If we’re trying to construct an ontology, we obviously have to have both universals and individuals. A problem that I think might happen is that people come up with varying definitions of what universals and indivduals must be. When the definitions are pitted against one another, it can be difficult sometimes to maintain coherent notions of both, as the definition of one may cancel out the possibility of the other, or one definition may appear better than the other causing us to favor a universalist or nominalist view. This is crap. If you find yourself favoring universals over individuals, then you probably need to reconsider how you define them.
Plato’s forms are supposed to be non-spatio temporal immaterial objects which instantiate in physical forms in varying degrees. A strict indiviualist would counter that this isn’t a good explanation of everything that there is because differences amongst objects are unavoidable and as plain as day. (at the very least they can’t share the same space at the same time and are thus different in that respect.) Individual objects are typically considered to be concrete.
It’s hard to make sense of anything at all without some categorization. And I think it’s a good idea to examine the categories and try and determine why we place things in certain ones rather than others.
The problem with the old universal/particular distinction is that the way that these two things have been defined is such that there is not equallity nor identity in the logic behind their explanations.
Enter tropes…
Trope theorists try and give individual objects the same epistemological status as Plato’s forms. Tropes must have at least one abstract property.
Tropes are particularized universals, (maybe by virtue of certain relational aspects of clustering properties), which give us an idea of the abstract particular. Because tropes make the indivdual abstract, now we can give the same status to indivduals as we do to Plato’s non-spatio-temporal forms.
I don’t think that this answers any of the big major questions of philosophy, but I think it may be a step in the right direction. If we need polarity in order to have meaning, then giving equally compelling abstract foundations to our understanding of both universals and individuals is probably a good idea.
MRN:
I have to check my notes now and remember how tropes are different from Aristotle’s forms. I think it’s because they’re spatio-temporal, (being IN the object), which subjects them to certain argumentative vulnerabilities that Plato’s universals avoid.
Xun:
Tell me more about this red vs. expertise. I found an abstract on google but it was short and I’m feeling lazy. Plus you might could direct me to something more spesific to what you’re saying. Is it about the polarity of two conflicting principles?
I recently read a book called “polarity, dialectic and organicity”. I like what you suggest about the flux of two ideals. I’m interested in learning more about not just being qua being, but relational properties qua relational properties!!!
Boiled down to its simplest level, it was a debate in China about “reactionary” academics who were reactionary due to their elitism. They were elitists because they had received training in their fields and were therefore better skilled at their particular tasks than some random person from the street. This goes against the Maoist notions of Mass Line and Social Practice where all innovation ultimately comes from the masses.
So, in this argument, “redness” basically means that new ideas are put forward by the society whereas “expertise” argues that skilled individuals are ultimately the driving force behind change.
In this case, “redness” is a stand in for universals, where we are all the same on some abstract level and it is through that abstraction that we actually create whereas “expertise” takes a more particularistic stance on the issue.
Interesting analogy. So if you wanted to say that neither was true, or that both were, you might depolarize them by introducing tropes as particularized universals giving rise to abstract particulars. Does that make sense? From a dialectical point of view?
I think my new definition of a trope is that it’s a non repeatable instantiation of a universal which through the instantiation gives rise to an abstract particular, (an essence which doesn’t transcend space or time). It’s an individual that’s purely individual but that not only doesn’t negate the possibility of universals, but by definition requires them.
Does this make any sense to anyone? Am I being too abstract?