Trivial Downward Causation

Out of context, you’re taking a vague quote and hoping I interpret the word “this” in the same way you do. Weird

Here’s the quote Niallm. First it says strong emergence is like magic. Then it explains why it’s like magic. It’s like magic because… and then it brings up downward causal powers. Why do you think your quote jumps from talking about strong emergence being magic to suddenly talking about downward causal powers? Hmmm there must be some kind of connection there.

Well there is, but the connection ends where Strong Emergence claims agency without the effect of fundamental forces, the connection is then broken.

Also:

Was claimed, that I do not dispute.

You have found one similarity in the definition, and that causes you to conflate both philosophies? Really?

One has much merit, the other is full of shit. Full stop. Period. EOF.

More people who talk about the link between strong emergence and downward causation:

No, don’t throw PDFs at me, Jesus, it was worse a link to Stack Exchange.. if you can’t discuss this on it’s own terms, then you certainly don’t understand it either.

That’s ridiculous lol. This is about words and what they mean, how they’re used. I can cite people using words. That’s how you convince someone other people use words in those ways.

Did you click this 5 link by the way? It brings you to David Chalmers essay, which clearly unambiguously spells out that strong emergence involves downward causation. Go read it.

Well before I even read it (which I sincerely doubt you have..), I can see a problem.

“Strong emergence involves Downward Causation”

So a weakly defined principle involves a stronger one. It sounds to me that Downward Causation can survive without Strong Emergence just fine and stand on its own, but Strong Emergence can’t even exist without Downward Causation. Hmm.. which of those can be discarded?

Bye bye, Strong Emergence.

Downward causation means that higher-level phenomena are not only irreducible
but also exert a causal efficacy of some sort. Such causation requires the formulation of basic principles which state that when certain high-level configurations occur, certain consequences will follow. (These are what McLaughlin (1993) calls configurational laws.)

These consequences will themselves either be cast in low-level terms, or will be cast in high-level terms that put strong constraints on low-level facts. Either way, it follows that low-level laws will be incomplete as a guide to both the low-level and the high-level evolution of processes in the world.

To be clear, one should distinguish strong downward causation from weak downward causation. With strong downward causation, the causal impact of a high-level phenomenon on low-level processes is not deducible even in principle from initial conditions and low-level laws.

With weak downward causation, the causal impact of the high-level phenomenon is deducible in principle, but is nevertheless unexpected. As with strong and weak emergence, both strong and weak downward causation are interesting in their own right. But strong downward causation would have more radical consequences for our understanding of nature, so I will focus on it here. I do not think there is anything incoherent about the idea of strong downward causation. I do not know whether there are any examples of it in the actual world, however. While it is certainly true that we can’t currently deduce all high-level facts and laws from low-level laws plus initial conditions, I do not know of any compelling evidence for high-level facts and laws (outside the case of consciousness) that are not deducible in principle. But I think it is possible that we will encounter some. (See Kim (1992; 1999) for some doubts.)

Nope. He divides Downward Causation into “Strong Downward Causation”, and “Weak Downward Causation”, but never once does he imply a correlation between those and Strong or Weak Emergence. If fact, he only refers to this:

As with strong and weak emergence, both strong and weak downward causation are interesting in their own right. But strong downward causation would have more radical consequences for our understanding of nature, so I will focus on it here.

That does not imply correlation, at all, I’m sure the author would agree. And I don’t accept these new sub-divisions of Downward Causation, the challenge was was to fit logic gates into the original definition, and none of the originally linked material mentions it. Here’s AI’s take:

Strong downward causation refers to the idea that higher-level entities or systems can directly alter the laws or causal regularities governing lower-level components—effectively overriding or changing the behavior of the parts in ways that cannot be explained solely by the lower-level interactions. This version is often criticized as metaphysically problematic or “magical,” as it implies that emergent properties can exert causal influence that violates the causal closure of lower levels (e.g., physics). It is associated with strong emergence , where novel causal powers arise at higher levels that are not reducible to or predictable from lower-level rules.

Weak downward causation , in contrast, is a more widely accepted and less controversial concept. It describes situations where higher-level structures or patterns constrain, guide, or influence the behavior of lower-level components without changing the fundamental laws of those components. This is seen in processes like coarse-graining , feedback loops, or regulatory systems—where the collective behavior of a system shapes how its parts act (e.g., a population’s norms influencing individual choices, or a brain’s overall state affecting neural activity). It does not require new causal laws, only that higher-level properties serve as contextual or organizational constraints .

Nope, not accepting that mumbo-jumbo, it has more holes than a doughnut factory, I’ll just stick to the original definition, thanks, every trace of Strong Emergence can get lost, and so can “Strong Downward Causation”, it’s nonsense.

Just “Downward Causation.”

Thus, while Donald Campbell is credited with originating the term and conceptualizing downward causation in hierarchical systems, his framework does not support strong downward causation in the philosophical sense—where higher-level causes are deemed irreducible and ontologically distinct. The debate between strong and weak downward causation remains active in philosophy of biology, with Campbell’s work serving as a key reference point for the latter.

Everything else is introducing unnecessary noise, it’s bullshit that has been bolted on top, Downward Causation itself, however, seems pretty solid to me.

So, back to the original statement, without all that irrelevant crap taken into account:

  1. An assembly of logic gates can originate Downward Causation.

So will you find and document an example of it actually happening?

Yes, I’ll invest millions in achieving that outcome, using cutting edge AI and a particle detector. FFS, you can’t even oppose a single idea I’ve had, and don’t say you have, they have all been swiped away, every single one. But my work should continue with you posting one-liners challenging my thought process?

You have provided NO valid counter argument to the idea whatsoever. Absolutely none. And now you say “prove it”. No, you disprove any of my logical proofs up to now. Put up, or shut up.

So we can just make random claims and then put it on other people to “oppose” them? Nah man you’re claiming something pretty spectacular, and if it was true it would be detectable so… where’s the documented detections?

OK, rolls sleeves up, you think that canonical papers are the most reliable source of information, and needed to back up claims.

The central text that directly addresses your question is the 2019 paper by George Ellis and Barbara Drossel, How Downwards Causation Occurs in Digital Computers . It explicitly argues that the abstract algorithms and logic gates in a computer program constitute a form of strong emergence and downward causation, controlling the behavior of electrons in transistors.

Here are the relevant papers, with the Ellis and Drossel work as the primary source:

  • Ellis, G., & Drossel, B. (2019). How Downwards Causation Occurs in Digital Computers. Foundations of Physics , 49(11), 1253–1277 . This is the most comprehensive and direct treatment of your question, providing the detailed mechanism of how logical structures constrain physical processes.
  • Ellis, G. F. R. (2020). The Causal Closure of Physics in Real World Contexts. Foundations of Physics , 50(10), 1057–1097 . Cited in the above paper, this work expands on the argument that physics is not causally complete in isolation, a key premise for allowing downward causation.
  • Ellis, G. F. R., & Gabriel, M. (2021). Physical, Logical, and Mental Top-Down Effects. In J. Voosholz & M. Gabriel (Eds.), Top-Down Causation and Emergence . This book chapter situates the computer example within a broader philosophical framework of top-down effects.
  • Flack, J. C. (2017). Coarse-graining as a downward causation mechanism. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A , 375(2109), 20160338 . While focused on biological and social systems, this paper provides a foundational, operational mechanism (coarse-graining) for how downward causation can work in complex, adaptive collectives, which is conceptually relevant to information-processing systems.
  • Dewar, R. C., et al. (2024). Dynamical theory of complex systems with two-way micro–macro causation. PNAS , 121(50), e2408676121 . This very recent paper develops a formal mathematical theory (DyMES) for systems exhibiting bidirectional causation. It mentions applications in epidemiology and economics, but its general framework is a significant theoretical development for the entire field.

I highly doubt I am going to agree with this: “constitute a form of strong emergence”, but it will be interesting to find out what they suggest..

You just sit back, I’ll do all the fucking work.

You not only asked an ai apparently, but also didn’t include the thing you asked it, stripping those words of vital context and thus meaning.

Dude I have no idea what any of the ai is talking about. Why do you think you can post that without context? What did you say to it first?

Link to the convo.

I am perfectly capable of fact-checking the AI. I do it all the time. What does “not only asked an ai” mean? That I saved time?

That still misses context clearly. It’s obvious you said a bunch of stuff to that ai before the text in that link begins.

In philosophy, downward causation is a causal relationship from higher levels of a system to lower-level parts of that system: for example, mental events acting to cause physical events.[1] The term was originally coined in 1974 by the philosopher and social scientist Donald T. Campbell.[1][2]

In science, downward causation is considered to be a causal interaction between two or more components that, in turn, influences the origin of that interaction. Cause and effect are thus reversed in an essentially recursive process . However, because it deals with the same interaction, this reversal is often more a function of the chosen perspective. The difference becomes clearer if there is any complex interaction of multiple components, leading to a new, emergent phenomenon:[3][4] the emergent phenomenon itself can also conversely influence the behavior of its components. The emergent phenomenon then forms an attractor for neighboring components that are not yet involved in the interaction (f.i. clustering, condensation, crystallization). This is certainly the case with weak emergence. Whether this is also the case with strong emergence is a matter of philosophical debate.[5]

Umm these seem to be two different definitions, for example a traffic jam could be downward causation according to the science definition and not downward causation according to the philosophy definition?

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OK, here’e the irrelevant shit as well:

Fresh session, full context.

And here’s a conversation with an AI that’s more directly focused on the claim at hand:

No missing context, one single question asked, one answer given.