Towards a Panpsychism:
Dennett categorizes a hierarchy of knowing by classes of creatures.
Darwinian Creatures: evolves by mutation, recombination and natural selection; a bacterium
Pavlovian Creatures: can learn simple conditioned stimuli, nervous system present; aplysia [marine snail]
Popperian Creatures: internal models of their world and can “run†the internal model so that the “hypotheses die in our steadâ€; vertebrates
Gregorian Creatures: utilize tools to enlarge a shared world of facts and processes. This enlarged, shared world gives us more know-how and know-that; humans
Stuart Kauffman, in recognition of the relevance this list asks an interesting question. How many of these categoried capabilities can be found much further down the ladder than suspected?
For example bacteria and amoeba, supposed “Darwinian Creatures” have a kind of Pavolian learning, despite the absence of a nervous system,
“for they have receptors that accommodate to a constant level of a given signal ligand and sense instead a change from the current level…[comparing chemical capabilities to neurological ones] As neurons are supposed to proliferate and form novel synaptic connections that survive if used and to mediate the linkage of conditioned to unconditioned stimulus, why not envision sustained complex sets of enzymes whose activities are modulated by the different carbohydrates themselves, which is a true contemporary metabolism.â€
He also links the “idotype†and “anit-idotype†of immune networks as a kind of non-neurological Pavolian knowing.
As to Popperian Creatures he asks,
“Why cannot the molecular-sensing and hypothesis-testing churning concerns of the bacterium [Darwinian Creature] as it senses a paramecium churn twenty cycles before kicking in the rotary motor, or not, such that the bacterium hides under a boulder of a grain of sand until the beast passes byâ€, not qualify? Or, “Plants are noted to signal one another with complex secondary metabolites to characterize the particular insects infesting the glade.â€
He admits to get stuck a bit at Gregorian Creatures, but suggests,
“If the conversation we recent two-legged ones are having with respect to our digging sticks and atomic bombs is impressive, so too is the chemical conversation in any full-fledged ecosystem, where we are all instrumental in the lives of on another.â€
He concludes,
“I suppose I am naively driven to consider the biosphere, with its urgent diversity in which, emboldened by all our know-how, we do get on with a very rich conversation, may very early already have harbored all the levels of which Dennett speaks. We humans are just more gregarious with our vocal chords and emails.â€
What Kauffman sets up is a pathway toward panpsychism, a questioning of what constitutes intentionality, and the depth at which we can gauge signal use, modeling and kinds of consciousness. By shifting these kinds of knowing away from their commonplace conceptual substrate (such and such organisms are only capable of such and such), and looking at the inter-related effects between forms, he opens the door to the conception that the entire thing knows – or at least sets the boundaries of the question, what is “knowing”, quite a bit wider than we might otherwise imagine.
Dunamis