come after the hard determinists in particular and make it rather clear that as far as they are concerned, they are…fools?
Yet can we really believe that biological life evolving into human autonomy was just inherently embedded in the Big Bang?
In fact, it is not at all difficult for some of us to conclude that both assessments can be bewildering. If only because we have scarcely just begun to understand the human brain itself. Then the part where the brain is tasked with attempting to understand itself.
Like trying wrap your head around space/time as it pertains to your day-to-day interactions.
That’s what it all comes down to, right? The part where brain scientists either do or do not reach the point where they can demonstrate step by step by step what really does go on inside my own brain as, say, I type these words. Is it my brain just doing its thing wholly in sync with the laws of matter or is there an “I” in there that transcends the neurological and chemical interactions in order to create an actual autonomous being.